While clearing the air on when the case of extortion is made out, the Chhattisgarh High Court in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Shatrughan Singh Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. in WPCR No. 133 of 2017 that was reserved on July 27, 2021 and then finally pronounced on September 7, 2021 has held in no uncertain terms that to make out a case of ‘extortion’ punishable under Section 384 IPC, the prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury, the victim voluntarily delivered any particular property to the accused. It must be apprised here that the single Judge Bench of Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas of Chhattisgarh High Court said unequivocally that if there were no delivery of property, then the most essential ingredient for constituting the offence of ‘extortion’ would not be available. Justice Vyas also made it clear that if a person voluntarily delivers any property without any fear of injury, then also an offence of ‘extortion’ cannot be said to have been committed.
To start with, the single Judge Bench of Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas of Chhattisgarh High Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in para 1 that, “The petitioner, who is an Advocate by profession, has filed the present writ petition (cr.) challenging the registration of First Information Report against him under Sections 384 and 388 of IPC on the basis of complaint filed by respondent No.5 Kuleshwar Chandrakar before the Police Station Rudri in connection with Crime No. 106 of 2015 on 9-10-2015 and subsequently, the Police has submitted the final report before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhamtari, now the case has been transferred to learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari, bearing Criminal Case No. 1405 of 2015 (State vs. Shatrughan Saho).”
As we see, the Bench then enunciates in para 2 that, “Brief facts, as projected by the petitioner in the present petition are that the Government of Chhattisgarh has enacted the Shakambhari (Nal-Jal) Scheme for benefit of agriculturists by granting subsidy. The beneficiary farmers applied for irrigation instrument in the Department of Agriculture. As per scheme, the State Government is giving them instrument and subsidy after following certain procedure. The Rural Agricultural Extension Officer, Village and Post Bhatgaon, Tahsil Kurud, District Dhamtari, Agricultural Development Officer, Village and Post Charmudiya, Tahsil Kurud, District Dhamtari, Agriculture Sub Divisional Officer, Collectorate Dhamtari, Deputy Director Agricultural Collectorate, Dhamtari and respondent No.5/complainant Kuleshwar Chandrakar and Roshan Chandrakar, Proprietor of Shri Ram Bore-wells have committed gross embezzlement at the time of granting subsidy to the concerned agriculturists, therefore, the petitioner made a complaint before the Collector, Dhamtari on 3-3-2015 and 24-4-2015 with regard to corruption done by them.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 3 that, “On 18-3-2015 the petitioner made a complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Dhamtari for registration of FIR against the corrupt employee/officers. Again, the petitioner along with other person namely Naresh Kumar has also filed a complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Dhamtari stating that the persons involved in the embezzlement under the Shakambhari (Nal Jal) Scheme threatened them to cause death. But the respondent authorities i.e., Collector and Superintendent of Police, District Dhamtari and Director of Agriculture Department Raipur did not take any action against the corrupt persons including the respondent No.5.”
As it turned out, the Bench then observed in para 4 that, “The Superintendent of Police has directed Rudri Police Station to enquire into the matter. Though the statements of persons namely Manik Ram, Tomar Sahu, Abhimanyu and Devendra Kumar have been recorded and all have supported the case, still Police has not taken any action against the erring officials. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has filed complaint under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C before the learned District and Sessions Court, Dhamtari for registration of offence under Prevention of Corruption Act. On 9-10-2015, the complainant Kuleshwar Chandrakar lodged FIR against the petitioner contending that the petitioner has demanded Rs.25,00,000/- by way of extortion. Police has registered the FIR without conducting any preliminary enquiry. Though the petitioner was present at his office along with other advocates on 9-10-2015, still he has been roped in crime number 106 of 2015 for committing alleged offence under Sections 384 and 388 of IPC.”
While continuing in the same vein, the Bench then brings out in para 5 that, “On 20-12-2015 the petitioner has submitted an application before the Police Station Rudri and prayed for an opportunity of defence and also submitted the representation on 24-12-2015 along with documents, but the same has not been considered. On 31-12-2015 when the petitioner was going to court, at that time four persons came in motorcycle and threatened the petitioner by pressing and compelled him to do compromise and withdraw the complaint. On 31-12-2015 the petitioner made a complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Dhamtari but no action has been taken. The Police on the strength of the FIR lodged by respondent No. 5, after investigation, registered the offence and final report has been submitted before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhamtari. Now the case is transferred to the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari and learned Magistrate registered the case bearing Criminal Case No. 1405 of 2015.”
