JUDGMENT
A.A. Khan, J.
1. Under a contract of apprenticeship dated April 26, 1976 the petitioner was engaged by the Rajasthan State Electricity Board (The Board) for training in the trade of L.D.C. or in such other trade for which he may be found suitable after the period of probation designated under the Apprentices Act, 1961. The period of training was one year and during such period the petitioner was to receive a stipend of Rs. 100/- per month. In case of breach of the contract by the petitioner the amount of stipend received or such amount as was to be determined by the Board was refundable by him. Similarly, in case of breach of contract by the Board within a period of one year the petitioner was to receive Rs. 300/- as compensation. By Clause 5 of the contract it was, however, agreed by the parties that on completion of the period of apprenticeship training neither the Board was under any obligation to offer any employment to the petitioner nor the petitioner was obliged to accept an employment under the Board. The petitioner joined the apprentice-ship training on April 29, 1976 at Chittorgarh. After undergoing apprentice-ship training in the trade of L.D.C. for a period of about six months only the petitioner was considered suitable for appointment to the post of L.D.C. under the Board. Therefore, under its order No. RSEB/Estt/F/D. 1681 dated December 10, 1976 the petitioner was appointed as LDC temporarily for one year on a pay of Rs. 126/-per month in the pay scale of Rs. 126-8-150-10-250/- plus usual allowance. The petitioner had joined the said post on September 29, 1976. Subsequently, his appointment as a regular L.D.C. w.e.f. September 29, 1974 was regularised and he was allowed annual grade increments w.e.f. September 29 of each succeeding year. As and when there was any change in the grade and/or rate of annual grade increment and/or dearness allowance the petitioner was given benefit thereof.
2. In the year 1987, the Board, vide its order No. RSEB/E & R/F. 46(21)/D.29 dated October 21, 1987 revised the pay scale of its employees w.e.f. September 1986. The employees were given option to elect the revised pay scales in which case such employees as might have completed service for 10 years as on September 1, 1986 were to get the benefit of one advance increment in the fixation of their pay in the revised pay scales. The petitioner opted for the revised pay scale but in the fixation of his pay in the revised pay scale he was not allowed the benefit of one advance increment. The petitioner thereupon moved an application Under Section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (here-in-after referred to as ‘The Act’) before the Authority, appointed Under Section 15(1) of the Act, with the allegation that the payment of wages in the form of one advance increment plus consequential benefits was unjustly delayed in his case. He claimed a total sum of Rs. 2306/- in that behalf. The Board contested the claim of the petitioner mainly on the ground that since the petitioner had not completed the service of 10 years so as to become entitled to the advance increment and since his claim related to the matter of fixation of pay, the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon his claim. The Authority, however, accepted the claim of the petitioner and directed the Board Under Section 15(3) to pay to the petitioner the amount of delayed wages at Rs. 2306/- as also an equal amount by way of compensation within a period of 30 days from the date of his order dated August 12, 1988. The Board challenged the order of the Authority by preferring an appeal Under Section 17 before the Distt. Judge, Ajmer.
3. Before the Distt. Judge, Ajmer, the petitioner raised a preliminary objection to the effect that since the Board had not deposited the amount of Rs. 4,612/- payable to the petitioner as per order of the Authority within a period of 30 days, the appeal was not maintainable. The learned Distt. Judge Ajmer with reference to the provisions of Section 17(1) of the Act, rejected petitioner’s objection held that the appeal was filed within time and that at the time of filing the appeal the memorandum of appeal was duly accompanied by a certificate of the Authority to the effect that the Board had deposited the amount payable to the petitioner as per directions appealed against. The same point has again been agitated (sic.) by the petitioner in the petition under Section 115 filed before this Court. On a study of the provisions contained in Section 17 (1) of the Act, I fully agree with the learned District Judge that the conditions precedent to the maintainability of an appeal under Section 17 of the Act is that the memorandum of appeal should be accompanied with a certificate from the authority that the employer has deposited the amount payable to the employee under the direction under Section 15(3) of the Act. That condition was fully fulfilled in the present case and there is no force in the objection raised by the petitioner in that behalf. The ground raised in that respect before this Court is therefore dismissed.
4. In its appeal under Section 17 before the District Judge the Board contended that the present matter related to fixation of pay of the petitioner in the revised pay scale and such matter did not fall within the ambit of a petition under Section 15(2). Relying on Rajasthan High Court decision in the case of Divisional Personnel Officer v. Brij Kishore, 1963 RLW 557 the learned District Judge accepted Board’s contention and held that the Authority under Section 15(1) had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the present matter. Aggrieved by his order dated October 10, 1991 the petitioner has now approached this Court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
5. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the matter of fixation of the petitioners pay in the revised pay scale was not at all a complicated one in as much as the petitioner was appointed as a LDC (Trainee) with effect from March 29, 1976 and had completed a service of 10 years on September 1, 1986. It was submitted that the remunerations received by the petitioner during the period of his training were required to be treated as “wages” and the period of training or as the period towards regular service or employment under the Board. In support of his argument the learned counsel relied upon the Madras High Court decision in the case of Managing Director v. Peerumal, AIR 1958 Mad. 25. The argument advanced seems to be quite misconceived in view of the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto.
