ORDER
Per V. P. Elhence, Judicial Member – the assessed is aggrieved of the order dated 14-12-1988 of the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals)-XVI, New Delhi for the assessment year 1987-88.
2. The assessed is a private limited company which manufactures pump sets as well as potato chips. The interesting point which arises in this appeal relates to the claim ability of deduction under section 32AB which was inserted by the Finance Act, 1986 with effect from 1-4-1987. That provision is to the effect that where an assessed whose income includes income chargeable to tax under the head Profits and gains of business or profession has, subject to the other provisions of that section, out of such income, –
(a) deposited any amount in an account (deposit account) maintained by him with the Development Bank before the expiry of six months from the end of the previous year or before furnishing the return of his income, whichever is earlier;
… He shall be allowed a deduction of a sum prescribed in the section 3 .
We are concerned only with the meaning and interpretation of clause (a) of section 32AB which the has been substantially reproduced above. The following dates are relevant :
(1) Date of introduction of Finance Bill, 1986 [158 ITR 1 (STATUTE)]
28-2-1986
(2) Date on which the previous year of the assessed relevant to the Asst. Year 1987-88 ended.
30-4-1986
(3) Date of assent of the President to the Finance Bill, 1986
13-5-1986
(4) Date of framing deposit scheme under section 32AB (161 ITR 101 Statutes).
15-7-1986
(5) Date on which 6 months from the end of the previous year relevant to the Asst. Year 1987-88 expired.
31-10-1986
(6) Date of coming into force of the Finance Act, 1986
1-4-1987
(7) Date on which deposit was made with IDBI.
25-6-1987
(8) Last date date for filing Income-tax return.
30-6-1987
(9) Actual date of filing return.
30-6-1987.
The assessed claimed deduction on account of investment deposit allowance amounting to Rs. 3,86,602 on the ground that it has paid Rs. 3,62,000 with the IDBI and had utilised Rs. 24,971 for purchase of new machinery (20 per cent of the eligible profit had been worked out at Rs. 3,86,602). The Inspecting Asset. Commissioner (Asst.) did not allow deduction under section 32AB in respect of deposit made in the IDBI on the ground that it had not been made within the time prescribed under section 32AB (1) (a).
3. Before the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (appeals) submissions made on behalf of the assessed for justifying the claim of deduction under sec. 32AB were the following :
(i) That the year under consideration was the first year when section 32AB was applicable;
(ii) The expression previous year used in section 32AB should be interpreted to mean the period of 12 months ending with 31-4-1987. According to the assessed, a different meaning had to be given to the expression previous year.
(iii) The deposit made with the IDBI on 25-6-1987 should be treated as deposit made within time.
The learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) noticed that since the scheme was framed on 15-7-1986, the assessed should have been aware as to by what time the deposit was required to be made in terms of section 32AB (1) (a). He did not accept the assesseds submission that the expression previous year could mean anything but the period of 12 months up to which the accounts of the assessed had been made up and that if court not be accepted that the said expression could mean the period ending 31- 31-3-1987. He held that whatever was required to be done by the assessed to avail of the deduction under section 32AB had to be done after the previous year expired. He accordingly upheld the disallowance.
