ORDER
P.S. Narayana, J.
1. The unsuccessful tenant aggrieved by a reversing order had preferred the present Civil Revision Petition under section 22 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, which will be hereinafter referred to as the Act in short for the purpose of convenience. Originally, the land lords Dr. Vasireddy Prabhakar Rao and Dr. Vasireddy Malathi filed the eviction petition R.C.C. No. 23/87 on the file of the Rent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsif, Rajahmundry and during the pendency of the R.C.C. proceedings, the 2nd petitioner in the R.C.C. Dr. Vasireddy Malathi died and that her legal representative Vasireddy Satya Surya Srinivas was brought on record as petitioner No. 3 in R.C.C. No. 23/87 and the said parties are respondents 1 and 2 in the present Civil Revision Petition. For the purpose of convenience, the revision petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition will be referred to as the tenant and the respondents in the Civil Revision Petition will be referred to as landlords hereinafter.
2. The R.C.C. was filed on the ground of wilful default and also on the ground of bonafide personal requirement and the Court of first instance had dismissed the said R.C.C. negativing both the grounds. Aggrieved by the same, the landlord preferred R.C.A. No. 53/96 on the file of the appellate authority-cum-Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, who had reversed the order dated 4.9.2000 on the ground of wilful default only but confirming as far as the ground of bonafide personal requirement is concerned and the tenant, aggrieved by the order of eviction made by the appellate authority, had preferred the present Civil Revision Petition. The pleadings of the respective parties are as follows:
“The petitioners Dr. Vasireddi Prabhakara Rao and Dr. Vasireddi Malathi filed a petition under section 10(2) and 10(3) of A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 in R.C.C.23/87 on 20.1.1987 seeking for eviction of M/s. Vijayalakshmi Agencies, represented by its Managing Partner Chinnam Somireddi on the ground of wilful default in payment of rents and on the ground of bonafide requirement.
The respondent/tenant took R.C.C. schedule premises bearing door No. 36-27-7 situate in Innispeta Rajahmundry from V. Srinivas. The rent stipulated is Rs. 800/- per month payable by the first day of every succeeding month. The respondent used to obtain two receipts each for Rs. 400/- whenever he paid rents for his own reasons.
The respondent purchased the vacant site which was part of the leasehold from the said Srinivas as per the registered sale deed dated 28.3.1985. As the respondent purchased only the vacant site it was specifically agreed between the respondent and the owner V. Srinivas that the agreed rent of Rs. 800/- per month should be paid even after the sale. The respondent did not pay the rents to the said Srinivas from the month of April, 1985 till the end of August, 1986.
The said V. Srinivas sold the rest of the portion of the house to the petitioners as per the registered sale deeds dated 23.7.1986 and 14.8.1986. The said Srinivas informed the respondent of the sales in favour of the petitioners and directed him to pay the rents thereafter to the petitioners. The respondent after coming to know of the sales in favour of the petitioners got issued a registered notice dated 7.8.1986 with false and untenable allegations. The respondent alleged in the said notice that the agreed rent was only Rs. 400/- and after the sale in his favour the rent was reduced to Rs. 200/- per month and that he was regularly paying the rents to the said Srinivas till the end of June, 1986. The said Srinivas got issued a reply notice dated 21.8.1986 setting out the true and correct facts. The respondent again got issued the registered notice dated 10.9.1986 and along with it he sent a pay order for Rs. 200/-. The said Srinivas returned the pay order as it was not the full rent payable by the respondent.
The respondent got issued a registered notice dated 10.9.1986 to the petitioners with false and untenable allegations. The respondent along with the said notice sent a pay order for Rs. 200/- stating that the said amount represents the rent payable by him for the portion for the month of August, 1986. The petitioners then sent a reply notice on 21.9.1986 to the said notice stating that the rent offered is not the full rent and that they are not willing to accept the amount sent. The petitioner also informed the respondent that they purchased the property for their own use and occupation. The petitioner therefore returned the pay order to the respondent.
The petitioners therefore submitted that the rent payable by the respondent is Rs. 800/- per month and not Rs. 400/- as alleged by the respondent. The respondent only purchased the vacant site not the house portion from V. Srinivas. There is absolutely no justification for the respondent to allege that the original rent stipulated for the portion purchased by the petitioners and for the portion purchased by him is only Rs. 400/- per month and after the sale in his favour the rent was reduced to Rs. 200/- per month. The respondent did not pay any rent to the petitioners/vendor from the month of April, 1985 till he sold the property to the petitioners. The respondent thus committed wilful default in payment of monthly rent and made himself liable for eviction.
