ORDER
A.G. Qureshi, J.
1. This is a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing the orders passed by the Board of Revenue and the Joint Registrar. The order of the Board of Revenue Annexure-G has been passed on 26th April, 1989. The parties to that order were the Maharashtra Brahman Sahakari Bank Ltd., Indore and Vasant son of Dattatraya Mooskar, Nandlalpura, Indore.
2. It is necessary to state the facts of the case in brief. The last election of the Maharashtra Brahman Sahakari Bank Ltd., Indore (hereinafter called the Bank) took place on 2-2-1986 in which the present petitioner and some other members were elected. On 30-4-1987, six executive members sent their resignations from the Executive Committee whereupon the remaining members co-opted six other members in that vacancy caused by the resignation. Thereafter, on 8-6-1987 the Executive Committee of the Bank was served with an order passed under section 53(13) of the M. P. Co-operative Societies Act (hereinafter called the Act) superseding the Executive Committee and appointing an Administrator. The petitioner thereupon filed a writ petition M. P. No. 631 of 1987 which was not pressed because the order of supersession was withdrawn. Thereafter, a fresh order was passed by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies superseding the Executive Committee against which the petitioner filed writ petition M. P. No. 1028 of 1987 and a stay order was obtained staying the operation of the order of supersession. This petition was ultimately dismissed by this Court on 28-4-1989. Thus, from the date of the stay order from this Court till the final disposal of the petition, the Executive Committee of the Bank continued to function by virtue of the stay order. In the aforesaid period, the respondent Vasant Dattatraya was given show cause notice by the Executive Committee and removed from membership of the Bank on 31-5-1987. According to the petitioner that order was validly passed. However, respondent Vasant filed an appeal under section 64 of the Act before the Deputy Registrar in which an ex pate stay was obtained against the show cause notice which was later on vacated. Against the vacation of stay he filed appeal to the Joint Registrar who allowed the appeal and when the Bank appealed before the Board of Revenue, the appeal of the Bank was rejected. The petitioner was undisputedly not a party to the aforesaid proceedings. According to him due to supersession the Bank is not interested in filing a writ petition. However, since the petitioner was a party to the decision taken against Vasant and so many other actions taken by the Bank, it is necessary that this Court may quash order of the Board of Revenue and hold that under section 51 of the Act, the acts of the Bank are validated.
3. The petition has been opposed by the respondent No. 5 on the ground that the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings before the Revenue board. Therefore, he has no locus standi to present this petition and the order passed does not in any way adversely affect the interest of the petitioner. Therefore, he is not an aggrieved person. It has also been stated that the legality of the co-option has already been held illegal by this Court in M. P. No. 1028 of 1987. Therefore, the Bank has already been superseded, and new elections are held as per the orders of the Hon’ble Court. According to respondent No. 5, the petitioner has committed many illegalities during the tenure of his office and he wants all those actions validated by filing this petition, and as such, in a way he is trying to seek an anticipatory bail pertaining to the illegalities committed by him.
4. It has been stated before us that during the pendency of this petition the new elections have been held, and as a result, a new Board has been constituted. Therefore, in view of the fact that the present petitioner was not a party before the Board of Revenue in the proceedings which he seeks to quash, coupled with the fact that the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate as to how he is an aggrieved party, and furthermore, in the changed circumstances of the Board having been reconstituted, we are not inclined to go into the merits or demerits of the order impugned. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Bagadiya has raised an important point pertaining to applicability of section 51 of the Act with which we will like to deal in brief.
5. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Satna Central Co-operative and Land Mortgage Bank Ltd. v. Puranlal Agrawal and Ors., 1969 MPLJ 879 = 1969 JLJ 888 had occasion to consider the scope and object of section 51 of the Act. After considering the principles of American Jurisprudence and the decisions of the English Courts the learned Judges were of the opinion that the provision under section 51 has been introduced as a matter of policy and necessary to protect the interests of the public. Even where there was no quorum for a meeting, the proceedings are validated by section 51 of the Act. While considering the scope of section 51, the learned Judges, in para 15 of the judgment, have traced the history of de facto doctrine under the American Law and have placed reliance on American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edition, Vol. 19, para 1103, at p. 544 wherein it has been laid down that:-
“The de facto doctrine is one of those legal makeshifts by which unlawful or irregular corporate and public acts are legalised for certain purposes on the score of necessity. xx xx xx xx.
It is, accordingly, well settled that the acts of de facto officers of a private Corporation are binding as to a third person who deals with them in ignorance of their want of legal right to the office. It is likewise the rule that the acts of Directors de facto of a Corporation are valid as to the third persons.
The acts of de facto officers are not, however, binding upon the Corporation as regards the third person dealing with them with knowledge of their want of legal power.”
The Court also took into consideration the English cases and has cited the findings of Lord Justice Cotton, Lord Justice Lindely and Lord Justice Bowen. Explaining the de facto doctrine, Lord Justice Lindely held, that the d.e facto doctrine becomes useful in cases where there are defects in the election or selection or qualification of any members of the Board to render valid the proceedings of the Local Board in all dealings between the Local Board on one side, and persons dealing with them on the other, subject to this, it is doubtful as to its application between the Local Board and the members who are improperly appointed. But in all dealings between the Board and other people, i.e. ‘third person’ or public the proceedings of the Board are rendered valid. The finding has been illustrated by example of a proceeding in fixing a building line in the township and that action being in public interest it was held, that such an action on the part of the Board will be binding on the public on the basis of de facto doctrine. Lord Justice Bowen has endorsed the same view of the de facto doctrine on the ground that when a validating provision is provided in the Act, then the purpose behind the statute is that when a Board is dissolved, the corporate body does not dissolve and there is no vacuum. Therefore, although there may be a defect in the constitution of the Board, still the actions of the Board are the actions of the corporate body and, therefore, they have to be held valid.
6. In the light of the Division Bench judgment of our Court (supra) it cannot be doubted that section 51 of the Act protects the action taken by any committee or a body even though there may be defect in the procedure or in the Constitution of Body or Society, but the aforesaid section has the effect of validating only those actions of illegally constituted body which are in public interest. But the de facto doctrine cannot be pressed into service when the illegally constituted Board takes a decision about the Constitution of the Board itself. In the instant case, the members who have been held to be illegally co-opted have passed a resolution to remove one of the members of the Society itself. Such an action cannot be saved by the de facto doctrine or by provisions contained in section 51 of the Act. The purpose of section 51 of the Act is to save those actions of the Society which have been taken in public interest and for the “smooth working of the Society itself. The de facto doctrine will also not be applicable where any of its members has acted illegally or has misused its powers. It may be held that all the acts done by an illegally constituted body are legal, then it will amount to holding all the actions of the Bank as injusticiable. It is true that the actions taken bona fide in the interest of the Bank are saved by section 51 of the Act, but it could not be construed to mean that any person aggrieved by such an action is not competent to challenge the legality of the Act before a proper forum. In the instant case, the respondent no. 5 was not a third person with whom the Bank was dealing, but it was a dispute pertaining to the constitution of the Board, the resignation of the members, its aftermath and the removal or induction of members in the Board itself. Therefore, in our opinion, in such cases the provisions of section 51 of the Act shall not apply and the person aggrieved is always free to challenge the action of the Board being illegal.
7. In view of the aforesaid we hold that the petitioner being not an aggrieved person and also not being a party to the proceedings which he has challenged, has no locus standi to file this petition. However, in view of the fact that there may not be arty confusion about the bona fide actions taken by the Bank in respect of third persons dealing with the Bank and such action may not be challenged leading to multiplicity of proceedings, we have discussed the scope and ambit of section 51 of the Act.
8. With the above observations, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.