ORDER
S.R. Nayak, J.
1. A short but an important question of general importance which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether a petition filed by an injured person before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal for short ‘M. A.C.T.’ on 24-11-1990 for compensation in respect of an accident which took place on 16-3-1989 is hit by limitation or it is saved by the subsequent change in law brought about by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 54 of 1994 which was brought into force with effect from 14-11-1994. This precise question arises for consideration and resolution in the back drop of the following facts:
It is the case of the appellant Bakka Venkamma that she sustained certain physical injuries on account of an accident occurred on 16-3-1989 involving a motor vehicle owned by the second respondent, driven by the first respondent and insured by the third respondent Insurance Company. The appellant filed original petition for compensation on 24-11-1990. This O.P. purported to have been filed under Section 10-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It is relevant to note at this stage itself that by the time the O.P. was filed on 24-11-1990 the old Act was repealed and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short ‘the Act’, was enacted and brought into force with effect from 1-7-1989. Therefore the original petition should have been filed under Section 166(1) of the Act and not under Section 110-A of the old Act. When the accident took place on 16-3-1989 the old Act was in operation. The owner and the driver of the motor vehicle did not contest the claim of the appellant before the M. A.C.T. Only the third respondent Insurance Company contested the claim by filing a counter. After filing the counter and after the M.A.C.T. framed the issues the Insurance Company raised an additional issue contending that the original petition filed by the appellant on 24-11-1990 was hit by limitation and therefore it was incompetent and not maintainable. In that view of the matter the M.A.C.T. framed an additional issue relating to the question whether the original petition filed by the appellant is hit by limitation or not and the M.A.C.T. by its order under appeal dated 12-7-1991 upheld the contention of the Insurance Company and held that the O.P. filed by the appellant is hit by limitation and therefore not maintainable. In that view of the matter the original petition is dismissed.
2. At the outset I deem it fit to place on record my appreciation for the services rendered by Sri M. Narender Reddy as Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant as well as Sri Kota Subba Rao, the learned Counsel and a member of this Bar in assisting the Court placing all the relevant authorities before the Court. In this case Sri P.V.R. Mohan Rao has filed vakalat for the appellant. When this case was posted for final hearing before this Court on 7-9-1995 none appeared nor any representation was made on behalf of the appellant or her counsel. Since it was a final hearing matter and filed by an illiterate village woman seeking compensation for the injuries suffered by her in the accident occurred on 16-3-1989 involving the vehicle owned by the second respondent and driven by the first respondent and insured by the third respondent- insurance company, I thought it not just to dismiss the appeal for non- prosecution and requested Sri M. Narender Reddy, a learned member of this Bar to appear as Amicus Curiae and argue the matter on behalf of the appellant. Sri M. Narender Reddy readily agreed and assisted the Court. Sri Kota Subba Rao who quite often appears for the Insurance Companies also came forward to assist the Court and accordingly he was also heard in the case.
3. Sri Narender Reddy, the learned Counsel submitted that the rejection of the O.P. by the M.A.C.T. on the ground that it was hit by limitation was justified on the date of the order i.e., 12-7-1991. According to him, when O.P. was filed on 24-11-1990 that application was obviously under Section 166 of the New Act and in that view of the matter the M.A.C.T.had no power to condone the delay in making the application unless such an application was made within the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. In the present case the accident occurred on 16-3-1989 and therefore the application ought to have been made by the appellant on or before 16-3-1990 whereas the application was made only on 24-11-1990. In that view of the matter the M.A.C.T. had no power to condone the delay in making the application beyond 12 months from the date of occurrence of the accident. However, Sri Narender Reddy the learned Counsel does not stop there but would argue that the present appeal was preferred to this Court in time and this appeal being a continuous proceedings of the original proceedings, this Court should take into account any change in law subsequent to the date of the order under appeal and if there is any change in law such a law should be applied. Sri Narender Reddy would point out that after the M.A.C.T. made the order under appeal on 12-7-1991, the Act was amended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act No. 54 of 1994 and brought into force with effect from 14-11-1994. By Amendment Act 54 of 1994 sub- section (3) of Section 166 of the Act is deleted and the resultant position is that after this amendment there is no limitation at all to make an application for compensation. Sri Narender Reddy would argue that since the limitation prescribed for making application for compensation is only a procedural matter, the amendment brought about by Amendment Act 54 of 1994 should apply retrospectively, that is to say from the inception of the Act. In support of his submission Sri Narender Reddy placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. national Insurance Company Ltd. and Ors., . On the other hand Sri Kota Subba Rao, the learned Counsel who assisted the Court placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in Mohd. Riyazuddin v. The General Manager, APSRTC, Hyderabad, , and in Maqbal Bee v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, . to contend that the law which governs an action is the law that is prevailing at the time of institution of the claim petition but not the law brought into force subsequent to the institution of the claim petition. Sri Subba Rao would also place reliance on the observations of the Supreme Court in para 11 of the judgment in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., ..
