It is quite noteworthy to note that the Delhi High Court has as recently as on January 28, 2022 in a refreshing, remarkable, rational and robust judgment titled Mohd Shakeel @ Shakeel Ahmed vs Mst Sabia Begum & Ors in CRL.REV.P. 588/2018, CRL.M.A. 12593/2018 & CRL.M.A. 13141/2021 and 2022 LiveLaw (Del) 54 observed that while the task of deciding the marital status of the parties has been conferred with Civil Courts, the Court under maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of the CrPC may not usurp the jurisdiction of the civil courts. This must be adhered to always. This is what forms the essence of this notable judgment.
To start with, the single Judge Bench of Justice Chandra Dhari Singh of Delhi High Court which has authored this judgment first and foremost puts forth in para 1 that, “The instant Petition under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter “Cr.P.C.) has been filed by the Revisionist/Petitioner (hereinafter “Petitioner’) seeking setting aside of the Order dated 3rd April, 2018, passed by the learned Judge, Family Court, North-East, Karkardooma, Delhi whereby the Petitioner was directed to pay maintenance to the tune of Rs. 4,000/- per month to Respondent No. 1 and Rs. 3,000/- to Respondents No. 2 and 3, each till attaining the age of maturity, alongwith litigation expenses of Rs. 11,000/-.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then points out in para 2 that, “It has been alleged by the Respondents that the marriage between Petitioner and Respondent No. 1 was solemnized in January, 1994, according to Muslim rites and ceremonies. Respondents No. 2 and 3 were born out of their wedlock. Prior to her marriage with the Petitioner, the Respondent No. 1 was married to one Likayat Ali and had four children out of that wedlock, namely, Danish, Monish, Sanah and Farah. It has been alleged that the Petitioner accepted the children of Respondent No.1 and gave his name as their father in the school records.”
While continuing in same vein, the Bench then envisages in para 3 that, “The Petitioner along with Respondents and said four children were residing together at their matrimonial house at Khajoori Khas, Delhi. However, due to disputes between the first wife of the Petitioner and Respondent No. 1, the Petitioner purchased a separate property at Ziauddinpur, Delhi and started living there alongwith the Respondents.”
What followed next is then dwelt upon in para 4 that, “Subsequently, due to certain matrimonial issues between the parties, the Petitioner stopped paying maintenance to the Respondents and aggrieved by the same, Respondent No.1 filed maintenance petition for herself and Respondents No.2 and 3 under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. before the learned Judge, Family Court, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.”
As it turned out, the Bench then enunciates in para 5 that, “The Petitioner in his Written Statement dated 29th February, 2008, to the Petition under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., denied his marriage to Respondent No. 1 and the birth of Respondents No. 2 and 3 from the wedlock of the Petitioner and Respondent No. 1. However, Respondent No.1 refuted the allegations of the Petitioner and agreed to carry out a DNA test for Respondents No.2 and 3. The learned Trial Court vide order dated 5th November, 2014, allowed the commission of the test subject to cost of Rs. 5,000/- to be paid by the Petitioner. However, the test was not carried out for unstipulated reasons.”
Be it noted, the Bench then stipulates in para 28 that, “The principle of prima facie evidence for establishing the existence of a marital relationship may vary with the facts and circumstances of each case. The same has to be addressed keeping in view the essentials of a valid marriage as well as the material facts of the case. There is no straight jacket formula for judging the validity of the marriage between the parties. Every case has to be judged on its own merits depending upon the conditions provided under the statutory or personal law for solemnization of marriage. The legal standard for determining the marital status of the parties in maintenance proceedings has been set out by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh v. Naresh Pal, (1998) 8 SCC 447. Therein, the Trial Court found the appellant to be the legally wedded wife of the respondent, which was subsequently reversed by the High Court. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was required to adjudge, whether the appellant could be considered to be a legally wedded wife of the Respondent. The Hon’ble Supreme Court restored the judgement of the Trial Court and observed:“…However, learned Judicial Magistrate after considering this question came to the conclusion that the respondent was already divorced from his first wife and thereafter he had entered into a second marriage with the appellant who was also a divorcee. The High Court took the contrary view and observed that the appellant had not proved that she was the married wife of the respondent and that she had her first husband, Satendra and there was no dissolution of her marriage with him. These are the questions which are required to be thrashed out finally in civil proceedings. In a proceeding for maintenance under Section 125 CrPC the learned Magistrate was expected to pass appropriate orders after being prima facie satisfied about the marital status of parties. It is obvious that the said decision will be a tentative decision subject to final order in any civil proceedings, if the parties are so advised to adopt.””
