JUDGMENT
K.K. Denesan, J.
1. Petitioner was an Asst. Manager under the 1st respondent-Bank. He requested for voluntary retirement in 1993. Though Voluntary Retirement Pension Regulations were framed at that time, the same was not approved by the Government. Petitioner therefore submitted his resignation on 17.9.1993 which was accepted by the respondent-Bank on 15.12.1993. As the petitioner had resigned from the service of the Bank, the respondents took the stand that he was not entitled to any pension or other benefits applicable to officers who retire from service.
2. Petitioner approached this Court by filing O.P.No. 15098 of 1994. Pending the above Writ Petition, he requested the Bank for payment of travelling allowance and privilege leave encashment. That request was rejected. Meanwhile the voluntary retirement scheme under the Pension Regulations was approved by the Government of India and those Regulations came into force. Relying on letter dated 24.2.1997 issued by the Indian Banks Association of which the 1st respondent-Bank is a member, the petitioner once again made a request for granting him voluntary retirement benefits. In response to the above request, the respondent-Bank informed the petitioner that his request for voluntary retirement pension will be considered provided he withdrew O.P.No. 18098 of 1994 filed against the Bank. Accordingly he withdrew that Writ Petition. Thereupon the petitioner was granted pensionary benefits as per order dated 23.10.1998.
3. Subsequently, petitioner filed O.P.No. 18972 of 2000 claiming privilege leave encashment and travelling allowance on the ground that his resignation was converted into voluntary retirement, which was rejected by the 1st respondent-Bank. O.P.No. 18972 of 2000 was dismissed. However, in W.A. No. 2396 of 2002 filed by the petitioner, a Division Bench of this Court, as per judgment dated 26.11.2002, directed the respondent-Bank to consider the request of the petitioner for travelling allowance and privilege leave encashment as his resignation was subsequently treated as voluntary retirement. In the light of the above direction, the respondent-Bank passed orders granting leave encashment and travelling allowance to the petitioner. Petitioner encashed a sum of Rs. 37,320.15 vide Demand Draft issued by the Bank on 25.1.2003. Being not satisfied, he requested the Bank to pay him interest for the aforesaid amount. This claim for interest was rejected by the respondent-Bank as per Ext.P6 order dated 24.4.2003. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner approached the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Thiruvananthapuram. As per order dated 16.12.2003 the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner as not maintainable but without prejudice to his right to seek reliefs from the proper forum. It is in this background, the petitioner has filed the above Writ Petition.
4. The only relief sought for in this Writ Petition is for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to make payment of the accrued interest for Rs. 36,254/-from 16.12.1993 and for Rs. 1066/-from 18.12.1993 at the rate of 18% till the date of disbursement.
5. The respondents have filed a detailed counter affidavit. The first contention of the respondents is that the above Writ Petition is not maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution. The second contention is that the respondents are not liable to pay any interest for the amount paid to the petitioner towards travelling allowance and privilege leave encashment. In this context, the counter affidavit says that the relevant regulations permitting payment of travelling allowance and encashment of privilege leave do not provide for payment of any interest. According to the respondents, petitioner is not entitled to claim interest in the absence of statutory provisions. Respondents have got a further case that the petitioner had filed O.P. 18972 of 2000 praying inter alia for award of interest for the amount of travelling allowance and leave encashment. In the judgment of the Division Bench in W.A.No. 2396 of 2002 allowing the above Original Petition there was no direction to pay interest or even to consider the request of the petitioner for payment of interest. The operative part of the judgment in the Writ Appeal is as follows:
“Therefore, the claim of the petitioner for travelling allowance and privilege leave encashment cannot be rejected on the ground that the very same request was rejected on an earlier occasion because he had resigned from service. Hence, Ext.P10 is quashed and we direct the respondents to consider the request of the petitioner-appellant for travelling allowance and privilege leave encashment as his resignation is now treated as voluntary retirement. A fresh decision in this regard should be taken within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment”.
Respondents therefore contends that the petitioner cannot agitate a fresh claim for interest in this Writ Petition. For the above and other reasons the respondents maintain the stand that the Writ Petition claiming interest is liable to be dismissed. The petitioner has filed a reply affidavit so as to justify his claim for interest.
