PREFACE
While leaving no stone unturned in sending a very loud, strong and unequivocal message to all the courts, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia vs State of Bihar & Anr in Criminal Appeal No.523 of 2024 ( @ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6562 of 2021) and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2024 INSC 77 that was pronounced most recently on January 31, 2024 minced just no words to observe in no uncertain terms that in appropriate cases, it is essential to protect against unwarranted criminal prosecution and from unnecessary trials. We thus observe that the Apex Court very rightly after perusing the case before it allowed the appeal that had challenged the Patna High Court’s judgment of dismissing the plea to quash the FIR. The Apex Court found that the dispute primarily revolved around the landowners/principals and the Power of Attorney (PoA) holder. While taking the most balanced and nuanced stand, the Apex Court conceded that it was unfair to involve the appellant in criminal litigation as he had no role in PoA’s execution and he had already paid the full amount of consideration to the PoA holder.
INTRODUCTION
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Ahsanuddin Amanullah for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Vikram Nath and himself sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 3 that, “The present appeal arises out of the Final Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2021 (hereinafterreferred to as the “Impugned Judgment”) passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No.42776 of 2013 by the High Court of Judicature at Patna (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”) by which the prayer for quashing First Information Report No.87 of 2011 dated 19.03.2011 (hereinafter referred to as the “FIR”) registered at Dumraon Police Station, Buxar, Bihar under Sections 467, 468, 469 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”), has been dismissed.”
THE BRIEF FACTS:
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 4 about the facts of the case that, “The informant/respondent no.2 Maharaj Kumar Man Vijay Singh @ Man Vijay Singh gave a statement in writing to the Station House Officer, Dumraon Police Station alleging that Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh, s/o Group Captain Late Maharaj Kumar Ran Vijay Singh had sold off property belonging to 5 persons of the informant’s family, including the informant himself. It was alleged that the informant and his family members had earlier given a Power of Attorney (hereinafter referred to as the “PoA”) to Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh in respect of and as owners of property bearing Khasras No.459G, 472, 474, 475, 476 and 478B and further Khasra No.459E situated in Village Karbari Grant, Tehsil Vikasnagar, Pargana Pachwain, District Dehradun. It was stated that the informant Maharaj Kumar Man Vijay Singh and his brother Kumar Chandra Vijay Singh, both sons of Maharaja Kamal Singh, Smt. Sangeeta Kumari, Indumati, Ran Vijay Singh, his father’s Sister, father, sisters and Aunt executed a PoA on 12.04.1994 for management and maintenance of their property. It was provided therein that the PoA holder shall pursue litigation, file plaint after obtaining signature of the land owners/principals of the PoA. It was alleged that some portion of the property of the informant and others was sold to the present appellant and on such knowledge, the informant sent a Legal Notice to the PoA-holder directing him to give the details of the sale made in conspiracy with the appellant and a Notice was also given to revoke the PoA but the agent did not give any information/reply to the informant and others who had executed the PoA. In this backdrop, and as such, the criminal case was instituted. It was alleged that criminal acts were committed by the accused, including the appellant, by misusing the PoA and alleging that they had misappropriated the property, did not rendition the account(s) and that the Sale Deed was fraudulent as it was without obtaining the signatures of the land-owners/Principals of the PoA-holder. Upon investigation, the police had submitted final report finding a case under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420, IPC and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar thereupon took cognizance of the offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420, IPC on 18.11.2014 in GR No.515 of 2011.”
As it turned out, the Bench discloses in para 5 that, “During the pendency of Criminal Miscellaneous No.42776 of 2013 on the file of the High Court, originally filed for quashing the FIR, the appellant filed Interlocutory Application No.1261 of 2017 seeking amendment of the prayer to include quashing of the order dated 18.11.2014 mentioned above.”
ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
As we see, the Bench observes in para 21 that, “Having considered the facts and submissions by the learned counsel for the parties, this Court finds that a case for interference has been made out. The undisputed and admitted facts are that the PoA was executed by the landowners/principals, including respondent no.2 and others on 12.04.1994, in favour of the person from whom the appellant purchased the land on 24.08.2000.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 22 that, “It is also a fact that the PoA-holder executed a Sale Deed and got it registered at Dehradun in favour of the appellant as also that the land is located in Dehradun. Much has been said with regard to a harmonious reading of the various clauses of the PoA viz. Clauses 3, 11 and 15 which read as under:
‘3. To execute any type of deed and to receipt consideration, if any, on our behalf and to get the Registration done of the same.