4. In this case when the accident occurred on 16-3-1989 the old Act was in force. Section 110-A (3) of the old Act read as under:
“Section 110-A(3): No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.”
5. The old Act was replaced by the present Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 with effect from 1-7-1989. Section 166(3) of the new Act before the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 54 of 1994 read as under:
“Section 166(3): No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.”
Then came the latest amendment i.e., Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 54 of 1994 which came into force with effect from 14-11-1994 deleting sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Act.
6. in Mohd. Riyazuddin v. The General Manager, APSRTC, Hyderabad (2 supra) the petitioner had filed the claim petition under the provisions of the old Act along with LA. No. 1182/87 for condoning the delay of 1283 days in filing the claim petition. The said LA. was resisted by the respondent. The M.A.C.T. dismissed the application for condoning the delay on two grounds, firstly, on the ground that the delay was not properly explained inspite of affording sufficient opportunity by granting adjournments and secondly on the ground that by the time the application was taken up for hearing the Motor Vehicles Act 59 of 1988 came into force which prescribed the period of limitation of six months and also restricted the power of the Courts to condone the delay for a period of more than six months thereafter. The order of the M.A.C.T. in that case rejectingI.A.No.1182 of l987 was called in question in C.R.P. No. 266/90before this Court which was later converted into C.M.A. The Court held that the law of limitation is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of the suit will apply to the same and any subsequent amendment in the law of limitation will not apply to a proceeding already instituted. The Court also held that even though the law of limitation is procedural law, if a right accrued prior tothe change of the law of limitation, that right is a vested right and cannot be ‘taken away by a subsequent Amendment. While declaring the law in those terms this Court referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Mt. Allah Rakhi v. Sluih Mohammad, AIR 1934 P.C. 77, decision of the Allahabad High Court in Tej Bahadur v. (Firm) Kothi Radha Kishan AIR 1936 Allahabad 858., decisions of the Supreme Court in Beepathuma v. Shankaranarayana, ., S.C. Prashar v. Vasansen, and Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Behtfri Khare, .
7. In Maqbal Bee v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (3 supra) the accident occurred on 29-3-1982, the claim petition was filed before the M.A.C.T. Chittoor on 18-8-1989 purported to be as it was a petition filed under Section 110-A(3) of the old Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 though by that time the old Act was replaced by the new Act with effect from 1-7-1989. There was a delay of 6 years 10 months 20 days in filing that O.P. The M.A.C.T. dismissed the O.P. opining that there was no justification for condonation of the exorbitant delay. Against the order of dismissal dt.22-8-1990 the appeal A.A.O. was preferred before this Court. The question which fell for consideration before this Court in that case was whether the appellants-petitioners were entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 110-A(3) of the old Act after passing of the new Motor Vehicles Act and whether an Original Petition can be entertained in violation of Section 166(3) of the new Act. The Court after considering the issue raised before it and referring to several authorities held that the law which governs an action is the law that is prevailing at me time of institution of the claim petition and not the law which prevailed at the date of occurrence of the accident. In that case the accident occurred on 29-3-1982 when the field was held by the old Act of 1939 and when the O.P. was filed on 18-8-1989 the new Act of 1988 was in force. In that view of the matter the Court held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction and competence to condone the delay beyond six months in view of the bar contained in the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the new Act.
