ORDER
Balakrishna, J.
1. By consent of the learned Counsel for the parties, arguments were heard.
2. Following are the facts of this case:
The petitioner along with All Karnataka Young Writers’ and Artists Association, Bangalore, preferred an application under Section 32(2) of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), on 5-2-1986/10-2-1986 to the Bangalore Development Authority requesting for approval for the formation of residential layout in accordance with the layout plan submitted in S.Nos.26, 28, 29 and 30 of Avalahalli Village, Kengeri Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. The application was made in the capacity of owners of the said lands.
3. The Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, Bangalore, in his communication to the Secretary of the All Karnataka Young Writers and Artists Association, Bangalore, dated 11-4-1986 (Annexure-C) rejected the application for the various reasons set out in the said communication. The petitioner is aggrieved by the impugned order of the respondent, a copy of which is Annexure-C and has sought for quashing of Annexure-C besides for a declaration that no order of conversion is necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case; for a declaration that no order of exemption under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulartion) Act is necessary; and for a Mandamus directing the respondent to grant permission to the petitioner to form a layout in S.Nos. 26, 28, 29 and 30 of Avalahalli Village in accordance with law.
4. Briefly stated, the following are the contentions advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner: Since the erstwhile C.I.T.B. has granted permission as far back as 1974 for purchase of the lands in question and thereafter the petitioner proceeded to purchase the lands for valuable consideration by virtue of registered sale-deeds and therefore from the inception, the conduct of the petitioner is beyond reproach. It is submitted that even otherwise, the scheme of acquisition by the Authority in relation to the survey numbers in question lapsed under Section 27 of the Act since the Authority had failed to execute the scheme in regard to these survey numbers within time-frame of five years from the date of publication in the Official Gazette of the declaration made under Section 18 of the Act. It is submitted that the very act of granting permission to the petitioner to purchase the lands was adequate to draw the inference that the respondent did not intend to implement the scheme in regard to these very survey numbers. It is therefore submitted that the authority was estopped from refusing permission on grounds which are extraneous to the provisions of Section 32(6) of the Act.
5. It is next contended that the petitioner had expressly stated that if any further information was required by the respondent, the petitioner was willing to furnish the same and that if the respondent had any doubt regarding the sale transaction, it was incumbent on the respondent to call upon the petitioner to produce the sale deeds, but it was certainly not open to the respondent to reject the application without calling for information if any information was required.
6. It is also contended that provisions of Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, are not attracted since the, lands in question fall within the planning area and further it is contended that Section 14 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961, is inapplicable since the utilisation of the lands is not for a purpose different from what has been entered in the Outline Development Plan and thereafter in the Comprehensive Development Plan. The reason given is that the entry shows that the entire land is meant for residential purpose.
7. Lastly, it was submitted that Annexure-C is not maintainable since none of the grounds specified in the Act for rejection of the application is available to the respondent.
8. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent made submissions on the basis of the statement of objections filed on 7-1-1987. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent that the no objection certificate granted by the erstwhile C.I.T.B. was only the permission to purchase the properties subject to certain conditions stated therein and in particular that the land should be converted by the Competent Authority and that the layout plans are subject to the approval of the Authority. In the objection statement, the following sentence is seen in para-2:
“By the said letter, No Objection was granted for formation of the lay-out, but it was only a permission to purchase the properties.”
However, when this was pointed out to the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, it was submitted that there is a mistake in typing and what actually was meant was that no objection was granted not for the formation of the layout, but it was only a permission to purchase the properties. The learned Counsel submitted that the details of information required under Section 32 of the Act were not furnished by the petitioner and the purported sale-deeds were also not furnished. It was contended that since the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, had not come into force during the relevant dates of sale, the provisions of the Land Reforms Act prohibited the purchase of the property and therefore the petitioner could not hold any property and the property so purchased became vested in the State Government. It was further argued that obtaining conversion of agricultural land for any other purpose is mandatory under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act and since no such conversion was obtained, the petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought.
9. The point for consideration is whether the impugned order under Annexure-C rejecting the application of the petitioner is sustainable in law and whether failure to furnish necessary documents and records along with the application for grant of approval for the formation of layout without affording an opportunity to produce the same is in accordance with law.
