JUDGMENT
R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.
1. Heard.
2.The learned Advocate appearing for the respondent has raised the preliminary objection regarding nonmaintainability of the appeal, on the ground that, the Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 provides for appeal only against “judgment and order” and does not provide for appeal against a “decree”, and further that bearing in mind the difference in the meaning of the terms “decree” and “judgment” under the Code of Civil Procedure which are squarely applicable to the proceedings under the said Act as also considering the provisions of the Section 19(2) and (5) of the said Act which provides that no appeal would lie except against the judgment, it means that the decision which is appealable, under the said Act is only “the Judgment” and not “the decree”. Once the decree is issued the proceeding attain finality for all purposes and no appeal lies thereafter.
3. Drawing attention to Section 19 r/w Section 2 of the Family Courts Act, the learned Advocate appearing for the Respondent submitted that the Sub-section (1) of Section 19 specifically provides that appeal would lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. The Legislature has consciously omitted “the decree’ being made a subject matter of appeal under the provisions of the Family Court Act. Further Sub-section (2) thereof specifically provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties. Sub-section (5) thereof specifically provides that no appeal shall He other than as provided under Section 19 of the said Act Sub-section (2) of the said Act defines various expressions under the said Act and Clause (e) thereof provides that the words in respect of which no definition is provided under the said Act the definition as provided under Code of Civil Procedure would apply. Considering the same it is the contention of the learned Advocate for the Respondent that once a final decree is passed dissolving the marriage, whatever may be the ground, question of filing an appeal against such final decree issued by the Family Court does not arise at all. The appellant can only make grievance against the reasons disclosed in the judgment before issuance of the decree for dissolution of marriage.
4. The learned Advocate for the Appellant on the other hand has submitted that the Section 19 of the Family Court Act clearly provide for appeal against the Judgment and therefore, the appeal which has been filed against the Judgment and decree allowing the claim for dissolution of marriage cannot be said to be not maintainable.
5. The crux of the arguments is that Section 19(1) specifically provides for appeal against the Judgment and order and not against the decree and further that Sub-section 5 thereof specifically debars an appeal against any Judgment order of decree of a Family Court other than as provided under Sub-section 1 or 2 of Section 19 of the said Act, as it gives finality to the proceeding on issuance of decree and therefore, thereafter the matter cannot be subjected to appellate review.
6. Section 19(1) of the said Act provides that save as provided under Sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties (or from an order passed under Chapter EC of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). Sub-section 5 thereof provides that no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, order or decree of a Family Court, except as provided in the said section.
7. Section 2 of the said Act deals with the definitions of the terms used under the said Act Clause (e) thereof provides that all other words and expressions used in the said Act, but not defined in the said Act and defined in the Code of Civil procedure 1908 shall have the meaning assigned to them respectively in that Code.
8. Undoubtedly, the provisions comprised in Section 2 of the said Act deal with the definition of the terminology used in the said Act. It nowhere provides for the definition of the terms judgment”, “order” and “decree”. Being so, bearing in mind the Clause (e) of Section 2 of the said Act, in order to understand the meaning of those terms, one will have to consider the definitions of those terms under Code of Civil Procedure.
9. Term “decree” has been defined under Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure to mean the formal expression of the adjudication which, so far as regards the Court expressing it conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controvorsy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. Section 2(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure defines the term “Judgment” to mean the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of decree or order, and the term “Order” has been defined under Section 2(14) of Code of Civil Procedure to mean the formal expression of any decision in a Civil Court which is not a decree.
10. If one peruses the definitions of the expressions “decree”, “judgment” and “order” as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure while considering the right of the aggrieved party to file appeal under Section 19 of the said Act, the contention sought to be advanced regarding non-maintainability of the appeal against the decree passed by the Family Court, may primafacie appear to be of some substance. However, perusal of Section 17 of the said Act would reveal that the said contention is totally fragile. The Section 17 of the said Act clearly provides that The Judgment of the Family Court shall contain a concise statement of the case, the point for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision”. Apparently, the expression “Judgment” as used in the said Act including in Section 19 thereof is to be understood in a sense different from the one defined under Section 2(a) of Code of Civil Procedure.
