PETITIONER: VISHNU DAYAL MAHENDRA PAL AND OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER DATE OF JUDGMENT01/05/1974 BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN ALAGIRISWAMI, A. SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH CITATION: 1974 AIR 1489 1975 SCR (1) 376 1974 SCC (2) 306 ACT: Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadhan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 and Rules made thereunder-If violative of Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitutional. HEADNOTE: The Uttar Pradesh Krishi Utpadhan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 as amended by U.P. Acts 25 of 1964 and 10 of 1970. was enacted to provide for the regulation of the sale and purchase of agricultural produce, to protect the producers from exploitation and for the establishment, superintendence and control of markets in U.P. Under s. 5, the State Government is empowered to declare a particular area as market area and under s. 7. the principal market yard and sub-market yards are declared. Section 7(2) provides that no person shall in a principal market yard or sub-market yard carry on business as a trader, broker, commission agent etc., in respect of specified agricultural produce except in accordance with the conditions of a licence obtained from he concerned market committee. Sec. 13 provides for the constitution of the market committee and for representation on the committee from different sources. Under s. 17. the committee has power to issue, renew, suspend or cancellicences. Section 25 provides for appeals against orders of the committeeto the Director of Agriculture and s. 32 for revision by the State Government Under s. 16(2)(vii), the committee has to provide accommodation for storage. Sec. 40 enables the-' State Government to make rules Rule 70(4)(1)provides that the Committee may issue a licence to an applicant if it is satisfied. (a) that the applicant is solvent and (b) that the applicant is a desirable person. Rule 76(1) provides that every consignment of specified agricultural produce brought for sale into the principal or sub-market yard shall be sold by open auction. The petitioners who were traders or commission agents, dealing in agricultural produce, challenged the validity of the Act, and the rules made thereunder on the ground of violation of Arts. 14 and19(1)(g). They contended that : (1) that constitution of the committee is prejudicial to their interests since. it will have a perpetual majority of producers, (2) the entrustment of licensing to such a committee is an unreasonable restriction on their right to trade, (3) there is no guidance in the matter of grant of licences, the criteria mentioned in r. 70(4) being vague, (4) the requirement to provide storage space for the producers by the petitioners is an unreasonable restriction, and (5) r. 76(1) is ultra vires s. 40 and also places an unreasonable restriction on the petitioners. Dismissing the petitions, HELD :-(1) Under s. 13, the Committee is to consist of 23 members and out of, them only 10 are from the producers. Therefore the submission is factually inaccurate as there is no question of a perpetual majority of producers. [381G-H] (2) There are no unreasonable features in the scheme of representation in the committee. Under 8. 13, 8 producers are elected who may represent the 8 categories of agricultural produce mentioned in the schedule and two producers are nominated from the schedule castes by the Government, because, they may not get due representation in the election. The performance of the duty of licensing by such a committee cannot prejudice the petitioners. In fact, none of the petitioners has been refused a licence. Though usually some governments] authority is charged with the duty of granting licences under various Acts, that does not prove that the duty cannot be property and impartially exercised by a Committee representing various interests which are 377 vitally interested in the trade. of agricultural produce. If in a particular case. the action of the Committee is mala fide' or otherwise objectionable such grievance can be properly dealt with. [381H-382E] (3) It is not correct to say that there is no guidance in the Act in the matter of grant of license and that the two criteria provided by rule 70(4)(1) are vague. [382E-F] (a) The Committee which is entrusted with the duty of granting licences consists of people from different sources vitally interested in the marketing of agricultural produce, as well as Government officials. It is a well-represented Committee which is expected to know the object and purpose of the Act of' which it is a creature. There is sufficient guidance from the preamble and other provisions of the Act with which the members of the Committee would be familiar and-conversant, for example, s. 16 of the Act and the particulars in Forms XI and XIII. for the application of a licence and Conditions of a licence. With the help of Government officials in the committee there is no reason to think that the Committee will not function smoothly or to apprehend that licence would be refused arbitrarily. There is also a limitation on the power of the Committee in that the