10. Before going into all the contentions urged by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties in detail, I propose to consider the question whether the order under Annexure-C is maintainable in view of the fact that the application for approval of the layout was rejected for the alleged failure to furnish the required information. Sub-section (4) of Section 32 of the Act provides that:
“Within six months after the receipt of any application under Sub-section (2), authority shall either sanction the forming of the extension or layout or making street on such condition as it may think fit or disallow it or ask for further information with respect to it.”
According to this provision, the authority has the power to sanction the formation of the layout on such condition as it may think fit or decline permission and in the alternative ask for further information with respect to the application.
11. It is seen from paragraph-5 of Annexure-C which seems to be the operative portion of the order that the reason for rejecting the application is failure to furnish all the necessary documents and records along with the application for grant of approval of the layout. The relevant portion reads as follows: "Since all the necessary documents and records are not enclosed along with your application the approval of the layout in S.Nos. 26 (part), 28, 29 and 30 of Avalahalli Village in favour of your society is hereby rejected."
It is not the case of the respondent that subsequent to the receipt of the application of the petitioner requesting for grant of approval for the formation of layout, the respondent called upon the petitioner to furnish the information and the documents referred to in its order dated 11-4-1986 under Annexure-C. On receipt of the application from the petitioner, the respondent proceeded to pass an order on 11-4-1986 on the strength of the allegation that the petitioner did not furnish all the necessary documents and records along with the application. In the preceding paragraph of Annexure-C leading to the operative portion of the order, there is some discussion by the respondent in regard to the merits of the application. But, ultimately, on the face of the order, it is possible to infer that what weighed in the mind of the respondent in rejecting the application of the petitioner is the alleged non-furnishing of all the necessary documents and records along with the application for grant of approval of the layout.
12. This, I am afraid, cannot be done by the respondent, who is bound by the provisions of Sub-section (4) of Section 32 of the Act, since the statutory discretion vested in the respondent is expected to be exercised in accordance with law. Sub-section (4) of Section 35 of the Act regulates exercise of discretion of the Authority and provides that it is the duty of the Authority to seek further information from the applicants if such information was required. The word ‘information’ would bring within its sweep information whether documentary or otherwise. Another cardinal principle which has been discarded by the respondent is the principle of natural justice. It is incumbent upon the respondent to afford reasonable opportunity to the petitioner to furnish the documents which according to the respondent were not furnished and if the petitioner did not comply with he request for furnishing the documents, it was open to the respondent to pass an order on merits and in accordance with law. Looking from both the angles, am of the opinion that the impugned order of the respondent is not compatible either with the rule of fairness or reasonableness. On the other hand, I am of the opinion that the impugned order amounts to arbitrary exercise of power. The power vested in a public authority has legal limits. A balance has to be struck between executive efficiency and legal protection of the citizen. Legislature may confer on public authorities powers which may appear to be ex-facie absolute and arbitrary. The Courts do not brook unfettered discretion and arbitrary power. The respected principle is restrictive, requiring that statutory power be exercised reasonably and in good faith for proper purpose only reconcilable with the letter and spirit of the empowering Act. The Courts do insist upon stringent procedural compliance.
13. In ROBERTS v. HOPWOOD, 1925 AC 578 laying down the law on reasonableness said:
“A person in whom is vested a discretion must exercise his discretion upon reasonable grounds. A discretion does not empower a man to do what he likes merely because he is minded to do so – he must in the exercise of his discretion do, not what he likes but what he ought. In other words, he must, by the use of his reason, ascertain and follow the course which reason directs. He must act reasonably.”
14. It is commonly understood that it is only where powers are given for the personal benefit of the person empowered that the discretion is absolute. Plainly this can have no relevance in public law. Unfettered discretion is wholly inappropriate to a public authority which possesses powers solely in order that it may use them for the public good.
