ORDER
K.A. Swami, J.
1. In these two petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioners have sought for quashing the order dated 28-8-1985 passed by the Karnataka State Transport Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) in Appeal No. 925/82.
2. The Tribunal by the aforesaid order, has set aside the Resolution dated 27/28-7-1982 passed by the Karnataka State Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the ‘KSTA’) in Subject No. 252/81 rejecting the application filed by the 3rd respondent for grant of Stage carriage permit on the route Chikkanayakanahally to Tumkur via Salakatte, Kandikere, Thimmenahalli, Badkegudlu, Bellara, Bukkapatna, Sira, Madalur State Border, Hullekere, Agali, State Border, Rantwala, Hosakere, Madhugiri, Koratagere and Agrahara and back.
3. The Tribunal has held that the appeal filed by the petitioners on 20th November 1982 is in time as the period of limitation commenced on 6-11-1982 the date on which the 3rd respondent received a certified copy of the order. It has also further held that the legal representative of P. Rangaiah, and Kumaraswamy Mudaliar are not in any way affected by remanding the matter, as on remand they will be entitled to be heard by the KSTA. On the basis of these two findings and on following a Division Bench decision of this Court in D.P Sharma v. State Transport Tribunal, 1985 (2) KLJ 16, it has remitted the case to the KSTA for fresh consideration.
4. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners by Learned Counsel Sri. S.V. Krishnaswamy and Sri M. Rangaswamy that an objector is a necessary party to the appeal and not making the objector a party to the appeal or bringing his legal representatives on record in case of the death of an objector is fatal to the appeal. Therefore, the Tribunal is not justified in holding that on remand the non-impleading parties will have an opportunity of being heard by the KSTA that the Tribunal is also not justified in holding that the Appeal is filed in time.
5. On the contrary, Sri P.R. Srirangaiah, Learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent, contends that though Sri P. Rangaiah filed the objections well in time, but he died on 27-3-1981. Whereas the application of the 3rd respondent was considered by the KSTA only on 26/27th July, 1982. Therefore, on the date of consideration of the application, the objector by name Sri P. Rangaiah was no more alive. Hence there was no need to implead the Legal representatives of the deceased P. Rangaiah. It is also further submitted that the legal representatatives of Sri Rangaiah who is no other than the petitioner in W.P. 14395/85 received the notice of the application sent by the KSTA in the name of Late P. Rangaiah, but never the less remained absent and did not make any effort to come on record. It is also further submitted that non-impleading of Sri Kumaraswamy Mudaliar is not fatal because he has no grievance to make and in addition to this, he will now be heard by the KSTA. On the question of limitation, it is submitted that even if it is assumed that the resolution of the KSTA was served upon the 3rd respondent on 5-10-1982, the appeal was filed in time because the application for a certified copy of the resolution was filed on 16th October, 1982 and it was supplied on 6-11-1982 and the appeal was filed on 20-11-1982 ; that after deducting the time occupied for obtaining a certified copy of the order the appeal was filed within time even on computing the period of limitation from 5-10-1982 the date on which the resolution was served upon the petitioners.
6. Having regard to these contentions, the points that arise for consideration are as follows :
(1) Whether the Tribunal was justified in holding that the appeal preferred by the 3rd Respondent was in time ?
(2) Whether the Tribunal was also right in holding that the non-impleading of Sri Kumaraswamy Mudaliar and the legal representatives of late P. Rangaiah was not fatal to the appeal ?
(3) What order ?
7. POINT NO. (1) : It is held by this Court in D.R. Chandramohan Rao v. State & Ors., 1981 (1) KLJ 35 that the limitation to file an appeal against the resolution or decision of the R.T.A. or S.T.A., as the case may be, commences from the date the resolution or decision is served upon the party and the party to the proceeding is entitled to a free copy of such order, decision or resolution of the R.T.A. or S.T.A., as the case may be. In the instant case, the 3rd respondent who was the appellant before the Tribunal does not dispute that the resolution of the STA was served on him on 5-10-1982. In that event, the limitation commenced from that date. There was no necessity for him to file an application for a certified copy of the resolution as the very authenticated free copy of the resolution which was served upon him should have been produced with the appeal. [See : B.S. Shankar v. RTA], ILR 1985 KAR 2249. Thus, the 3rd respondent ought to have filed an appeal within 30 days from 5-10-1982. As the appeal had not been filed within 30 days, there was a delay in filing the appeal. Thus, the Tribunal was not right in holding that the appeal was in time. Point No. (1) is answered in the negative.
8. The next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the 3rd respondent should be given an opportunity to explain the delay. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to me that it is just and appropriate that the 3rd respondent is afforded an opportunity to explain the delay as he has proceeded under the bona fide legal advice given to him that he is entitled to deduct the time occupied in obtaining a certified copy of the resolution. Therefore, even on holding that Tribunal was not right in holding that the appeal was in time, the ends of justice require that the 3rd respondent should be given an opportunity to explain the delay.