8. In Vinod Gurudas Ratkar v. Natbnal Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (1 supra) the appellant was injured in a road accident and his claim petition was dismissed as being barred by limitation. The accident had occurred on 22-1- 1989 when the old Act was in force. The old Act was repealed and the new Act was brought into force with effect from 1-7-1989. The period of limitation for filing a claim petition under the old Act and the new Act being six months expired only on 22-7-1989. The claim petition of the appellant however was filed belatedly on 15-3-1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay, the accidents Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned. The application was accordingly dismissed. The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the decision before the Bombay High Court. The further appeal to the Apex Court was also dismissed.
9. The argument before the Apex Court was that since the accident took place when the old Motor Vehicles Act was in force, the proceeding before the Accidents Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act and if it is so held the petition could not be dismissed on the basis of the provisions in the new Act. Meeting this argument the Apex Court held that when the accident took place the old Motor Vehicles Act was in force but the claim petition was filed after the repeal of the old Act and the new Act came into force, the case would be covered by the new Act and delay for longer period than six months could not be condoned. The Court also held that though the claimant in that case earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but that cannot be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired. The Apex Court also pointed out in that case the difference between an application claiming compensation and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an application. The Apex Court observed that liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or privilege. The Court also pointed out that the right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another.
10. What emerges from the combined reading of the two decisions of our Court and the Supreme Court is that the law of limitation which governs an action is the law of limitation that is prevailing at the time of institution of the claim petition and liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or privilege and that limitation is a procedural law, and amendment to that law operates retrospectively unless its operation is restricted or limited by the statute itself.
11. In the light of these legal principles let us have a look at the facts of this case. When the accident occurred on 16-3-1989 the old Act was in operation and it was in operation till 1-7-1989 on which date the new Act was brought into force. When the old Act was in operation the appellant did not file claim petition under Section 11o~A(3) of the old Act. When the appellant filed the claim application on 24-11-1990 the new Act was in operation and under the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the new Act the Tribunal had no power to condone the delay for a longer period than six months. The delay a. Sling the O.P. was more than six months. Therefore the Tribunal could not condone the delay. At this juncture it is also relevant to note a well settled proposition of law. Although limitation is a procedural law and although it is open to the legislature to extend the period of limitation, an important right accrues to a party when the remedy against him is barred by the existing law of limitation and a vested right cannot be affected except by express terms used by the statute or the clearest implication. The authority for this proposition is the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in S.C. Prashar v. Vasantsen, .. If that principle is applied to the facts of this case it should be held that the respondents acquired a negative right not to be sued on 16-3-1990 i.e., immediately after one year from the date of accident. No claim petition by any party for compensation filed under Section 166 of the new Act before Act 54/1994 came into force could be entertained by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal after 16-3-1990 in respect of an accident occurred on 16-3-1989. Therefore it should be held that such a right accrued to the respondents on 16-3-90 though it is a negative right could not be affected except by express terms used by the statute or by the clearest implication, to borrow the expression of the Apex Court. I do not find any such express terms in Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 54 of 1994. Further, the observations made by the Supreme Court in Vinod Gutudus Raikarvs. National Insurance Company Limited and another (1 supra) in para 11 in a way completely answers the issue raised before the Court. The Supreme Court in para 11 observed as under:
“If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position could be different. Having acutally initiated the proceeding when the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that this right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away. The present case is different. The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as ‘sufficient cause’ also relates to the time after the repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal, ‘sufficient cause’ as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from ’cause of action’ for the claim itself. The question of condonation of delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law.”
In this case when the accident took place the old Act was in operation but the claim petition was not filed when the old Act was in operation but it was filed only on 24-11-1990 after the new Act came into force with effect from 1-7-1989. If the claimant had filed her petition for compensation before 1-7-1989 when the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the claim petition of the appellant would not have been rejected on the ground that there was a delay of more than six months in filing the application. But that is not the situation obtaining in the present case. The application came to be filed only after the new Act came into force. Therefore as held by this Court and the Supreme Court the law prevailing at the time of institution of the claim petition should be applied and not the law prevailing at the time of the accident. In that view of the matter I do not find any illegality in the order impugned in this appeal. Appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed.
12. In the facts and circumstances of the case the parties are directed to bear their own costs.