Act insists that the Committee should record its reasons while refusing a licence. Further, there is provision of appeal against the decision of the Committee and a further revision to the State Government. [382F-383D] (b) One of the two criteria mentioned in r. 70(4)(i). is solvency and the criterion on the score or 'bankruptcy is well-known and cannot be said to be vague or indefinite. As regards the second criterion, namely, that the applicant should be a desirable person the Act itself provides sufficient guidance to the Committee in the matter of deciding whether a particular applicant is or is not a proper person to hold the licence. [383F-H] (4) The requirement to provide a storage space is only an interim measure pending arrangements by the Committee for proper storage as required by S. 16. Under r. 52(4) storing of the specified agricultural produce shall be subject to the payment of such storage fee and other conditions as may be: specified in the bye-laws. Since the storage by the traders in the market yards will always be paid for under the rule there is no substance in the contention that the requirement is unreasonable. [384A-B] (5)(a Rule 76(1) is not ultra vires s. 40 Section 9(2) restricts the right to carry on trade except under and in accordance with the licence_ and s. 17 provides for issuing or renewal of licences subject to the restrictions under the rules, and these sections are not challenged. Section 40 empowers the State Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act, and under s. 40(2) (xxvii), r. 76(1) only prescribes open auction as the mode of sale. [384B-D] (b) The rule does not violate the fundamental right of the petitioners under Art. 19(1)(g). [384G] The definitions of sale and purchase in the. Act do not run counter to the provisions relating to auction sale under, the rule and, it Could not be field to be an unreasonable mode considered in the entire scheme of the Act. in order that the producers may obtain the best price for their commodity, sale by open auction is prescribed under the rule to fulfil one of the important purposes of the Act. The legislature is intervening to see that the producers get the maximum pecuniary return possible in the transaction and as a necessary concomitant eliminated the made of private sale by individual negotiation resulting in malpractices. Besides, by the Proviso to the rule the restriction is not allowed to operate in the case of retail sales. [384D-G] Lala Hari Chand Sarda v. Mizo District Council and all)-. [1967] 1 S.C.R. 479 and Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia and ors. etc. v. Union of India and ors. [1970] 1 S.C.R. 479, distinguished. 378 JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petitions Nos. 1524, 1537-1580
of 1973 and 74, 75, 254, 510-512 of 19702′ 21 of 1971 and
1525 & 1581-1606 of 1973.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India.
A. K. Sen, Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga and S. Bagga, for
the petitioners (in W.Ps. Nos. 1524 and 1537-1580/73).
A. K. Sea, (in W.P. No. 74/70), Hardyal Hardy (in W.P. No.
75/70), Yogeshwar Prasad, S. K. Bagga and S. Bagga, for the
petitioners in (W.P. Nos 74, 75, 254 and 510-512/70, 21/71
and 1525, 1581-1606/1973).
L. N. Sinha, Solicitor General and O. P. Rana, for
respondents (in W.Ps. Nos. 1524, 1537-1580173).
O. P. Rana, for respondents (in W.Ps. Nos. 74, 254/70,
21171, 1525, 1581-1606/73 and respondents nos. 1 & 3 in W.P.
75 and 510-512/70).
V. M. Tarkunde and E. C. Agarwala, for respondent No. 2
(in W.-P. No. 75/70 and applicant/intervener in W.P. No.
75/70.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by-
Goswami, J.-By the above writ applications under Article 32
of the Constitution the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Krishi
Utpadhan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 (U.P. Act No. XXV of 1964 as
amended by U.P. Act No. 10 of 1970) (briefly called the Act)
and the rules made thereunder are challenged on the ground
of violation of Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the,
Constitution.
The petitioners in all the above cases are traders or
commission agents dealing in agricultural produce.
The following submissions are made on behalf of the
petitioners
(1) The constitution of the Market Committee
under section 13 of the Act is highly
prejudicial to their interests and of the
traders in general since, it will have a
perpetual majority of producers.
(2) To entrustment of licensing to such a
Market Committee instead of to any impartial
authority is unfair and an un-. reasonable
restriction on the right to trade.
(3) The Act in the matter of grant of
licences gives no guidance at all and even
under rule 70(4) two vague criteria have been
laid down in the matter of issue of licences
under the Act.
(4) The petitioners are required to provide
a storage space to the producers for their
agricultural produce going to the market and
this obligation is also an unreasonable res-
triction on the fundamental right of the
petitioners.
379
(5) Rule 76 (1) is invalid and ultra vires
section 40 of the Act and has also placed
unreasonable restrictions on the right to
carry on trade or business.
