It is definitely a matter of extreme solace to note that while standing up most stoutly to protect the legal rights of even history sheeters affirming entirely their right to privacy, the Kerala High Court in a most positive, pragmatic, persuasive, pertinent and progressive judgment titled Prasath C v. State of Kerala & Anr. in Crl.M.C. No. 3751 of 2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025:KER:44716 that was finally heard on 13.06.2025 and then pronounced also as recently as on June 19, 2025 has made it absolutely clear in no uncertain terms that the police have no right to try to enter the homes of suspects or history sheeters at odd hours in the name of surveillance. It merits noting that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice VG Arun who authored this learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment most resolutely observed that such house visits do not fall within the ambit of lawful surveillance and are violative of one’s right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution. In addition, the Bench also very rightly underscored that a person’s right to life encompassed the right to live with dignity, with dignity being non-negotiable. It is high time and doubtless police must definitely pay heed to what the Kerala High Court has directed so very cogently, commendably, courageously and convincingly in this leading case!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “The petitioner is the accused in Crime No.267 of 2025 registered at the Thoppumpady Police Station for the offence under Section 117(e) of the Kerala Police Act, 2011. The crime is registered on the basis of Annexure A2 report of the Sub Inspector of Police, Thoppumpady stating that, on 03.04.2025, as part of night check duty on Rowdy History Sheeters, he along with police party had gone to the house of the petitioner, at about 01:30 am, to ascertain whether the petitioner is available at his house. After reaching the house, the police party asked the petitioner to open the door, but the petitioner not only refused to abide by their direction, but abused and intimidated the police personnel, thereby preventing the officers from discharging their duty.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench enunciates in para 2 stating that, “The petitioner’s version of the incident and the reasons behind registration of the crime are as under;
The Thoppumpady Police had framed the petitioner in a false POCSO case, of which the petitioner got acquitted after a full fledged trial. Alleging foul play in registering that case, the petitioner approached the State Police Chief. This led to animosity towards the petitioner and the police started registering false cases against him, alleging violation of traffic rules and dangerous driving. While so, the petitioner started receiving frequent phone calls from the police enquiring about his whereabouts. On 03.04.2025 also, by about 12:58 am, the petitioner received a call from the police, asking him to stand outside his house. In obedience of the direction, the petitioner stood outside his house for some time, but did not find anyone there. Later in the morning, the petitioner got another call, asking him to report at the Thoppumpady Police Station. As directed, petitioner went to the Police Station and without any reason, was subjected to torture by the Sub Inspector of Police. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner filed W.P.(C) No. 15550 of 2025, alleging police harassment and the writ petition was disposed of by directing the Principal Secretary, Home Department, to enquire into the complaint. According to the petitioner, he is implicated as accused in the present crime to divert that enquiry.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 6 that, “Much later, by the celebrated judgment in K.S. Puttaswamy and Another v. Union of India and Others [(2017) 10 SCC 1], the Apex Court reversed the finding that privacy is not a constitutional right. The following erudite exposition on that aspect by the Apex Court is very insightful;
“317. Kharak Singh [Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329 : (1964) 1 SCR 332] has correctly held that the content of the expression “life” under Article 21 means not merely the right to a person’s “animal existence” and that the expression “personal liberty” is a guarantee against invasion into the sanctity of a person’s home or an intrusion into personal security. Kharak Singh [Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329 : (1964) 1 SCR 332] also correctly laid down that the dignity of the individual must lend content to the meaning of “personal liberty”. The first part of the decision in Kharak Singh [Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329 : (1964) 1 SCR 332] which invalidated domiciliary visits at night on the ground that they violated ordered liberty is an implicit recognition of the right to privacy. The second part of the decision, however, which holds that the right to privacy is not a guaranteed right under our Constitution, is not reflective of the correct position. Similarly, Kharak Singh [Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329 : (1964) 1 SCR 332] reliance upon the decision of the majority in Gopalan [A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCC 228 : AIR 1950 SC 27 : 1950 SCR 88] is not reflective of the correct position in view of the decisions in Cooper [Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248] and in Maneka [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248]. Kharak Singh [Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 1295 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 329 : (1964) 1 SCR 332] to the extent that it holds that the right to privacy is not protected under the Indian Constitution is overruled.”
Most significantly, most sagaciously, most rationally, most remarkably and so also most forthrightly, the Bench encapsulates in para 8 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “It is thus beyond cavil that the police have no right to knock at the doors of suspected persons or history sheeters under the guise of surveillance. The officers should understand that the concept of home transcends its physical manifestation as a dwelling and encompasses a rich tapestry of existential, emotional and social dimensions. In other words, every man’s house is his castle or temple, the sanctity of which cannot be vilified by knocking on the door at odd hours. A person’s right to life encompasses the right to live with dignity and dignity is non-negotiable. The above discussion leads to the definite conclusion that, under the guise of surveillance, the police cannot knock on the doors or barge into the houses of history sheeters.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench notes in para 7 that, “In K.S. Puttaswamy (supra), the Apex Court also encapsulated the concept of privacy in the Indian Constitution eruditely in the following words;
“323. Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Personal choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects heterogeneity and recognises the plurality and diversity of our culture. While the legitimate expectation of privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the private to the public arenas, it is important to underscore that privacy is not lost or surrendered merely because the individual is in a public place. Privacy attaches to the person since it is an essential facet of the dignity of the human being.
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325. Like other rights which form part of the fundamental freedoms protected by Part III, including the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, privacy is not an absolute right. A law which encroaches upon privacy will have to withstand the touchstone of permissible restrictions on fundamental rights. In the context of Article 21 an invasion of privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which is fair, just and reasonable. The law must also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and personal liberty under Article 21. An invasion of life or personal liberty must meet the threefold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate State aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them.”
Finally and far most significantly, we see that the Bench then deems it fit to draw the curtains of this notable judgment by propounding in para 9 holding and directing that, “While on the subject, it will be worthwhile to note that as per Section 39 of the Kerala Police Act, all persons are bound to comply with the ‘lawful directions’ given by a police officer for the discharge of his functions under the Act. Knocking on the doors of a history sheeter at midnight and demanding him to come out of the house cannot by any stretch of imagination be termed as a lawful direction. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for the offence under Section 117(e) of the Kerala Police Act, for refusing to abide by that direction. If, as alleged, the petitioner had used derogatory language or threatened the police during the course of such refusal, his action may invite some other offence, but definitely not the offence he is presently charged with. For the aforementioned reasons, the Crl.M.C. is allowed. Annexure A1 FIR and all further proceedings in Crime No. 267 of 2025 of Thoppumpady Police Station are quashed.”
Sanjeev Sirohi