JUDGMENT
J. Kanakaraj, J.
1. This Special Tribunal Appeal has had a chequered career. The appeal also illustrates the different between the proceedings under the Inam Abolition Act and proceedings before the civil court. We will first set out the facts before we refer to the question of law relating to the precedence to be given to the judgment of civil court over the judgment of the Revenue court, according to the circumstances of the case.
2. Town Survey Nos. 1756, 1757, 1758 and 1760 in ward No. 2, Kancheepuram Town originally comprised in T.D. No 1152 were inam lands. The inam character of the lands stood abolished with effect from 15.2.1965, by virtue of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams Abolition Act XXX of 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). The settlement Tahsildar took up suo motu enquiry in his proceedings S.R.2880/A.C.T./K.P.M., dated 13.6.1968 granted ground rent patta under Section 13(1) of the said Act 30 of 1963 in favour of several persons. In respect of T.S.No. 1758/ 2 with which we are concerned, he gave patta in favour of the Kancheepuram Co-operative Society, Kancheepuram. As against this grant of patta to the society in respect of T.S.No. 1758/2, only the appellant before us namely Jothimani filed an appeal before the tribunal in C.M.A.No. 21 of 1969. No doubt, the respondents got themselves impleaded in the above appeal, as per orders in I.A.No. 136 of 1969 dated 1.2.1973. At this juncture, one important turn of event relates to the filing of the suit by the appellant in the District Munsif’s Court, Kancheepuram in O.S.No. 823 of 1968 seeking a declaration of title to the very same property and for an injunction against the respondent herein. The suit was decreed on 13.4.1971. An appeal against the said decree was allowed in A.S.No. 98 of 1971 on 30.8.1973. A further appeal to this Court in S.A.No. 81 of 1974 was again allowed on 3.9.1976 subject to certain conditions. The High Court upheld the order of the District Munsif relating to the title, but made it subject to the proceedings under Act 30 of 1963. In other words, if either party was in a position to get patta under Act 30 of 1963, he was to be declared as the owner of the property. It is under these circumstances that C.M.A.No. 21 of 1969 came for final disposal and the tribunal by an order dated 30.11.1976 remanded, back to the Assistant Settlement Officer. It is seen that the order of remand was passed at the request of both the parties. Thereafter, a series of proceedings which do not have any relevance to the case, happened. But all the same, we will advert to the facts seriatim. By an order dated 12.5.1978, the Assistant Settlement Officer, on remand, granted patta in favour of the respondent. On revision, the settlement officer again remanded the case back to the Assistant Settlement Officer. Again the Assistant Settlement Officer granted patta to the respondent on 17.4.1979. Again the appellant herein filed a revision petition and succeeded and the matter was remanded to the Assistant Settlement Officer. It is on such a remand that the present order, which is the subject-matter of the S.T. Appeal came to be passed on 9.8.1982. In and by this proceedings, The Assistant Settlement Officer granted patta in favour of the respondent. The appellant promptly filed an appeal to the tribunal in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982 and the appeal came to be dismissed on 30.4.1983. Against the said order in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982, the present S.T.A. came to be filed and it so happens that a Division Bench of this Court on 10.8.1988 allowed the appeal on the short ground that the appellant had succeeded in S.A.No. 81 of 1974. The Division Bench then purported to follow the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam with State of Tamil Nadu v. K.L.M. Ramamurthy and Ors., and held that the decree of the civil court was conclusive. Therefore, the Division Bench held that the appellant was entitled to patta. In doing so, with great respect, the Division Bench did not consider the conditions under which the Second Appeal No. 81 of 1974 was allowed. The condition was that if in the proceedings under Act 30 of 1963 one of either of the parties were able to get patta, such party alone should be declared as owner of the property. It is for this reason that we had allowed the review application and we have re-opened the matter and heard the S.T. Appeal at length.
3. With a view to render justice to both the parties, we looked into all the various proceedings we find that the judgment of the Civil Court in O.S.No. 823 of 1963 which came to be rendered on 13.4.1971 is an important piece of document which the revenue authorities should have taken note of. As already stated, we are concerned with the correctness of the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 9.8.1982 as confirmed in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982 dated 30.4.1983. We therefore proceed to find out whether the learned District Munsif had analysed the evidence in the proper manner and to what extent Was the said judgment binding on the revenue authorities.
4. Before that, we will deal with the legal questions as to the scope of the civil proceedings in a matter relating to patta proceedings under the Inam Abolition Act. In a case arising under the madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1948, Ramachandra Iyer, J (as he then was) has rendered a decision in Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar (1961)1 M.L.J. 168, which holds the field even to-day. The learned Judge observed as follows:
But if there are rival claims to the title of the land holder himself there would be no power in the settlement officer of the Tribunal to adjudicate as to who among them would have a preferential right. This is more so in a case under Section 11 where no question of any decision at all can arise. There is no provision for any adjudication amongst the rival claimants to patta in respect of a particular land. It would therefore follow that the statute having declared that the erstwhile ryot (that is the ryot lawfully entitled to be in possession of the holding) would be entitled to patta and not having designated a Tribunal or machinery to decide as to who amongst the several claimants would be entitled to patta, the dispute if and when its rises will have necessarily to be decided by the civil court.
