JUDGMENT
S. Nainar Sundaram, C.J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge passed in Special Civil Application No. 4077 of 1983*. The petitioner in the Special Civil Application originally preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. We would prefer to refer to him as the petitioner, while dealing with the controversy in this Letters Patent Appeal. Pending the Letters Patent Appeal, the petitioner passed away and his legal representative has been brought on record today in Civil Application No. 1210 of 1993. The petitioner on 5-7-1980 was hold to held lands within the ceiling limit, under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. 23 of 1976, hereinafter referred to as the Act. The petitioner is stated to have effected sales of the lands subsequently. On 5-6-1983 the impugned proceedings — annexure ‘A’ has been issued by the State — respondent No, 1 to the petitioner and its body as per the English translation (the original being in Gujarati) furnished to us runs thus :
“It has come to the notice of Government that the Competent Authority and Additional Collector, Surat Under Section 6 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 has granted permission in relation to land situated in the Surat Urban Agglomeration in village Athwa bearing survey No. 3 — plot Nos. 1, 2, 3 of ward No. 9 in Surat by his order dated 5-7-80 bearing ref. No. ULC-6/1-1-42. The said permission being contrary to the provisions of the law and the facts on record, Government has decided to review the said order Under Section 34. Therefore, until further orders you are directed to keep the land in the same condition as at present, that no change should be made in the land in question and to maintain status quo in relation to the said land. You will be intimated the date and time of hearing in this matter separately.
By order and in the name of the Government of Gujarat.”
2. Very many contentions were urged on behalf of the petitioner before the learned single Judge who dealt with the Special Civil Application, coveting interferance at his hands. Broadly speaking the contentions touched the questions of lack of jurisdiction to issue interim direction to maintain status quo; lack of competence to issue such direction on the ground no concrete proceeding for exercise of power under section 34 of the Act had, in fact, been initiated at that time; the delay in initiating proceedings under section 34 of the Act as per annexure ‘A’ and lack of power to take action after the lands have been sold away. The learned single Judge repelled all the contentions raised before him and rejected the Special Civil Application.
3. We do not propose to go into the merits of all the contentions raised before the learned single Judge on behalf of the petitioner and again raised before us in this Letters Patent Appeal, since we are inclined to countenance the primary contention put forth by the learned counsel Mr. S. B. Vakil for the petitioner and now for his legal representative that since by the proceedings — annexure ‘A’ impugned in the Special Civil Application, no positive action for exercise of powers under section 34 of the Act could be stated to have been properly commenced and initiated and except for barely notifying a proposal or a decision of the State to review the order dated 5-7-1980, the matter had not progressed even to the stage of initiation of proceedings for exercise of powers under section 34 of the Act and in that context the interim direction to maintain status quo, assuming that such interim direction could be issued, on such initiation of proceedings, is wholly incompetent. When we look into the express verbalism of the impugned proceedings — annexure ‘A’ in the light of section 34 of the Act, we find that what is being advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is perfectly justifiable and deserves acceptance.
4. Section 34 of the Act runs as follows :
“34. Revision by State Government –
The State Government may, on its own motion, call for and examine the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under the provisions of this Act and against which no appeal has been preferred under Section 12 or Section 30 or Section 33 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or so as to the regularity of such procedure and pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit :
Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter.”
The calling for and examining the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under the Act by the State are only for the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction of the State as to the legality or propriety of the order or as to the regularity of the procedure. On subjective satisfaction being arrived at, the stage for exercise of powers of revision can be arrived at, and then the action for exercise of such powers to pass orders as the State may think fit has to be initiated or commenced. Since the orders to be made, may affect a person, he has to be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. The positive action for exercise of powers to pass orders as the State may think fit, could be stated to have commenced only on the issuance of a show cause notice to the person to be likely affected by the orders. The initiation of action could be only towards the end of passing orders. Without initiation of action towards passing orders as the State may think fit, there could not be passing of such orders. Such initiation of action could appropriately happen, only when a show cause notice is issued to the person to be affected. The action for exercise of powers in the real sense commences only on issuance of show cause notice to the person to be affected. Prior to such commencement of action, the matter is with the State in a sphere of consideration and deliberation, which may or may not fructify into initiation of action. The stage prior to issuance of a show cause notice is nebulous, and certainly the stage for making such orders as the State may think fit would arrive only on issuance of the show cause notice. Whatever was thought about, and deliberated upon, before issuance of a show cause notice, may remain in paper without being acted upon. The proviso is portent and decisive on this aspect, when it speaks about a reasonable opportunity of being heard being given to the person to be affected by the orders. Obviously, the proviso contemplates that action towards passing such orders as the State may think fit under section 34 could appropriately commence only by issuance of a show cause notice to the person to be affected by the such orders.
