ORDER
U.B.S. Bedi, J.M.:
This is assessee’s appeal directed against the order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals)-Ii, Pune, dated 4-2-2002, relevant to Block assessment period 1-4-1988 to 8-9-1998, on the following grounds
“The appellant requests for admission ofthe following additional grounds No. 1 and 2 of appeal.
1. On the facts and in law, the assessment under section 158BC(c) made by the assessing officer is bad in law, as it has been made in pursuance to the invalid notice issued under section 158BC(b) f/w section 143(2) because it was issued for the first time after one year from the date of filing of the return by the appellant.
2. As the provisions of section 143(2) are applicable in the course of framing an assessment under section 158BC(c), the appellant submits that the proviso to section 143(2) was equally applicable and as the notice under section 158BC(c) is not issued within the time frame as mentioned in the proviso to section 143(2), the notice is time-barred and the assessment made in pursuance to the said notice be declared bad in law with the result that the assessing officer be directed not to demand any tax as per the demand note issued by him to the appellant.
Without prejudice to the above grounds, the appellant further raises the following grounds of appeal.
3. On the facts and in law, the learned Commissioner (Appeals) erred in confirming the additions of Rs. 3,632 in financial year 1988-89 and of Rs. 40,105 in financial year 1997-98 on stamp duty and registration charges as unexplained expenditure when the appellant had proved that the undisclosed income of the firm M/s Modern Traders (Chinese Room) wherein he is a partner. was available to him for incurring the expenditure.”
2. The relevant facts are that there was a search action under section 132 of the Act at the residential and business premises of the assessee on 9-9-1998, pursuant to which notice under section 158BC was issued on the assessee calling for return in Form 2B for the block. In response to this notice, the assessee filed return on 17-1-1999, declaring undisclosed income at Nil. The assessment for the block period was finahsed at income of Rs. 2,12,812.
3. The facts relating to the addition of Rs. 3,632 and Rs. 40,105 as undisclosed income for the assessment years 1989-90 and 1998-99 respectively are that as per the documents found and seized in the course of search action, the assessee had purchased agricultural land and a property at Waghoh and he had incurred expenditure of Rs. 3,632 in financial year 1988-89 relevant to assessment year 1989-90 and Rs. 40,105 in financial year 1998-98 relevant to assessment year 1998-99 on stamp duty and registration charges. As the assessee could not satisfactorily explain the source of these expenses, addition of Rs. 3,632 and Rs. 40,105 were made as undisclosed expenditure under section 69C of the Act.
4. Being aggrieved, the assessee took up the matter in appeal before the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and as regards the addition of Rs. 3,632 it was contended that the said amount incurred on stamp duty and registration charges during financial year 1988-89 for purchase of agricultural land was meagre and source of the same should be considered as explained out of withdrawals for household expenses.
As regards the expenditure of Rs. 40,106 incurred during financial year 1997-98 for registration of property at Waghoh, the assessee submitted that the assessing officer had not raised any query about the expenses of Rs. 40,105 and he had asked the assessee only about the source of investment of Rs. 8 lakhs made for purchase of this property which was duly explained to the assessing officer. It was thus urged that there was no justification for inclusion of Rs. 40,105 in the undisclosed income and this expenditure should be considered to have been met out of Rs. 8 lakhs declared in the case of Modern Traders (Chinese Room), in which the assessee was a partner.
4A. The learned Commissioner (Appeals) while considering but not accepting the plea of the assessee, has concluded to uphold the additions by holding as under :
“I have considered the submissions of the learned authorised representative but I do not agree with, him that addition of Rs. 3,632 and Rs. 40,105 was not called for. In fact, the withdrawal of the appellant in assessment year 1989-90 was only Rs. 15,400 and as such it cannot be said that household withdrawal was enough to explain the expenditure on stamp duty and registration charges incurred on purchase of agricultural land in assessment year 1989-90. Similarly, from Lhe reply given to question No. 8 of the statement dated 27-10-1998, it cannot be said that the disclosure of Rs. 8 lakhs made in the case of M/s Modern Traders (Chinese Room) covers the unexplained investment of Rs. 40,105 because the said disclosure was made in respect of certain irregularities in respect of business activities of that firm, Accordingly, I do not find any case to interfere with addition of Rs. 3,632 and Rs. 40, 105 made as undisclosed income for assessment year 1989-90 and 1998-99. Appeal thus fails in ground Nos. 1 and 2.
