1
mst
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.579 OF 2010
Vijendra B. Singh Petitioner
versus
Uma Vijendra Singh Respondent
Mr.Ketan R. Parekh a/w Ms.Kunjal Sanghavi i/by K.R.Parekh & Co. for
petitioner.
Mr.Sasi Nair for respondent.
CORAM : A.S.OKA, J.
DATE : 21st April 2010
JUDGMENT :
1. The submissions of learned counsel appearing for the parties were
heard on the earlier date. Parties were put to notice that the petition will
be finally decided at the stage of admission. With a view to appreciate the
submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, it will be necessary
to consider the facts of the case. The petitioner is the husband and the
respondent is the wife. They got married on 22nd April 1996. In the year
1998 the respondent-wife filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights
under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as
“the said Act”). In the said petition, a decree of restitution of conjugal
rights was passed on 3rd October 2002 .As the said decree remained
unexecuted, the petitioner-husband filed a petition for divorce under
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:06 :::
2
section 13(1-A)(ii) of the said Act for a decree of divorce. The learned
Judge of the Family Court dismissed the said petition for divorce by
judgment and decree dated 23rd August 2006. A Family Court appeal
preferred by the petitioner for challenging the said decree is pending in
this Court. The said appeal has been admitted. An application for
execution was made by the respondent-wife for execution of the decree
for restitution of the conjugal rights. By the impugned order, the learned
Judge of the Family Court directed that the petitioner-husband shall obey
the decree of restitution of conjugal rights within a period of one month
from the date of impugned order i.e. 6th November 2009. The learned
Judge directed that upon failure of the petitioner to obey the said decree
within the time prescribed under the said order, he shall pay an amount of
Rs.20,000/- p.m. to the respondent-decree holder from the date of
passing the decree of restitution of the conjugal rights.
2. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has made detailed
submissions. He submitted that while passing the decree, the Court had
not fixed any time limit for compliance of the decree. He submitted that
the impugned order amounts to going beyond the decree and adding to
the decree something which is not permissible in law. He submitted that
the notice under Rule 22 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the said Code”) was not served and,
therefore, the impugned order has been vitiated. He submitted that the
time for complying with the decree of restitution of conjugal rights could
have been fixed only by the Court which passed the decree either at the
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:06 :::
3
time of passing the decree or any time afterwards but the Executing Court
had no jurisdiction to pass an order fixing an outer limit for complying with
the decree of restitution of conjugal rights. He submitted that the
Executing Court was powerless to pass an order fixing the period of one
month for compliance with the decree. He submitted that the Executing
Court has added a direction in the decree for restitution of the conjugal
rights which is completely prohibited. He submitted that after the
petitioner had filed the petition under section 13(1-A)(ii) of the said Act on
the basis of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the said decree
ceases to be executable. He submitted that in execution of a decree
which was not executable, no such direction could have been issued.
Without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, he submitted that the
Executing Court proceeded on assumption that what was required to be
fixed was the maintenance amount and the payment contemplated by
Sub- Rule 2 of Rule 33 of Order XXI of the said Code cannot be equated
with maintenance payable under the said Act. He submitted that in any
case, such a drastic order could have been passed only on the basis of a
finding that there was willful disobedience of the decree on the part of the
petitioner-husband and no such finding has been recorded. He pointed
out that an application for execution was filed earlier which was not
pressed by the respondent and therefore, a fresh application was not
maintainable. The learned counsel for the respondents supported the
impugned judgment and order. He submitted that the Executing Court is
the same Court who has passed the decree of restitution of conjugal
rights. He submitted that the learned Judge had jurisdiction to pass an
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:06 :::
4
order in exercise of powers under Rule 33 of Order XXI of the said Code.
He submitted that periodical payment referred to in Sub-Rule 2 of Rule 33
of Order XXI of the said Code is a payment by way of penalty and not by
way of maintenance. He submitted that the tests which are applicable for
fixing the amount of interim alimony or maintenance will not apply in the
present case. He submitted that the learned Trial Judge was justified in
fixing the amount of Rs.20,000/- considering the income of the petitioner.
