ORDER
M.A.A. Khan, Judicial Member
1. All these appeals by Revenue, directed against the consolidated appellate order dated 9-4-1985 of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Surat (AAC), involve common facts and raise common grounds before us. These are, therefore, decided by this common order.
2. The Respondent (assessee) is a Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) of Sri Kantilal Gulab Chand Shah. This family seems to be consisting of Sri Kantilal Gulab Chand Shah, the Karta, his wife Smt. Janswantiben K. Shah, their son Sri Anil Kumar K. Shah, their daughter Smt. Sawitaben and their son’s wife Smt. Raxaben Anil Kumar Shah. Smt. Raxaben A. Shah became the member of the family after her marriage with Sri Anil Kumar K. Shah on 5-3-1978 and Smt. Sawitaben ceased to be the member of this family consequent upon her marriage on 24-12-1978. The assessment years involved are 1977-78 to 1982-83. In each of these years the relevant valuation date was the last day of March of the year concerned by English calendar.
3. The 22nd day of July 1982 seems to have been quite an inauspicious day for this family. It was on that fateful day that the Income-tax authorities appear to have simultaneously carried out search and seizure operations Under Section 132 of Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) and survey operations Under Section 133A of the Act at several places in the individual case of Sri Kantilal Gulab Chand Shah, the karta of this family. The search operations carried on at Flat No. 5-1, Sai Apartment, Gopipura, existing in the name of Sri Anil Kumar K. Shah and whereat Sri Kantilal G. Shah was living at that time brought out jewellery worth Rs. 2,53,000. The search of Locker No. 2465 with Gujarat Safe Deposit Co. Ltd. in the name of Sri Kantilal G. Shah, opened on 24-7-1982, brought out jewellery weighing 151.45 Tolat worth Rs. 2,33,827 besides cash amounting to Rs. 11,780. In the disposal of these appeals we are not much concerned with the result of search operation at 10/1024, Limdikui, Gopipura another residence of Sri Kantilal G. Shah and survey operations Under Section 133A at Barempuri Bhagol, Surat, the business places of M/s Honest Finance Mart and M/s Silver Steel Works wherein Sri Kantilal G. Shah was a partner.
4. It was in the above background that the assessee filed its returns of net wealth for all the six years under consideration on 30-9-1982. In each of the six years it had declared its net wealth exceeding the minimum exempted limit applicable in the case of HUF. In the statements of wealth, attached with the returns, it had declared the sources of its wealth from immovable and movable properties. The immovable property included agricultural lands at village Kora Vyara and Bed Kurvadur, as stated in a Farghali deed dated 8-7-1963. These lands were stated to have in possession of the Ganotias under the provisions of Land Tenancy Act and were, therefore, valued at Nil. Under the head “Movable property” the assessee declared “Lena” (Debt due) from Ganotias at Rs. 4,500 besides ornaments and silver utensils and cash on hand. At the foot of the statements it was also mentioned that none of the members of the HUF possessed taxable wealth. The assessee also appear to have filed the lists of ornaments possessed by the HUF. Wherein the details of the ornaments, name of the persons to whom a particular ornament belonged and in what manner and also as to how and when a particular ornament ceased to belonged to the HUF, were given.
5. Noting that the returns for assessment years 1977-78 and 1978-79 ought to have been filed on or before 30-6-1977 and 30-6-1978 respectively but were filed on 30-9-1982 the W.T.O. was of the opinion that return for assessment year 1977-78 may be treated as having been filed in response to notice Under Section 17 of the Act, keeping in view the fact of search operations and his intention to make assessment on “protective basis”.