4B. Still aggrieved, the assessee is in further appeal.
So far as points in ground No. 1 and 2 of appeal are concerned, the same are found to have not been raised before the lower authorities, i.e., before the assessing officer or before the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and these are totally fresh issues, but of course are legal issues. Therefore, these are being dealt with for the first time and the assessee hits to the root of the matter of the assessment on the legal ground that assessment under section 158BC(c) is bad in law, inasmuch as the same has been made in pursuant to the invalid notice issued under section 158BC(b) read with section 1430 because it was issued for the first time after lapse of one year from the end of the month in which return of undisclosed income was furnished in response to notice issued in this regard. As per assessee’s counsel, provisions of section 143(2) are fully applicable in the case of the assessee and similarly proviso to said section is applicable which stipulates that no notice under section 143(2) can be issued beyond period of one year from filing of return. Therefore, assessment framed on the basis of time-barred notice cannot be held to be legal assessment in the eye of law and the same requires to be quashed. So making reference to various provisions of Chapter XIV-B of the Act and non obstante clause as contained in section 158BA and giving interpretation to the words so far as may be’ and placing reliance on 1951 AIR Cal 97, Surana Steels (P) Ltd. v. Dy. CIT & Ors. (1999) 153 CTR (SC) 193. (1999) 237 ITR 777 (SC) Circular No. 737 ((1996) 131 CTR (St) 9: (1995) 2151TR (SC) 701, AIR 1998 SC 1388, AIR 1954 SC 591 at 599 (para 10), AIR 1992 SC 81 at p. 88 and Ahmedabad Bench of Tribunal decision in Rakesh S. Mardia v. Dy. CIT (2002) 74 TTJ (Ahd) 836 based on Supreme Court decision in R. Dalmia & Anr. v. CIT (1999) 152 CTR (SC) 383 (1999) 236 FM 480 (SC) Narendra Kumar Jain v. Dy. CIT (2002) 74 TTJ (Lucknow) 848 and (1995) 215 = 17 (SC) CBDT circular, it was pleaded for quashing of the order passed under section 15813C. On merits, while reiterating the submissions as made before the lower authorities, it was pleaded that otherwise also addition with respect to these amounts is not sustainable and the same should be deleted.
5. The learned departmental Representative while making reference to various case law relating to rule of interpretation, legislative incorporation and strict construction of the section, pleaded for confirmation of the block assessment made by the assessing officer and confirmed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals). It was further contended that it would be relevant to consider the background of purpose of introduction of section 158BC and history of the provision. Sec. 158BC in Chapter XIV-B states that under the provisions of section 143(2) opportunity of hearing may be given to an assessee and nothing more than that, because purpose of Chapter XIV-B talks about special procedure for assessment of search cases. It starts with section 158B which contains definition of undisclosed income of the block period and of block period, whereas section 158BA talks about assessment of undisclosed income which starts with non obstante clause and section 158BC under the head procedure for block assessment and 158BB in the manner of computation of undisclosed income. The procedure for block assessment is given in section 158BC which talks about notice for furnishing of return of income for the block period. It specifies that return is to be filed in the prescribed form, i.e., Form No. 2B. It further says that the,assessing officer has to determine undisclosed income of the block period in the manner laid down in section 158BC and provisions of section 142 sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 143 and section 144 shall, so far as may be, apply. The assessing officer on determination of undisclosed income of the block period in accordance with this Chapter shall pass an order of assessment and determine the tax payable by him on the basis of the assessment. This also talks of retention of seized assets.