He pointed out that even the petition for divorce filed by the petitioner-
husband has been dismissed by holding that the petitioner was not ready
and willing to co-habit and, therefore, power under Rule 33 of Order XLII
of the said Code has been rightly exercised by the Trial Court.
3. I have given careful consideration to the submissions. There is no
dispute about the decree for restitution of conjugal rights passed on a
petition filed by the respondent which has attained finality. The decree
was passed on 3rd October 2002. There are two provisions relating to
execution of such a decree. The said two provisions are Rule 32 and
Rule 33 of Order XXI of the said Code. Before proceeding further, it must
be noted here that in view of Section 21 of the said Act, the proceedings
under the said Act shall be regulated as far as may be by the said Code.
The decree for restitution of conjugal rights was passed by a Family Court
established under the Family Courts Act, 1984. Under section 10 of the
Family Courts Act, 1984, the provisions of the said Code apply to the
proceedings before the Family Court subject to provisions of said Act of
1984. Section 18 of the said Act of 1984 provides that a decree or order
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:06 :::
5
passed by a Family Court shall have same effect as a decree or order of a
Civil Court and shall be executed in the same manner as is prescribed by
the said Code. Sub section 3 of section 18 provides that a decree passed
by the Family Court can be executed either by the same Court or by
ordinary Civil Court to which it is sent for execution. Rule 32 of Order XXI
of the said Code reads thus:-
ORDER XXI : EXECUTION OF DECREES & ORDERS
Rule 32 : ig Decree for specific performance for
restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction.-
(1) Where the party against whom a decree for the
specific performance of a contract, or for restitution of
conjugal rights, or for an injunction, has been passed, has
had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has wilfully
failed to obey it, the decree may be enforced in the case of
a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachmentof his property or, in the case of a decree for the specific
performance of a contract, or for an injunction by hisdetention in the civil prison, or by the attachment of his
property, or by both.
(2) Where the party against whom a decree for specific
performance or for an injunction has been passed is acorporation, the decree may be enforced by the attachment
of the property of the corporation or, with the lave of the
Court, by the detention in the civil prison of the directors or
other principal officers thereof, or by both attachment and
detention.
(3) Where any attachment under sub-rule (1) or sub-
rule (2) has remained in force for six months if the
judgment-debtor has not obeyed the decree and the
decree-holder has applied to have the attached property
sold, such property may be sold; and out of the proceeds
the Court may award to the decree-holder such
compensation as it thinks fit, and shall pay the balance if
any to the judgment-debtor on his application.
(4) Where the judgment-debtor has obeyed the decree
and paid all costs of executing the same which he is bound
to pay, or where, at the end of six months from the date of::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:06 :::
6the attachment, no application to have the property sold
has been made, or if made has been refused, theattachment shall cease.
(5) Where a decree for the specific performance of a
contract or for an injunction has not been obeyed, the Court
may, in lieu of or in addition to all or any of the processes
aforesaid, direct that the act required to be done may be
done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some
other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of thejudgment-debtor, and upon the act being done the
expenses incurred may be ascertained in such manner as
the Court may direct and may be recovered as if they were
included in the decree.”
Sub Rule 1 of Rule 32 of Order XXI of said Code provides that a decree
for restitution of conjugal rights may be enforced by attachment of the
property of the party against whom the decree has been passed. This is
the mode prescribed for executing a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights under Rule 32 of the said Code.
4. Rule 33 of Order XXI of the said Code reads thus:-
ORDER XXI : EXECUTION OF DECREES & ORDERS
Rule 33 : Discretion of Court in executing decrees for
restitution of conjugal rights.-
(1) Notwithstanding anything in rule 32, the Court, either
at the time of passing a decree against a husband for the
restitution of conjugal rights or at any time afterwards, may
order that the decree shall be executed in the manner
provided in this rule.
(2) Where the Court has made an order under sub-rule
(1), it may order, that in the event of the decree not being
obeyed within such period as may be fixed in this behalf,
the judgment-debtor shall make to the decree-holder such
periodical payments as may be just, and, if it thinks fit,
require that the judgment-debtor shall, to its satisfaction,
secure to the decree-holder such periodical payments.