6. By his letter dated 22-7-1983 the W.T.O. required the assessee to furnish necessary details in respect to assessment years 1977-78 and 1978-79 and mainly relating to the position of agricultural land and the income therefrom, the ‘Lena’ from Ganotias books of accounts, bank pass books, gold and silver ornaments, silver vessels, family tree along with the occupation of the members of the family and their Permanent Account Numbers and assessments under the Wealth-tax Act. Inviting W.T.O.’s attention to his letters dated 8-9-1982,28-9-1982, Q-613 of 13-10-1982, Q-616 of 14-10-1982 and the documents attached with those letters Sri Kantilal G. Shah, the Karta, vide his letter dated 11-8-1983 explained that the HUF was possessed of sufficient agricultural lands and the ancestors were also doing money-lending business and that from such income and wealth earning activities the assessee had come to acquire and possess its wealth as declared in various returns. The W.T.O. did not feel satisfied with the explanation offered by the assessee and summed up his conclusions in para 5 of his order as follows: –
The assessee has shown value of agricultural lands at Nil in respect of ancestral agricultural lands received by a deed dt. 8-7-63. Copy of the deed is filed. All the pieces of land are situated at Village Kara Vyara and Bedkuwa. It appears that Shri Gamanaji – grandfather of Shri Kantilal – had four sons, namely S/Shri Gulabchand, Amichand, Bhagwandas and Chhotalal. There is claimed to be a partition in about 1943. The particulars of partition are not available. But in view of what is stated in a deed dt. 8-7-63, Shri Amichand and Shri Gulabchand jointly became the owner of lands at Kara Vyara and Bedkuwa. At Kara Vyara there were 30 acres and 31 gunthas of land and at Bedkuwa there were 9 acres and 29 gunthas of land.
7. Though the W.T.O., while making assessments on protective basis only for all the years under consideration, had neither increased the amount of net wealth, as returned by the assessee, nor had he accordingly increased the amount of wealth-tax as payable by the assessee, the assessee, feeling aggrieved against the mode of assessment being on Protective Basis appealed to the AAC.
8. The learned AAC considered the rival contentions of the parties at sufficient length and after critically examining the material on record concluded thus in para 8 of his order:
8.1 have carefully considered the submissions of the I.T.O. and the appellant, the materials placed on records and also gone through the W.T.O.’s order minutely. From careful consideration of the same, I find that: –
1. There was a locker with the H.U.F. since 21-2-61.
2. There was a S .B. A/c with Bank of Baroda operated by the H.U.F. on 18-5-82.
3. The H.U.F. did possess agricultural lands in the past and earned agricultural income by way of rent and sale of agricultural produce.
4. The contention of having doing money-lending business was not refuted with any material evidence by the W.T.O.
5. It is not always necessary to procure money-lending licence before doing money-lending business. If no licence was obtained, it was a default committed not in respect of Income-tax Act and the illegal income also has to be taxed in the hands of the person earning the illegal income.
6. The H.U.F. did possess jewellery/ornaments as evidenced by sale proceeds of 190 gms. of it for Rs. 25,701 on 21-5-82.
7. The H.U.F. was in existence, owned jewellery/ornaments earned money-lending business albeit illegally, much before the dreaded search took place in the premises of the appellant, in individual status.
9. In view of his above findings the learned AAC directed the W.T.O. to treat the assessments in assessee’s status as HUF in ‘substantive’ capacity and to remove the words ‘protective basis’, wherever they occur, from his orders. This time Revenue is aggrieved and is now in appeals before us all the six years.
10. Opening his arguments, Mr. V.G. Vyas, the learned Departmental Representative first required us to admit and decide the following additional ground raised by the Revenue in all the appeals vide its application dated 4-11-1987:
The learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no power to hear the appeal as the appeal did not fall in any of the clauses of Section 23 of the W.T. Act.
Mr. Vyas submitted that assessments for all the years having been made on ‘Protective’ basis only not resulting either in any enhancement to the amount of net wealth returned or of the wealth-tax payable the assessee could have no cause for any grievance to go in appeal before the AAC as by filing the returns the assessee had accepted its liability to be assessed under the Act. Opposing the effort by the Revenue to raise the additional ground at this stage of proceedings, Mr. N.R. Divatia, the learned Advocate appearing for assessee, vehemently submitted that objection to the power of the AAC to hear the appeal was never raised before the lower appellate authority, though the W.T.O. had actively participated in the proceedings before him and, therefore, it should not be admitted at this belated stage. On merits Mr. Divatia submitted that by making protective assessments the W.T.O. had jeopardised the very right of the assessee to be assessed substantively for the net wealth belonging to it. The assessments, as made by the W.T.O., threatened assessee’s rights in and title to the net wealth returned and this mode of assessment, claimed Mr. Divatia, gave every right of appeal for the assessee to deny its liability to be assessed under the Act in that way. In support of his arguments Mr. Divatia relied upon Tribunal’s Special Bench decision in the case of Eastern Bulk Services v. ITO [1983] 5ITD 471 (Delhi).