Before we deal with these submissions, we may turn out
attention to the Act. As the preamble shows the Act has to
provide for the regulation of sale and purchase of
agricultural produce and fox the establishment,
superintendence, and control of markets therefore in Uttar
Pradesh. The statement of object and reasons gives a clear
picture of the evils sought to be, remedied by this
legislation and a portion therefrom may be extracted below
:-
“The present chaotic state of affairs as,
obtaining in agricultural produce markets is
an acknowledged fact. There are.,innumerable
charges,, levies. and exactions which the
agricultural producer is required to pay
without having any say in the proper
utilisation of the amount so paid by him. In
matters of dispute, between the seller and the
buyer, the former is generally put at a
disadvantage; by being given arbitrary awards.
The producer is also denied a large pa
rt of his
produce by manipulation and defective use of
weights and scales in the market. The
Government of India and the various committees
and commissions appointed to study the
condition of agricultural markets in the
country have also been inviting the attention
of the State Government from time to time
towards improving the conditions of these
markets …. The Planning Commission stressed
long ago that legislation in respect of
regulation of markets should be, enacted and
enforced by 1955-56″.
56″.
It is also mentioned that legislation in the State was first
proposed in 1938 but lapsed. It also appears that most of
the other states have already passed legislation in this
respect. It is, therefore, clear that the principal object
of this Act is to come in aid of the producers who are
generally ill-organised and are by far and large the
exploited party in the bargain between unequals.
Section 2 contains the definitions. By section 2(a) ”
‘agricultural produce’ means such items of produce of
agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, apiculture,
sericulture, pisciculture, animal husbandry or forest as are
specified in the schedule, and includes admixture of 2 or
more of such items, and also includes any such item in
processed form, and further includes gur, rab, shakkar,
khandsari and jaggery”. By section 2 (f) “‘Committee’ means
a Committee constituted under this Act”. By section 2(k) ”
‘Market Area’ means an area notified as such under section 6
or as modified under section 8″. By section 2(p) ”
‘producer’ means a person who, whether by himself or through
hired labour, produces, rears or catches, any agricultural
produce, not being a producer who also works as a trader,
broker or Dalal, commission agent or Arhatiya or who is
otherwise ordinarily engaged in the business, of storage of
agricultural produce”. We are not concerned with the pro-
viso attached thereto. By section 2(y) ” ‘trader’ means a
person who in the ordinary course of business is engaged in
buying or selling agricultural produce as a principal or as
a duly authorised agent of one or more
380
principals and includes a person, engaged in processing of
agricultural produce”. After notification by the State
Government of its intention to declare a particular area as
a Market Area under section 5 and after inviting objections
and consideration of the same, the State Government under
section 6 declares the whole or any specified portion of the
area mentioned in the notification to be the Market Area in
respect of such agricultural produce as may be specified.
Similarly under section 7, the Principal Market Yard and
Sub-Market Yards are declared. Section 9(2) which is
material for our purpose, may be quoted:-
“No person shall, in a Principal Market Yard
or any Sub-Market Yard, carry on business or
work as a trader, broker, commission-agent,
warehouse man, weighman, palledar or in such
other capacity as may be prescribed in respect
of any specified agricultural produce except
under and- in accordance with the conditions
of a licence obtained therefore from the
Committee concerned”.
The petitioners make a great grievance of this licensing
provision by the Market Committee called the Mandi Samiti of
the Market Area. Section 13 provides for constitution of
the Market Committee and provides for representation from
different sources as detailed in (i) to (xi) thereunder.
The learned counsel draws our attention to clauses, (vii)
and (vii-a) of section 13(1) whereby ten representatives of
the producers are included in the Committee. It is pointed
out by the learned Solicitor General and not contradicted by
Mr. Sen that ‘ the Committee under section 13 consists of 23
members out of which ten are from the producers. Section 16
provides for functions and duties of the Committee and,
inter alia, under section 2(i) thereof “a Committee shall
ensure fair dealings between the producers and persons
engaged in the sale or purchase of specified agricultural
produce.” Under section 17, “A Committee shall, for the
purposes of this Act, have the powers to-
(i) issue or renew licences under this Act
on such terms and conditions and subject to
such restrictions as may be prescribed, or,
after recording reasons therefore, refuse to
issue or renew any such licence;
(ii) suspend or cancel licences issued or
renewed under this Act”.
Section 25 provides for appeals against the, orders of the
Committee to the Director of Agriculture who is to decide
the same in accordance with the rules. Under section 32,
the State Government also has powers of revision and may
call for the records of the proceedings of the Committee and
pass orders modifying, annulling or reversing the same.