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:06 :::
7
(3) The Court may from time to time vary or modify any
order made under sub-rule (2) for the periodical payment of
money, either by altering the times of payment or by
increasing or diminishing the amount, or may temporarilysuspend the same as to the whole or any part of the money
so ordered to be paid, and again revive the same, either
wholly or in part as it may think just.
(4) Any money ordered to be paid under this rule may
be recovered as though it were payable under a decree for
the payment of money.”
Sub-Rule 1 of Rule 33 of Order XXI of the said Code starts with non-
obstante clause. Thus, Rule 33 will have overriding effect over the rule
32. Under Sub-rule 1 of Rule 32 it is provided that the decree for
restitution of conjugal rights can be enforced by attachment of property of
the party against whom the same is passed, provided, the party had an
opportunity of obeying the decree and has willfully disobeyed it. Thus,
what is contemplated by Sub-rule 1 of Rule 32 is willful disobedience on
the part of the party against whom such a decree has been passed.
However, Rule 33 overrides Rule 32 because of non-obstante clause and
it confers power on the Court passing a decree either at the time of
passing a decree against the husband for restitution of conjugal rights or
any time afterwards to direct that the decree for restitution of conjugal
rights shall be executed in the manner provided in Rule 33. Thus, it is not
necessary that at the time of passing a decree for restitution of conjugal
rights, the Court has to pass an order that the decree shall be complied
with in accordance with Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33. Even after passing a
decree, the Court can issue a direction that the decree shall be executed
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:06 :::
8
in the manner provided in Rule 33. In such event, under Sub-rule 2 of
Rule 33, the Court has power to direct that in the event the decree not
being obeyed within such a period as may be fixed in this behalf, the
judgment-debtor shall make to the decree-holder such periodical
payments as may be just. In a given case the Court may require the
judgment-debtor to secure to the decree-holder such periodical payments.
As distinguished from Sub-rule 1 of Rule 32, willful disobedience is not a
condition precedent for passing an order under Sub-Rule 2 of Order 33
directing the judgment-debtor to make periodical payments to the decree-
holder. The Court gets power when it is found that the decree has not
been complied with within such period as may be fixed in this behalf. The
power can be exercised under Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33 once the Executing
Court finds that the decree is not obeyed within the period as may be fixed
in that behalf. The provision of Sub-rule 1 of Rule 33 requires that the
Court passing a decree should issue a direction at any time after passing
a decree that the decree shall be executed in the manner provided in the
Rule. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33 provides that where the Court has made an
order under Sub -Rule 1 that the decree shall be executed in the manner
provided in Rule 33 , it may order that in the event of the decree not
being obeyed within such period as may be fixed in this behalf , the
judgment-debtor shall make periodical payments as may be just. Thus,
the power under Sub-rule 1 of Rule 33 of Order XXI of the said Code
directing that the decree shall be executed in the manner provided under
Rule 33 is of the Court passing the decree. The power under Sub-Rule 2
of Rule 33 is to be exercised by the Court in execution. Sub-rule 4 of Rule
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
9
33 provides that periodical payments ordered to be made under Sub-Rule
2 of Rule 33 may be recovered as if the same is payable under a decree
for payment of money. The effect of Sub-rule 4 is that if the judgment-
debtor fails to make periodical payments, as ordered under Sub-rule 2 of
Rule 33, the said direction can be executed as if it is a money decree.
5. As far as the date from which the periodical payment is payable,
Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33 confers discretion on the Court. It is not necessary
that in every case periodical payment shall be ordered to be paid from the
date of passing the decree of restitution of conjugal rights or from the date
on which the period provided for compliance comes to an end. In a given
case the direction under Sub-rule 1 of Rule 33 may be issued by the
Court after a lapse of considerable time from the date of decree as the
rule provides that such a direction can be issued at time after passing a
decree. In such a case, it may be unjust to direct that periodical payment
shall be made from the date of passing the decree.