11. We agree with Mr. Divatia that objections relating to jurisdiction, limitation etc. should be taken by a party at the earliest available opportunity so that in the event of success of such objections, wastage of time and energies of the persons concerned may be avoided. But at the same time we have also to agree with Mr. Vyas that a ground raising purely a question of law and not involving any further investigation of fact, like the ground under consideration, may be raised at any stage of proceedings. We are of the opinion that Rule 11 of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963, which, mutatis mutandi, applies to the proceedings under the Act and corresponds practically to Order 41 Rule 2 C.P.C. empowers the Tribunal to entertain an additional ground of appeal particularly when such ground raises purely a question of law and necessitates no further enquiry into facts. We find that the additional ground, sought to be raised by Revenue before us, challenges the very jurisdiction of the A.A.C. to entertain assessee’s appeals and thus goes to the very root of the case. It raised purely a question of law and necessitates no further enquiry into or investigation of facts. Notice thereof had already been given to the assessee. Under all these circumstances we admit the additional ground for hearing and proceed to decide it first, as urged by Mr. Vyas.
12. A right of appeal is a creature of statute and does not accrue to a party unless specifically granted by the relevant statute. In the present case, Section 23 of the Act deals with the right of a person to prefer appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the orders of the Wealth-tax Officer. Section 23, as is relevant for our purpose, reads as under: –
Section 23(l) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) any person, –
(a) objecting to the amount of net wealth determined under this Act, or
(b) objecting to the amount of wealth-tax determined as payable under this Act, or
(c) denying his liability to be assessed under this Act; or
(d) to(i)** ** ** **
may appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner against the assessment order, as the case may be, in the prescribed form and verified in the prescribed manner.
Sub-section (1-A) of Section 23 is not material for our purpose.
13. It may be noted that the determination of the amount of net wealth of an assessee and of the amount of wealth-tax payable by him gives rights of appeal to him under Clauses (a) and (b) above respectively. As the assessee before us was not aggrieved against the amount of net wealth determined nor against the amount of wealth-tax determined as payable by it, neither of the two Clauses (a) or (b) of Section 23(l) stood attracted to its case. Let us proceed further.
14. Clause (c) of Section 23(1) stands attracted to the cases of those persons who deny their very liability to be assessed under the Act. In the language of this clause the vital distinction made by the Legislature by using the word “denying” instead of the word “objecting” as has been done in the language of all other clauses may clearly be noted. The word “denying” is wider in its meaning and scope than those of the word “objecting”. Whereas all the rest of the clauses of sub-sec.(l) of Section 23 give specific rights of appeal to a person to raise his objection against the action of W.T.O. taken with regard to a particular point or done in a particular direction, Clause (c) confers upon a person, who denies his very liability to be assessed under the Act, a general right of appeal. The question is whether the assessment on an assessee on “protective” basis only may give rise to such a cause to him as to entitle him to deny his liability to be assessed under the Act. This requires us to consider and understand the meaning and scope of the phrase “his liability to be assessed under the Act” as used in the language of Clause (c) of sub-sec.(l) of Section 23 of the Act.
15. The liability of a person to be assessed under the Act flows from his relationship with an asset. Section 3 is the charging section and it seeks to charge a tax in respect of net wealth of an individual, HUF and a Company, as on a valuation date. The net wealth is to be computed/determined in accordance with the definition of the term given in Section 2(m) of the Act. Reading the definition of the term ‘net wealth’ with the charging Section 3 it is evident that a person shall be charged to wealth-tax in respect of such net wealth as belongs to him on a relevant valuation date. His representative capacity notwithstanding, a person cannot be charged to wealth-tax in respect to the net wealth which does not belong to him on a valuation date. It means that an attempt to subject a person to the charge of wealth-tax in respect of an asset which does not belong to him on a valuation date would give rise to a right to him to deny his liability to be assessed under the Act.
16. Ordinarily the refusal to charge tax in respect of an asset which belongs to a person on a valuation date should cause no grievance to such person. But where the refusal to charge tax is not absolute and where the decision of the authority concerned over the point of an asset belonging to a person is not final, such actions on the part of the assessing authority may cause grievance to the person concerned. By such an action the assessing authority approves, may be tentatively, the liability of the person concerned to be assessed under the Act but at the same time by not making his decision with regard to the asset belonging to that person final he keeps his relationship with that asset in suspense and under the state of suspicion. This makes the liability of that person to be assessed under the Act quite uncertain. This state of uncertainty with regard to his liability to be assessed under the Act should, to our minds, give rise to a right to that person to deny his liability as assessed by the assessing officer.
