In a significant development with far reaching consequences pertaining to second FIR on same incident, we saw how just recently on January 7, 2022, the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a learned, laudable, landmark and latest judgment titled Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab and another in CRM-M-45411-2021 has minced just no words to candidly hold that if a second FIR is registered regarding an incident on which a prior FIR already exists, it amounts to abuse of process of law and the High Court is well within its powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same, without awaiting a final report under Section 173 CrPC. This clearly implies that a second FIR should not be normally registered regarding an incident on which a prior FIR already exists. No denying it.
To start with, this brief, brilliant and balanced judgment authored by a single Judge Bench of Justice Vikas Bahl of Punjab and Haryana High Court sets the ball rolling by first and foremost observing in the opening para that, “This petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR No.236 dated 15.09.2021 (Annexure P-1), under Sections 384, 511 and 506 IPC, registered at Police Station Lehra, District Sangrur along with all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.”
While dwelling on the FIR in this case, the Bench then observes in next para that, “The FIR in the present case has been registered on 15.09.2021, on the statement of respondent No.2 Jagdeep Singh/complainant, as per which, the occurrence has been stated to have taken place during the period starting from 10.10.2019 to 15.09.2021. In his statement, the complainant has alleged that the petitioner was having enmity against father of the complainant since 2008 and the petitioner in connivance with his accomplices, had got registered a false rape case against the complainant in the year 2019, so that he could blackmail the complainant and could take Rs.14 lakhs from the complainant and could take revenge on account of his enmity and in the said FIR, the SHO and Superintendent of Police had declared the complainant innocent. It is further alleged that as per the enquiry report of the police officials, the petitioner got the said false case registered against the complainant for taking Rs.14 lakhs from the complainant. It is further alleged that in the year 2020, Gurjit Singh had told the complainant that one girl ‘S’ (name withheld) was demanding money by blackmailing the said Gurjit Singh and the complainant being an advocate, advised Gurjit Singh to get a case registered against the said girl ‘S’ and as per the advice given by the complainant, the said Gurjit Singh got a case registered under Section 384 IPC against ‘S’ and it was the petitioner who helped ‘S’ in getting bail and then provoked ‘S’ to register a false case against the complainant, but said ‘S’ refused to do so and got registered the rape case i.e. case 307/2020, only against Gurjit Singh, which was subsequently cancelled as the same was found to be false. It is further alleged that now, the petitioner, in connivance with wrong persons, is demanding Rs.14 lakhs from the complainant and has threatened that in case, the said amount is not paid, then a false rape case will again be registered against the complainant. On the basis of the said complaint and allegations, the present FIR under Sections 384, 511 and 506 IPC has been registered.”
Be it noted, the Bench forthrightly observes that, “The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala” reported as 2001 (6) SCC 181 has observed as under: -“However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It would clearly be beyond the purview of sections 154 and 156 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of a fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxxThe course adopted in this case, namely, the registration of the information as the second FIR in regard to the same incident and making a fresh investigation is not permissible under the scheme of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code as pointed out above, therefore, the investigation undertaken and the report thereof cannot but be invalid. We have, therefore, no option except to quash the same leaving it open of the investigating agency to seek permission in Crime No. 353/94 or 354/94 of the Magistrate to make further investigation, forward further report or reports and thus proceed in accordance with law.””
As a corollary, the Bench then enunciates in the next para that, “A perusal of the above judgment would show that it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that in case, with respect to one incident an FIR has already been registered, then a second FIR with respect to the same incident cannot be registered and in case the same is registered then the High Court while exercising its powers under Section 482 CrPC would be well within its rights to quash the second FIR. The same principle has been followed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr” reported 2013 (6) SCC 348. Thus, in a situation where a second FIR is registered with respect to the same incident on which an FIR has already been registered, the petition for quashing of the second FIR should not be thrown out on the ground that the report under Section 173 CrPC has not been submitted.”
It is worth noting that the Bench while placing reliance upon a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case “Mrs. Priyanka Srivastava and another Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported as 2015(6) SCC 287 observes that, “Perusal of the above judgment would show that it was observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the exercise of power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. warrants application of judicial mind as a court of law is involved and the said proceedings are on a higher footing than the proceedings under Section 154 Cr.P.C. It was further observed that in the application under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C., it was necessary to spell out that the application under Sections 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. has been filed before filing the petition under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Even supporting affidavit was required to be submitted. The copy of the said judgment was circulated to all the High Courts for further circulation to the Sessions Judges and to the Magistrates. Once, in the application under Section 156(3)Cr.P.C., it was found incumbent to mention about the filing of application before the police, it would be equally incumbent, rather, the higher duty of the complainant to mention about the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed and the orders thereof, in the complaint before the police on the basis of which the FIR has been registered, when the complaint before the police is subsequent to the application filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. In the present case, the same has admittedly not been done and the same amounts to suppression of a material fact. As earlier noticed hereinbefore, vide order dated 20.07.2020, it had been noticed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Moonak in the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. that the allegations made in the complaint did not warrant registration of an FIR and thus, the subsequent registration of the present FIR is in violation of the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Moonak. In fact, both the applications under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. have been dismissed as withdrawn. In the first application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. observations had come against respondent No.2 and thus, it seems that instead of pursuing his complaint or challenging the order dated 20.07.2020, respondent No.2 had got the present FIR registered. The said act of Respondent no.2 amounts to forum shopping. Moreover, police officials cannot be permitted to act in violation of judicial orders or judicial proceedings. The registration of the present FIR is thus, illegal on the said account also in addition to there being active concealment of suppression of material facts and thus, deserves to be quashed on each of the said grounds.”
It cannot be glossed over that the Bench then minces no words to hold that, “In the present case, there is no overt act alleged in the FIR and it has only been vaguely stated that the petitioner is threatening to implicate respondent No.2 in a false rape case and thus, as per the law laid by the above-said judgments and also, as per the settled principles of law, the provision of Section 506 IPC would not be attracted even in case, the allegations levelled in the FIR are taken on its face value. Even with respect to the offence of extortion/attempt to extort, it is apparent that the allegations are far-fetched and with respect to the second incident, no alleged false case has been registered even till date and thus, the question of seeking money is too far-fetched. In case on the basis of such allegations, an FIR is registered, then, it would be very easy for any person to implicate another person by merely making vague allegations, moreso, when there is previous enmity between the parties. Thus, as per the opinion of this Court, the present FIR registered under Sections 506, 384 and 511 IPC has no legs to stand on. It would be relevant to mention that while deciding the present case and holding that the present FIR deserves to be quashed, the entire material, which was required for the adjudication of the present case, was before this Court and it could not be said that the facts were incomplete so as to await the report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by holding aptly that, “Accordingly, the present petition is allowed and the FIR No.236 dated 15.09.2021 (Annexure P-1), under Sections 384, 511 and 506 IPC, registered at Police Station Lehra, District Sangrur as well as subsequent proceedings emanating therefrom, are quashed qua the petitioner.”
In a nutshell, the Punjab and Haryana High Court has made it absolutely clear in this notable case that a second FIR on the same subject is abuse of process of law and may be quashed without awaiting the final report under Section 173 of the CrPC. Of course, all the police in all the states must definitely adhere firmly and fully to what has been laid down so commendably, cogently and convincingly in this leading case also! There can be just no denying or disputing it! Sanjeev Sirohi