5. In the instant case when we look into the impugned proceedings — annexure ‘A( we are not able to spell out any feature that would fit in with such initiation of action. There is only a proposal to take action. The decision of the State to take action under Section 34 of the Act alone is notified. The proposal and decision could not be stated to have been implemented by the impugned proceedings-annexure ‘A’. There is a difference between a proposal cum decision to take action and the actual and the factual initiation of action. What we could discern from the impugned proceedings-annexure ‘A’ is only a proposal to take action and not the very initiation of action. The learned single Judge was more guided to express a view that there was, in fact, initiation of action under section 34 of the Act by the sentence in and by which there was an intimation, that the date and time of hearing in the matter will be intimated separately. Until and unless a show cause notice is issued calling upon the petitioner to make his say on the question of revising the earlier order on grounds to be notified, the bare statement in the impugned proceedings-annexure ‘A’ that the date and time of hearing in the matter will be intimated separately is of no consequence at all. Such a statement will have a meaning only after a show cause notice has been issued. Hence we are not able to take any guidance from that statement and hold that there was, in fact, initiation of action.
6. There is one factor which was not present at the time when the learned single Judge decided this question and disposed of the Special Civil Application and that is, a regular show cause notice had come to be issued on 9/10th September 1984. A copy of the said show cause notice is annexed to the application for interim relief — Civil Application No. 5040 of 1984 and there we find that the ingredients for initiation of action are evident. The grounds for taking action are set down; the petitioner is being called upon to make his submissions on the grounds and conjointly a date and time of hearing is also given, intimating further the place at which the hearing will take place. By the said show” cause notice, the petitioner was notified that if he fails to make his submissions and appear for the hearing, on the date and time and at the place intimated, it will be construed that he has nothing to say in this connection and the matter will be decided ex parfe. This show cause notice also adumberates the direction to the petitioner not to deal with the property in any manner until the proceedings are over. The subsequent issuance of this show cause notice clinches the issue. It is not possible to hang on to the impugned proceedings-annexure ‘A’ as tantamounting to initiation of action as such under section 34 of the Act. According to Mr. S. B. Vakil, learned counsel for the petitioner and now for his legal representative, initiation of action under section 34 of the Act happened only by the issuance of the present show cause notice. This submission is tenable and deserves acceptance by us.
7. When there had been no initiation of action, it is not possible to claim a power to pass interim order or direction assuming it is there. Such power if at all could be claimed to be available only after the action is initiated under section 34 of the Act. But we are not pronouncing any opinion of ours one way or the other on this question in this Letters Patent Appeal as to whether after the initiation of action under section 34 of the Act there could be a power for the State to pass interim order or direction pending disposal of the main proceedings. That question will legitimately arise for consideration after the initiation of the action and when an interim order or direction is made. Here, we are on the primary contention that there had been no initiation of action under section 34 of the Act by the issuance of a show cause notice and hence the question of passing any interim order or direction, assuming that power is available to the State, on initiation of action would not arise at all. We are convinced that when there is no initiation of action, there is no question of making any interim order or direction, pending the main proceedings, conceding for arguments’ sake, that such power is available when action under section 34 is initiated. Now the show cause notice has been issued on 9/10th September 1984 after the disposal of the Special Civil Application — if the legal representative of the petitioner who is now interested in the matter should choose to agitate the question before Court, there will be time enough for the Court to look into and pronounce upon that question taking note of all the relevant aspects. As stated above, we have no say on the question at this juncture. Having found no initiation of action as such at all within the ambit and meaning of section 34, and taking note of that lacuna, we are not able to countenance the interim direction set forth in the impugned proceedings — annexure ‘A’ over which alone the grievance of the petitioner arose. The more declaration of the decision and the proposal to initiate action could not be stated to have offended the petitioner.