5A. Sec. 158BE talks about time-limit for completion of block assessment and section 158BFA talks about levy of interest and penalty in certain cases. Sec. 158BFA(3)(a) provides for opportunity of being heard to be given to the assessee, but no such provision is found to be mentioned in section 158BC which is very important as per the learned departmental Representative. Though in the provisions with relation to interest and penalty it is specifically mentioned that opportunity to be given to the assessee, but so far as assessment proceedings are concerned for the block period this particular provision is not found to be mentioned in the procedural section, i.e., 158BC and only to meet the requirement of natural justice, reference can be made to other sections, particularly section 143(2) with the further qualification, ‘so far as It may, apply’. So, it is to be decided about the applicability of provisions of section 143(2) to block assessment. Provisions of section 143(2) are applicable in the case where return of income is filed under section 139(1) or in response to notice under section 142(1). There is no mention of return filed under section 158BC in these provisions. Therefore, the time-limit given in proviso cannot be made applicable in reference to the return filed under section 158BC for the block period and on similar reasoning return filed in response to notice under section 148 is not found to be mentioned in section 143(2) and it has been held that time-limit given in proviso to section 143(2) is not applicable in the case of assessment/reassessment under section 148 by Pune Bench (D.B) in Income Tax Officer v. Master Vishal D. Ladge in ITA No. 683/Pn/2001 for the assessment years 1992-93 dated 24-7-2002 and Agra Bench in the case reported in 79 ITD 839 (sic).
6. Sec.- 143 pertains to regular assessment. Provisions of regular assessment and block assessment are distinct and different as can be seen from difference between the two as held by Gujarat High Court in the case reported in N.R. Paper & Board Ltd. & Ors. v. Dy. CIT (1998).146 CTR (Guj) 612. (1998) 234 ITR 733 (Guj). Therefore, section 143(2) as it is cannot be made applicable to the block assessment. Sec. 158BC(b) reads that provisions of section 142/143/144 “so far as may be, apply” and meaning of this phrase has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Pratap Singh & Anr. v. Director of Enforcement & Ors. (1985) 46 CTR (SC) 319: (1985) 155 ITR 166 (SC), wherein it is given that declaration is possible and Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uagar Prints v. Union of India & Ors. (1989) 75 CTR (SC) 1 : (1989) 179 ITR 317 (SC) has opined about the difference between incorporation and reference of a provision and meaning of these words, wherein provision of sections 142, 143(2), 143(3) and 144 cannot in their entirety be made applicable to block assessment, as these are separate and distinct from other provisions and return required to be filed is also different than normal return, hence, practical approach to give opportunity is to be taken of full effect to the section is not to be given. Further reliance on Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer & Ors. (1980) 15 CTR (SC) 157 : (1980) 122 ITR 55 (SC) was placed to contend that court can’t be party to an unfair advantage that the assessee tries to gain such effort should be neutralized. Reference was made to G.P. Singh’s (6th Ed.) commentary. Further reliance was placed on AIR 1992 SC B7 rule of interpretation Otherwise also non-adherence of procedural part of statute cannot vitiate block assessment proceedings and reference was made to CIT v. Jai Prakash Singh (1996) 132 CTR (SC) 262 : (1996) 219 ITR 737 (SC), CIT v. Gyan Prakash Gupta (1986) 54 CTR (Raj) 69.- (1987) 165 ITR 501 (Raj), Ratan Lal nku v. CIT (1974) 97 ITR 553 (J&K). Further reference in this context was made to (2002) 21 STC 372 (Gui), Madhupuij Corpn. v. Prabliat Jha, Dy. Director of Income-tax (2001) 171 CTR (Guj) 593 : (2002) 256 ITR 498 (Guj), CIT v. Bharat Kumar Modi (2000) 164 CTR (Bom) 273: (2000) 246 ITR 693 (Bom) difference in lack of jurisdiction and irregular exercise of jurisdiction and in any case, delay in issue of notice cannot make the assessment bad in law/void. It was thus urged for upholding order of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) on legal ground as well as on merits as it has been passed and confirmed on sound basis and assessee has not been able to make out a case for deletion of addition made/confirmed on merits even.
7. Both the sides have been heard, material on record as well as precedents referred and relevant provisions of law have been gone into. In this case the point for consideration is whether while completing the block assessment under Chapter XIV-B, the time-limit of one year as contained in proviso to section 143(2) for service of notice from the end of the month in which return (in Form 2B in this case) is filed, is to be applied or not.
8. So far as applicability of provisions relating to notice under section 143(2) in block assessment under Chapter XIV-B is concerned, relevant provision is envisaged in clause (b) of section
“……..
