REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 406 OF 2008
Vaman Narain Ghiya ...Appellant
Versus
State of Rajasthan ...Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single
Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur, rejecting the application for
bail filed by the appellant. An earlier application for bail filed by the
appellant was also rejected by the High Court by order dated 15.12.2003.
Allegation against the appellant was that he is involved in several nefarious
activities of smuggling of antiques particularly the idols to foreign countries
for heavy sums of money.
2. Stand of appellant before the High Court was that he was discharged
of offence punishable under Section 413 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in
short the `IPC’) by the trial Court and therefore he was facing trial only for
the offence triable by the Court of Magistrate, i.e. under Sections 457, 380
and 411 IPC. It was the stand of the appellant that the evidence of the
prosecution witnesses was not sufficient to secure his conviction in respect
of any of the charges. It was pointed out that evidence of seven witnesses
have been recorded and none of them has implicated him in the crime.
There is no recovery from him and other co-accused persons similarly
situated namely, Madam Mohan Agarwal and Manoj Sharma had been
enlarged on bail. Out of 10 cases registered against him, he has been granted
bail in six cases. He is in jail for more than 2 = years and in any case he is
entitled to bail in view of the provisions contained in Section 437 (6) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the `Code’). The State opposed
the bail application on the ground that in an identical case the application of
the applicant was rejected by the Jaipur Bench and the matter was carried to
this Court and no interference was made. Further the order of discharge in
respect of offence punishable under Section 413 IPC was challenged by
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filing a revision before the High Court. Considering the aforesaid aspects
the prayer for bail was rejected.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that though the
proceedings have been stayed and several cases have been clubbed together,
the charge sheet was filed on 27.9.2003 and on 21.4.2005 the order of
discharge was passed. Subsequently, the order of discharge has been set
aside by the High Court in S.B. Criminal Revision No.817 of 2005. The
same order of discharge was challenged before this Court in Criminal
Appeal No.1585 of 2007 which was dismissed as withdrawn. The only
distinguishing feature pointed out by the appellant to seek reconsideration
of the prayer for bail was the order of discharge. As noted above, the same
was set aside by the High Court. Appeal against the same has been
dismissed as withdrawn.
4. Section 439 of the Code reads as follows:
“439. (1) A High Court or Court of Session may direct –
(a) that any person accused of an offence and in custody
be released on bail, and if the offence is of the nature
specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437, may impose
any condition which it considers necessary for the
purposes mentioned in that sub-section;
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(b) that any condition imposed by the Magistrate when
releasing any person on bail be set aside or modified.”
(underlined for emphasis)
5. It is clear from a bare reading of the provisions that for making an
application in terms of Section 439 of the Code a person has to be in
custody. Section 438 of the Code deals with “Direction for grant of bail to
person apprehending arrest”.
6. In Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1996
SC 1042) it was observed as follows:
“Anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest in
non-bailable cases, but that does not mean that the
regular court, which is to try the offender, is sought to
be bypassed and that is the reason why the High Court
very rightly fixed the outer date for the continuance of
the bail and on the date of its expiry directed the
petitioner to move the regular court for bail. That is the
correct procedure to follow because it must be realised
that when the Court of Sessions or the High Court is
granting anticipatory bail, it is granted at a stage when
the investigation is incomplete and, therefore, it is not
informed about the nature of evidence against the
alleged offender. It is, therefore, necessary that such
anticipatory bail orders should be of a limited duration
only and ordinarily on the expiry of that duration or
extended duration the court granting anticipatory bail
should leave it to the regular court to deal with the
matter on an appreciation of evidence placed before it4
after the investigation has made progress or the charge-
sheet is submitted”.