8. However, Mr. Divetia, learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the respondents would submit that the very Letters Patent Appeal is incompetent, because the impugned proceedings — annexure ‘A’ could only have the character of quasi-judicial proceedings, and as per the pronouncements of Benches of this Court; in Himatlal K. Parekh v. Competent Authority and Deputy Collector (U.L.C.), Rajkot, (1990) 31 (1) Guj LR 626 and in Jasubhai Hiralal Gandhi v. Competent Authority and Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad, (1990) 31 (2) Guj LR 1140. Special Civil Applications questioning such proceedings could only have the character of petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and hence Letters Patent Appeal is not competent. If proceedings have been initiated under section 34 of the Act, we may be legitimately asked to look into this contention. We have examined and accepted the point raised by Mr. S. B. Vakil, learned counsel for the petitioner and now for his legal representative that there had been no initiation of action as contemplated under section 34 of the Act and initiation of action happened only on 9/ 10th September 1984. If that is so, we could not elevate the impugned proceedings — annexure ‘A’ to any proceedings of quasi-judicial nature, of the respondent. In Himatlal K. Parekh v. Competent Authority and Deputy Collector (U.L.C.), Rajkot (1990) 31 (1) Guj LR 626, this Court was concerned with the decision of the Urban Land Tribunal under the Act. In Jashubhai Hiralal Gandhi v. Competent Authority and Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad, (1990) 31 (2) Guj LR 1140, there was a consideration of the orders passed by the authorities under the Act, declaring the excess lands and it was opined that such orders are of quasi-judicial nature and not administrative. Thus, the above pronouncements proceeded on different facts and dealt with different orders. Here, we have found no initiation of action at all under section 34 of the Act, much less passing in it of any order interim or otherwise so as to claim that the proceedings have acquired quasi-judicial character. The impugned proceedings — annexure ‘A’ having not acquired the character of quasi-judicial proceedings, the propriety or otherwise of which could be canvassed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The impugned proceedings — annexure ‘A’ does not satisfy the well accepted norms for acquiring the character of quasi-judicial proceedings, so as to be pleaded that it could be canvassed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The State by itself is not a quasi-judicial authority and every action or function of its at every stage and in every field is not quasi-judicial. When the State exercises powers under section 34 of the Act after initiation of action therefor, it may be claimed that such initiation of action and the orders thereon interim or otherwise by the State are quasi-judicial. We have no opinion to express on this question at this juncture, since no contingency therefor has arisen. Hence no exception could be taken to the petitioner convassing the impugned proceedings — annexure ‘A’ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In fact, we find that the petitioner has invoked only Article 226 of the Constitution of India for interference at the hands of this Court and the learned single Judge himself has not purported to exercise powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the said circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the petitioner invoked the jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the order of the learned single Judge was made only under that Article and hence Letters Patent Appeal would not lie against such an order.
9. Even otherwise as opined by the Apex Court in the land in Umajikeshao Meshram v. Smt. Radhikabhai, AIR 1986 SC 1272 (at p. 1320):
“Where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution, and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226.”
The principle which we discern from the above pronouncement is that quoting of either of the Articles or both the Articles is not a decisive factor to be taken note of by this Court for the purpose of finding out as to whether the Letters Patent Appeal would lie or not only taking note of the Article under which the learned single Judge made the decision, but this Court should look into the substance totality of the facts and circumstances and all the relevant aspects of the case of the party invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. We find that the view expressed in AIR 1986 SC 1272 has been reiterated in the case of Mangalbhai v. Dr. Radheyshyam, AIR 1993 SC 806.
10. Thus we allow this Letters Patent Appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Judge, subject matter of this Letters Patent Appeal and allow the Special Civil Application, so far as regards the direction to keep the land in the same condition as at present without making any change in it and to maintain the status quo. We make no order as to costs. We have not gone into the other contentions raised by the petitioner, because we have sustained the primary contention as per our discussion above.