6. In so far as the factual position is concerned, the contract of apprentice-ship, as is available on the file of the Authority, clearly says that it was executed between the parties on April 26, 1976. The stamped endorsement made thereupon indicates that the petitioner had joined as apprentice trainee on April 29, 1976. There is no material on record to show that the petitioner had joined as LDC (Trainee) on February 29, 1976. The incomplete document of Bond filed by the petitioner clearly says that in the event of not passing the periodical tests, short attendance and serious misconduct during the period of training, the petitioner was obliged to pay to the Board all moneys expended on his training. The employment of the petitioner as a “worker” under the Board had commenced after the completion of the period of training as an apprentice, as would be evident from later discussion. The factual position, therefore, clearly suggests that the petitioner had not completed 10 years of service under the Board so as to become entitled to the advance increment.
7. Now coming to the legal position Section 18 of the Apprentice Act, 1961 clearly laid down that the apprentices were to be treated as “trainees” and not as “workers” during the period of apprentice-ship training. Section 18 provides as under –
“Section 18. Apprentices are trainees and not workers- Save as otherwise provided in this Act.
a) every apprentice undergoing apprenticeship training in a designated trade in an establishment shall be a trainee and not a worker; and
b) the provisions of any law with respect to labour shall not apply to or in relation to such apprentice.”
Clause (b) of Section 18 clearly provides that the provisions of any law with respect to labour shall not apply to or in relation to the apprentices. It was in fact after the successful completion of the period of apprenticeship training that the question of employment of the apprentice-trainee was to arise. In that behalf Section 22 of the Apprentices Act, 1961, provided that-
“Offer and acceptance of employment-
1) It shall not be obligatory on the part of the employer to offer any employment to any apprentice who has completed the period of his apprenticeship training in his establishment, nor shall it be obligatory on the part of the apprentice to accept an employment under the employer.
2) Notwithstanding anything in Sub-section (1), where there is a condition in a contract of apprenticeship that the apprentice shall, after the successful completion of the apprentice-ship training, serve the employer, the employer shall, on such completion, be bound to serve the employer in that capacity for such period and on such remuneration as may be specified in the contract.
Provided that where such period or remuneration is not, in the opinion of the Apprenticeship Adviser, reasonable, he may revise such period or remuneration so as to make it reasonable, and period or remuneration so revised shall be deemed to be the period or remuneration agreed to between the apprentice and the employer”.
8. In view of the above legal position the relationship of an employee and employer between the petitioner and the Board was to commence from the date of offer of an employment by the Board to the petitioner. And that was made under the order dated December 10, 1976 w.e.f. September 29, 1976. The petitioner therefore, commenced his employment under the Board w.e.f September 29, 1976 and not before. That is also the position of his service shown by the service record as brought on the file of the Authority. On the face of it, therefore, the petitioner had not completed a service of 10 years as on September 1, 1986 so as to be entitled to the advanced increment.
9. Be that as it may the contentions made by the petitioner with regard to the length of his service raised complicated questions of law and fact in the present case. Whether the stipend received by him during the period of training amounted to “wages” and whether his services are required to be treated as having been commenced on or w.e.f. March 29, 1976 or September 29, 1976 were all complicated questions of fact and law necessitating prolonged enquiry and could not have been considered by the Authority within his limited powers Under Section 15(2) or 15(3) of the Act.
10. The Madras case relied upon by the petitioner dealt with the case of fixation of regular increment of the employee and such was not the position in the present case. In the instant case, the law laid-down by this Court in the case of Divisional Personnel Officer v. Brij Kishore (supra) which was relied upon by the learned Distt. Judge, Ajmer, applied on fours. In that case it was held that;
“It must be taken as a settled law that where complicated questions of fact or law are raised and a prolonged enquiry becomes necessary the payment of wages Authority, would have no jurisdiction to decide the claim before it. The case involving complicated and controversial question of facts and law which could not be decided by the Payment of Wages Authority by a summary procedure provided in Section 15(3) of the Payment of wages Act.”
On the facts of the present case, therefore, the learned District Judge, Ajmer, has rightly held that the Authority Under Section 15(1) had no jurisdiction to issue directions Under Section 15(3) of the Act. The jurisdiction exercised by the learned District Judge, suffers from no vice of illegality or material irregularity. This petition, therefore, has no force and is dismissed with costs on parties.