11. As already seen above, the Section 2(e) of the said Act specifically provides that the expressions used in the said Act and those which are not defined under the said Act will have the same meaning as defined under the Code of Civil Procedure. In other words, those terms which are not specifically defined under the said Act, only in respect of such terms the definition given to those terms under the Code of Civil Procedure will have to be applied. Once Section 17 specifically describes the scope of the expression “Judgment” to mean to contain concise statement of the case, point for determination and the decision thereon, the definition of the term “Judgment” given under Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed to supersede the term “Judgment” used in the said Act Including the one used in Section 19 thereof,
12. The Section 17 of the said Act clearly enlarges the scope of the term judgment for the purpose of appeal under the said Act. Being so, the term “judgment” as used in Section 19 of the said Act has to be understood as described under Section 17 of the said Act. Having so understood, the said term would not only include the reasonings for the decisions but even the decision itself. Any decision of any Court which is preceded by the reasonings for arriving at such decision would amount to a formal declaration of determination of rights of the parties on final adjudication of the controversy before such Court and it would be a decree, as defined under Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time, such adjudication resulting in final pronouncement of a decision along with the reasonings for such decision by the learned Single Judge of the Family Court would be a Judgment for the purpose of an appeal under Section 19 of the said Act Being so, there would be virtually no difference between the term “decree” and “Judgment” for the purpose of an appeal under Section 19 of the said Act.
13. The view that we are taking in the matter is also clear from the manner in which the expressions “judgment”, “order” and “decree” have been used at different places in the Section 19 itself. Though Sub-section (1) of Section 19 refers only to the expressions “judgment” and “order”, the Sub-section (2) thereof refers to “decree” or “order” whereas the Sub-section (5) thereof uses the words “judgment”, “order” and “decree”. At the same time, Section 17 of the said Act, as already stated above, defines the term “Judgment”. The expressions “decree” and “order” are not defined under the said Act but the term “decree” under Section 2(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure amounts to a formal expression determining the rights of the parties in relation to the subject matter of dispute and the term “order” amounts to a formal expression of any decision which is not a decree in terms of Section 2(14) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Taking into consideration all these definitions under the Code of Civil Procedure as well as Section 17 read with Section 2(e) of the said Act, we are left with no alternative than to hold that the term “judgment” under Section 19(1) would include a decree passed by the Family Court.
14. Merely because the term “decree” is not used in Sub-section (2) of Section 19, that would not lead to the conclusion that any decree passed by the Family Court could not be subjected to appeal. Such a proposition would run totally counter to the provisions comprised under Sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the said Act. Very fact that the Legislature in its wisdom has restricted the embargo against the appeal to the decrees obtained under consent, and except those decrees, all other final decisions of the Family Court are made appealable under Section 19(1), it shows that the term “judgment” specifies final adjudication of the dispute by the Family Court which could culminate in the form of a decree.
15. It is also sought to be argued that the expression “decision thereon” in Section 17 refers to the finding on the point for determination and not the final pronouncement of the decision on the basis of such adjudication as such. The contention that the expression “decision thereon” under Section 17 would only mean a finding on the point for determination cannot be accepted. The term decision is not defined under the said Act. However, it is settled law that the term ‘decision’ implies conclusive opinion expressed by Court or the authority on the point in controversy. The term decision presupposes application of mind by the adjudicating authority to the point which is placed before it for the purpose of adjudication and expression of final opinion to be arrived at on the basis of material placed before it in relation to the point in dispute. Being so, it is not a mere finding as such but it will be a conclusive adjudication of the dispute referred to such authority for the decision. Besides, the Section 17 itself does not conclude with the expression “the decision thereon” but it proceeds to say further “and the reasons for such decision”. It would, therefore, mean that it is not a mere finding but it would include a final conclusive decision on the point for determination, coupled with the reasons for such decision.
16. For the reasons stated above, therefore, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Respondent about non-maintainability of the appeal is not sustainable. The primary objection is therefore, rejected.