158BC which reads as under 158BC. Where any search has been conducted under section 132 or books of account, other documents or assets are requisitioned under section 132A, in the case of any person, then,
(b) The assessing officer shall proceed to determine the undisclosed income of the block period in the manner laid down in section 158BB and the provisions of section 142, sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 143 (Sec. 144 and 145) shall, so far as may be, apply.”
As is seen from the above, the significant relevant phrases is “so far as may be, apply” and it is not a case of lifting of provisions of sections 143/142/144 as it is but has made its application conditional with the said phrase and this phrase came up for consideration before various Courts including Hon’ble Supreme Court on more than one occasion and in the case of Dr. Pratap Singh & Anr. v. Director of Enforcement & Ors. (supra) it has opined at p. 173-174 as under
“Sec. 37(2) provides that “the provisions of the Code relating to searches, shall so far as may be, apply to searches directed under section 37(1)”. Reading the two sub-sections together, it merely means that the methodology prescribed for carrying out a search provided in section 165 has to be generally followed. The expression “so far as may be” has always been construed to mean that those provisions may be generally followed to the extent possible. The submission that section 165(1) has been incorporated by pen and ink in section 37(2) has to be negatived in view of the positive language employed in the section that the provisions relating to searches shall so far as may be apply to searches under section 37(1). If section 166(1) was to be incorporated by pen and ink as sub-section (2) of section 37, the legislative draftsmanship will leave no room for doubt by providing that the provisions of the Cr.PC relating to searches shall apply to the searches directed or ordered under section 37(1) except that the power will be exercised by the Director or Enforcement or other officer exercising his power and he will be substituted in place of the magistrate. The provisions of sub-section (2) of section 37 has not been cast in any such language. It merely provides that the search may be carried out according to the method prescribed in section 165(1). If the duty to record reasons which furnish grounds for entertaining a reasonable belief were to be recorded in advance, the same could have, been incorporated in section 37(1), otherwise a simple one-line section would have been sufficient that all searches as required for the purpose of this Act shall be carried out in the manner prescribed in section 165 of the Code by the officer to be set out in the section. In order to give full meaning to the expression “so far as may be”, sub-section (2) of section 37 should be interpreted to mean that broadly, the procedure relating to search as enacted in section 165 shall be followed. But if a deviation becomes necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act in which section 37(1) is incorporated, it would be permissible except that when challenged before a court of law, justification will have to be offered for the deviation. This view will give full play to the expression “so far as may be.”
9. In another case, the Bench of 5 Judges of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ujagar Prints v. Union of India & Ors. (supra) has ruled to describe referential legislation and meaning of ‘so far as may be’ and has held as under
“The next question that arises for consideration is, whether, even assuming that the terms of section 3(3) are applicable, its terms are wide enough to take in not merely the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, arid, in particular, its definition clauses, as they stood in 1957 on the date when the 1957 Act came into force, but also the amendments effected therein from time to time. The answer to this question depends upon the general principles applicable to what is described as ‘referential legislation’ of which this is an instance. Legislatures sometimes take a short cut and try to reduce the length of statutes by omitting elaborate provisions where such provisions have already been enacted earlier and can be adopted for the purpose on hand. While, on the one hand, the prolixity of modern statutes and the necessity to have more legislations than one on the same or allied topics render such a course useful and desirable, the attempt to legislate by reference is sometimes overdone and brevity is achieved at the expense of lucidity. However, this legislative device is quite. well known and the principles applicable to it are fairly well settled.
