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Violation Of Fundamental Right To Speedy Trial Is A Ground For Constitutional Court To Grant Bail In UAPA Cases: SC

It is most refreshing, reasonable and righteous to learn that most recently on February 1, 2021, the Apex Court in a learned, latest, landmark and laudable judgment titled Union of India vs KA Najeeb in Criminal Appeal No. 98 of 2021 has commendably held that restrictions under Section 43-D(5) of UAPA does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on the violation of fundamental right to speedy trial. The three Judge Bench comprising of Justices NV Ramana, Surya Kant and Aniruddha Bose also observed that the rigours of the provision will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Very rightly so!

To start with, the ball is set rolling in para 2 of this judgment authored by Justice Surya Kant for himself, Justice NV Ramana and Justice Aniruddha Bose after granting leave in para 1  wherein it is observed that, “The present appeal has been preferred by the Union of India through the National Investigation Agency (in short, “NIA”) against an order dated 23.07.2019 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam, whereby bail was granted to the respondent for an offence under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120-B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326, 506(H), 201, 202, 153A, 212, 307, 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and Sections 16, 18, 18-B, 19 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.”

While elaborating on the facts and the prosecution case, the Bench then puts forth in para 3 that, “The prosecution case in brief is that one Professor TJ Joseph while framing the Malayalam question paper for the second semester B.Com examination at the Newman College, Thodupuzha, had included a question which was considered objectionable against a particular religion by certain sections of society. The respondent in association with other members of the Popular Front of India (PFI), decided to avenge this purported act of blasphemy. On 04.07.2010 at about 8 AM, a group of people with a common object, attacked the victim-professor while he was returning home with his mother and sister after attending Sunday mass at a local Church. Over the course of the attack, members of the PFI forcefully intercepted the victim’s car, restrained him and chopped off his right palm with choppers, knives and a small axe. Countrymade bombs were also hurled at bystanders to create panic and terror in their minds and to prevent them from coming to the aid of the victim. An FIR was consequently lodged against the attackers by the victim-professor’s wife under Sections 143, 147, 148, 120B, 341, 427, 323, 324, 326,506(H), 307, 149 of IPC; and Section 3 of Explosive Substances Act.”

What then emerges is stated in para 4 that, “It emerged over the course of investigation that the attack was part of a larger conspiracy involving meticulous preplanning, numerous failed attempts and use of dangerous weapons. Accordingly, several dozen persons including the present respondent were arraigned by the police. It was alleged that the respondent was one of the main conspirators and the provisions contained in Sections 153A, 201, 202, 212 of IPC, along with Section 16, 18, 18B, 19 and 20 of the UAPA were also thus invoked against him. However, owing to him being untraceable, the respondent was declared an absconder and his trial was split up from the rest of his co-conspirators. The co-accused of the respondent were tried and most of them were found guilty by the Special Court, NIA vide order dated 30.04.2015 and were awarded cumulative sentence ranging between two and eight years’ rigorous imprisonment.”

To put things in perspective, the Bench then states in para 5 that, “The respondent could be arrested on 10.04.2015 only and a chargesheet was re-filed by the National Investigation Agency against him, pursuant to which the respondent is now facing trial. The respondent approached the Special Court and the High Court for bail as many as six times between 2015 and 2019, seeking leniency on grounds of his limited role in the offence and claiming parity with other co-accused who had been enlarged on bail or acquitted. Save for the impugned order, bail was declined to the respondent, observing that prima facie he had prior knowledge of the offence, had assisted and facilitated the attack, arranged vehicle and SIM cards, himself waited near the place of occurrence, transported the perpetrators, sheltered, and medically assisted them afterwards. The Courts were, therefore, of the view that the bar against grant of bail under Section 43-D (5) of the UAPA was attracted.”

What then follows is then stated in para 6 that, “The respondent again approached the High Court in May, 2019 for the third time, questioning the Special Court’s order denying bail. The High Court through the impugned order, released the respondent on bail noting that the trial was yet to begin though the respondent had been in custody for four years. Placing emphasis on the mandate for an expeditious trial under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, the High Court held that the undertrial respondent could not be kept in custody for too long when the trial was not likely to commence in the near future, for not doing so would cause serious prejudice and suffering to him. The operation of the aforementioned bail order was, however, stayed by this Court. Resultantly, the respondent has spent nearly five years and five months in judicial custody.”

After a thorough analysis, the Bench then observes in para 9 that, “It must be emphasised at the outset that there is a vivid distinction between the parameters to be applied while considering a bail application, vis-à-vis those applicable while deciding a petition for its cancellation. In Puran v. Rambilas (1996) 2 SCC 616, it was reiterated that at the time of deciding an application for bail, it would be necessary to record reasons, albeit without evaluating the evidence on merits. In turn, Puran (supra) cited Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1978) 1 SCC 118; wherein this Court observed that bail once granted by the trial Court, could be cancelled by the same Court only in case of new circumstances/evidence, failing which, it would be necessary to approach the Higher Court exercising appellate jurisdiction.”

More relevantly, the Bench then observes in para 10 that, “In State of Bihar v. Rajballa v Prasad (2017) 2 SCC 178, this Court ruled that deference must be given to the discretion exercised by Superior Courts in matters of bail, save for exceptional circumstances. The aforesaid decision holds as follows:

“14. We may observe at the outset that we are conscious of the limitations which bind us while entertaining a plea against grant of bail by the lower court, that too, which is a superior court like High Court. It is expected that once the discretion is exercised by the High Court on relevant considerations and bail is granted, this Court would normally not interfere with such a discretion, unless it is found that the discretion itself is exercised on extraneous considerations and/or the relevant factors which need to be taken into account while exercising such a discretion are ignored or bypassed. There have to be very cogent and overwhelming circumstances that are necessary to interfere with the discretion in granting the bail. These material considerations are also spelled out in the aforesaid judgments viz. whether the accused would be readily available for his trial and whether he is likely to abuse the discretion granted in his favour by tampering with the evidence…..””