(Emphasis supplied)
7. In K.L. Verma v. State and Anr. (1996 (7) SCALE 20) this Court
observed as follows:
“This Court further observed that anticipatory
bail is granted in anticipation of arrest in non-bailable
cases, but that does not mean that the regular court,
which is to try the offender, is sought to be bypassed. It
was, therefore, pointed out that it was necessary that
such anticipatory bail orders should be of a limited
duration only and ordinarily on the expiry of that
duration or extended duration the court granting
anticipatory bail should leave it to the regular court to
deal with the matter on an appreciation of evidence
placed before it after the investigation has made
progress or the charge-sheet is submitted. By this, what
the Court desired to convey was that an order of
anticipatory bail does not enure till the end of trial but it
must be of limited duration as the regular court cannot
be bypassed. The limited duration must be determined
having regard to the facts of the case and the need to
give the accused sufficient time to move the regular
court for bail and to give the regular court sufficient
time to determine the bail application. In other words,
till the bail application is disposed of one way or the
other the court may allow the accused to remain on
anticipatory bail. To put it differently, anticipatory bail
may be granted for a duration which may extend to the
date on which the bail application is disposed of or even5
a few days thereafter to enable the accused persons to
move the higher court, if they so desire.”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. In Nirmal Jeet Kaur v. State of M.P. and Another (2004 (7) SCC 558)
and Sunita Devi v. State of Bihar and Anr. Criminal Appeal arising out of
SLP (Crl.) No. 4601 of 2003 disposed of on 6.12.2004 certain grey areas in
the case of K.L. Verma’s case (supra) were noticed. The same related to the
observation “or even a few days thereafter to enable the accused persons to
move the Higher Court, if they so desire”. It was held that the requirement
of Section 439 of the Code is not wiped out by the above observations.
Section 439 comes into operation only when a person is “in custody”. In
K.L. Verma’s case (supra) reference was made to Salauddin’s case (supra).
In the said case there was no such indication as given in K.L. Verma’s case
(supra), that a few days can be granted to the accused to move the higher
Court if they so desire. The statutory requirement of Section 439 of the
Code cannot be said to have been rendered totally inoperative by the said
observation.
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9. In view of the clear language of Section 439 and in view of the
decision of this Court in Niranjan Singh and Anr. v. Prabhakar Rajaram
Kharote and Ors. (AIR 1980 SC 785), there cannot be any doubt that unless
a person is in custody, an application for bail under Section 439 of the Code
would not be maintainable. The question when a person can be said to be in
custody within the meaning of Section 439 of the Code came up for
consideration before this Court in the aforesaid decision.
10. After analyzing the crucial question that when a person is in custody,
within the meaning of Section 439 of the Code, it was held in Nirmal Jeet
Kaur’s case (supra) and Sunita Devi’s case (supra) that for making an
application under Section 439 the fundamental requirement is that the
accused should be in custody. As observed in Salauddin’s case (supra) the
protection in terms of Section 438 is for a limited duration during which the
regular Court has to be moved for bail. Obviously, such bail is bail in terms
of Section 439 of the Code, mandating the applicant to be in custody.
Otherwise, the distinction between orders under Sections 438 and 439 shall
be rendered meaningless and redundant.
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11. If the protective umbrella of Section 438 is extended beyond what
was laid down in Salauddin’s case (supra) the result would be clear
bypassing of what is mandated in Section 439 regarding custody. In other
words, till the applicant avails remedies upto higher Courts, the
requirements of Section 439 become dead letter. No part of a statute can be
rendered redundant in that manner.
12. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is concerned with the
personal liberty of an individual who is entitled to plead, innocence, since
he is not on the date of application for exercise of power under Section 438
of the Code convicted for the offence in respect of which he seeks bail. The
applicant must show that he has `reason to believe’ that he may be arrested
in a non-bailable offence. Use of the expression `reason to believe’ that he
may be arrested in a non-bailable offence. Use of the expression `reason to
believe’ shows that the applicant may be arrested must be founded on
reasonable grounds. Mere “fear” is not `belief’ for which reason it is not
enough for the applicant to show that he has some sort of vague
apprehension that some one is going to make an accusation against him in
pursuance of which he may be arrested. Grounds on which the belief on the
applicant is based that he may be arrested in non-bailable offence must be
capable of being examined. If an application is made to the High Court or
the Court of Session, it is for the Court concerned to decide whether a case
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has been made out of for granting the relief sought. The provisions cannot
be invoked after arrest of the accused. A blanket order should not be
generally passed. It flows from the very language of the section which
requires the applicant to show that he has reason to believe that he may be
arrested. A belief can be said to be founded on reasonable grounds only if
there is something tangible to go by on the basis of which it can be said that
the applicant’s apprehension that he may be arrested is genuine. Normally a
direction should not issue to the effect that the applicant shall be released on
bail “whenever arrested for whichever offence whatsoever”. Such `blanket
order’ should not be passed as it would serve as a blanket to cover or protect
any and every kind of allegedly unlawful activity. An order under Section
438 is a device is secure the individual’s liberty’ it is neither a passport to
the commission of crimes nor a shield against any and all kinds of
accusations likely or unlikely. On the facts of the case, considered in the
background of legal position set out above, this does not prima facie appear
to be a case where any order in terms of Section 438 of the Code can be
passed.
