JUDGMENT
T.N. Singh, J.
1. This is tenant’s appeal whose eviction has been ordered under Clause (c) of Section 12(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, for short, the ‘Act’ by two Courts below.
2. Having taken the view that the interpretation of Section 12(1)(c) aforesaid in several decisions of this Court manifested divergence of views and the matter required consideration of a larger Bench, I framed for that Bench’s consideration, the question “Whether mere disclamer of landlord’s title by the tenant/defendant entitled the landlord to a decree for his eviction in terms of Section 12(1)(c) of the Act without proving further that such disclaimer affects the plaintiff’s interest adversely and substantially?”
3. The matter has since been considered by a Division Bench of this Court which has rendered on 27-3-1987 (AIR 1988 Madh Pra 225) its opinion on the question aforesaid. In para 6 of the opinion, the Bench has concluded that “in a case where there is a ‘disclaimer’ as explained hereinabove, mere ‘disclaimer’ is sufficient to constitute an act which is likely to affect adversely and substantially the interest of the landlord in the accommodation constituting ground for his eviction under Section 12(1)(c).”
4. It fs necessary, therefore, to read the other parts of the Opinion to examine how the Bench explained the expression “disclaimer”. In para 2 it is stated that “the term disclaimer has to be understood to mean renunciation by the tenant of his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself”. However, the Bench proceeded further to discuss the case-law cited before it holding that the decision in Ghulam Mohammad, 1969 MPU 843 was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nebraj v. Amrit Kaur, 1973 Jab LJ 445. Indeed, in these two decisions, the Bench read exceptions to the general proposition it had earlier enunciated. This appears clear reading para 3 of the Opinion. There it is specifically stated that under certain circumstances, the tenant’s act would not
amount to “disclaimer” to provide ground for his eviction. Firstly, when any statement amounting to disclaimer is withdrawn because any averment made under mistake could be withdrawn. Secondly, when the tenant’s averment do not amount to disclaimer at all, such as, in a case when there is complete denial of relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant.
5. It is the contention of Shri N. K. Jain, appellant’s counsel, that the second case would also include the case of a tenant who bona fide acts to protect his interest by refusing to recognise any of rival heirs of original landlord as his landlord until the rival claims are settled. Because, this specific case is referred in the extract in para 3 of the Opinion from the decision in Ghulam Mohammad’s case (supra). That indeed is so and I would, therefore, accept counsel’s contention that such a case would also be a case of “complete denial of relationship of landlord and tenant” on the footing that the tenant was bound to protect his own interest and to insist therefore that the rival claimants settle their disputes so that the landlord claiming eviction could be judicially accepted to be the “landlord” of the suit premises whether in the right of succession or otherwise as the successor-in-interest of the original landlord entitling him to claim legally and lawfully rent for the suit premises to fulfil the requirement of Section 2(b) of the Act.
6. In the light of the law indicated above, this appeal has to be finally decided. Shri Apte, respondent’s counsel, on being asked to stress relevant averments in the pleadings, has taken care to do so by underlining in red some portions in the plaint dt. 15-10-1975 and written statement dt. 17-1-1976. Indeed, some statements are also underlined in Ex.P/7 which is also written statement of the appellant/defendant, albeit filed on 24-2-1975 in an earlier suit, which the same landlord had earlier filed for his eviction. Indeed, it is to be ascertained from the pleadings if the claim of “disclaimer” was duly established and the plaintiff/respondent was entitled to a decree under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act for eviction of the appellant/defendant from the suit premises.
7. The averment made in the plaint, para 2, underlined by Shri Apte, is to the effect that the defendant had accepted the Maliki’ right of plaintiff on and from 30-9-1973; he accepted a receipt from the plaintiff tor the rent paid by him; and that the defendant had thus admitted the relationship of lessor and lessee between the parties and he continued to do so. In para. 5 of the plaint, are extracted statements made by the defendant/appellant in several paragraphs of his earlier written statement dt. 24-2-1975 above referred. A portion of the averment made in para 10 of earlier written statement extracted herein is stressed, which is to the effect that Kailash Chandra son of Banshilal was claiming t o be t he owner of this house on the basis of deed of gift executed by Mst. Champabai. In written statement dt. 17-1-1976, filed in the instant suit, in para. 2 the defendant has traversed the averment made in plaint para. 4. Shri Apte has underlined the statement made in para. 2 by the defendant which constitutes plain and simple denials of several plaint averments in question. What is also stressed in para 3 of this written statement is that the statement of the defendant/appellant that he was admittedly tenant under Mst. Champabai during her lifetime. What is stressed by underlining the statement of the defendant/appellant in his earlier written statement dt. 24-2-1975 are to be read in paragraphs 2, 10 and 14 thereof. In para 2, the defendant/appellant stated that he did not admit execution by Champabai of the will in favour of the plaintiff. Validity of the will was also not accepted because before 22-12-1969, Mst. Champabai was very old and her mentalstate of health was not normal In para 10 the underlined statement is to the effect that Kailash Chandra s/o. Bansilal was claiming to be the owner of the house on the basis of deed of gift executed by Mst.Champabai and, therefore, at that stage, the plaintiff had no cause of action to institute the suit. Lower down, in para 14, the statement underlined is to the effect that neither Mst. Champabai, nor the plaintiff having possession within 12 years (of the tin shed and roof), the claim for those portions was barred by time.
