While according paramount importance to the “due procedure” to be followed strictly in matters pertaining to the termination of services, the Himachal Pradesh High Court has in an extremely laudable, learned, landmark and latest judgment titled Sh Raj Kumar vs State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. in Civil Writ Petition Original Application No. 3165 of 2019 and cited in 2022 LiveLaw (HP) 21 and pronounced as recently as on August 5, 2022 has observed without mincing any words that termination of an employee from service summarily, merely on account of registration of FIR and without conducting proper inquiry violates principles of natural justice. The petitioner was working as a Lecturer of History in the Higher Education Department of State Government against vacancies for Ex-servicemen. His services were terminated following registration of a FIR against him under Section 354-A of IPC. The complainant was one of the petitioner’s students. It merits underscoring that all the courts in India must definitely pay heed to what the Himachal Pradesh High Court has laid down so very elegantly, eloquently and effectively in this leading case.
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment by a Single Judge Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Satyen Vaidya first and foremost puts forth in para 1 that, “Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the petition are that the petitioner rendered about 17 years of services in Indian Army and was superannuated in the year 2008. Petitioner is M.A. in History and also has the degree in Bachelor of Education.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then envisages in para 2 that, “After retirement, petitioner got his name registered with the Employment Exchange, Ex-servicemen Cell at Hamirpur on 03.10.2008. The Sub-Regional Employment Officer, Directorate of Sainik Welfare, Ex-servicemen Employment Cell, Hamirpur recommended the name of petitioner for appointment as Lecturer (History) in the Department of Higher Education. Respondent No.2 vide order dated 24.07.2012 appointed the petitioner as Lecturer (History) on contract basis against the vacancies for Ex-servicemen of 2008. Petitioner was posted at GSSS Loharghat, District Solan, H.P.”
While continuing in the same vein, the Bench then mentions in para 3 that, “On 11.09.2014 an FIR No. 46/2014 was registered at Police Station, Ramshehar, District Solan, H.P. against the petitioner under Section 354-A IPC. The complainant was a student of Class +2 in GSSS Loharghat. Petitioner was taken in custody on 11.09.2014 and was released on bail on 24.09.2014. Petitioner was suspended from service on 20.09.2014. The Principal, GSSS Loharghat, terminated the services of petitioner vide communication dated 13.01.2015. Respondent No.2 also issued office order dated 17.01.2015, terminating the contract of the petitioner.”
As it turned out, the Bench then notes in para 4 that, “Aggrieved against his termination, petitioner approached this Court by way of instant petition praying for following substantive reliefs:
“It is, therefore, humbly prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed keeping in view of the facts and the circumstances of the case and in view of the averments made hereinabove, the impugned order of termination of the petitioner, Annexures P-12 & 13 passed by respondents No. 2 and 4 may kindly be quashed and set-aside in the interest of justice.””
Be it noted, the Bench then notes in para 5 that, “Petitioner was prosecuted in pursuance to challan filed on completion of investigation in FIR No. 46/2014. During the pendency of this petition, petitioner has been acquitted of all charges in the above noted case vide judgment dated 22.02.2022 passed by the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Special Court (POCSO), Solan, District Solan, H.P. in Sessions Trial No. 125-S/7 of 2020/15.”
Furthermore, the Bench then adds in para 6 stating that, “The above said judgment of acquittal has been placed on record vide CMP-T No. 321/2022 filed on 23.04.2022. The matter was heard by this Court on 16.06.2022 for some time and was adjourned to 24.06.2022. On said date again, the matter was heard further. Learned Additional Advocate General was directed to have the instructions from the Administrative Department regarding their stand after the acquittal of the petitioner. On 22.07.2022 further time was sought by the learned Additional Advocate General to place on record the instructions. On 29.07.2022, again a similar prayer was made on the ground that the petitioner had not submitted a copy of judgment of acquittal with respondent No.2. On the basis of such contention, it was observed that the respondents were not interested to consider the grievances of the petitioner at their end. Such observation was made on the basis that the stand of respondent No.2 regarding non-supply of copy of judgment did not appear to be justified as CMP-T No.321/2022 could not have been filed without supplying an advance copy to the respondents alongwith its annexures. The matter was thereafter finally heard. Record also perused.”