17. That apart, the phrase ‘liability to be assessed under the Act’ occurring in the language of Clause (c) of Section 23(l) not only refers to the determining of the liability of a person to the charge of wealth-tax in respect of an asset by also refers to the mode of assessment as well. The words “under the Act” in this phrase mean “in accordance with the provisions of the Act”. Section 16 of the Act governs the subjects of making assessment on a person. There is nothing in Section 16 which specifically or by necessary implication entitles the W.T.O. to assess more than one assessee in respect of the same asset. The departmental practice of making “protective” assessments, has thus no legal sanction. In the case of a protective assessment, therefore, an assessee may very well say that his liability has not been assessed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But at the same time nothing contained in Section 16 prevents the W.T.O. from assessing two different assessees in respect of one and the same asset by including that in the net wealth of both.
18. The necessity of making “protective assessments” generally arises in a case where two different persons may be found to be claiming the same asset or the W.T.O. is himself in doubt as to its ownership. In such a case, in order to safeguard the interest of revenue it must be open to the W.T.O to make assessments in the case of both the different assessees simultaneously, and ultimately, when the question of ownership to that asset is finally settled to retain the assessment in the hands of that assessee who is found to be entitled to the asset and to cancel the other. No doubt the procedure does not entitle the Revenue to proceed to recover taxes from both the persons concerned yet it keeps the question of their ownership to the asset involved in doldrum. This state of affairs resulting from such mode of assessment must give them a right of appeal Under Section 23(1) (c) of the Act, the exercise of which may bring the state of uncertainty causing mental torture to them, if not physical, to an early end. By exercising such a right they would be denying their liability either to be assessed at all or if to be assessed then not on protective basis but substantively in respect to the net wealth in dispute.
19. In the case of Eastern Bulk Services (supra), relied upon by Mr. Divatia, the Special Bench of the Tribunal, dealing with a like point arising in a case under the Income-tax Act, 1961, observed that ‘protective’ assessments tend to cause mental harm, if not physical, to the person concerned, in the same way as libellous, slanderous or defamatory actions do under the law of criminology and if the law of crimes may take note of such actions and may make them punishable offences why should the tax laws not make such actions of the assessing officer causing grievance to an assessee appealable. We think we are fortified in our approach to the point on hand by the views expressed by the Special Bench in the cited case.
20. To sum up we hold that an order of making a protective assessment on an assessee is an appealable order within the meaning of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act. We accordingly declare that the appeals of the assessee before the A.A.C. in the present cases were clearly maintainable and were rightly entertained by him. Consequently the additional ground, as raised by Revenue before us, is dismissed.
21. Now coming to the merits of the appeals we find that the findings and conclusion of the learned AAC, as have been quoted by us above, have been challenged by Revenue by raising as many as six grounds of appeal. The pith and substance of all these grounds is that the learned AAC should not have directed the W.T.O to treat the assessments made by him in these cases as having been made in the status of the assessee as HUF on substantive basis. This objective is sought to be achieved by assailing various findings of the learned AAC with regard to assessee’s possessing agricultural lands and earning agricultural income so as to form circulating capital for any money-lending business and thus becoming capable of acquiring jewellery and ornaments, silver vessels and utensils and cash on hand as on the relevant valuation dates. Mr. Vyas heavily relied upon the order of the WTO and contended that the learned AAC, in his approach to the case of the assessee had failed to bring any cogent evidence on record to prove sufficient sources or funds available to it so as to acquire the large wealth. Mr. Vyas further submitted that obtaining a locker in a bank in the joint names of two or more persons of this family was no proof of the fact that such locker was obtained by the HUF and further that it contained any HUF property in it. Likewise the Bank A/c and the credit entries therein were no proof of its being HUF property. Mr. Vyas thus contended that in the absence of satisfactory evidence on such points the W.T.O. was fully justified in raising assessments in these cases on protective basis and such an action of the W.T.O. should not have been disturbed by the learned AAC.