8. Because the plaintiff/respondent made a prayer for eviction of tenant (defendant/appellant) on the ground
envisaged under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act,” there is no escape from the legal imperative that the written statement of defendant in the instant suit has to be read as a whole, in its entirety, before any decision is, or can be, rendered on plaintiffs plea. Para 5 of the written statement is made up of five sub-paragraphs and each sub-paragraph deals with several parts of the several allegations made in para 5 of the plaint. However, specific case of the defendant/appellant as respects the plea of ‘disclaimer’ appears to be stated in detail in sub-para (4) of para 5. Herein the defendant has made an honest and earnest attempt of explaining the stand he had taken and the statement he made in para 16 of the written statement in the earlier suit. The following facts are unequivocally stated therein :
(a) The defendant always accepted that he was tenant under Mst. Champabai of the suit property.
(b) He had never given out himself as the landlord or the owner of the suit premises.
(c) The plaintiff had not, before institution of the earlier suit, taken care to satisfy the defendant that he had become owner of the suit premises and the house in question, or that he had obtained any order in his favour to that effect. On the other hand, Champabai’s (first) daughter Manti, children of her deceased (second) daughter Manna as also her (third) daughter Lachho were claiming to be heirs of Champabai and in that regard litigation was pending in a Civil Court.
(d) Kailash Chandra son of Bansilal was claiming to be the owner of the house on the basis of deed of gift executed by Champabai.
(e) All the aforesaid several claimants were giving themselves out as owners of the suit property and further asserted to be entitled in law to receive rent for the suit property and they were claiming rent from the defendant.
(f) In so for as the ground for eviction of defendant from a portion of the suit property was concerned, namely, from the tin shed and roof, the plaintiff was entitled to claim eviction of the defendant only on the footing that he was trespasser thereof and not on the ground of nuisance.
(g) The further fact that which is pressed not only in sub-para (4), but also in sub-para 15), is that the claim of the plaintiff, whether under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act or under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, was misconceived and not maintainable because plaintiff had always accepted himself to be a tenant of the suit premises. But, he was confused as he was misled by several claims laid by different contenders, as heirs and owners of the suit premises on the death of Champabai while making on him demand of rent for the suit premises.
9. I do not understand how it is possible to take the view on the pleadings aforesaid that the plaintiff/respondent had been able to make out his case of “disclaimer” against the defendant/appellant within the meaning of the term explained in the opinion of the Division Bench, discussed above. What has come out very clearly in pleadings is the fact that tenant was not acting mala fide because he stated that he was facing claims for rent from several contenders. Further, he had never set up in himself title to the suit property or had accepted categorically title of any person to suit property after death of original owner Champabai,
10. I must also say, indeed on the holding of Division Bench itself, whatever statements he had made earlier in his written statement, filed in the earlier suit, could be withdrawn by him and he could even explain the stand taken by him in his earlier written statement. That is what he really did when he filed subsequently his written statement in the instant case. Even if there was general denial by him earlier of the fact that he had not accepted the plaintiff as his landlord, that could not be considered his indelible sin. Indeed, by his explanation of the stand consistently taken by him he had expiated thesin. He merely stated earlier the fact that another person, namely, Kailash Chandra son of Banasilal was “claiming” himself to be owner of the suit premises on the basis of the deed of gift and he had said nothing more than that. Indeed, he did not state at any time, that he had accepted any particular “claimant” as his landlord or that he had accepted any particular person out of the several “claimants” as the owner of the suit premises, entitled, to recover rent from him. What he had earlier stated was that he had
doubts about the validity of the will which his erstwhile landlady Champabai had executed in favour of the plaintiff, on the basis of which the plaintiff claimed title in himself of suit premises. Indeed, I have no hitch to hold that at no point of time, in no manner, the tenant (defendant/appellant) made any statement to renounce his status and character as “tenant” of the suit premises.
11. On the discussion of the pleadings of the parties, in the light of the law laid down by the Division Bench, I have no hesitation to hold that the case of “disclaimer” which the plaintiff/respondent sought to prove against the defendant/appellant under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act has not been made out. Accordingly, I have no other option except to hold that the suit was liable to be dismissed, and not decreed.
12. In the result the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The suit stands dismissed, but the parties are left to bear their own costs.