6. I think the primary question for consideration is why should this Court decide, the disputed claim for interest, in exercise of the extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India? Is it not a dispute which can, more effectively and appropriately be decided by the Civil Court, for, the dispute is of a civil nature and hence triable by the Civil Court under the ordinary law of the land? Power to grant reliefs under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is discretionary. In the absence of special circumstances jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution will not be exercised when there exists an efficacious alternate and adequate remedy. Whether the alternate remedy is efficacious or adequate depends on the nature of the relief sought for, as well. No doubt, alternate remedy cannot be a bar in cases where relief is sought on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, violation of the principles of natural justice, infringement of the fundamental rights or patent violation of statutory provisions. However, a petition under Article 226 will not be entertained for the purpose of enforcement, in general, of a contract or for relief for torts particularly where there are defences on which a suit brought for the same purpose including a claim for money could be defeated. In State of M.R and Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai, AIR 1964 SC 1006, a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court laid down the principle as follows:
“At the same time we cannot lose sight of the fact that the special remedy provided in Article 226 is not intended to supersede completely the modes of obtaining relief by an action in a Civil Court or to deny defences legitimately open in such action. It has been made clear more than once that the power to give relief under Article 226 is a discretionary power. This is specially true in the case of power to issue writs in the nature of mandamus”.
Another Constitutional Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Thansingh Nathmal and Ors. v. The Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419, also holds the same view and has laid down the dictum as follows:
“The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the Court will not entertain a petition for a writ under Article 226, where the petitioner has an alternative remedy, which without being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter upon a determination of questions which demand an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce which the writ is claimed”.
Viewed from the same angle, petition under Article 226 seeking the sole relief of interest for alleged delayed payment of a sum of money need not be entertained, for the claim for interest can be appropriately adjudicated and decided in a suit filed for that purpose, particularly when the respondents in the Writ Petition have got defences which require detailed examination in the context of the documentary and other evidence. In Mohan Pandey v. Usha Rani Rajgaria, (1992) 4 SCC 61, the Apex Court held that the High Court cannot allow the constitutional jurisdiction to be used for deciding disputes, for which remedies, under the general law, civil or criminal, are available. It is not intended to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit or application available to a litigant. The jurisdiction is special and extraordinary and should not be exercised casually or lightly. In N.T. Abraham v. State of Kerala, (1999) 9 SCC 280, Supreme Court in paragraph 3 of the judgment held:
“The High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that the dispute between the parties is of a civil nature which has to be agitated in an appropriate forum. Whether there has been a bona fide mistake or not in paying the excess amount to the appellant and whether the appellant is entitled to retain the said amount of Rs. 1,59,939.75 or not, are all matters which have to be decided under civil law and these disputes cannot be decided under Article 226 of the Constitution of India”.
Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code proclaims that the Civil Courts constituted under the said Code shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature except suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.
7. No doubt, having regard to the language used in 226 of the Constitution a Writ Petition seeking the relief of interest from the 1st respondent-nationalised bank cannot be said to be not maintainable. But the High Courts do follow certain self-imposed restrictions in exercising the discretionary power and refuse to entertain petitions seeking enforcement of a civil liability arising out of the terms of a contract, a tortious act, a money claim etc. Reluctance to adjudicate such claims and relegating the parties to the Civil Court or other appropriate dispute resolving forum, though not a rule of jurisdiction is a sound rule of practice.
8. Quick relief or speedy justice is said to be one of the salient features that attracts litigants to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. But the recent indiscriminate trend among litigants to rush to the writ Courts with all kinds of disputes which can be effectively dealt with, adjudicated and decided by Courts or tribunals set up under the ordinary law of the land, tends to add to the heavy pendency of Writ Petitions and takes away the advantage of getting speedy justice and quick relief. There is no gainsaying the fact that this Court has got a duty to exercise the discretion appropriately keeping in mind the very object of the constitutional remedy. If all matters which can be brought under the writ jurisdiction are entertained indiscriminately, that is to say, without making any effort to see whether those cases ought to be adjudicated by the writ Court, it will defeat the object of conferring the High Courts with the extraordinary jurisdiction. Hence there is need to distinguish between cases which essentially deserves the attention of the writ Court and those to be dealt with by the statutory authorities or Tribunals or Courts under the ordinary law of the land. Cases which cannot brook delay, cases which have to be dealt with in the larger public interest, cases where the remedy available under the ordinary law of the land is not efficacious, cases where the fundamental rights of the citizen are violated or are in danger, violation of human rights etc. are matters which may readily attract the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such petitions deserve to be examined on merits to meet the ends of justice, under the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. On the contrary, matters which do not quality such urgent or serious attention shall take their retreat course at the very threshold, so that without any further loss of time, the parties can avail the proper remedy.