In T.K. Ramanujam Kavirayar (Died) and five Ors. v. Sri-La-Sri Sivaprakasa Pandora Sannadhi Aergal and Ors. 1987 T.L.N.J. 91, Srinivasan, J. (as he then was) while dealing with the question of jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the question of title to lands, to which the provisions of Act 30 of 1963 were applicable, considered a plethora of cases and came to the conclusion as follows:
I hold that the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the question of title is not ousted by the provisions of the minor Inam Act.
In R. Desiga Thathachariar v. Shanmugam Pillai and Anr., S.T.A.No. 108 of 1973 dated 19.12.1974, a Division Bench of this Court observed as follows:
The matter falls under Section 10. But the point is whether the appellant or the respondent is entitled to ryotwari patta, the character of the land being ryotwari not disputed. That being so, a suit is the proper remedy. The appeal is dismissed.
5. Before us, Mr. T.V. Ramanujam, learned senior counsel has also cited the decision in Kuppuswami Nainar v. The District Revenue Officer . That case arose out of patta proceedings taken under the Revenue Standing Orders. Even so, the observations of the court are relevant and they are as follows:
No provision is brought to out notice in the standing orders of the Board of Revenue taking away the jurisdiction of the civil court to adjudicate upon the question of title relating to immovable property. Revenue officers in a patta proceedings may express their views on the question of title, but such expression of opinion or decision is not conclusive and it is only intended to support their decision for granting patta. Ultimately, it is the civil court which has to adjudicate the question as to whether the person claiming patta is the title-holder of the land. Even if the revenue authorities decide the question of title, that will not in any way affect the jurisdiction of the civil court, which has to decide the question without reference to the decision of the revenue authorities.
6. But a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in R. Manicka Naicker v. E. Elumalai Naicker , brings to light the reason behind the line of decisions which we have already quoted. That case also arose under Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963 and the Apex Court pointed out that the finality of the orders passed under the Inam Abolition Acts is only for the purposes of the respective acts, and not for any other purpose. Observed the Supreme Court:
The main object and purpose of the Act is to abolish all the estates of the intermediaries like zamindars, inamdars, jagirdars etc. and to convert all land holdings in such estates into ryotwari settlements-which operation in revenue parlance, means conversion of alienated lands into non-alienated lands to deprive the intermediaries of their right go collect all the revenues in respect of such lands and vesting the same back in the Government. The enactment and its several provisions are thus intended to serve the revenue purpose of the Government by way of securing to the Government its sovereign right to collect all the revenues from all the lands and to facilitate the recovery thereof by the Government, and in that process, if necessary, to deal with the claims of occupants of lands, nature of the lands etc. Only incidentally in a summary manner and that too for identifying and registering persons in the revenue records from whom such recovery of revenue is to be made. The court further observed that even where the statute has given finality to the orders of the Special Tribunal, the civil court’s jurisdiction can be regarded as having been excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in the suit. We need not, however, examine this aspect at any length because of the nature of the grant which has been made in the present case which expressly preserves the rights of the respondent in respect of the land.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain a suit for the recovery of the land which is earlier the subject matter of the Inam Abolition Act.
7. With the above background if we now peruse the judgment of the District Munsif, we will be able to understand that the learned District Munsif has thoroughly examined the case and upheld the title of the appellant for the suit property. The Judgment of the learned District Munsif in O.S.No. 823 of 1968 has to be appreciated along with the plan which was annexed to the decree. The learned District Munsif rightly refers to the disputed property being ABEF in the said plan, and proceeds to discuss the case, point by point as to how the appellant had established the title. The first point referred to by the learned District Munsif is the fixing of the western boundary about which there was a dispute between the parties. The next point relates to Ex.A-5 which is the extract of Town survey Field Register relating to Town S.No. 1758. It is needless to point out that the dispute between the parties relates to S.No. 1758/72. Ex.B-45 is the extract of the Survey Re-Settlement Register which shows that the old Survey No. 771-C correspondent to the new Town Survey No. 1758. Reference is made to Exs.A-8 and A-9 which are the notices issued by the Land Acquisition Officer through the appellant herein who was the plaintiff in the suit. What is more, P.W.3 who happened to be one of the relations of the respondents defendants gave evidence fully supporting the case of the appellant herein. His evidence was to the effect that he had purchased three sites from Onnah Sah and three sites from Tulasi Sah and one site from Kandamani Chettiar. According to him, all the seven sites that he had purchased were sold to the appellant herein. On the other hand, the learned District Munsif found that the evidence of the respondent defendants was not consistent. In the written statement, the respondents had contended that the property was purchased by their grand father orally in or about 1920. It was also found that Ex.B-3 dated 17.2.1919 which related to the purchase of a portion of the suit property did not at all relate to the suit property. This was found by the comparison of four boundaries. Lastly, the learned District Munsif has also decided the issue by referring to door numbers while the respondents had sought to establish their title to door No. 48, by production of tax receipts, the learned District Munsif found that door No. 48 did not relate to the suit property. It was found that with reference to the property Tax Registers, the door numbers of the suit property were 50 and 51.