22. Contrary to the above, Mr. Divatia took considerable pains in taking us through the orders of the lower authorities in these and other related cases as also through various pages of assessee’s voluminous paper book. Supporting the order under appeal tooth and nail Mr. Divatia vehemently urged that it was fully proved on record by cogent and convincing evidence that the forefathers of Sri Kantilal G. Shah, the karta of the assessee-HUF, were possessed of vast agricultural lands, receiving rental as well as agricultural produce income and also carrying on money-lending business in that part of State which was mostly inhabited by Adivasis. Mr. Divatia further contended that living in a village at a time when the light of modern civilisation had not spread in the way it is found today particularly in the mercantile life of the community, the forefathers of the karta of the assessee-HUF could not be expected to have kept minute to minute memoranda or record of their income earning activities, to have kept their savings in bank accounts and to have invested them in other more beneficial ways. Mr. Divatia asserted that once the proof of HUF property and the nucleus coming from such property was there on the record of the case the view taken by the learned AAC was the most reasonable view of the matter in these cases and such view, which is not only reasonable but also judicious and justifiable, deserves to be upheld by this final fact finding body.
23. Before we proceed to appreciate the merits in the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties it would be worthwhile to recapture certain principles governing the issue on hand. Firstly, it is the well established proposition of Hindu Law that the normal state of every Hindu family is joint. Legally such a family is to be presumed to be joint in food and worship. Thus there exists a legal presumption in favour of the joint character or status of a Hindu family. But, at the same time there is no presumption, that a family, because it is joint, possesses joint property or any property. Therefore, to render a property to be the joint property of a Hindu family it is required to be proved that the family was possessed of some property with the income of which the property in question could have been acquired or from which the presumption could be drawn that the property possessed by such family was its joint property, or that It was purchased or acquired with joint family fund such as the sale proceeds of ancestral property, or application of the income of its joint fund or even by joint labour. But none of these factors is a matter of legal presumptions. They are to be proved by evidence in the same way as any other facts are proved. Once it is established or admitted that a family possessed some joint property which from its nature or relative value may have formed sufficient nucleus from which the property in question may have been acquired, the presumption arises that it was joint property and the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that the property was obtained without the aid of joint family. All these facts are required to be determined on the evidence in a given case. Secondly, it must be remembered that the standard of proof required in tax proceedings to create the presumption of joint character of a property of a Hindu family is no greater than that required in civil proceedings. Here again preponderance of probabilities is to decide the issue either way. Again, in appreciating the evidence, for or contra, normal human conduct, the environment and atmosphere the members of the family are living or have lived, their way of life and their behavioural pattern etc. shall have to be taken into account while deciding the issue. Thus it would be after considering the entire material or evidence brought on the record of a given case and the facts and circumstances attending on the question that an answer whether a particular property is a joint Hindu family property or is the separate or self-acquired property of one or two or more members of that family shall have to be recorded.
24. Judged in the light of the principles enunciated above the position in the instant cases comes to this. It is gathered from the material on record that one Gumanji, the grandfather of Sri Kantilal, karta of assessee-HUF, was the original ancestor of this family. He had four sons viz. Gulab Chand, Ami Chand, Bhagwan Das and Chhotey Lal. This family of father and sons was living in a village Mandvi. Sri Kantilal Shah is stated to have born to Sri Ami Chand sometimes in 1925 or 1926 but went in adoption to the family of his uncle, Sri Gulab Chand in 1936. Gulab Chand died sometime in 1940 leaving behind him Sri Kantilal G. Shah, as his adopted son and Smt. Bhikiben as his widow. It is gathered from a deed dated 8-7-1963 that in the year 1943 there had been a family partition in which 30 acres and 30 gunthas of agricultural land at Village Kara Vyara and 9 acres and 29 gunthas of such lands at village Bedkuwa, both situated in Vyara Taluka, fell to the lot of the two brothers Ami Chand and Gulab Chand. Smt. Bhikiben also died in 1955.
25. It is in the above background that it is stated by the assessee that its ancestors belonging to Marwari Jain community traditionally carried on money-lending business in that locality inhabited mostly by Adivasis. By their such activities they had acquired vast agricultural lands and jewellery and ornaments. Therefore, with the income from the agricultural land as also from money-lending activities the assessee-HUF, could have been very well in a position to possess the wealth disclosed by it in its returns for various years. The question is whether these facts are probable and also probabilise the possession of the net wealth by the assessee-HUF at the relevant valuation date.