9.1) POINT No. (2) : This Court has taken a view that an objector or on his death his legal representative, is a necessary party to the appeal under Section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’). [See; Raju & anr. v. Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal and Ors., 1975 (2)KLJ 168 and W.P. No. 8446/79 decided on 23-10-1979, Udaya Motor Transport Co. Ltd. v. RTA Shimoga & ors. and W.A.2294/84 decided on 11-3-1985, N. Rangaswamy v. KSTA Tribunal].That being so,the Tribunal was not right in holding that on remand, the non-impleaded objectors would have an opportunity of being heard by the original authority; therefore, non-impleading of the objector or the legal representative of the deceased-objector was not fatal to the appeal. Consequently, it follows that the order of remand passed by the Tribunal cannot at all be sustained.
9.2) Here itself I may also refer to the contention of Sri P. R. Srirangaiah, Learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent, that late P. Rangaiah died before 27-8-1981 long before the application was considered on 27/28th July, 1982 ; therefore, there was no need to bring his legal representative on record. Further, the petitioner in Writ Petition 14395/85 being the legal representative of the late P. Rangaiah, received the notice sent in the name of late P. Rangaiah, but nevertheless did not appear and come on record ; therefore, there was no need to implead the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 14395/85.
9.3) In view of the aforesaid contention, the question that necessarily arises for consideration is as to when the application is pending before the R.T.A. or S.T.A., as the case may be, for grant of a stage carriage permit, and one of the objectors dies before the application is taken up for consideration, is it necessary to bring the legal representative/s of such objector on record. The statute gives a right to the existing operators providing transport facilities on the route in respect of which a stage carriage permit is sought, to file objections and oppose the application. It also gives them the right to be heard and the right of appeal against the order or decision granting a stage carriage permit. [See : Sections 47(1)(f), 57(3)(4) & (5) and 64(1)(f) of the Act]. It cannot at all be disputed that grant of a fresh stage carriage permit to a certain extent does affect the existing operators on the route ; therefore, the law has given them the right to object to the application filed for grant of a stage carriage permit. A stage carriage permit is property. It can be dealt with like any other property in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It is transferable in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the law of Transfer of Property. The right, title and interest held by the grantee of a permit are governed by the Law of Inheritance and Succession governing the grantee. Thus, the right, title and interest of the grantee of a stage carriage permit do not die with him and they go along with the permit As the right to object to an application filed for grant of a stage carriage permit is a legally recognised and well defined right of an existing operator on the route, it forms an integral part of the permit itself. Therefore, it goes along with the permit and becomes available to a holder of such permit. Consequently, if an objector dies before consideration of the application filed for grant of stage carriage permit, the successor-in-interest of the objector is entitled to come on record and pursue the objections filed by his predecessor-in-interest. Therefore, the successor-in-interest of such operator shall have to be brought on record. From what is stated above, it follows that there is an obligation cast on the applicant seeking a stage carriage permit to bring on record the legal representative or successor-in-interest of the deceased-objector before the application is taken up for consideration. Though the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not made applicable to a proceeding before the R.T.A. or S.T.A., nevertheless the principles embodied in Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, must be applied to the proceeding for grant of stage carriage permit. There is also no doubt that a transferee of a stage carriage permit held by the objector is also entitled to come on record and pursue the objections. However, in this case, it is not necessary to pronounce upon the question as to whether there is legal obligation cast on the applicant to bring on record the transferee-in-interest of the objector, and whether failure to bring him on record vitiates the proceeding because the same do not arise in this case. For the reasons stated above, it is not possible to accept the contentions of Sri P.R. Srirangaiah, learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent. That being so, the petitioner in W.P. 14395/85, who has undisputedly succeeded to the interest of late P. Rangaiah, ought to have been brought on record. The fact that the petitioner in W.P. 14395/85 received the notice sent in the name of his late father, did not appear and come on record pursuant to it, did not absolve the applicant of his obligation to bring the petitioner in W.P. 14395/85, on record.
9.4) Similarly, Sri Kumaraswami Mudaliar, who is an objector, also ought to have been impleaded in the appeal. He is a necessary party to the appeal.
9.5) For the reasons stated above, Point No. (2) is answered as follows :
The Tribunal was not right in holding that the non-impleading of Sri Kumaraswami Mudaliar and the legal representatives of late P. Rangaiah, was not fatal to the appeal.
10. Having regard to the conclusions reached by me, the next question that arises for consideration is as to whether the appeal should be remitted to the Tribunal or to the KSTA. In view of the fact that the necessary parties are not impleaded to the appeal, and the KSTA has rejected the application, it is just and appropriate to remit the appeal to the Tribunal for fresh consideration, on impleading the necessary parties.
11. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, these Writ Petitions are allowed. The Order dated 28th August 1985 passed in Appeal No. 925 of 1982 by the Tribunal, is quashed. The appeal now stands remitted to the Tribunal with a direction to decide the same afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. The 3rd respondent – who is the appellant in the appeal be permitted to implead the petitioner in W.P. 14395/85 and also Sri Kumaraswami Mudaliar.