Section 40 enables the State Government to make rules for
carrying out the purposes of this Act.
The rules, inter alia, provide for matters relating to the
functions, powers and duties of the Committee, licensing
fee, or market fee which may be levied and realised by the
Committee and their mode of recovery and the terms and
conditions for assessment and renewal of licences under this
Act [section 40 (2) ]. There is a schedule to the Act
381
which contains the description of the agricultural produce
Under eight different heads. Chapter VIII of the rules
deals with transaction of business in Market Yards and the
opening rule 70 provides for licensing by the Market
Committees. By sub-rule(3) “any person desiring to hold
licence under sub-rule (1) shall make, in Form No. XI or
Form No. XII, as the case may be, a written application for
a licence to the Market Committee and shall pay the licence
fees prescribed under rule 67”. Rule 70(4) (i) may now be
quoted:
“On receipt of such application together with
the amount of fee prescribed under rule 67,
the Market Committee may issue him the licence
applied for,, if-
(a) it is satisfied that the applicant is
solvent;
(b) it is satisfied that the applicant is a
desirable person to whom a licence may be
granted;
provided that the provisions of sub-clause (a)
shall not apply to weighmen, measurers,
palledars, truck plyers and Thela plyers”.
This rule will have to be read with section 17 quoted above.
By rule 73, the order of refusal, cancellation or suspension
of a licence by, the Committee shall be communicated to the
person concerned in the specified manner indicated therein.
Rule 76(1) which is impugned may be quoted :
“Every consignment of specified agricultural
produce brought for sale into the Principal
Market Yard or any sub-Market Yard shall be
sold by open auction:
Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall
apply to a retail sale as may be specified in
the bye-laws of the Committee”.
Some provisions of similar Acts of the States of Madras,
Bombay and Gujarat had earlier been the targets of
unsuccessful attack in this Court and hence the
constitutional challenge in the present applications against
the U.P. Act is necessarily on different ground,,. [See M.
C. V ‘ S. Arunchala Nadar etc. v. The State of Madras &
others;(1) Mohammad Hussain Gulam Mohammad and Another v.
The State of Bombay and another;(2) and Jan Mohammed Noor
Mohammed Begban v. State of Gujarat and Another(3)].
We may now turn to the Submissions. With regard to the
first submission, as earlier noted, the grievance is not
factually accurate. Out of 23 members of. the Committee
only 10 are from the producers. Therefore, there is no
question of a perpetual majority of the producers in the
Committee. Besides under section 13(1)(vii), 8 producers
are elected. It may be even a legitimate expectation of the
legislature that there may be reasonable likelihood that
Producers of eight categories of agricultural produce
mentioned in the schedule,
(1) [1959] (Supp) (1) S.C.R. 92. (2) [1962] (2) S.C.R. 659.
(3) [1966] (1) S.C.R. 505.
382
may be represented. Under section 13(1)(vii-a), which was
introduced by an amendment in 1970, two producers belonging
to the scheduled castes are to be nominated by the State
Government This provision is made in the interest of the
People belonging to the scheduled castes who may not be able
to. get due representation in the elections. We do not find
any unreasonable features in the scheme of representation in
the Committee under section 13. This will be clear even
from section 14 whereby the first Committee appoints suit-
able members “to represent different interests referred to
in sub-section (1) of section 13”. The first submission of
the petitioners is, therefore, of no avail.
We may now take up consideration of the second and the third
submissions which may be dealt with together. It is
submitted that the licensing of the traders should not be
left in the hands of the Market Committee. We find it
difficult to appreciate how the performance of this duty by
the Committee will at all prejudice the traders. To say the
least it is a hypothetical objection in this case, as, we
understand, none of the petitioners have been refused a
licence.. It is true that usually some governmental
authority is charged with the duty of granting of licences
under various local Acts. That, however, does not prove
that the duly cannot be properly and impartially exercised
by the Committee representing various interests which are
vitally interested in the trade of agricultural produce.
Whether in a particular case the action of the Committee is
mala-fide or otherwise, objectionable, may be a different
matter and such a grievance can be properly dealt with.
That would, however, not make, the, provision invalid nor
can it be said to place an unreasonable restriction on the
right of the petitioners to trade.
It is further submitted that there is no guidance in the Act
in the matter of grant of licence and the relevant rule
70(4)(1) prescribes only two vague criteria in the matter.
