While fully, firmly and finally espousing the perfectly legitimate right of the daughter just like son to inherit self-acquired property of father dying intestate, the Supreme Court has in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Arunachala Gounder (Dead) Vs Ponnusamy in 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 71 and Case No. Civil Appeal No. 6659 of 2011 that was delivered on January 20, 2022 observed that a daughter is capable of inheriting the self-acquired property or share received in the partition of a coparcenary property of her Hindu father dying intestate. It must be mentioned here that in this case, the property in question was admittedly the self-acquired property of Marappa Gounder. It must also be mentioned here that the question raised by the appellant was whether Late Gounder’s sole surviving daughter Kupayee Ammal, will inherit the same by inheritance and the property shall not devolve by survivorship?
It merits no reiteration that the Court was considering the moot question of whether a sole daughter could inherit her father’s separate property dying intestate (prior to the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956). No doubt, this judgment makes it indubitably clear that daughters have been conferred with equal right to father’s property even prior to codification of Hindu personal laws and enactment of the Hindu Succession Act in 1956. It thus clarified that the law of inheritance would apply to partition of properties even if the father had died intestate before 1956.
Indubitably, what differentiates this extremely commendable judgment from the ones delivered earlier is that the Apex Court had in August 2020 ruled that daughters will have inheritance rights equal to those sons of the properties of fathers, grandfathers and great grandfathers right from the codification of the Hindu laws in 1956. On the contrary, this learned judgment took the daughters rights to the pre-1956 period, when male primacy was in vogue pertaining to inheritance of properties. While referring to the ancient texts and Smritis, Justice Krishna Murari said that, “It is clear that ancient text as also the Smritis, the commentaries written by various renowned learned persons and even judicial pronouncements have recognized the rights of several female heirs, wives and daughters being foremost of them.”
In hindsight, this can potentially open up various potential disputes pertaining to properties partitioned prior to 1956 in which time daughters were not given any share at all and could culminate in their heirs resorting to reclaim their legal rights over such assets.
To start with, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Justice Krishna Murari for a Bench of Apex Court comprising of himself and Justice S Abdul Nazeer sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Challenge has been laid in this Civil Appeal to the judgment and order dated 21.01.2009 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as ‘High Court’) dismissing a regular First Appeal being A.S. No. 351 of 1994 filed under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the judgment and decree dated 01.03.1994 rendered by the Trial Court dismissing Original Suit No. 295 of 1991 for partition filed by the appellant herein, claiming 1/5th share in the suit properties.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench then aptly observes in para 3 that, “Suit for partition was filed by Thangammal, daughter of Ramasamy Gounder, claiming 1/5th share in the suit property on the allegations that the plaintiff and defendant nos. 5 and 6, namely, Elayammal and Nallammal and one Ramayeeammal are sisters of Gurunatha Gounder, all the five of them being the children of Ramasamy Gounder. The said Ramasamy Gounder had an elder brother by the name of Marappa Gounder. Ramasamy Gounder, predeceased his brother Marappa Gounder who died on 14.04.1957 leaving behind the sole daughter by the name of Kuppayee Ammal who also died issueless in 1967. Further case set up by the plaintiff/appellant was that after the death of Marappa Gounder, his property was inherited by Kuppayee Ammal and upon her death in 1967, all the five children of Ramasamy Gounder, namely, Gurunatha Gounder, Thangammal (Original Plaintiff now represented by legal heir), Ramayeeammal, Elayammal and Nallammal are heirs in equal of Kuppayee and entitled to 1/5th share each.”
As it turned out, the Bench then mentions in para 4 that, “Gurunatha Gounder, died leaving behind defendant nos. 1 to 4 (Respondents herein) as heirs and legal representatives. Ramayeeammal died leaving behind defendants 7 to 9. The plaintiff-appellant, Thangammal, died leaving behind, appellant nos. 1, 3 and 4 herein and Appellant no. 1, Arunachala Gounder, since having died is represented by her legal representatives appellant no. 1, Venkatachalam and appellant no. 2, A. Mottaiyappan.”