Needless to say, the Bench then discloses in para 6 that, “On the above factual matrix of the case, the petitioner prayed for quashing of FIR registered against the petitioner in connection with Crime No. 106 of 2015 at Police Station Rudri, District Dhamtari for offence under Sections 384 and 388 of IPC.”
Truth be told, the Bench then unfolds in para 7 that, “This Court issued notice to the respondents and in pursuance of notice, respondent No.5 has entered his appearance and filed his return. The State counsel has also filed their return in which they have stated that on the basis of complaint made by the petitioner, an enquiry has been conducted by the Additional Collector & Inquiry Officer, Dhamtari has submitted his report on 28-11-2016 wherein charges levelled against respondent No.5 and other Government officials have been found false and baseless. It has also been stated that the petitioner being an Advocate indulged in making complaint with regard to corruption under the scheme of the State Government and requesting for registration of FIR. It is further contended that the petitioner made another complaint before the Superintendent of Police, District Dhamtari, regarding corruption being made in the Rajya Poshit Sukshma Sichai Yojna by one Roshan Chandrakar which was enquired into and upon enquiry no incriminating was found for taking cognizance and the complaint of the petitioner was found to be false and baseless and copy of the report has been forwarded by the Incharge of Police Station, Dhamtari to the Superintendent of Police, Dhamtari on 7-2- 2015. He would further submit that the charges leveled against respondent No.5 are false and baseless, therefore, the petition filed by the petitioner deserves to be dismissed by this court.”
Simply put, the Bench then states in para 8 that, “Complainant/respondent No.5 has also filed his return in which he denied the allegations made by the petitioner and would submit that as per material collected by the Investigating Officer case under Section 384 and 388 of IPC is made out. It has been further contended that the petitioner is a habitual complainer and blackmailing the people and he has filed a complaint against the Officer of the Agriculture Department alleging certain irregularities and thereafter vide letter dated 24-10-2015 has withdrawn the same which clearly shows the conduct of the petitioner itself. He would further submit that prima facie the allegations leveled against him are made out, therefore, the writ petition, at this juncture is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed by this court.”
Furthermore, the Bench then remarked in para 9 that, “The petitioner has filed his rejoinder on 24-6-2021 and would submit that at the time of incident, the petitioner was in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate to argue the criminal case and in this regard a copy of the order sheet thereof has also been annexed. He would further submit that he has been falsely implicated in this case as he was not present at the time of alleged incident, therefore, the story projected by the complainant is false, baseless and cannot be accepted at this juncture and would pray that the petition filed by him be allowed and the criminal proceeding be quashed. In support of his arguments, he has relied upon the judgments rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs Bhajanlal reported in 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335.”
Significantly, the Bench then states in para 15 that, “Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that from perusal of the FIR it is nowhere reflected that on extortion made by the petitioner, complainant/respondent No.5 has delivered any valuable property to the petitioner, as such, he has not committed offence under Section 384 of IPC. Even from perusal of the final report, it is clear that the documents submitted by the investigating agency regarding statements of the witnesses, none of the witnesses has stated that on extortion made by the petitioner by demanding Rs.25,00,000/- from respondent No.5. The respondent No. 5 has given Rs.25,00,000/- to the petitioner, as such, there is no ingredient of offence under Section 384 of IPC is made out.”
Of course, the Bench then points out in para 16 that, “It would be evident from the reading of Section 383 of the IPC that the ingredients of ‘extortion’ are; (i) the accused must put any person in fear of injury to that person or any other person; (ii) the putting of a person in such fear must be intentional; (iii) the accused must thereby induce the person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, valuable security or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security; (iv) such inducement must be done dishonestly. The terms ‘dishonestly’, ‘illegally’ and ‘injury’ used in “Section 383 of the IPC” and in “Sections 24, 43 and 44 of the IPC” respectively. On a careful consideration of the above definitions and ingredients what appears is that if someone puts the others intentionally in fear to any injury and thereby, dishonestly induces that person who has been put into fear to deliver to the person any property or valuable security or anything signed or sealed or which may be converted into valuable security shall be liable to be punished for ‘extortion’.”
Most significantly, what forms the cornerstone of this brief, brilliant and balanced judgment is then stated in para 17 wherein it is put forth that, “Thus, what is necessary for constituting an offence of ‘extortion’ is that the prosecution must prove that on account of being put in fear of injury, the victim was voluntarily delivered any particular property to the man putting him into fear. If there was no delivery of property, then the most important ingredient for constituting the offence of ‘extortion’ would not be available. Further, if a person voluntarily delivers any property without there being any fear of injury, an offence of ‘extortion’ cannot be said to have been committed.”