Referential legislation is of two types. One is where an earlier Act on some of its provisions are incorporated, by reference, into a later Act. In this event, the provisions of the earlier Act or those so incorporated, as they stand in the earlier Act at the time of incorporation, will be read into the later Act. Subsequent changes in the earlier Act or the incorporated provisions win have to be ignored because, for all practical purposes, the existing provisions of the earlier Act have been reenacted by such reference into the later one, rendering irrelevant what happened to the earlier statute thereafter. Examples of this can be seen in Secretary of State v. Hindustan Co-op. Insurance Society AIR 1931 PC 149, Bolani Ores Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1975 SC 17, Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India (‘1979) 49 Comp Cas 419 (SC) : AIR 1979 SC 798. On the other hand, the later statute may not incorporate the earlier provisions. It may only make a reference of a broad nature as to the law on a subject generally, as in BaJya v. Gopikabai (Smt) (1978) 3 SCT 561, or contain a general reference to the terriis of an earlier statute which are to be made applicable. In this case, any modification, repeal or reenactment of ‘ the earlier statute will also be carried into the later, for here, the idea is that certain provisions of an earlier statute which become applicable in certain circumstances are to be made use of for the purpose of the later Act also. Examples of this type of legislation are to be seen in Collector of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty (1962) 3 SCR 786, New Central Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Asstt. Collector (1971) 2 SCR 92 and Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Trust Board v. P. Govindan (1977) 1 SCR 549. Whether a particular statute falls into the first or second category is always a question of construction. In the present case, in my view, the legislation falls into the second category. Sec. 3(3) of the 1957 Act does not incorporate into the 1957 Act any specific provisions of the 1944 Act. It only declares generally that the provisions of the 1944 Act shall apply “so far as may be”, that is, to the extent necessary and practical, for the purposes of the 1957 Act as well.”
10. As is clear from the above noted two authoritative pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, out of which later one is of Constitutional Bench, which makes the meaning of the phrase “so far as may be” amply clear, that is, “to the extent necessary and practical”, therefore, for the purpose of block assessment provisions of section 143(2) can be applicable to the extent necessary and practicable as the provisions of section 158BC(b) does not incorporate specific provisions of section 143(2) and it only declares generally that provisions of section 143(2) shall apply “so far as may be” and if the relevant provisions in relation to the manner of assessment of undisclosed income as detected in the search, the issuance of notice, filing of the return in Form 2B and period of completion of assessment etc. as given in Chapter XIV-B is seen it would transpire that only for giving opportunity, recourse to section 143(2)/142(1) can be taken especially when section 158BC(b) does not incorporate section 143(2) specifically. So far as assessment under Chapter XIV-B is concerned, the same cannot be equated either with the assessment and reassessment under section 147 or assessment under section 143(3) or 144. This view gets further strengthened by the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court decision where clear distinction has been brought out with regard to normal assessment, assessment and reassessment of escaped turnover and assessment of undisclosed income detected in a search and it has been held that the exercise under section 143(2) and (3) for regular assessment stands in contrast LO the exercise of the assessing officer under section 158BB read with section 158BC(b) and further that requirement of section 142 can never be read into the provisions of section 143(2). While distinguishing normal assessment from block assessment under Chapter XIV-B, the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of N.R. Paper & Board Ltd. & Ors. v. Dy. CIT (supra) has held as under
“Chapter XIV.-B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, lays down a special procedure for assessment of search cases and provides for assessment of undisclosed income as a result of search. Under section 158BB(1), read with section 158BC of the Income Tax Act, 1961, what is assessed is the undisclosed income of the block period and not the total income or loss of the previous year required to be assessed in the normal regular assessment under section 143(3). This exercise under section 143(2) and (3) for regular assessment stands in contrast to the exercise of the assessing officer under section 158BB read with S. 158BC(b), where he has to assess only the undisclosed income of the block period on the basis of the evidence found and material available as a result of the search conducted under section 132 of the Act. The regular assessment is to assess the total income or loss of the previous year where a return is filed under section 139 and the assessing officer considers it necessary or expedient under section 143(2) to ensure that the assessee had not understated the income or has not computed excessive loss or has not underpaid tax in any manner.
There was a search and seizure operation in the case of the assessees and in the block assessment under Chapter XIV-B of the said Act was made for the block period from 1-4-1985, till 6-1-1996, which included assessment year 1995-96. In those proceedings, the total income of the assessees for the said period was worked out in accordance with the provisions of section 158BB of the Act and after giving credit for the amount disclosed, the assessment order was made. The assessees’ appeals in respect of the said assessment orders passed under Chapter XIV-B of the Act were pending before the Tribunal. The assessing officer issued notices to the assessees under section 143(2) with a view to completing the assessment for the assessment year 1995-96 pursuant to the returns filed by the assessees. In a writ petition it was contended by the assessees that the total income for the assessment year 1995-96 was already computed in the assessment orders for the block period and, therefore, no regular assessment for the assessment year 199596 could be computed and that the returns of income filed by them in respect of the assessment year 1995-96 was required to be filed.