As we see, the Bench then states succinctly in para 9 that, “In order to adjudicate the issue regarding legality of termination of petitioner vide impugned orders dated 13.01.2015 (Annexure P-12) and 17.01.2015 (Annexure P-13), it is necessary to assess the nature of employment of petitioner with respondents. There is no denial on behalf of respondents to the factual position asserted by the petitioner. Office order dated 24.07.2012 (Annexure P-6) clearly reveals that the appointment was offered to petitioner on the recommendation of the Director, Ex-servicemen Cell, Hamirpur against the vacancies of Lecturer (school cadre) for Ex-servicemen of 2008. Though, the appointment was made on contract basis, but from the terms of the aforesaid order, it is clear that permanency was attached to the employment. As per Clause 6 of the terms and conditions of the office order dated 24.07.2012, the contract was liable to be renewed on year to year basis by the Principal of concerned school on behalf of respondent No.2 subject to good performance and conduct. As per Clause 10, an official appointed on contract basis having completed five years of service, was made liable for transfer on need basis. All other conditions also pointed out that the permanency was attached to the employment with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, the contract agreement was executed and renewed on yearly basis. Petitioner has placed on record the contract agreement executed for the period 01.08.2014 till 31.07.2015.”
Quite pragmatically, the Bench then points out in para 10 that, “The Recruitment and Promotion Rules framed by the Department of Higher Education for the post of Lecturer (School Cadre), specify one of the mode of appointment as contract appointment. The State Government has framed the policies, from time to time, to regularize the services of its contractual employees. In this view of the matter, it can be inferred that the services of the petitioner were also permanent in nature. He was also allowed the minimum of pay scale of pay band applicable to the Lecturer (School Cadre) in the Department of Higher Education, Government of Himachal Pradesh.”
Most notably, the Bench then minces no words to say point blank in para 11 that, “Thus, the termination of the petitioner summarily without adopting due procedure and was clearly in violation of the principle of natural justice. In K. Ragupathi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2022) 6 SCC 346, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:
“14. It could thus be seen that though the communication of the said University dated 12.8.2014 states that the appellant’s contractual period has expired, in the facts of the present case, it would reveal that his services were discontinued on account of the allegation made against him by the Dean of the said University. Since even according to the said University, though the employment was contractual but the employee was entitled to get all the benefits of a regular employee, we find that in the facts of the present case, the appellant’s services could not have been terminated without following the principles of natural justice. We, therefore, find that the present appeal deserves to be allowed on this short ground.””
Frankly speaking, the Bench then concedes in para 12 that, “Notwithstanding the illegality found in the termination of the petitioner, this Court is not oblivious to the fact that serious allegations involving moral turpitude were made against the petitioner by none-else than a student of the school where the petitioner was a teacher. The petitioner was charged for offence under Section 354-A IPC. Though, he has been acquitted, but it is trite law that mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to seek service benefits. Each and every case has to be adjudged on its own merits and the authority competent to adjudge is the employer. The relevant considerations are whether the petitioner has been acquitted merely on technical grounds or his acquittal is honourable. The purpose is to assess the desirability and suitability of the employee in the backdrop of allegations levelled against him and the acquittal recorded by the Court of competent jurisdiction.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench then hastens to add in para 14 that, “The petitioner definitely has a right of consideration vis-à-vis his plea for revocation of his termination, reengagement and ensuing consequential benefits in view of the exposition made hereinabove. Irrespective of the fact that the termination of petitioner vide orders dated 13.01.2015 (Annexure P-12) and 17.01.2015 (Annexure P-13) have been held to be not in accordance with law, the respondents still have a right to consider the suitability of the petitioner for his continuance on the post of Lecturer (School Cadre) in view of the allegations levelled against him and the acquittal ordered by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track, Special Court (POCSO), Solan, District Solan, H.P. on 22.02.2022.”
As a corollary, the Bench then directs in para 15 that, “As a result, respondent No.2 is directed to consider the case of the petitioner for reinstatement and continuance in service with consequential benefits, if any, in view of the observations made hereinabove and also dictum of judgment passed in Methu Meda (supra). Since the petitioner is out of job for the last about eight years, it is desirable and will be in the interest of justice in case the consideration order is passed by respondent No.2 within four weeks from the date of production of a copy of this judgment before respondent No.2.”
Finally, the Bench concludes by holding in para 16 that, “The petition is accordingly disposed of in the aforesaid terms, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s) if any.”
All told, the Himachal Pradesh High Court has taken the most balanced and pragmatic stand in holding that summary termination of services on registration of FIR without adopting due procedure violates the principles of natural justice. It would, of course, certainly tantamount to absurdity of the highest order if service is terminated merely because someone harbouring animosity lodges FIR without adopting the due procedure as is mandated under the law also! It merits no reiteration that all the courts in India must definitely pay heed to what Hon’ble Mr Justice Satyen Vaidya of Himachal Pradesh High Court has laid down so very explicitly in this leading case! No denying it!
Sanjeev Sirohi