15. In regard to the contention whether the petitioner is bound to obtain conversion of the lands from agricultural purpose to the residential purpose, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court rendered in the case of THE SPECIAL DEPUTY COMMISSIONER v. NARAYANAPPA., . It was held in the said case that if a land falls within the Outline Development Plan or Comprehensive Development Plan prepared for Bangalore Metropolitan planning area, the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore, ceases to have any power under Section 95 of the Act in view of the over-riding effect given to the provisions of the Planning Act by Section 76-M thereof over all other laws which includes the Land Revenue Act. The case of the petitioner is that there is an entry both in the Outline Development Plan and the Comprehensive Development Plan showing the lands in question as residential in character. Applying the ratio of the decision aforesaid, I hold that the necessity to obtain conversion once again is totally obviated. But, if the petitioner intended to put the land to any different purpose other than residential, it is only then a necessary application has to be made before the Competent Authority under the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961, and only after sanction is given, the petitioner could use the land for any purpose other than residential.
In W.A.2436 to 2444, Jayashree v. State of Karnataka of 1985, which was dismissed on 8-3-1989, a Division Bench of this Court rejected the plea of the appellants therein to reconsider the view of the Bench taken in paras 12 and 13 of the Judgment in Special Deputy Commissioner v. Narayanappa2 and observed:
“The view taken by the learned Judges in paras 12 and 13 is in consonance with the scheme and object of the legislature and commends to us. We do not find any ground for differeing with that view. Consequently the appeals are dismissed but without any order as to costs,”
16. It is necessary to refer to Section 14 of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961, in this context. Sub-section (1) of Section 14 reads:
“On and from the date on which a declaration of intention to prepare a outline is published under Sub-section (1) of Section 10, every land-use, every change in land-use and every development in the area covered by the plan shall conform to the provisions of this Act, the Outline Development Plan and the regulations, as finally approved by the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 13.”
On a plain reading of the said Section, it is clear that the land use shall be restricted to the purpose which is mentioned in the Outline Development Plan.
17. According to Sub-section (2) of Section 14:
“No such change in land-use for development as is referred to in Sub-section (1) shall be made except with the written permission of the Planning Authority which shall be contained in a commencement certificate granted by the Planning Authority in the form prescribed.”
Sub-section (2) of Section 14 thus makes it clear that should the owner of the land intends to change the land-use, it cannot be done without written permission of the Planning Authority. In the instant case, it has to be held that- conversion is not required in view of the entry found in the Outline Development Plan ear-marking the land for residential purpose. The effect of such an entry in the Outline Development is brought about by the operation of statute. In this regard, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied upon a decision of the Delhi High Court in KAMLA BAKSHI v. UNION OF INDIA, wherein provisions similar to the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961, came up for consideration, and it was held that conversion under the Delhi Development Act by virtue of a statutory provision amounted to statutory conversion the moment an entry is made either in the Master Plan or the Zonal Plan. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken on the question by the Delhi High Court.
18. It was also submitted by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that the question of application of the provisions of the Land Reforms Act does not arise since the land had been purchased by the Society in 1974 under 8 registered sale deeds and that the lands fall within the urban agglomeration. It must be pointed out that no such reason as the applicability of the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act comes in the way of the grant of approval to the petitioner is assigned in the order dated 11-4-1986. The reasons given are totally different. The reason is now being supplied for the first time in the statement of objections filed by the respondent before this Court. I must observe that the respondent is precluded from “changing front” guided by considerations of expediency and convenience. The objection raised by the respondent lacks credibility. What is of relevance is the ‘legitimate expectation’ of the petitioner if not a legal right, arising from the permission granted at the inception to the petitioner by the respondent for purchase of the properties in order to form a lay-out. Hence, I am of the opinion that the belated plea of the respondent is not only untenable but also contumacious.
19. In the light of the above discussion, I allow this Writ Petition and quash the impugned order under Annexure-C. I make it clear that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no order of conversion under Section 95 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act is necessary in respect of the lands in question and further exemption under Section 20 of the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 is also not necessary in the facts and circumstances of the case. If the respondent requires any document or further information from the petitioner it is open to the respondent to call for such information or documents or records from the petitioner and then proceed to pass an order on merits and in accordance with law for the grant of approval for the formation of the layout sought by the petitioner in its application dated 5-2-1986/10-2-1986. However, I direct that the application of the petitioner shall be disposed of on merits and in accordance with law within 90 days of receipt of this order.