6. The Court gets power to pass a direction against judgment-debtor
to make periodical payment in the event the decree is not obeyed within
such time as may be fixed in this behalf. Therefore, while passing an
order in terms of Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33, of fixing the date from which the
periodical payment is payable, the Court will have to consider all the facts
and circumstances and conduct of the parties. At the same time, it must
be noted that it is not necessary for the wife (decree-holder) to establish
that there is willful disobedience of the decree on the part of husband-
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
10
judgment debtor. The Court gets jurisdiction to pass a direction for
periodical payments when the judgment-debtor fails to obey the decree
within time limit provided. In a given case where time limit is provided
while passing a decree and if there is non-compliance, there may be
some justification for passing a direction against the judgment-debtor to
make periodical payments from the date of passing the decree. In a given
case, a direction may be issued to make such periodical payments from
the date on which period provided for compliance of the decree is over.
No hard and fast rule can be laid down in that behalf.
7. As far as quantum of amount is concerned, it must be remembered
that the Court can exercise the power under Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33 only if
the husband-judgment debtor fails to comply with the decree of restitution
of conjugal rights. In a way this is a provision to compensate the wife-
decree holder on account of non compliance of the decree for restitution
of conjugal rights by the husband and, therefore, it is not possible to
accept the argument that periodical payment contemplated by sub-rule 2
is in the nature of penalty. If a decree for restitution of conjugal rights
would have been implemented, a wife could have enjoyed the benefit of
the status of her husband in terms of the standard of living of the
husband, life style of the husband and other material aspects of the life. If
the object of directing periodical payments to be made by the husband-
judgment debtor is considered, the amount which is made payable under
the said sub-rule 2 cannot exceed the maintenance or the alimony which
may be payable to the wife in accordance with section 24 or section 25 of
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
11
the said Act. Therefore, while determining the amount, the Executing
Court has to apply the same yardsticks which are normally applied when
the amount of maintenance is determined under the provisions of said Act.
As stated earlier, the argument that the amount is in the nature of penalty
has to be discarded as there is no requirement of law that before the
power under Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33 is exercised, it is necessary to
establish willful disobedience on the part of the husband. What is
required to be established is the fact that the husband has not obeyed the
decree within the time fixed for compliance thereof.
8. The first issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the Executing Court could not have passed a direction contemplated
by Sub-rule 1 of Rule 33. In the facts of the case, the said objection is too
technical. Application for execution is made to the same Court which
passed the decree. The application may have been styled as one under
Order XXI of the said Code but there is a specific prayer therein for
passing a direction in terms of Rule 33. As a prayer has been made in the
application for execution, considering the object of the provision, since the
Executing Court was the same Court which had passed the decree, the
power under Sub-Rule 1 read with Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33 could have been
always exercised by the learned Judge of the Family Court while dealing
with execution application.
9. On conjoint reading of Sub-rules 1 and 2 of Rule 33, it is very clear
that the power under Sub-rule 2 of fixing the periodical payments has to
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
12
be exercised by the Executing Court as such power has to be exercised
only after the husband fails to comply with the decree and, therefore, in
Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33, the husband has been referred to as the judgment-
debtor.
10. It is already held that the periodical payment cannot exceed the
amount of the maintenance or alimony payable under section 24 or
section 25 of the said Act.
11.
One of the important submissions made by the learned counsel for
the petitioner was on the basis of failure to serve notice under Rule 22 of
Order XXI of the said Code. His submission was that as the decree is
sought to be executed by filing an execution application after expiry of
period of more than two years from the date of decree, it was mandatory
for the Executing Court to issue notice calling upon the judgment-debtor to
show cause as to why the decree should not be executed against him.
