JUDGMENT
V.G. Sabhahit, J.
1. This appeal is filed against the judgment dated 3-7-2006 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bijapur, acquitting the respondent of having committed the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
2. The appellant is the complainant before the Trial Court and it is his case that respondent had issued a cheque for Rs. 25,000/- along with a letter dated 10-10-2000 authorising the complainant to fill in the date and the amount towards the amount which may become due towards the price of cement supplied to the respondent and when the cheque was presented on 14-8-2002 for encashment, the same was returned with an endorsement “account is closed”. Thereafter, notice was issued on 30-8-2002 which was returned as not claimed on 17-9-2002 and wherefore the complaint. The respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
3. On behalf of the complainant, power of attorney holder was examined as P.W. 1 and he examined himself as P.W. 3 and also examined P.Ws. 2 and 4 and got marked Exs. P. 1 to P. 16. The statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code was recorded.
4. It is the defence of the accused that the cheque was given by way of security and it did not bear the date and the amount and he had not authorised to put the date and amount on the cheque and there was no debt due to be paid on the date when the cheque was handed over and the application is barred by time.
5. The Trial Court after considering the oral and documentary evidence on record held that in view of the facts elicited in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 to the effect that cheque was blank and did not bear the date or the amount and there was no debt due on the date when the cheque was handed over on 10-10-2000 and cheque was presented after six months from the date of handing over, the application was barred by time and accordingly acquitted the accused by judgment dated 3-7-2006. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, this appeal is filed.
6. I have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent.
7. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the signature on the cheque is admitted and the cheque, when it was presented, it was dishonoured and despite notice, amount is not paid nor any reply is given and wherefore the Trial Court was not justified in acquitting the respondent.
8. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent argued in support of the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court.
9. I have considered the contentions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties.
10. It is clear from the perusal of the material on record that even as per the evidence adduced before the Court by the complainant, cheque was handed over on 10-10-2000 without mentioning the date and the amount but bearing the signature of the respondent. It is the case of the complainant himself that the said cheque was issued to him with a specific instruction to fill in the amount and date, if any, if the amount becomes due towards the value of the cement supplied to the respondent and wherefore, on the date of handing over the cheque on 10-10-2000 there was no debt due to be paid by the respondent and wherefore the cheque was not issued towards discharge of any debt and even otherwise it is clear that in the absence of mentioning the date on the cheque, the cheque should be deemed to have been undated on the date of handing over on 10-10-2000 and the cheque is presented for payment only on 14-8-2002 and wherefore the Trial Court has held that the cheque was presented after six months from 10-10-2000 and in view of the facts elicited in the cross-examination of P.Ws. 1 to 3 referred to in the order passed by the Trial Court as also the facts elicited in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 that there was no debt due as on 10-10-2000 and the cheque was undated without mentioning the amount and the date of presentation of cheque on 14-8-2002, it is clear that having regard to the above said material on record, the Trial Court had no other option but to acquit the accused and wherefore the order passed by the Trial Court is justified and does not call for interference in exercise of power of this Court in the appeal against the judgment of acquittal.
11. Accordingly, I hold that there is no merit in the appeal and pass the following order.
12. The criminal appeal is dismissed.