9 Viewed in the above perspective the relief sought for by the petitioner whose only claim is tor a sum of money from the respondents by way of interest does not deserve to be adjudicated by this Court in the exercise of the original jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution of India. It is true that the Supreme Court in State of Kerala and Ors. v. Padmanabhan Nair, 1985 KLT 86 (SC) = (1985) 1 SCC 429 held that pension and gratuity are no longer bounties to be distributed by the Government to Us employees on their retirement but have become valuable rights and property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with penalty of payment of interest at the current market rate till actual payment But, it may not be out of place to take note of the fact that the above ruling was given by the Supreme Court while disposing of a Special Leave Petition (Civil) challenging the judgment of this Court in A.S.No. 10 of 1979 by which the claim for interest decreed in favour of the pensioner (plaintiff in the civil suit) was upheld. Of course, following the above decision, the writ Courts have been allowing the claims of retired employees for interest for delayed payment of terminal benefits. The interest awarded in such cases is not on the basis of any contract between the employee and the employer or the government and its officers. The interest allowed is not statutory either The foundation for the claim is culpable delay or negligent or grossly unjust action on the part of the employer or its officers, making them liable to compensate for the loss sustained. The claimant has to establish culpable inaction or negligence on the part of the employer. Therefore, the amount awarded as interest is in lieu of the amount payable as compensation for the tortious liability. Interest may be awarded on equitable grounds also. The Civil Court may exercise the power under Section 3 of the Interest Act Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other relevant statutory provision What is important to notice, in the context in which the above principle of law has come to be examined, is that determination of the claim for interest on equitable grounds or as compensation for acts of negligence or culpable inaction on the part of the employer whether it be the Government or a public sector undertaking or a banking company requires appreciation of relevant facts and determination of the factual as well as legal issues arising therefrom.
10. In a claim for interest, one of the relevant questions for consideration would be the rate of interest. It could be at the statutory rate or contract rate or the current rate approved by the Reserve Bank or a just and reasonable rate which the Court may fix having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Questions may also arise as to what should be the rate of interest for the sum adjudged, the rate of interest pendente lite as also the post decree interest rate. Whether the fault is exclusively that of the respondent or defendant and whether the petitioner/plaintiff is also guilty of contributory negligence, that is to say, whether the petitioner also contributed to the delay may also come up as relevant issues. In my view, such investigations into questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact to determine the legality and the justifiability of the claim or interest, can be better done by the courts referred to in Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the form, if any, provided by the respective statutes, So that the writ Courts can adjudicate matters exclusively or essentially coming within the purview of Article 226 of the Constitution.
11. I have already referred to the basic contentions of the petitioner and the counter arguments of the respondents in this case. The fact that interest claimed is not for delayed payment of pension or gratuity; but for the alleged delay in disbursing some other service benefit, does not make any difference in the application of the principle of law, I have stated above. What is relevant to notice is that the claim for interest is seriously disputed by the respondents. Hence the burden to establish that he is entitled to be compensated for the alleged injury or loss, by awarding interest, is that of the petitioner.
12. Writ Petitions filed claiming interest alone has to be distinguished from those filed claiming retirement benefits and interest for delayed payments together. Cases of employees or officers who are denied the terminal benefits deserve urgent attention justifying the exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that process, this Court, simultaneously may consider whether the delay in payment of the retirement benefit is such as to make the authority liable to pay interest also, to the pensioner. There is no such urgency when the pensioner, having received the amounts due to him, make a separate claim for some more money by way of interest. I held that civil suit is the proper remedy in such matters. In the above view of the matter I decline jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and dismiss this Writ Petition.