ORDER
G.C. Bharuka, J.
1. This Writ Petition has- been filed for quashing the order dated 26.3.1994 passed by the Assistant Regional Transport Officer, Sagar (Respondent No. 2) demanding a sum of Rs. 1,067/- being the penalty leviable for delayed payment of tax for the period of July 1993.
2. Petitioner is the owner of vehicle bearing No, AP-13/T-2980. According to him, his principal place of business is at Shikaripura in the District of Shimoga. The said vehicle had been purchased by him at Hyderabad. According to his claim, the vehicle was brought in the State of Karnataka only in the month of June 1993 and he had given necessary information in this regard in the prescribed Form No. 27 as required under the Central Motor Vehicles Rules. His further case is that on 15.7.1993 subsequent to bringing the vehicle to this State ho paid the tax for the month of July 1993. But on insistence by the second respondent he had deposited the tax also for the month of June 1993 being Rs. 5,335/-. Subsequently on 19.11.1993 he filed an application before the second respondent for refund of the said amount being the tax for the month of June 1993. The said application was refused by the second respondent by his order dated 19.11.1993 (Annexure-A). Against the said order he preferred an appeal before the first respondent under Section 50 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1957 (the Act, for short) which was allowed by an order dated 7.3.1994 (Annexure-B). The operative portion of the said order reads as under:
“Under these circumstances as examined above, I allowed the Appeal, and set aside the Order of the Respondent Asst. Regional Transport Officer, Sagar. Respondent is directed to collect the penalty having paid the tax by late for the month of July 1993.”
3. From the above said order, it is clear that the appellate authority had accepted the claim of the petitioner for refund of tax which he had been made to pay for the month of June 1993. But, strangely in the same breath he directed for collecting the penalty from the petitioner for late payment of tax for the month of July 1993. Accordingly the impugned notice at Annexure-C was issued by respondent No. 2 requiring the petitioner to pay the penalty as stated above.
4. In my opinion, the second part of the order passed by the first respondent acting as an appellate authority is obviously without jurisdiction since the question of levying penalty for late payment of tax for the month of July 1993 was not a subject matter of appeal and he had no jurisdiction to give any direction in this regard. Accordingly, that part of the order directing for levying penalty being illegal is quashed. That being so, since at Annexure-C which is merely consequential to the said direction by the appellate authority also cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashed.
5. I may observe here that though I had asked Mr. Nazeer, HCGP to place any provision under the Act wherein any penalty as such can be imposed by the authorities thereunder like respondent No. 2, he could not lay hands on any such provision except Section 12 which merely relates to offences. Section 12A and 12B of the Act read as under:
“12A. Trial of offences.- No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder.
12B. Composition of offences.- The prescribed officer may accept, in the prescribed manner, from any person who has committed or is reasonably suspected of having committed an offence punishable under sub-sections(l) and (3) of Section 12 such sum of money as may be prescribed, by way of composition of the offence which such person has committed or is reasonably suspected of having committed and on the payment of such sum of money to the prescribed officer such person, if in custody, shall be set at liberty and no further proceedings shall be taken against such person with reference to the same act.”
From a reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is quite clear that the penalties provided under Section 12 can be imposed only as a measure of punishment against a person who is convicted of an offence committed under the said Section. Section 12B empowers the authorities to compound the said offence on acceptance of the prescribed composition fee. Section 12A sets out an exception to the general mode of trial of offences as envisaged under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the Cr.P.C.) only to the extent that no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try an offence punishable under the Act.
6. Section 4 of the Cr.P.C. reads as under:
“4. Trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws.-(1) All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.
(2) All offences under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.”
7. Therefore, subject to the provisions made under Section 12A of the Act, the offences created under Section 12 have to be tried under and in accordance with the provisions of the Cr.P.C., and it is the only Criminal Court which can levy the penalty as a punishment on having found the person guilty of committing the said offence. The authorities under the Act have no competence to levy penalties under Section 12 of the Act.
8. In the case P.M. BILEBHAVI AND ORS. v. THE A.P.M.C., TALIKOTI AND ANR. 1. 1984 Crl.L.J. NOC 60 (Karnataka), this Court has held that the penalties provided under Chapter XII of the Karnataka Agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) Act (27 of 1966) can be inflicted only in accordance with the provisions contained in the Cr.P.C. Also, in the cases of SAILENDRA NATH DE v. CHAIRMAN CHAKDAHA MUNICIPALITY AND ORS. 2. 1987 Calcutta Weekly Notes 554, and SUBHAS TALKIES v. STATE OF BIHAR 3. 1985 BR & LJ 135, similar views have been taken in respect of penalties provided under Special Acts like Bengal Municipal Act, 1932 [Section 500(1) (2)3 and Bihar Cinema Regulations Act, 1954 (Section 6 thereof).
9. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned notice at Annexure-C cannot be sustained and it is quashed. Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.