The petitioners purchased R.C.C. schedule premises adjoining the schedule property with a view to demolish the existing structures therein and with a view to construct a dispensary cum nursing Home for their first son and daughter-in-law who are qualified Medical Practitioners. Thus, the petitioners require the schedule portion for their own use and occupation. The petitioners in fact informed the respondent of their requirement and asked the respondent to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the RCC schedule property to them. The petitioners are constrained to file the petition seeking for eviction. Hence the petition in R.C.C. No. 23/87.
( c ) The respondent/tenant filed counter opposing the petition in R.C.C.23/87. In the counter, it is submitted that R.C.C. petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. The respondent took the premises from V. Srinivas. It is false to state that the agreed rent was Rs. 800/- per month. The agreed rent for the entire building which is godown is Rs. 400/- per month. It is false to state that the respondent used to obtain two receipts at the rate of Rs. 400/- each for the payment of Rs. 800/-. The V. Srinivas used to give only one receipt for the entire payment of Rs. 400/-. The said amounts also are being debited periodically in the respondent’s accounts which are assessed to Income Tax. Therefore, the agreed rent was Rs. 400/- originally but not Rs. 800/- per month as contended by the petitioner. It is false to state that the respondent only purchased a vacant site but not godown from Vasireddi Srinivas under the sale deed dated 28.3.1985. There is no vacant space except the godown which is covered by the entire site which is under the leasehold of the respondent, out of which half portion was sold to the respondent by Srinivas under sale deed dated 28.3.1985. But in order to avoid the technical difficulties of registration and also unnecessary stamp duty and registration charges, it was agreed between the vendor and the vendee, it is sufficient to mention the vacant site in the sale deed as the godown is situated in that site. So, the sale was not only with regard to the vacant site, but also portion of that godown. It is not a sale of exclusive vacant site under that sale deed. After the respondent’s sale deed was executed, it was agreed between the land lord Srinivas and the respondent that for remaining half portion of the godown the respondent shall pay a rent of Rs.200/- per month. Accordingly the respondent has been regularly paying the rent to him from 1.4.1985 till the end of June, 1986. As the landlord Sreenivas agreed to sell the remaining half portion also to the respondent, the respondent did not insist for the receipts from him for the said period. But, however, those amounts are being deposited in the accounts of the respondent. The accounts are maintained in the regular course and they are assessed to Income Tax. For the month of July, 1986 the respondent tendered the rent to Srinivas who evaded to receive the same. Therefore, the respondent got issued a registered notice on 7.8.1986 sending the rent of Rs.200/- to him by way of a pay order which was refused by him. And pay order was returned with reply notice dated 21.8.1986. Thereafter, the respondent sent same pay order under notice dated 10.9.1986 that is also refused by Srinivas along with reply dated 21.9.1986. Rent for the month of July, 1986 of a sum of Rs. 200/- is yet to be paid by the respondent. For the month of August, 1986, the rent was sent to the first petitioner herein as desired by the erstwhile landlord Srinivas and that amount was sent by way of a pay order under notice dated 10.9.1986 which was returned by the first petitioner under reply notice dated 21.9.1986. The respondent having no other go filed a petition under R.C.C.12/87 before the Rent Controller under section 8 of A.P. Rent Control Act and he has been depositing the rents regularly at the rate of Rs. 200/- per month from 1.8.1986 onwards till now. Thus, there is no dispute of payment of rent either to the previous landlord V.Srinivas or to the petitioner herein. The contention that respondent refused to pay the rent is not correct. The allegation in paragraph No. 7 of the petition that there is default in payment of rents from April, 1985 onwards up to July, 1986 is not tenable under law as the landlords acquired the right to the leasehold property under the two sale deeds dated 27.3.1986 and 14.8.1986, and so they are entitled to collect rents only after the sale deeds are executed and after purchase of the property by them. The respondent tendered rent for the month of August, 1986 to the first petitioner, which was refused wilfully. So, the petitioners cannot plead that there is default. There is no wilful default in payment of the rents. The petitioners are not entitled to seek eviction of the respondent on the ground of default in payment of rents.
The requirement is not a bonafide requirement. The petitioners are having a multi-storeyed building in which they are running a dispensary-cum-nursing home. There are no bonafides in seeking the order of eviction for demolishing the lease hold premises and construct a dispensary-cum-nursing home. The ground alleged is not a bonafide one.”
