JUDGMENT
A.M. Sapre, J.
1. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant (Revenue) and having perused the record of the case, we are unable to notice any question of law, much less substantial question, as is required to be made out for the purpose of entertaining the appeal under Section 260A of IT Act.
2. On perusal of the impugned order rendered by the Tribunal, which was passed on two appeals, one filed by the assessee and other filed by the Department, it is noticed that Tribunal went into the factual aspect of the matter and then accordingly granted the relief to the parties.
3. Issue before the Tribunal arose out of the assessment made by the AO under Section 158B(c) of the IT Act. It was pertaining to the block assessment period from 1st April, 1988 to 1st July, 1998. The CIT(A) and then Tribunal went into all questions pertaining to the deletion as also addition of some of the items and examining them in detail in the context of the stand taken by the parties on facts, granted appropriate relief to the parties concerned,
4. One of the grounds on which assessee was aggrieved before the Tribunal was that CIT(A) while deciding the appeal of the assessee ought not to have given direction to initiate proceedings under Section 148 of the Act against the assessee for the asst. yr. 1998-99. This direction of the CIT(A) was set aside by the Tribunal by holding that there was no case made out for initiation of any proceeding under Section 148 of the IT Act in relation to the asst. yr. 1998-99 against the assessee. It was found that such a direction was totally uncalled for.
5. We are in agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal on this issue. Perusal of the CIT(A)’s order (Annex. P-5) clearly shows that after setting aside order under appeal before him, which ran into 15 pages, learned CIT(A), in his own handwriting wrote impugned direction in the bottom of the order, which reads as under :
“The AO shall be at liberty to initiate proceedings under Section 148 of IT Act for asst. yr. 1998-99.”
6. The aforementioned directions as stated supra were successfully assailed by the assessee in an appeal before the Tribunal and accordingly, these directions were set aside.
7. In our opinion, once the block assessment for the period 1st April, 1988 to 11th Aug., 1998 was gone into in proceedings under Section 158B(c) and appropriate reliefs by way of addition and/or deletion were given to the assessee by the AO and by GIT(A) and lastly by Tribunal on facts, there was no need to give this liberty to the AO to again initiate proceedings under Section 148 in respect of concluded regular assessment for the year 1998-99. It was much more so, when no reasons were assigned whatsoever as to why and under what circumstance and on what basis, this liberty is being given by the CIT(A) to the AO for initiation of the proceedings under Section 148 of the Act and that for the asst. yr. 1998-99. In order to grant this liberty to AO for initiating proceedings under Section 148 of the Act against the assessee, it is necessary to record a finding that a case for initiation of proceedings under Section 148 of the Act is made out. It was, therefore, necessary for the CIT(A) to have recorded categorical finding justifying grant of this liberty to the AO in case, if he was so keen to do so.
8. The Tribunal while accepting the contention of the assessee in his appeal rightly set aside these directions.
9. Since we are in agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal on this issue, we do not find that this involves any question of law much less any substantial question of law. So far as other issues are concerned, as we have already observed (supra), they do not involve any question of law, much less any substantial question of law and, therefore, they cannot be probed by the High Court in exercise of its second appellate power. They basically relate to the issue of fact and relate to the addition/deletion under the various heads on account of seizure of some loose papers and documents. They do not involve any interpretation of law or rule entitling the Revenue to invoke the powers of the High Court under Section 260A of the IT Act.
Appeal thus fails and is hereby dismissed in limine.