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11. To sell moveable or immoveable property including land, live stock, trees etc. and receive payment of such sales on our behalf.
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15. To present for registration all the sale deeds or other documents signed by us and admit execution there of before the District Registrar or the Sub-Registrar or such other Officer as may have authority to register the said deeds and documents as the case may be and take back the same after registration.’”
Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 23 that, “A mere perusal of the above indicates that as per Clause 3, the PoA-holder was authorised to execute any type of deed, to receive consideration in this behalf and to get the registration done thereof. Clause 11 of the PoA further makes it clear that the PoA-holder had the authority to sell movable or immovable property including land, livestock, trees etc. and receive payment of such sales on behalf of the land-owners/principals. However, Clause 15 of the PoA, which has been strenuously relied upon by the respondent no.2, while opposing the present appeal, states that the PoA-holder was authorized to present for registration the sale deed(s) or other documents signed by the landowners/principals and admit execution thereof before the District Registrar or the Sub-Registrar or such other officer as may have authority to register the said deeds and documents, as the case may be, and take back the same after registration.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 24 that, “Thus, the Court is required to interpret harmoniously as also logically the effect of a combined reading of the afore-extracted clauses. As such, our endeavour would, in the first instance, necessarily require us to render all three effective and none otiose. In order to do so, this Court would test as to whether all the three clauses can independently be given effect to and still not be in conflict with the other clauses.”
Simply put, the Bench then postulates in para 25 that, “With this object, when the three clauses are read, it is obvious, at the cost of repetition, that Clause 3 pertains to execution of any type of deed and receiving consideration, if any, on behalf of the land-owners/principals and to get the registration thereof carried out. Basically, this would take care of any type of deed by which the PoA-holder was authorized to execute and also receive consideration and get registration done on behalf of the land-owners/principals.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench expounds in para 32 that, “The PoA and its execution/registration not being in dispute, the only controversy relating to the Sale Deed executed by the PoA-holder in favour of the appellant in Dehradun for property located at Dehradun would thus, in the emerging factual matrix, clearly be an issue for the Courts at Dehradun to examine, much less give rise to any cause of action at Buxar.”
As things stands, the Bench hastens to add in para 33 stating that, “We may add that this issue of jurisdiction is limited to the transaction of the execution of the Sale Deed in favour of the appellant, and not to any other controversy or dispute the landowners/principals may have, either inter-se or against the PoA-holder. Moreover, a suit filed by the land-owners/principals at Dehradun prior to the lodging of the FIR, for the same cause of action, has been dismissed in favour of the appellant, where a specific plea to cancel the Sale Deed stands rejected.”
It is worth noting that the Bench then aptly notes in para 34 that, “In sum, the dispute, if any, is between the land-owners/principals inter-se and/or between them and the PoA-holder. We think it would be improper to drag the appellant into criminal litigation, when he had no role either in the execution of the PoA nor any misdeed by the PoAholder vis-à-vis the land-owners/principals. Moreover, the entire consideration amount has been paid by the appellant to the PoA-holder.”
Most significantly and as a corollary, the Bench then propounds and directs succinctly in para 35 that, “On an overall circumspection of the entire facts and circumstances, we find that the Impugned Judgment needs to be and is hereby set aside. This Court has held that in the appropriate case, protection is to be accorded against unwanted criminal prosecution and from the prospect of unnecessary trial (Priyanka Mishra v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 978 and Vishnu Kumar Shukla v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1582). We quash FIR No.87 of 2011 dated 19.03.2011, Dumraon Police Station, Buxar, Bihar as also the order taking cognizance dated 18.11.2014 and all consequential acts emanating therefrom, insofar as they relate to the appellant.”
What’s more, the Bench stipulates in para 36 that, “Learned senior counsel for the respondent no.2 had submitted that the Trial Court be allowed to exercise power under Section 319, CrPC against the appellant, if warranted. Expressing no opinion thereon, we insert the caveat that the Trial Court will act in accordance with law.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding in para 37 that, “The appeal is accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.”
All told, we thus see that in this leading case, the Apex Court has made it indubitably clear to the courts that protection is to be accorded to the appellant against unwanted criminal prosecution and also from unnecessary trial. The appellant thus got the relief that was sought but which was not granted by the Patna High Court earlier. But the appellant as we see was able to get the much needed and much deserved relief finally from the Supreme Court. Very rightly so!
Sanjeev Sirohi