3. On the strength of these pleadings, P.Ws 1 and 2 were examined on behalf of the landlords and Exs. A1 to A10 and X1 and X2 also were marked. On behalf of the tenant, R.Ws 1 and 2 were examined and Exs. B1 to B10 were marked. The Court of first instance, as already stated supra, had negatived both the grounds and the landlords, aggrieved by the same, had preferred an appeal and the appellate authority in R.C.A. No. 53/96 on the file of the appellate authority-cum-Principal Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry had framed the following points for consideration:
1. Whether the respondent/tenant committed wilful default in payment of rents? If so, whether the respondent/tenant is liable to be evicted from R.C.C. Schedule premises ?
2. Whether the requirement of R.C.C. Schedule premises by the petitioners/land lords is a bonaifde? If so, whether the respondent/tenant is liable to be evicted from R.C.C. schedule premises ?
3. Whether there are any grounds to interfere with the order of the learned Rent Controller made in R.C.C. No. 23/87 dated 6th September, 1996 ?
4. To what other relief ?
4. The appellate authority, as far as point No. 1, the ground of wilful default is concerned, on the strength of the oral and documentary evidence, had arrived at a conclusion that the findings of the Rent Controller are not sustainable and had reversed the same. In fact, the learned appellate authority, while discussing the ground of wilful default, had divided the ground into the following sub-heads:
1. Whether the quantum of rent agreed is of Rs. 800/- per month as contended by the appellant/petitioners/landlords or Rs. 400/- per month as contended by the respondent/tenant.
2. Whether there was any agreement between P.W.2 V. Srinivas and respondent/tenant subsequent to the date of Ex.B1 sale to reduce the quantum of rent from Rs. 400/- to Rs. 200/- per month.
3. Whether the respondent/tenant has not paid rents to P.W.2 from August, 1985
4. Whether the respondent/tenant has not paid rents to the appellants/petitioners/landlords from August, 1986 ? If so whether non payment of rents constitutes wilful default in payment of rents.
5. The appellate authority had given cogent and convincing reasons as far as the ground of wilful default is concerned. The appellate authority, on sub-heads 2, 3 and 4 also, after detailed discussion, had arrived at a conclusion that the ground of wilful default was established. But, as far as bonafide requirement is concerned, at paras 42 to 47, after discussing the ground in detail, had negatived the contention of the landlords and had confirmed the finding of the learned Rent Controller and had ultimately allowed the appeal granting the tenant a period of three months to vacate the premises and aggrieved by the same, the tenant had preferred the present Civil Revision Petition.
6. Sri Muddu Vijay, learned counsel representing the revision petitioner-tenant, had strenuously contended that the appellate authority had totally erred in reversing the well considered judgment of the Court of first instance. The learned counsel also had contended that O.S. No. 83/87 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Rajahmundry, a suit for recovery of rents, was dismissed for default on 15.12.1995 and in fact, the said decision operates as Res judicata and hence for the same period again, in a rent control proceeding, it cannot be made a ground at all. The learned counsel also had taken me through the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2, Exs.A1 to A10 and also the evidence of R.Ws 1 and 2 and Exs. B1 to B10 and X-series and had contended that the findings of the appellate authority are not sustainable at all. The learned counsel also had contended that there is a dispute relating to the quantum of rents whether it is Rs. 800/- or Rs. 400/- and in fact, except the self-serving documents there is no other material available to prove that the rent is Rs. 800/- as contended by the landlords. The learned counsel also had contended that the additional ground raised that the tenant is in arrears of Rs. 6,600/- and the said non-payment also will amount to wilful default cannot be taken into consideration. The learned counsel had further contended that at any rate, the ground of wilful default is not available to the landlords since there is no wilful, conscious and deliberate default committed by the tenant. The learned counsel has placed strong reliance on CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES v S. MOOSA AND OTHERS, and also P. RAJANNA v SMT. K. LALITHA REDDI @ CHINNAMA DEVI AND ANOTHER, .
7. Sri M.S.K. Shastry, learned senior counsel representing Mr. M.V. Suresh, the counsel on record, had made elaborate submissions supporting the findings recorded by the appellate authority on the ground of wilful default. No doubt, the learned senior counsel had not stressed much on the aspect of bonafide requirement since it is a concurrent finding recorded by both the Courts below on appreciation of evidence. However, as far as wilful default is concerned, the learned counsel had taken me through the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 2 and also the documentary evidence, which had been discussed in detail under different sub-heads from paras 8 to 41 of the order of the appellate authority. The learned senior counsel also had contended that as far as the dismissal of the suit for default is concerned, it is not a decision on merits and even otherwise, the ground of wilful default under Rent Control proceedings stands on a different footing and the mere fact that a suit for arrears of rent had been dismissed for default is not of much significance. The learned counsel also had pointed out how the account books had been disbelieved. The learned counsel had drawn my attention to the relevant periods and also purchase of the property and the learned senior counsel had contended that while appreciating the ground of wilful default, the state of mind of the tenant also may have to be taken into consideration and in the light of the detailed discussion relating to the ground of default by the appellate authority and in view of the limitations placed on the revisional Courts while exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 22 of the Act, the impugned order does not warrant any interference.