13. “Bail” remains an undefined term in the Cr.P.C. Nowhere else the
term has been statutorily defined. Conceptually, it continues to be
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understood as a right for assertion of freedom against the State imposing
restraints since the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, to which
Indian is a signatory, the concept of bail has found a place within the scope
of human rights. The dictionary meaning of the expression `bail’ denotes a
security for appearance of a prisoner for his release. Etymologically, the
word is derived from an old French verb `bailer’ which means to `give’ or
`to deliver’, although another view is that its derivation is from the Latin
term baiulare, meaning `to bear a burden’. Bail is a conditional liberty.
Strouds’ Judicial Dictionary (Fourth Edition 1971) spells out certain other
details. It states:
“When a man is taken or arrested for felony, suspicion of
felony, indicated of felony, or any such case, so that he is
restrained of his liberty – And being by law bailable, offence
surety to those which have authority to bail him, which sureties
are bound for him to the Kings use in a certain sums of money,
or body for body, that he shall appear before the Justices of
Goale delivery at the next sessions etc. Then upon the bonds of
these sureties, as is aforesaid, he is bailed, that is to say, set at
liberty until the day appointed for his appearance.”
14. Bail may thus be regarded as a mechanism whereby the State
devolutes upon the community the function of securing the presence of the
prisoners, and at the same time involves participation of the community in
administration of justice.
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15. Personal liberty is fundamental and can be circumscribed only by
some process sanctioned by law. Liberty of a citizen is undoubtedly
important but this is to balance with the security of the community. A
balance is required to be maintained between the personal liberty of the
accused and the investigational right of the police. It must result in
minimum interference with the personal liberty of the accused and the right
of the police to investigate the case. It has to dovetail two conflicting
demands, namely, on one hand, the requirements of the society for being
shielded from the hazards of being exposed to the mis-adventures of a
person alleged to have committed a crime; and on the other, the fundamental
cannon of criminal jurisprudence, viz, the presumption of innocence of an
accused till he is found guilty. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome
restrain, the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we
have (See A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 1000).
16. The law of bail, like any other branch of law, has its own philosophy,
and occupies an important place in the administration of justice and the
concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to
restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime, and
presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal. An accused is
not detained in custody with the object of punishing him on the assumption
of his guilt.
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17. Chapter XXXIII consists of Sections 436 to 450. Sections 436 and
437 provide for the granting of bail to accused persons before trial and
conviction. For the purposes of bail, offences are classified into two
categories, that is, (i) bailable, (ii) non-bailable. Section 436 provides for
granting bail in bailable cases and Section 437 in non bailable cases. A
person accused of a bailable offence is entitled to be released on bail
pending his trial. In case of such offences, a police officer has no discretion
to refuse bail if the accused is prepared to furnish surety. The Magistrate
gets jurisdiction to grant bail during the course of investigation when the
accused is produced before him. In bailable offence there is no question of
discretion for granting bail. The only choice for the Court is as between
taking a simple recognizance of the principal offender or demanding
security with surety. Persons contemplated by this Section cannot be taken
in custody unless they are unable or unwilling to offer bail or to execute
personal bonds. The Court has no discretion, when granting bail under this
section, even to impose any condition except the demanding of security with
sureties.
18. “Bailable offence” is defined in Clause (b) of Section 2 of the Cr.P.C.
to mean an offence which is shown as bailable in the First Schedule of the
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Cr.P.C., or which is made bailable by any other law for the time being in
force; and “non-bailable offence” means an other offence.
19. While considering an application for bail, detailed discussion of the
evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits is to be avoided. This
requirement stems from the desirability that no party should have the
impression that his case has been pre-judged. Existence of a prima facie
case is only to be considered. Elaborate analysis or exhaustive exploration
of the merits is not required. (See Niranjan Singh and Anr. v. Prabhakar
Rajram Kharote and Ors. AIR 1980 SC 785). Where the offence is of
serious nature the question of grant of bail has to be decided keeping in
view the nature and seriousness of the offence, character of the evidence
and amongst others the larger interest of the public. (See State of
Maharashtra v. Anand Chaintaman Dighe AIR 1990 SC 625 and State v.
Surendranath Mohanty 1990 (3) OCR 462).
20. We find no merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly.
…………………………………..J.
(Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)
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…………………………………..J.
(Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA)
New Delhi,
December 12, 2008
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