This submission fails to take note of the fact that the
Committee which is entrusted with the duty of granting
licences consists of people from different sources vitally
interested in the marketing of agricultural produce. The
Committee consists also of representatives from local
bodies, cooperative marketing societies Central Warehousing
Corporation, State Warehousing Corporation, representatives
of traders and commission agents, Government officials of
whom one shall be a representative of the Agriculture
Department and the other of Food and Supplies Department,
and so forth. It is, therefore, a fairly well-represented
Committee which is expected to know the object and purpose
of the Act of which it is a creature. One may legitimately
expect that the members are well aware of the difficulties
of the producers, interests of the traders and the
intricacies of the trade. There is sufficient guidance from
the preamble and other provisions of the Act with which the
members of the Committee owe their duty to be conversant For
example under section 16 the Committee is charged with the
duty of enforcing the provisions of the Act, the rules and
the bye-laws. It has to exercise its powers and perform its
duties and discharge its functions in accordance with the
provisions of the Act and the rules.
38 3
Under sub-section (2) of section 16, the Committee shall
ensure fair dealings between the producers and the traders
besides performing other functions. Form No. XI in which a
trader has to submit his application for a licence. also
gives various particulars from which the Committee would be
able to consider his claim for a licence. It will be’ seen
that in this form the, applicant has to undertake to abide
by the conditions of the licence and the provisions of the
Act and the rules. The condition of the licence which are
noted in Form No. XIII would also give an indication of the
obligations of the licensee. All these would be known to
the Committee.
At any rate, with the help of the Government officials in
the Committee there is no reason to think that the work of
the Committee will not function smoothly and that there will
be any reason to apprehend that licences would be refused
arbitrarily. Even the scope for such an apprehension is
sought to be done away with by providing a provision
Provision of appeal against the decision of the Committee
and also a further revision to the State Government. There
is a further limitation on the power of the Committee by
insisting upon recording of reasons while refusing a
licence. It is, therefore, clear that a speaking order has
to be. passed when refusing a licence and it will have to
justify that the licence is refused only on relevant
considerations with regard to solvency and fitness in terms
of the provisions. of the Act.
It is submitted that the choice of the two criteria under
rule 70(4) (i) is bad and there is no proper guidance in
these criteria which are not capable of objective
determination. The two criteria laid down are solvency and
desirability. The applicant has to satisfy the Committee
that he is solvent as opposed to insolvent that is bankrupt.
We are informed that the original Hindi version of the rule
which is translated into English gives the equivalents as
follows :-
“It is satisfied that the applicant is not a
bankrupt (rindiwali) “.
“It is satisfied that the applicant is a
proper (upoyukta) person to whom a licence may
be granted”.
Mr. Sen candidly admits that the criterion on the score of
“bankruptcy” is well known and cannot be said to be vague or
indefinite. Hi, however, submits that the second criterion
is not at all precise and definite.
Although perhaps a more expressive guidance could have been
given, we have already observed that the Act itself provides
sufficient guidance to the Committee in the matter of
deciding whether a particular applicant is or is not a
proper person to hold a licence and we cannot accede to the
submission that the two criteria taken with the other
guidelines from the provisions of the Act and the rules
offer no proper guidance to the Committee in tic matter of
grant of licence. The second and the third submissions of
the petitioners are, therefore, devoid of substance.
With regard to the fourth submission, it is sufficient to
point out that under section 16(2)(vii) the Committee has to
provide, inter
384
alia, accommodation for storage and such other facilities as
may be prescribed. Under rule 52(4) storing of the
specified agricultural produce shall be subject to the
payment of such storage fee and such other conditions as may
be specified in the by-laws. That being the position, this
may be even an interim measure pending arrangements by.the
Committee, for proper storage. Even otherwise the storage
by the traders in the Market-Yards will be always paid for
under rule 52(4). There is, therefore, no substance in the
fourth submission of the petitioner.
With regard to the last submission regarding invalidity of
rule 76(1), we are not satisfied that the same is ultra
vires section 40 of the Act. Section 40 empowers the State
Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of
the Act. Rule 76(1) is well within the rule making power of
the State Government under section 40(2), clause (xxvii).