8. The premises was let out by P.W.2 to the tenant, the original owner. The tenant purchased the vacant site from him on 20.3.1995 and the said vacant site is part of the leasehold premises let out by P.W.2, the original owner to the tenant. Subsequent there to, the landlords purchased the scheduled premises and the other portion from P.W.2 by virtue of registered sale deeds dated 23.7.1986 and 14.8.1986, the copies of which had been marked as Exs. A1 and A2. It is the case of the landlords that the tenant had not paid the rents to their vendor P.W.2 from the month of April, 1985 onwards and the wilful default was committed in payment of rents from the said time onwards. It is pertinent to note that the very quantum of rent is in dispute. The evidence of P.W.2, the vendor, is that the rent is Rs.800/- per month. P.W.1, no doubt, had admitted that he has no personal knowledge about the terms of the lease agreement to P.W.2 and had deposed that the monthly rent is at the rate of Rs. 800/- and he is an income tax assessee and further, Ex.X1 and also Ex.X2, the photo copy of the income tax return of P.W.2 for the year 1986-87 and assessment order issued to P.W.2 by income tax department also had been relied upon and on the strength of the oral and documentary evidence and after appreciating even the evidence of R.W.1 and the documents relied upon Exs.B1 and B10, the appellate authority had recorded a finding that the quantum of rent agreed is Rs. 800/- per month and not Rs. 400/- per month as contended by the tenant. In my considered opinion, this is the most crucial aspect since, if the contention of the tenant that the rent payable is only Rs. 400/- per month is disbelieved, then, necessarily, the Court has to arrive at a conclusion that the default committed by the tenant is a conscious and deliberate default amounting to wilful default. All the other aspects, no doubt, which had been discussed by the appellate authority in detail, may fall into insignificance if, on the material available, it is to be accepted that the rent payable is Rs. 800/- and not Rs. 400/-. After perusing the material available on record, I am also satisfied that on the available material, necessarily the Court has to arrive at an irresistible conclusion that the rent is Rs. 800/- per month as contended by the landlords and not Rs. 400/- per month as contended by the tenant. Hence, in view of this finding on point, necessarily, I have to hold that the appellate authority is justified in arriving at a conclusion that the tenant had committed wilful default irrespective of the period of wilful default since it is not the case of the tenant at all that he has been paying or he is prepared to pay the rents at the rate of Rs. 800/- per month. Apart from this aspect of the matter, the appellate authority, in fact, had gone a step further and had in detail discussed the oral and documentary evidence available on record at paras 16 to 24. The appellate authority also, after appreciating Exs. B2 to B7, had arrived at a conclusion that merely because they are books maintained for the purpose of sales tax, it cannot be said that the entries therein are true and correct. The learned appellate authority at paras 26 to 30 had recorded clear findings and had ultimately arrived at the conclusion that in the absence of any agreement subsequent to the date of agreement Ex.B1 reducing the quantum of rents, the point has to be answered against the tenant. The appellate authority at paras 31 to 41 had recorded clear findings relating to the default committed from August, 1985 i.e. the rents due to P.W.2 himself and also on appreciation of Ex.A4 notice where under P.W.2 informed the tenant about the sale of the property and the subsequent conduct on the part of the tenant deliberately committing default, had arrived at a conclusion that the ground of wilful default has been well established. The appellate authority also had arrived at a conclusion that the default order made in a suit for arrears of rent may not come in the way of ordering eviction on the ground of wilful default.
9. In view of the detailed discussion of the appellate authority relating to the ground of wilful default and also in the light of the ratio laid down in CHORDIA AUTOMOBILES case (1 supra) and also RAJANNA’s case (2 supra), I am of the considered opinion that the default committed by the tenant is deliberate, conscious and wilful and hence the order of the appellate authority ordering eviction of the tenant on the ground of wilful default is sustainable in law and hence the findings of the appellate authority on the said grounds are hereby confirmed.
10. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the Civil Revision Petition is devoid of merits and accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs. However, the tenant is granted four months time to vacate the premises.