As is quite ostensible, the Bench then discloses in para 5 that, “The defence set up by the defendant-respondents was that Marappa Gounder died on 11.05.1949 and not on 14.04.1957 as alleged by the plaintiff-appellant and as per the provisions of Hindu Law prevailing prior to 1956, Gurunatha Gounder was the sole heir of Marappa Gounder and accordingly, he inherited the suit properties and was in possession and enjoyment of these properties and after his death the respondents herein, were continuing as lawful owners.”
Be it noted, the Bench then observes in para 6 that, “It is an undisputed fact between the parties that the property in question i.e., the suit property, was independently purchased by Marappa Gounder in the year 1938 through the process of a Court auction and thus, it was his independent property. However, there was a issue between the parties in respect of the date of death of Marappa Gounder. The plaintiff – appellant asserted the date of death as 14.04.1957, whereas the defendant-respondent pleaded the date of death as 15.04.1949.”
As we see, the Bench then reveals in para 7 that, “The Trial Court after considering the evidence brought on record of the case by the parties concluded that Marappa Gounder died on 15.04.1949 and thus, the suit property would devolve upon the sole son of deceased Ramasamy Gounder, the deceased brother of Marappa Gounder by survivorship and the plaintiff-appellant had no right to file the suit for partition and, accordingly, dismissed the suit.”
What next unfolds is then stated in para 8 that, “The findings recorded by the Trial Court particularly in respect of the date of death of Marappa Gounder in 1949 was confirmed by the High Court in the first appeal and the decree dismissing the suit for partition was affirmed holding that the property would devolve upon the defendant by way of survivorship.”
Needless to say, the Bench then mentions in para 13 that, “We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the record of the case and the various texts and commentaries pertaining to Hindu Law.”
Of course, the Bench then rightly observes in para 14 that, “Insofar as, the date of death of Marappa Gounder being 15.04.1949, it is a finding of fact affirmed by the two fact-finding Courts based on appreciation of material evidence existing on the record of the case and is not liable to be interfered with and we proceed to decide the issue between the parties taking the date of death of Marappa Gounder as 15.04.1949.”
Furthermore, the Bench then envisages in para 15 that, “The other aspect of the matter is whether the suit property was exclusively purchased by Marappa Gounder in the Court auction and was his separate property or it was purchased out of the joint family fund making it a joint family property. It is correct that neither any issue was framed by Trial Court in this regard nor any evidence was led by the parties nor any finding has been returned. However, in view of the admission made by the defendant in para 3 of the written statement that suit properties are absolute properties of Marappa Gounder, he having purchased the same in a Court auction sale on 19.09.1938, there was hardly any necessity to frame any issue in this regard, once the fact was admitted in written statement.”
It is worth noting that the Bench then enunciates in para 16 that, “It may be relevant to extract the relevant part of paragraph 3 of the written statement which reads as under :-“3. It is true that the suit properties are the absolute properties of the Marappa Gounder, he having purchased the suit properties in the Court auction sale on 19.09.1938.””
It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then concedes in para 17 that, “Furthermore, the defendants themselves have nowhere pleaded that purchase of suit property was made by Marappa Gounder out of the joint family funds. There is a clear admission in the written statement that property in question was the absolute property of Marappa Gounder, he having purchased the same in the Court auction sale.”
What deduces from this is then stated in para 17.1 that, “In view of above facts, the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the respondent, in this regard, has no force and not liable to be accepted.”
We need to pay undiluted attention to what is then stated so significantly in para 63 that, “The 174th Law Commission in its report on ‘Property Rights of Women’ while proposing reforms under the Hindu Law has observed as under :-“1.3.3 The Mitakshara law also recognising inheritance by succession but only to the property separately owned by an individual, male or female. Females are included as heirs to this kind of property by Mitakshara law. Before the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act 1929, the Bengal, Benares and Mithila sub-schools of Mitakshara recognised only five female relations as being entitled to inherit namely;- widow, daughter, mother, paternal grandmother, and paternal great-grand mother.