Held, (i) that the notices issued under section 143(2) were in respect of the regular assessment and the assessing officer was within his jurisdiction to proceed with the same as per section 143(3) and make a regular assessment of the total income/loss of the previous year for the assessment year 1995-96 notwithstanding the fact that the said previous year was included in the block period for the purpose of assessment of the undisclosed income and that such assessment was already done and was the subject-matter of challenge before the Tribunal. Any question or problem that may arise in implementing the said provision or other provisions of Chapter XIV-B had no bearing whatsoever on the question whether the assessing officer had jurisdiction to proceed with the regular assessment for the assessment year 1995-96 in the case of the assessee;
(ii) that there is no need to give any reasons or grounds for proceeding with such regular assessment and the requirement of section 147 of there being reason to believe that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, can never be read into the provisions of section 143(2). The only requirement for issuance of the notice under section 143(2) for calling upon the. assessees to attend office and produce evidence in support of the returns is that the assessing officer should consider it necessary or expedient to ensure that the assessee had not understated the income or has not computed excessive loss or has not underpaid the tax in any manner.”
11. In another case titled R. Dalmia & Anr. v. CIT (1999) 152 CTR (SC) 383 (1999) 236 ITR 480 (SC) where the question about the procedure prescribed in section 144B is to be applied even to assessment and reassessment under section 147 and extended period of limitation prescribed by Expln. 1(iv) to section 153 has to be applied, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has opined as under
“If, therefore, the procedure that is prescribed by section 144B is to be applied even to assessments and reassessments under section 147 and, as we have stated, we think it must, having regard to the terms of the provisions of the Act hereinbefore referred to as also because the provisions of section 144B are intended to safeguard the interest of the assessee, the extended period of limitation prescribed by Expln. 1(iv) to section 155 must apply.
It was submitted on behalf of the assessee that the provisions of section 144B were not applicable to assessments and reassessments under section 147 because section 144B stated that it applied only to “an assessment to be made under sub-section (3) of section 143”. The submission cannot be accepted because the words we have quoted from section 148 cannot be ignored. A notice having been issued under section 148, the procedure set out in the sections subsequent to section 139 has to be followed “so far as May be”. Sec. 144B is a procedural provision. It fits into the procedural scheme as hereinbefore noted and, therefore, it cannot be excluded by reason of the use of the words “so far as may be”. Nor is there any other good reason to exclude it from the procedure to be followed subsequent to notice under section 148.
While holding so, the Judges of the apex court did not cast any doubt that assessment under section 143 and assessment and reassessment under.s. 147 are different.
12. Keeping in view the discussion as held above in foregoing paragraphs, considering the language as used in clause (b) of section 158BC and other provisions of Chapter XIV-B, the provisions of section 143(2) are found to be applicable to the extent necessary and practical. Since the assessment under section 143(3) relates to normal assessment, assessment and reassessment under section 147 relates to income escaping assessment and assessment under Chapter XIV-B relates to undisclosed income found during the search and seizure operation, therefore, these are different and distinct in character, as has been held by the Courts and the words “so far as may be apply” gives the meaning” to the extent necessary and practical”. Therefore, in my considered view, provisions of section 143(2) in its entirety cannot be made applicable to block assessment and same can be to the extent and for the purposes of opportunity only as same are necessary and practicable in terms of provisions and scheme of Chapter XIV-B of the Act. Therefore, the plea of the assessee in this regard is found to be untenable and as such is rejected, Case law relied upon by learned counsel is found to be not applicable in view of Hon’ble Supreme Court’s latest decision.
13. So far as the case on merits in concerned, nothing more than what is submitted before the lower authorities is contended or produced. In the absence of any material or evidence, I am not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Commissioner (Appeals), who is found to have appropriately considered all the pleas as raised before him and arrived at a correct conclusion. Therefore, finding no substance in the appeal of the assessee on merits also, I concur with the findings and conclusions of the learned Commissioner (Appeals) and dismiss the appeal of the assessee.
14. As a result, appeal of the assessee gets dismissed.