ORDER
Umesh Chandra Banerjee, C.J.
1.
The short question that falls for consideration in these petitions is in regard to the maintainability of the departmental proceedings after the acquittal in a criminal case.
2. The contextual facts depict that while the petitioner was working as Sub-Inspector (Executive) Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) attached to the Singareni Colleries Company Limited, Ramakrishnapur, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Mancherial filed a charge-sheet against the writ petitioner in Crime No.40/93 under Sections 307, 353, 34 and 506 IPC alleging that on 21-5-1993 at about 11-30 P.M, the writ petitioner and others assaulted the Inspector, CISF B.Raju and made a criminal threat against him and subsequently in furtherance of the above incident, he is alleged to have gone to the Government Hospital, Mancherial on 29-5-1993 at 10.25 p.m. while the said Raju was getting treatment and attempted to kill him by pressing the throat for which a case in Crime No.98/93 has been registered for the offence under Section 307 IPC. Since the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Assistant Sessions Judge, Asifabad. The records depict that two separate Sessions Cases were tried against the writ petitioner, one in S.C.No. 177 of 1994 for the offence under Sections 307 and 506 IPC and the other in S.C.No. 178 of 1994 for the offence under Section 307 IPC. During the course of evidence, however, some of the witnesses turned hostile in both the cases and the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Asifabad
did record that except the sole evidence of P.W.1, there is no other evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and as such, the accused is entitled to acquittal, by reason of which the writ petitioner was acquitted in both the cases.
3. Incidentally, it may be placed on record that during the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the departmental enquiry had commenced, and the petitioner filed writ application before this Court and obtained the order of stay of all further proceedings in the departmental enquiry.
4. The contextual facts further depict that immediately after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, the respondent-authority thought it fit to continue with the departmental proceedings and it is at this stage, another writ petition has been filed before this Court with a prayer that by reason of the fact that similar charges have been levelled both in the criminal case as also in the departmental proceeding, the question of continuing with the departmental proceeding does not and cannot arise.
5. The matter was moved before the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge, however, was informed of a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Muralidhar, . By reason, therefore, the learned single Judge thought it fit to refer the matter to the Division Bench recording the following:
“The learned Counsel for the petitioner brought to my notice a latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Government of A.P. v. Muralidhar, (supra) and contended that in view of the said judgment of the Supreme Court, the departmental proceedings cannot go on since the petitioner has already been acquitted of the same charges by the Criminal Court. But this Court has been taking the view that even if a person is acquitted of the charges in a criminal case, the departmental proceedings would not be barred. One such judgment rendered by a
Division Bench of this Court is reported in Chief Regional Manager, SBI v. E.Eswara Rao, . In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court cited supra, in my opinion, the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Eswara Rao’s case requires to be reconsidered. Since there are large number of writ petitions filed on this point, I think it is just and proper to refer these matters to the Division Bench for laying down law on the subject. Accordingly, I pass the order as under: The writ petitions are referred to a Division Bench. Office is directed to place the matter before a Division Bench after obtaining the necessary orders of the Hon’ble the Acting Chief Justice.”
and it is in terms of the order as passed by the learned single Judge, this matter has been placed in the list for being dealt with by this Bench.
6. In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it would be convenient, however, to note the charges culled out in the domestic enquiry. The articles of charge are as follows:
“Article I:
No. 872310098 Sub-Inspector (Exe) Y.C. Rajwar attached with CISF Unit, Ramakrishnapur Area (SCCL) is charged with insubordination and gross indisciplined act, in that during the night from 2130 hours on 21-5-1993 to 0530 hours on 22-5-1993 he reportedly assaulted No.7638016 Inspector (Exe) B.Raju, his superior officer, at about 2335 hours on 21-5-1993, at the sentry room of Ramakrishnapur area Auto work shop duty post, when Inspector (Exe) B.Raju was checking the registers maintained at the Auto work shop duty post. No. 872310098 SI (Exe) Y.C.Rajwar also reportedly used abusive and threatening language such as “Thum Chugli Maraghe? Mujhe thum paichana nahin, murder kar dunga” to Inspector (Exe) B. Raju, who is also superior in rank to him.
Article II:
No. 872310098 Sub-Inspector (Exe) Y.C.Rajwar attached with CISF Unit, Ramakrishnapur Area (SCCL) is charged with insubordination and gross indisciplined act, in that he was found to have removed the key of the jeep Registration No. AP 1A-2652, with a view to stop Inspector (Exe) B.Raju to avail the jeep for returning from Ramakrishnapur Auto work shop at about 2335 hours on 21-5-1993 to unit lines. It is also reported that he did not allow Inspector (Exe) B.Raju to travel in the jeep taking plea to go to the hospital. Later No. 872310098 SI (Exe) Y.B.Rajwar alleged to have left with No.714050047 HC (GD) M.R.S.Narayanan and No. 873190268 Constable K.K.Dwivedi in jeep, leaving Inspector (Exe) B.Raju near Auto Work Shop duty post.