- The Madras sub-schools recognised the heritable capacity of a larger number of females heirs that is of the son’s daughter, daughter’s daughter and the sister as heirs were expressly named as heirs in Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act,1929.
- The son’s daughter and the daughter’s daughter ranked as Bandhus in Bombay and Madras. The Bombay School which is most liberal to women, recognised a number of other female heirs, including a half sister, father’s sister and women married into the family such as step-mother, son’s widow, brother’s widow and also many other females classified as Bandhus.” We also cannot be oblivious that it is also stated in para 69 that, “The legislative intent of enacting Section 14(I) of the Act was to remedy the limitation of a Hindu woman who could not claim absolute interest in the properties inherited by her but only had a life interest in the estate so inherited.”
Briefly stated, it is then envisaged in para 70 that, “Section 14 (I) converted all limited estates owned by women into absolute estates and the succession of these properties in the absence of a will or testament would take place in consonance with Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.” Be it noted, the Bench then stipulates in para 71 that, “The scheme of sub-Section (1) of Section 15 goes to show that property of Hindu females dying intestate is to devolve on her own heirs, the list whereof is enumerated in Clauses (a) to (e) of Section 15 (1). SubSection (2) of Section 15 carves out exceptions only with regard to property acquired through inheritance and further, the exception is confined to the property inherited by a Hindu female either from her father or mother, or from her husband, or from her father-in-law. The exceptions carved out by sub-Section (2) shall operate only in the event of the Hindu female dies without leaving any direct heirs, i.e., her son or daughter or children of the pre-deceased son or daughter.” While continuing in same vein, the Bench then also stipulates in para 72 that, “Thus, if a female Hindu dies intestate without leaving any issue, then the property inherited by her from her father or mother would go to the heirs of her father whereas the property inherited from her husband or father-in-law would go to the heirs of the husband. In case, a female Hindu dies leaving behind her husband or any issue, then Section 15(1)(a) comes into operation and the properties left behind including the properties which she inherited from her parents would devolve simultaneously upon her husband and her issues as provided in Section 15(1)(a) of the Act.” To be sure, the Bench then hastens to add in para 73 that, “The basic aim of the legislature in enacting Section 15(2) is to ensure that inherited property of a female Hindu dying issueless and intestate, goes back to the source.” Most significantly, the Bench then points out in para 74 that, “Section 15(1)(d) provides that failing all heirs of the female specified in Entries (a)-(c), but not until then, all her property howsoever acquired will devolve upon the heirs of the father. The devolution upon the heirs of the father shall be in the same order and according to the same rules as would have applied if the property had belonged to the father and he had died intestate in respect thereof immediately after her death. In the present case the since the succession of the suit properties opened in 1967 upon death of Kupayee Ammal, the 1956 Act shall apply and thereby Ramasamy Gounder’s daughters being Class-I heirs of their father too shall be heirs and entitled to 1/5th share each in the suit properties. No wonder, the Bench then holds in para 77 that, “Applying the above settled legal proposition to the facts of the case at hands, since the succession of the suit properties opened in 1967 upon death of Kupayee Ammal, the 1956 Act shall apply and thereby Ramasamy Gounder’s daughter’s being Class-I heirs of their father too shall also be heirs and entitled to 1/5th Share in each of the suit properties.” Quite significantly, the Bench then lamented in para 78 that, “Unfortunately, neither the Trial Court nor the High Court adverted itself to the settled legal propositions which are squarely applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case.” Finally and far most significantly, the Bench then holds in para 79 that, “Thus, the impugned judgment and decree dated 01.03.1994 passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 21.01.2009 are not liable to be sustained and are hereby set aside.” In short, the Apex Court has made it manifestly clear that daughter’s right to inherit self acquired property of father dying intestate is recognized under customary law. All the courts must always adhere to what the Apex Court has held so elegantly, eloquently and effectively in this leading case. No denying it!</code></pre></li>
Sanjeev Sirohi