While citing the relevant case law, the Bench then stipulates in para 18 that, “Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.S. Nayak vs. A.N. Antulay and another, reported in (1986) 2 SCC 716, has held in para 60 and relevant portion thereof is extracted as under:
“60. Before a person can be said to put any person to fear of any injury to that person, it must appear that he has held out some threat to do or omit to do what he is legally bound to do in future. If all that a man does is to promise to do a thing which he is not legally bound to do and says that if money is not paid to him he would not do that thing, such act would not amount to an offence of extortion. We agree with this view which has been indicated in Habibul Razak v. King Emperor, A.I.R. 1924 All 197. There is no evidence at all in this case that the managements of the sugar cooperatives had been put in any fear and the contributions had been paid in response to threats. Merely because the respondent was Chief Minister at the relevant time and the sugar co-operatives had some of their grievances pending consideration before the Government and pressure was brought about to make the donations promising consideration of such grievances, possibly by way of reciprocity, we do not think the appellant is justified in his contention that the ingredients of the offence of extortion have been made out. The evidence led by the prosecution falls short of the requirements of law in regard to the alleged offence of extortion. We see, therefore, no justification in the claim of Mr. Jethmalani that a charge for the offence of extortion should have been framed”.”
Be it noted, the Bench then observes in para 21 that, “From perusal of the aforesaid judgment, it is apparent that the alleged offence under Section 384 of IPC has been quashed on the ground that no valuable assets have been delivered because of extortion, threaten, pressure created by the accused. In the present case also respondent No.5 has not delivered any valuable assets to the petitioner, therefore, the judgment referred to by respondent No.5 also support the contention of the petitioner and in that case also Madhya Pradesh High Court held that offence under Section 384 of IPC is not made out. Therefore, the judgments cited by learned counsel for respondent No.5 are distinguishable from the facts of the present case.”
Quite forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 22 that, “From bare perusal of the FIR it can be very visualized that if we take the face value of the allegation made in the complaint, then also it can be very well seen that no offence under Section 388 of IPC is made out as respondent No.5 in his complaint has nowhere stated that on the basis of extortion made by the petitioner, respondent No.5 was put in fear of an accusation by the petitioner or he committed or attempted to commit any offence punishable with death and has delivered any valuable assets to the petitioner. When prima facie provisions of Section 383 of IPC is not made out, then the offence under Section 388 of IPC cannot be made out, because unless and until the ingredient of extortion is established, then only the alleged offence, prima facie, is said to have been committed by the petitioner. Since the ingredients of Sections 383 of IPC are not made out, the ingredient of Section 388 of IPC cannot be, prima facie, established, therefore, registration of FIR, prima facie, is nothing, but an abuse of process of law.”
To put it succinctly, the Bench then hastens to add in para 26 that, “From bare perusal of FIR it is crystal clear that no case of extortion is made out, therefore, offence under Sections 384 and 388 of IPC against the petitioner is not made out. The proceeding initiated by the complainant is nothing, but an abuse of process of law and on this count alone this court is quashing the FIR, therefore, no other ground is required to be dealt by this court.”
It is worth noting that the Bench then holds in para 27 that, “In view of above legal provisions, considering the facts of the case and from perusal of FIR, prima facie, no case is made out against the petitioner and criminal proceedings is manifestly attended against the petitioner with malafide, therefore, initiation of criminal proceeding is nothing, but an abuse of process of law.. Considering overall the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the view that the petitioner has made out strong case for quashing of FIR. Accordingly, FIR No. 106 of 2015 registered at Police Station – Dhamtari on 9-10-2015 for alleged offence said to have been committed under Section 384 and 388 of IPC is quashed. Consequently, the criminal proceeding pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dhamtari is also quashed.”
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 28 that, “Accordingly, the instant petition is allowed. No order as to costs.”
Finally, the Bench then holds in para 29 that, “A copy of this order be sent to learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, for closure of the proceedings.”
All said and done, the inescapable conclusion that can be drawn from this noteworthy judgment is that the offence of extortion is not made out in absence of delivery of property. It is a no-brainer that the property has to be delivered in order to prima facie make a case of offence of extortion. It is also made amply clear that the victim too must be put in fear of injury before he/she delivers the property. To put it differently, if there is no fear of injury and property is still delivered then the offence of extortion cannot be prima facie said to be made out!