Most significantly, the Bench minces no words to specify in para 33 stating clearly, cogently and convincingly that, “Therefore, the Court, in proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., is required to merely decide the quantum of maintenance based on the prima facie evidence regarding the marital status of the parties. If the party alleging the solemnisation of marriage has sufficient material to prima facie establish the existence of a marriage, then the husband may be directed to maintain her without going into the strict requirements of evidence. The task of deciding the marital status of the parties has been conferred with the Civil Courts and the Court under maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. may not usurp the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. Thus, the litmus test for determining the marital status of the parties in maintenance proceedings is prima facie satisfaction of the concerned Magistrate and nothing more. It is also pertinent to note that the above-mentioned decisions bring out the fact that the proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. are designed to reduce the vagaries of the neglected wife and children. In line with this, the Magistrate under such proceedings cannot be expected to wait for the determination of the marital status by the concerned Court. Thus, to preserve the social intent of Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., the Magistrate can render the prima facie finding about the factum of marriage, which will not be a conclusive finding for any other purpose apart from the order on maintenance. Any other interpretation would defeat the social intent of the legislation and must be avoided.”
Quite remarkably, the Bench then also maintained in para 34 that, “It is an established law that the Revisional Court need not re-assess or re-appreciate the material and evidence on record before the Trial Court. A Revisional Court is to limit its jurisdiction for adjudicating upon the material illegalities and irregularities apparent in the impugned orders. The conclusive determination of marital status in cases of maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., shall therefore, be declared by the Civil Court and the Revisional Court shall restrain itself to the questions before it without reopening the evidence.”
While citing a relevant case law, the Bench then mentions in para 35 that, “In Pyla Mutyalamma v. Pyla Suri Demudu (2011) 12 SCC 189, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has set out the standards of revisional jurisdiction to be exercised by the High Courts in maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., when it observed as under:“16. In a revision against the maintenance order passed in proceedings under Section 125 CrPC, the Revisional Court has no power to reassess evidence and substitute its own findings. Under revisional jurisdiction, the questions whether the applicant is a married wife, the children are legitimate/illegitimate, being pre-eminently questions of fact, cannot be reopened and the Revisional Court cannot substitute its own views. The High Court, therefore, is not required in revision to interfere with the positive finding in favour of the marriage and patronage of a child. But where finding is a negative one, the High Court would entertain the revision, re-evaluate the evidence and come to a conclusion whether the findings or conclusions reached by the Magistrate are legally sustainable or not as negative finding has evil consequences on the life of both the child and the woman. This was the view expressed by the Supreme Court in Santosh v. Naresh Pal [(1998) 8 SCC 447], as also in Pravati Rani Sahoo v. Bishnupada Sahoo [(2002) 10 SCC 510: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1140]. Thus, the ratio decidendi which emerges out of a catena of authorities on the efficacy and value of the order passed by the Magistrate while determining maintenance under Section 125 CrPC is that it should not be disturbed while exercising revisional jurisdiction.””
Quite forthrightly, the Bench then holds in para 36 that, “To prevent sufferings and vagaries of woman and children, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that in cases where the Trial Court has rendered a positive finding with respect to marriage of the parties, the High Court need not substitute its views in such questions of facts especially in their revisional jurisdiction. However, when a negative finding is given, the High Court can revise and revaluate the evidence in order to protect the wife and the children from the evil consequences that might ensue due to non-payment of maintenance, if such an exercise is not undertaken.”
Furthermore, the Bench then quite aptly observes in para 43 that, “After taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of this case, the law laid down, the precedents analyzed, arguments advanced as well as the perusal of pleadings, this Court does not find any gross illegality or impropriety in the findings and analysis of the learned Trial Court in upholding the existence of a martial relationship between Petitioner and Respondent No.1 and accordingly, awarding maintenance to the Respondents.”
What’s more, the Bench then holds in para 44 that, “The learned Family Court, Karkardooma, Delhi, vide its judgment dated 3rd April, 2018, has taken the right view in light of the circumstances present before it. This Court does not find any substantial ground for invoking the Revisional Jurisdiction to interfere with the impugned judgment. In view of the above, this revision petition is dismissed as being devoid of any merit. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.”
In sum, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment by the Delhi High Court has made it crystal clear that the Court under maintenance proceedings under Section 125 of the CrPC may not usurp the jurisdiction of the civil courts. This should always be adhered to by the Courts without fail. No denying it!Sanjeev Sirohi