4. Before us, Shri R. Ganesan, the learned counsel for the assessed reiterated the submissions made on behalf of the assessed before the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). He sought to compare the language used inspection 32AB (1) (A) with the language used in sections 12A (b), 35CC (3), 809I (7) and section 0J (6a). He referred to the decision of Bombay Bench E in Trustees of Virji Peraj Trust v. Eighth ITO [1984] 8 ITD 890 (Bom.) wherein section 12A (b) was considered which requires audit report to be filed along with the return of income. In that case it was held by the Tribunal that although the report was not filed along with the return of encomium, it was filed before the final assessment was made, the question of grant of exemption under section 11 could be considered. Next he referred to the decision of Bombay Bench D in ITO v. K. C. A. Ltd. [1987] 22 ITD 554 which referred to the grant of deduction under sec. 35CC (1). That provision requires that the statement of expenditure in prescribed from duly singed and verified and setting forth prescribed particulars was to be filed along with the return under section 139(1). The Tribunal had held that the words along with the return meant that the return and the statement of expenditure should be duly filed and that both these documents should be before the assessing authority at the time when he was applying his mind to the assessments of the particular assessed. Next, he referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of CIT v. Filmistan Ltd. [1958] 33 ITR 334 wherein section 30(1) and the first proviso to section 30(1) had been considered. It was held that if tax was paid after the presentation of appeal but before the hearing of an appeal, the right of appeal was not taken away but only remedy was barred until the tax was paid, since the payment of tax was a condition precedent not to the presentation of the appeal but to the hearing and disposal of the appeal. Shri Ganesan referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dhandhania Kedia & Co. v. CIT [1959] 35 ITR 400 wherein it was held that the expression this previous year in section 2(6A) (c) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 is different from the expression previous year used in section 2(11). Next he referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Filmistan Ltd. [1961] 42 ITR 163 which affirmed the decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Filmistan Ltd. (supra). Shri Ganesan referred to the decision in the case of CIT v. Modi Spg. & Wvg. Mills Co. Ltd. [1973] 89 ITR 304 (All.) which dealt with the provision of clause (vib) to section 10(2) (vii) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 and held that the Act did not specify and period of time within which the relevant entry should be made and so the assessed could make the necessary entries at any time before the return of income was filed. the Court also held that even if the entries were made, thereafter during the pendency of the assessment proceedings, the Income-tax Officer may take them into consideration. Lastly, Shri Ganesan submitted that since section 32AB is a beneficial provision, it had to be liberally construed. In this connection, he relied upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. U.P. Co-operative Federation Ltd. [1989] 176 ITR 435. Section 14(3) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 extended certain advantages to the co-operative societies in order that the legislative purpose of providing incentives to the co-operative movement were fulfillled. Therefore, the Supreme Court took the view that the provisions contained in section 14(3) required to be liberally construed. On the basis of the above mentioned submissions, Shri Ganesan argued that the Income-tax authorities should have held that the assessed was entitled to the deduction claimed under section 32AB. On the other hand, Smt. meanjari Kakkar, the learned Departmental Representative strongly supported the orders of the income-tax authorities. firstly, the argued that the scheme having been framed on 15-7-1986, the assessed had ample time to make the deposit as contemplated in section 32AB (1) (A). Next, she submitted that the language of section 32AB (1) (a) was clear and no two interpretations were possible. She referred to the decision of the Honorable Delhi High Court in the case of Addl. CIT v. Bhagat Swarup Charanjit Singh & Co. [1982] 133 ITR 13 for the proposition that no statute should be interpreted in such a manner as to render any provision completely meaningless or refund ant.
5. We have considered the rival submissions as also the decisions referred to above. The expression in section 32AB (10(A) which is under consideration before us is deposited any amount… before the expiry of six months from the end of the previous year 5 or before furnishing the return of his income, whichever is earlier. The expression previous year has not been redefined in this section and therefore, it has to have the same meaning as given in section 2(34) read with section 3. The assessment order shows that the accounting period of the assessed ended on 300401986 and therefore, the period of 6 months from the end of the previous year ended on 31-10-1986. It is not the case of the assessed that it went before the assessing officer under section 3(4) to have the meaning of the expression previous year varied. therefore, the argument sought to be put forward on behalf of the assessed that the expression previous year used in section 32AB (1) (A) should be interpreted to mean the period of 12 months ending with 31-3-1987 cannot be countenanced. the expression used in section 12A (b), 35CC (3), 80-I (7) and 80J (6A) is not the same as used in section 32AB (1) (A). the expression used in the above sections referred to above, refers to the furnishing alone with the return of income, the report of audit in the prescribed form. therefore, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal in the cases of Trustees of Virji Peraj Trust (supra) and K. C. A. Ltd. (supra) cannot assist the assessed. In fact section 12A (a) is in the following terms :
“The person in receipt of the income has made an application for registration of the trust or institution in the prescribed from and in the prescribed manner to the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner before the first day of July, 1973 or before the expiry of a period of one year from the date of the creation of the trust or the establishment of the institution, whichever is later.”