Article III:
No. 872310098 Sub-Inspector (Exe) Y.C.Rajwar attached with CISF Unit, Ramakrishnapur Area (SCCL) is charged with insubordination and indisciplined act, in that he reportedly went to the Government G.R.M.Hospital, Manchiryal, about 1020 hours on 29-5-1993, along with an unknown person and allegedly assaulted Insp (Exe) B.Raju, who was admitted in that hospital at Manchiryal.”
While in the contextual facts, certain offences under IPC may be made out in terms of Article I of the charge, but Article II of the charge is completely different and as such, independent of the criminal charge tried against the writ petitioner. In any event, the decision of the Supreme Court as noted above, does not lend any assistance to the learned Advocate appearing in support of the writ petition and the same is clearly distinguishable on facts. The law as laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Chief Regional Manager’s case referred to supra relying upon a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Jayaram Panda v. D.V.Raiyani and others, AIR 1989 Orissa 109 may be quoted as follows:
“The question as to the competence and propriety of initiation of departmental proceeding on the self-same charges of which the delinquent has been acquitted has been examined successively by different Courts and considerable case law has developed on the subject. Almost all such decisions appear to have been taken into account by a Division Bench of this Court in General Manager, APSRTC v. K.Seshagiri Rao, 1991 (2) An.WR 49, wherein it was observed as follows:
“The conclusion deducible from the precedents is that even if the charges were the same in a criminal proceeding and in a disciplinary proceedings and the former ends in acquittal by the Criminal Courts it is open to the disciplinary authority to continue departmental proceedings if the authority is satisfied that there are sufficient evidence and good grounds to proceed with the enquiry. The authorities, are, however, to be governed by the Rule of caution that they shall advert to and take into account the fact of acquittal, but they are not precluded from initiating or continuing the disciplinary proceedings, if that course is warranted by the circumstances of the case”.
Corporation of Nagpur v. Ramachandra GModak’s case, was also considered in that case. Hence the view unequivocally taken was that merely because the charges in the criminal case and the departmental proceedings are identical and the employee has been acquitted of the charges by the criminal Court, the authority and the jurisdiction of the employer is not lost to conduct a departmental proceeding on the same allegations. This question was considered by a Full Bench of the Orissa High Court referred to by the Division Bench, in which the observations were:
“an order of acquittal passed in a criminal case does not debar a departmental enquiry of self-same charges. Even if the delinquent is honourably acquitted, the discretion is
left with the authority himself, and if he, on the facts and circumstances of the case, feels that notwithstanding the acquittal of the delinquent a departmental enquiry is expedient, ordinarily that should not be open to scrutiny by a Court. Thus the only guiding factor for a departmental authority would be to find out whether it would be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry in the facts and circumstances of a particular case where the accused stood his trial on the very same charges and the charges were completely exonerated and he was acquitted honourably. This could be a germane consideration for the departmental authority to take into account and decide whether the departmental inquiry would be continued or not, but the power of the authority to continue the same is not taken away nor the discretion has been fettered in any manner.
It was further observed by Agarwal, C.J., “the decision to hold a departmental enquiry against a delinquent Government servant which is required “in the interest of the public administration” is entirely different i.e., whether the delinquent is guilty of any mis-conduct or delinquency and the mere fact that the enquiring officer may reach a conclusion different from that recorded by the criminal Court does not abridge his right. There is no constitutional, statutory or legal bar on the basis of which it can be held that a departmental enquiry is bad in view of the order of acquittal recorded by a criminal Court. That being the position, we do not see any reason to take a different view.”
In the instant facts of the matter in issue, atleast some of the charges are completely different and as such, the question of there being any ‘double jeopardy rule’ being taken recourse does not and cannot arise. Be it noted that in any event, standard of proof required in a criminal proceeding is “beyond all reasonable doubt”. That may not be so in regard to a departmental enquiry. In the
criminal prosecution, all the witnesses have turned hostile excepting P.W.1 being the defacto complainant. Factually, therefore, the matter is completely different from that of the Supreme Court decision as noted above. In our view, question of stay of all the departmental proceedings by reason of the acquittal as above, does not and cannot arise in the contextual facts. In that view of the matter, the writ petitions fail and are dismissed without any order as to costs.
7. The Departmental authority, however, is directed to consider the feasibility of proceeding with the departmental proceedings and in the event the consideration is in the affirmative, the departmental proceedings should be completed with utmost expedition and preferably within a period of two months from the date of commencement of the proceedings, upon affording proper opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioner. This order is passed having due regard to the fact that the writ petitioner is a personnel engaged in a disciplined force known as “Central Industrial Security Force” wherein the standard of discipline is expected to be much higher than in any other ordinary service.
8. In view of the above, the stay granted earlier stands vacated and the Departmental authority is to act in terms of the directions as above.