Section 9(2) restricts the right to carry on trade except
under and in accordance with a licence. Section 17 provides
for issuing or renewal of licences subject to the
restrictions under the rules. Section 9(2) and section 17
are not challenged before us. Rule 76(1) prescribes the
mode of sale that is to say by open auction under the rule
making power under section 40 read with clause (xxvii). The
rule is not ultra vires section 40 of the Act. It is said
that prohibiting private sales by confining only to sale by
open auction puts an unreasonable restriction on the right
to trade of the petitioners. If section 9(2) and section 17
are not challenged as invalid, it is not understood how rule
76(1) which is within the rule making power can be said to
be unreasonable. In order that the producers obtain the
best price for their commodity, sale by open auction is
prescribed under rule 76(1) lo fulfil one of the important
purposes of the Act. Sale by auction is a well known mode
of sale by which the producers, for whose interest this Act
has been made, can obtain the best price for their
commodities. The definition of sale and purchase to which
our attention has been drawn by the petitioners do not run
counter to the provisions for auction-sale under rule 76.
It cannot by any stretch of imagination be held to be an
unreasonable mode in the entire scheme of the Act. The
legislature is intervening to see that the producers get the
maximum pecuniary return possible in their transactions and,
as a necessary concomitant, eliminated the mode of private
sale by individual negotiations resulting in malpractices.
Besides by the proviso to rule 76(1) this restriction is not
allowed to operate in the case of retail sales. There is,
therefore, no substance in the submission that rule 76(1)
violates the fundamental right of the petitioners under
Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution.
Mr. Sen particularly drew our attention to two decisions of
this Court. The first is given in Lala Hari Chand Sarda v.
Mizo District Council and Anr. (1) That was a case where the
Executive Committee of the Mizo District Council refused to
renew the temporary licence issued to the appellant therein
who was a non-tribal trader under section 3 of the Lushai
Hills District (Trading by non-Tribals) Regulation, 1953.
This Court by majority struck down section 3 as
(1) 1967 (1) S.C.R. 1012.
385
violative of Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. This
decision is clearly distinguishable from the present case.
In that case there was no right of appeal to any superior
authority against a refusal to grant or renew a ]licence and
the non-tribal trader had no remedy whatsoever against such
an order. This Court also observed in that case that “a
perusal of the Regulation shows that it nowhere provides any
principle or standard on which the Executive Committee has
to act in granting or refusing to grant the licence”
(emphasis added).
The second decision, is in Harakchand Ratanchana Benthia and
Ors. etc. v. Union of India and Ors.(1) This was a case
under the Gold (Control) Act and Mr. Sen drew our attention
to the expression ‘suitability of the applicant” in section
27(6)(e) of the Gold (Control) Act which was held to provide
no objective standard or norm and as such was held to be
constitutionally invalid. This Court while dealing with the
objection to section 27 of the Gold (Control) Act which
relates to licensing of dealers held as follows :—
“Section 27(6)(a) states that in the matter of
issue or renewal of licences the Administrator
shall have regard to the number of dealers
existing in the region in which the applicant
intends to carry on business as a dealer, But
the word ‘region is nowhere defined in the
Act. Similarly s. 27(6)(b) requires the
Administrator to have due regard to the
anticipated demand, as estimated by him for
ornaments in that region, but the expression
anticipated demand’ is vague and incapable of
objective assessment and is bound to lead to a
great deal of uncertainty. In the same way
‘the expression ‘Suitability of the applicant
in S. 27(6 ) (e) and ‘public interest” in s.
27 (6) (g) do not provide any objective
standard or norm. Further, the requirement in
the section imposing the same conditions for
the renewal of the licence as for the initial
grant is unreasonable, as it renders the
entire future of the business of the dealer
uncertain and subject to the caprice and
arbitrary will of the administrative ‘autho-
rities. Therefore, clauses (a), (b), (e) and
(g) of s. 27(6) are constitutionally invalid”.
In the instant case we have already examined the two
criteria laid down under rule 70(4) (i) and have held that
they do not place any unreasonable restriction on the right
of the applicants to obtain a licence. By rule, 70(4)(i)(b)
the Committee has to be satisfied that the applicant is a
fit and proper person (upoyukta) to whom a licence may be
granted. This is not the same thing as the suitability
simpliciter which this Court had to deal with in the Gold
(Control) Act case. The decision is, therefore, clearly
distinguishable.
In the result all the applications fail and are dismissed.
The parties will pay and bear their own costs.
V.P.S. Petitions dismissed.
(1) [1970] (1) S.C.R.479.
386