Simply put, the Bench then makes it a point to state in para 11 that, “It is a fact that the High Court in the instant case has not determined the likelihood of the respondent being guilty or not, or whether rigours of Section 43-D(5) of UAPA are alien to him. The High Court instead appears to have exercised its power to grant bail owing to the long period of incarceration and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime in the near future. The reasons assigned by the High Court are apparently traceable back to Article 21 of our Constitution, of course without addressing the statutory embargo created by Section 43D(5) of UAPA.”

As a corollary, the Bench then states in para 12 that, “The High Court’s view draws support from a batch of decisions of this Court, including in Shaheen Welfare Association (supra), laying down that gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail. It would be useful to quote the following observations from the cited case:

“10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh case [(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899], on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay. No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21.””

As we see, it is then ascertained and conceded in para 13 that, “Even in the case of special legislations like the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 or the Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS”) which too have somewhat rigorous conditions for grant of bail, this Court in Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi) (1999) 9 SCC 252, Babba alias Raghuman Rohida v. State of Maharashtra (2005) 11 SCC 569 and Umarmia alias Mamumia v. State of Gujarat (2017) 2 SCC 731 enlarged the accused on bail when they had been in jail for an extended period of time with little possibility of early completion of trial. The constitutionality of harsh conditions for bail in such special enactments, has thus been primarily justified on the touchstone of speedy trials to ensure the protection of innocent civilians.”

As an aside, the Bench then states in para 14 that, “We may also refer to the orders enlarging similarly situated accused under the UAPA passed by this Court in Angela Harish Sontakke v. State of Maharashtra SLP (Cri.) No. 6888 of 2015, Order dated 04.05.2016. That was also a case under Sections 10, 13, 17, 18, 18A, 18B, 20, 21, 38, 39 and 40(2) of the UAPA. This Court in its earnest effort to draw balance the seriousness of the charges with the period of custody suffered and the likely period within which the trial could be expected to be completed took note of the five years’ incarceration and over 200 witnesses left to be examined, and thus granted bail to the accused notwithstanding Section 43D(5) of UAPA. Similarly, in Sagar Tatyaram Gorkhe v. State of Maharashtra SLP (Cri.) No. 7947 of 2015, Order dated 03.01.2017. an accused under the UAPA was enlarged for he had been in jail for four years and there were over 147 witnesses still unexamined.”

More damningly yet more appropriately, the Bench then goes on to hold in para 15 that, “The facts of the instant case are more egregious than these two above cited instances. Not only has the respondent been in jail for much more than five years, but there are 276 witnesses left to be examined. Charges have been framed only on 27.11.2020. Still further, two opportunities were given to the appellant-NIA who has shown no inclination to screen its endless list of witnesses. It also deserves mention that of the thirteen co-accused who have been convicted, none have been given a sentence of more than eight years’ rigorous imprisonment. It can therefore be legitimately expected that if found guilty, the respondent too would receive a sentence within the same ballpark. Given that two-third of such incarceration is already complete, it appears that the respondent has already paid heavily for his acts of fleeing from justice.”

Be it noted, the Bench then elucidates in para 16 that, “This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee Representing Undertrial Prisoners v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 731, it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, Courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.”

Of course, what is quite ostensible is then stated in para 18 that, “It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA per se does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution. Indeed, both the restrictions under a Statute as well as the powers exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43D (5) of UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.”

While reverting back to the present case, the Bench then holds in para 19 that, “Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the respondent’s prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected.”

What cannot be also glossed over is what is then pointed out in para 20 that, “Yet another reason which persuades us to enlarge the Respondent on bail is that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the NDPS where the competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such precondition under the UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D (5) of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to the well-settled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by absconsion etc.”

In the concluding para 21, the Bench then holds that, “In light of the above discussion, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order. However, we feel that besides the conditions to be imposed by the trial Court while releasing the respondent, it would serve the best interest of justice and the society at large to impose some additional conditions that the respondent shall mark his presence every week on Monday at 10 AM at the local police station and inform in writing that he is not involved in any other new crime. The respondent shall also refrain from participating in any activity which might enrage communal sentiments. In case the respondent is found to have violated any of his bail conditions or attempted to have tampered the evidence, influence witnesses or hamper the trial in any other way, then the Special Court shall be at liberty to cancel his bail forthwith. The appeal is accordingly dismissed subject to above stated directions.”

On the whole, it is a landmark, laudable, learned and latest judgment wherein the Apex Court lays down rightly that the restrictions under Section 43-D(5) of UAPA does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on the violation of fundamental right to speedy trial. The Constitutional Courts are fully empowered in such cases to step in and enforce the right to speedy trial which is a fundamental right in cases of violation of fundamental right to speedy trial. There is nothing incorrect in doing so. In other words, it is a settled position of law that where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence, then the restrictions under Section 43-D(5) of UAPA should be certainly relaxed and the accused should be granted bail in such cases as there is a clear cut case of violation of fundamental right to speedy trial due to which the accused suffers immeasurably for no fault of his/her which cannot be overlooked any longer! There can certainly be no denying or disputing it!

Sanjeev Sirohi

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