The object of Rule 22 of Order XXI is to provide an opportunity of being
heard to the judgment-debtor, if the decree is sought to be executed two
years after the date of decree. Reliance has been placed by the learned
counsel for the petitioner on the decision of Madras High Court in case of
Natarajan Vs. M/s. Chandmull Amarchand by Power of Attorney
K.Milopchand and another (1971-Mh.L.J.-474). The learned counsel
pointed out that what is held by the said High Court is that on failure to
comply with Rule 22 of Order XXI of the said Code, the sale executed in
execution stands vitiated. This is held in the context of the fact that the
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
13
judgment-debtor should know that his property is going to be sold. What
is held by the Madras High Court is that it would be most unjust and
unfair to a judgment-debtor that the process of sale is initiated without
issuing such a notice under Rule 22 of Order XXI. He has also placed
reliance on a decision of this Court in case of M/s.Bhurmal Kapurchand
& Co. Vs. M/s.PLremier Machine Tools Ltd. (AIR-1977-Bom-305)
where this Court was dealing with issuance of insolvency notice under the
Presidency Town Insolvency Act, 1909. This Court observed in the
context of the drastic provisions of the said Act of 1909 that to sustain an
insolvency notice, it must arise out of an enforceable decree. In this
context this Court held that a decree which is more than two years old, by
its own force, is unexecutable unless procedure under Rule 22 of Order
XXI of the said Code if followed. At this stage it must be observed that
provisions of the said Act of 1909 have drastic consequences which may
have result of a civil death of an insolvent. In the context of validity of
insolvency notice under section 9 of the said Act of 1909, this Court has
examined the matter. The learned counsel also relied upon decisions of
the Apex Court in case of State of Punjab Vs. K.D.Sharma (AIR-1990-
SC-2177) and Rameshwardas Gupta Vs. Styate of U.P. (AIR-1997-
SC-410) in the context of his contention that the Executing Court cannot
go behind the decree. As held earlier, the power to fix the periodical
payments is vested in the Executing Court. Therefore, the said
submission is of no avail to the learned counsel for the petitioner. In this
context he has also placed reliance on decision of Apex Court in the case
of K.Rajamouli Vs. A.V.K.N.Swami (AIR-2001-SC-2316).
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
14
12. The argument based on failure to serve notice under Rule 22 of
Order XXI of the said Code was of some consequence, provided, the
petitioner was not heard before passing the impugned order. The object
of Rule 22 of Order XXI is to enable the judgment-debtor to raise an
objection to the executability and validity of the decree within the four
corners of the said Code. In the present case, the Executing Court has
not only given an opportunity to contest the execution application by filing
a reply but even issues were framed on the basis of contentions raised by
the petitioner about maintainability of the execution in view of pendency of
Family Court appeal. Therefore, in substance, there is a substantial
compliance with Rule 22 of Order XXI as more than sufficient opportunity
was given to the petitioner to contest the execution application on all
grounds. From the annextures to the petition it appears that even the
parties were permitted to adduce evidence as affidavit in lieu of
examination-in-chief of the respondent has been annexed to the petition.
Therefore, the said argument based on failure to issue specific notice
under Rule 22 of Order XXI has to be rejected. Though in the points
formulated by the advocate for the petitioner there is a contention raised
as regards effect of the opting for the remedy under section 13(1-A)(ii) of
the said Act, the learned counsel has not canvassed the said submission
in view of pendency of Family Court appeal in this Court against the
decree of dismissal of the said petition filed by the petitioner.
13. Now, coming back to the impugned order, another objection raised
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
15
by the petitioner has to be considered that earlier there was an execution
application filed by the petitioner which was dismissed. However, I find
that in the earlier execution application, the only prayer was for enforcing
the decree of restitution of conjugal rights. On the earlier execution
application filed on 22nd September 2003, there is an order passed on
18th August 2007 by the learned Judge of the Family Court that the
decree-holder has remedy of an application under Rules 32 and 33 of
Order XXI. Therefore, the objection to the maintainability of the present
execution application filed in the year 2007 has no basis.
14. By the impugned order, the learned Judge directed the petitioner to
comply with the decree within one month i.e. on or before 5 th December
2009. On failure to pay, a direction was issued to pay the amount of Rs.
20,000/- p.m. to the respondent-wife from 3rd October 2002 which is the
date of passing the decree. As stated earlier, the first execution
application was filed by the respondent on 22th September 2003 when the
respondent had not chosen to seek a direction under Sub-rule 1 of Rule
33 of Order XXI of the said Code. The said direction was sought by filing
an execution application on 6th October 2007. It must be also noted that
on 25th November 2003 the petitioner filed a petition for divorce on the
ground that the decree for restitution of conjugal rights remained
unexecuted for the statutory period. On 23th August 2006 the Family
Court dismissed the said petition and thereafter present execution
application has been filed. I am conscious of the fact that an appeal
against a decree of dismissal is pending in this Court. Nevertheless, while
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
16
dismissing the petition, the Family Court has recorded a finding that the
petitioner himself has committed default and that on his own he never
took any step for complying with the decree for restitution of conjugal
rights. In short, the finding is that the petitioner himself is the wrongdoer.