26. In view of the material on record the facts as mentioned above can hardly be disputed. It is not disputed by the department that originally the forefathers of the assessee were living in village and at a time, much prior to the arising of the controversy under consideration, were possessed of vast agricultural land. This fact is fully borne out by the relevant extracts from Revenue record and letters written by the Mamlatdar. It is also not disputed that the said land yielded income either in the form of rent or agricultural produce. The very fact that ultimately the agricultural land was settled with the ganotias under the relevant provisions of Tenancy Laws, clearly suggests that the said land was yielding income to the assessee and its ancestors. Then again, it is also an established fact that the assessee-HUF comes from Marwari Jain community. The conditions in which this family was living and earning its livelihood in a village in the vicinity of Adivasis probabilises the fact that the forefathers of the assessee might be doing money-lending business. We may point out that whereas the assessee has specifically asserted this fact and has, in its support, relied upon the affidavits of Shah Manak Chand Poonam Chand and Shah Amnet Lal Kastur Chand, both residents of the same village Mandvi, Revenue did not like to rebut this evidence. It can, therefore, reasonably be inferred that on the death of his adoptive father, Gulab Chand, in the year 1940, Sri Kantilal G. Shah, the karta, had certainly inherited sufficient ancestral property to earn circulating capital for money-lending business.
27. Here we would like to stress another principle required to be taken into consideration while deciding such question. Sri Kantilal G. Shah, the karta of assessee-HUF, has all along stated that the wealth in question was not his self-acquired property but was HUF property acquired with nucleus of the joint property. This is an admission of Sri Kantilal G. Shah against his own interest and is required to be believed. As against this admission of a material fact by a person concerned, coupled with the statements of the two persons named above, Revenue led no evidence in rebuttal to dislodge the effect flowing from such evidence produced by the assessee-HUF. In fact there seems to be no good reasons to reject the evidence and circumstances relied upon by the assessee-HUF in support of its contention that the wealth declared in its return was HUF wealth. This is corroborated by the conduct of the parties concerned also. We, therefore, hold that the assessee-HUF was possessed of sufficient joint nucleus so as to acquire the declared wealth.
28. It was as back as on 21-2-1961 i.e. almost 20 years before the search operations in the case of Sri Kantilal G. Shah, individual, that Locker No. 2465/A had been engaged by Sri Kantilal G. Shah and his wife Smt. Jaswantiben with Gujarat Safe Deposit Co. The said locker was released on 4-3-1971 and was again engaged by them on that very day under the “Own Your Locker” scheme of the said company. It was released on 26-6-1981 and again engaged by them along with their son and daughter. This conduct of these persons cannot be suggestive of the fact that they had been acting in that way only to create evidence in favour of the articles kept in the locker to be considered joint property of their HUF later on. No doubt engaging lockers does not suggest that any property was kept in it but at the same time the act of engaging the locker does not also suggest that nothing was kept therein.
29. Then again Bank Account No. 8109 was opened on 18-5-1982 with Bank of Baroda and later on it was having a credit balance of Rs. 25,701. The case of the assessee in that behalf was that the above amount had been obtained by it from sale proceeds of gold ornaments belonging to HUF. Bill No. 554 dated 21-5-82 issued by M/s Chokshi Haji Ali Mohd. Noor Mohd. and the entries in the Bank A/c standing in the name of Sri Kantilal G. Shah and his son Sri Anil Kumar corroborated that fact. The entry dated 1-7-82 in the books of Anil K. Shah showed that Rs. 42,501 were deposited with him as HUF fund. Above all, the I.T. Assessment of the assessee-HUF for assessment year 1983-84 shows that accrual of long-term capital gain to the assessee-HUF from sale of its ornaments was accepted by the I.T.O. All these pieces of evidence and instances of conduct of parties go a long way to support the conclusions arrived at by the learned A.A.C. in these cases.
30. Having examined the material on record quite critically and exhaustively in respect of all the grounds of appeals, we are left in no doubt that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence placed before him the learned A.A.C. was fully justified in directing the W.T.O. to treat the assessments made by him in these cases as on substantive basis and not on protective basis. We agree with him and confirm his order in all the appeals accordingly. Consequently we reject all the grounds as raised by Revenue in all these appeals.
31. In the result all the appeals fail and are hereby dismissed.