8. As against the above analytical and clinical precision with which the learned District Munsif had dealt with the matter, the impugned order of the Assistant Settlement Officer is cursory and superficial. In fact, the hall mark of a judicial decision is such precision in dealing with the documents which is not always found in the orders of Revenue Authorities. What is more, the settlement officer has wholly relied upon the report of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Villupuram. This itself shows that the prescribed authority had not exercised his own mind for coming to the conclusion as to whether one or the other of the parties is entitled to patta. His findings were also superficial because he says that the documents relied upon by the appellant are not relatable to the suit property based on the report of the Assistant Settlement Officer. Regarding the case of the respondents, the officer accepts the oral deed and proceeds to say that T.S.No. 1578/72 was in the possession of respondents. Here again this finding is based only on the report of the Assistant Settlement Officer. While the learned District Munsif had referred to certain building plans applied for by the appellant, the Settlement Officer says that there was no sufficient evidence to show that there were buildings in the property. Therefore, the Settlement Officer proceeds to say that on the basis of the possession of the respondents, he was granting patta under Section 13(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963. The order of the tribunal in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982 is nothing but a repetition of the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, and does not stand scrutiny by this Court.
9. For the sake of completion, we will refer to the report of the Assistant Settlement Officer, Villupuram which has been held to be sacrosanct by the Assistant Settlement Officer in the impugned order dated 9.8.1982. The said officer is said to have inspected the suit claim T.S.No. 1758/72 and also adjoining lands. He no doubt describes the suit lands and observes that there is no ridge to draw a boundary line in between T.S.Nos. 1758/71 and 1758/72. The entire plots in T.S.Nos. 1758/70, 1758/71 and 1758/72 arose covered with brick compound walls. The northern side of T.S.No. 1758/72 is kept open towards the lane. The measurements are found to fit in the Town survey sketch. The above observations go in support of the appellant’s case. Thereafter, the Assistant Settlement Officer has proceeded to discuss the title deeds namely the following sale deeds:
1. Sale Deed 1594 of 1963 (R1)
2. Sale Deed No. 604 of 1925 (R2)
3. Sale Deed No. 4085 of 1924 (R3)
4. Sale Deed No. 1427 of 1917 (R4)
Sale Deed No. 2594 of 1963 (R1).
He accepts that the first document which was the document filed before the learned District Munsif as Ex.A.1 correctly fits in with T.S. 1758/71 and 72. He then proceeds to discuss the earlier documents and finds that the 1925 document relates to 66 feet North to south. For the balance of 23 feet which is claimed by the appellant herein the sale deed 4085 of 1924 was relied upon. This document is also discussed by the officer. But, without any reason he says that the same does not relate to the suit sites. On the other hand, when he comes to the case of the respondent, he accepts the oral sale and also holds that adverse possession has been proved in the “court of law”. He refers to only the Judgment in A.S.No. 98 of 1971 which has been subsequently set aside in S.A.No. 81 of 1974. We are unable to see how this report can at all help their respondent, whereas the question of title has to be decided only by the civil court. The order of the Assistant Settlement Officer cannot have precedence over the judgment of the learned District Munsif to which we have made elaborate reference.
10. On the above discussion, what is baffling to us is that when the matter was remanded to the Assistant Settlement Officer, there was already the judgment of the civil court in O.S.No. 823 of 1968 available for perusal. The Revenue Officers had not cared to even refer to the said judgment before taking a final decision. On the other hand, the Revenue Authorities seem to have passed final orders with gross disrespect to the findings of the civil court and even without referring to the civil court judgment. We have absolutely no doubt in our mind mat the orders of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 9.8.1982 and the appellate authority order in C.M.A.No. 86 of 1982 dated 30.4.1983 are liable to be set aside. In this connection we have to make it clear that we have discussed the case threadbare on the basis of the available documents and we have no doubt that the appellant has proved his title to the property. In fact in S.A.No. 81 of 1974, A. Varadarajan, J., (as he then was) had confirmed the title of the appellant, but only left it to the final decision of the Revenue Authorities. We have now finally decided the proceedings under Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963 in favour of the appellant.
11. For all the above reasons, the S.T.A. is liable to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. The authorities are directed to issue patta to the appellant under Section 8(1) of the Tamil Nadu Act 30 of 1963, because as on date, there is no building on the suit property.