The above provision gives rise to two points. Firstly, that in the provision under consideration, the expression whichever is earlier has been intentionally and advisedly used since in section 12A (a) the expression used in whichever is later. Secondly, the proviso appended to section 12A (a) is to the effect that the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner may, in his discretion, admit an application for the registration of any trust or institution after the expiry of the period aforesaid. this shows that so far as section 12A (a) is concerned, the Legislature empowered the Chief Commissioner or Commissioner to admit the application for registration even after the expiry of the said period. Such a provision is conspicuously absent with reference to section 32AB (1) (A). This also shows that apart from the very clear language be of this provision, the time or time frame forms an essential or mandatory part of the provision. To accept the submissions of the assessed would mean that we would be substituting in section 32AB (1) (a) the expression whichever is later even though the expression used in whichever is earlier. This only the Legislature can do. Where the language is plain, interpretation cannot take the shape of addition or interstitial legislation. The language of the provision of section 32AB (1) (a) being clear enough, a doubt cannot be imagined nor can it be said that two interpretations thereof were possible. Equitable considerations cannot be taken into consideration which interpreting a taxing Act. In interpreting a fiscal statute the Court cannot proceed to make up deficiencies, if there by any. It has to interpret the statute as it stands. No doubt as held by the Supreme Court in the case of U.P. Co-operative Federation Ltd. (supra) the provisions of section 14(3) of Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 were held to require to be liberally construed. But that decision proceeded on its own facts on the basis of the wordings of section 14(3) which provides that tax shall not be payable by a co-operative society in certain situations. On facts that decision cannot be taken advantage of by the assessed. The contention put forward on behalf of the assessed, cannot be upheld without doing violence to the language of section 32AB (1) (a) and which does not admit of any doubt or ambiguity. the principle of interpretation in favor of the assessed applies only in case of doubt. It does not apply where the provision is clear. Hardship caused in a particular case is not relevant. Literal construction has to be applied regardless of the results, where the meaning is plain. The clauses governing limitation constitute fetters and are therefore to be construed strictly.
Since the assessed sought to claim deduction under section 32AB, the requirements thereof, which were clear and patent, had to be strictly complied with. Even in regard to provisions dealing with exemption, the law laid down by the Supreme Court is that though it is true that exemption provision should be liberally construed but that this does not mean that such literal contraction should be made even by doing violence to the plain meaning of such exemption. Liberal construction will be made where it is possible to be made without impairing the legislative requirement and the concept of the provision. A look at the provisions of section 32AB (1) (a) shows that the deposit of the amount in the deposit account was to be made before the expiry of 6 months from the end of the previous year of before furnishing the return of income, whichever is earlier. The provision does not restrict assesseds right to file the return by a particular date and that is why the earlier of the two dates mentioned in that provision had been prescribed to be followed. there is another aspect also which may be referred to. the Finance Bill, 1986 was introduced on 28-2-1986. After it received the assent of the president on 13-5-1986, the Investment Deposit Account Scheme, 1986 was framed by the Government on 15-7-1986 (vide p. 3,121 of Taxman’s Yearly Tax Digest and Reference, 1987). That gave the assessed sufficient time to consider whether a deposit was to be made in the deposit account before the expiry of six months from the end of the previous year (31-10-1986) or before furnishing the return (30-6-1987). Therefore, the deposit made with the IDBI on 25-6-1987 being clearly after 31-10-1986, could not be said to have been made in terms of time frame prescribed under section 32AB (1) (A). The department is, therefore, right in relying upon the decision of the Honorable Delhi High Court Court in the case of Bhagat Swarup Charanjit Singh & Co. (supra) which is to the effect that no statute should be interpreted in such a manner as to render any provision completely meaningless or redundant. If we were to interpret section 32AB (1) (A) the way assessed wants us to interpret, it would certainly render that provision completely meaningless or redundant. In view of the foregoing discussion therefore, we hold that there is no warrant or justification for interference with the order of the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).
6. The appeal filed by the assessed accordingly fails and is dismissed.