As of today, the said finding stands. Considering these peculiar facts of
the case, in the present case, the learned Judge could not have directed
payment of monthly amount from 3rd October 2002 as the respondent
herself waited for seeking a direction under Sub-rule 1 of Rule 33 of Order
XXI till the year 2007. In the present case, the monthly amount ought to
have made payable from October 2007 when the execution application
was filed by the respondent and to that extent the order will need
modification.
15. Now, as far as quantum is concerned, the amount is fixed at Rs.
20,000/- p.m.. Parties have adduced evidence in respect of their
respective income. For the year 2007-08 the income of the respondent-
wife was Rs.1,72,388/- and for the year 2008-09 her salary income was
Rs.2,02,240/-. As far as income of the petitioner-husband is concerned,
for the year 2007-08 the same was Rs.8,08,422/- and for the year
2008-09 it was Rs.6,31,926/-. For the year 2006-07 the income was Rs.
10,06,585/-. Thus, from the year 2006-07 the total income of the husband
has reduced. Taking the income of 2008-09, broadly the monthly income
of the husband comes to Rs.52,000/- and the monthly income for said
year of the respondent-wife is Rs.16,850/-. If the income for this year is
considered and a sum of Rs.20,000/- is made payable by the husband,
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
17
the income of the wife will be Rs.36,850/- and what will be left with the
husband will be a sum of Rs.32,000/-.
16. As stated earlier, if the decree for restitution of conjugal rights
would have been implemented, the respondent-wife could have enjoyed
the status of her husband in relation to his income. The wife is entitled to
say that she must have the same life style as that of her husband. But
while fixing the amount under Sub-rule 2 of Rule 33 of Order XXI of the
said Code, it cannot be that the wife gets more amount than what the
husband will retain after payment of monthly amount to the wife.
Considering the manner in which the income of the husband has
fluctuated, and considering the income of the wife, this is a case where
the amount ought to have been reasonably fixed at Rs.12,000/- per month
instead of Rs.20,000/- per month. To that extent the impugned order will
have to be modified.
17. On 4th February 2010 this Court has passed an ad-interim order
pursuant to which certain deposit has been made. The said deposit will
have to be naturally considered. Before parting with this judgment, it must
be also noted that Sub-Rule 3 of Rule 33 of Order XXI of the said Code
gives power to the Court from time to time to vary or modify the order
made of periodical payments of money. Obviously, said power can be
exercised by the Court on the application made by either party. In the
event of change of circumstances, both the petitioner and the respondent
can always take recourse to Sub-Rule 3 of rule 33 of Order XXI of the said
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::
18
Code. The said remedy always remains open to both the parties.
18. Hence, the petition is disposed of by passing following order :-
A) Clauses (1) and (3) of the operative part of the impugned order are
maintained.
B) Clause (2) of the operative part of the impugned order is modified
and it is directed that the petitioner shall pay an amount of Rs.12,000/-
(Rs.Twelve thousand only) per month to the respondent-wife from 6th
October 2007 till the date of compliance with the decree of restitution of
conjugal rights;
C) Time of three months is granted to the petitioner to pay or deposit
the arrears. However, the petitioner shall continue to pay a sum of Rs.
12,000/- per month from May 2010 onwards on or before 10th day of
every calender month;
D) The impugned judgment and order is modified in above terms with
no order as to costs;.
E) It is obvious that the petitioner will be entitled to adjustment of the
amounts paid under the impugned order or under the ad-interim order
passed by this Court.
(A.S.OKA, J.)
::: Downloaded on – 09/06/2013 15:52:07 :::