JUDGMENT
B.K. Roy, J.
1. This is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) against an order allowing compensation of Rs. 30,000/- and interest thereon from the date of the accident.
2. The case of the respondent, who was the applicant, was to this effect: He is a sepoy bearing No. 6466454 DV (AT) and posted at Gaya Cantonment and was going to bring magazine from the store. When he reached at T. Junction in front of the quarter guard on Gaya-Dobhi Road, the bus No. BRK 4984 of the appellant came from the Magadh University side and hit him, due to which he sustained injuries on his right shoulder, head and back. The bus was being driven by Surajdeo Singh, examined by the appellant as OPW 1, who drove the bus rashly and negligently at a very high speed resulting in the said accident. He was taken to the Military Hospital. The driver was chased by the military personnel up to Gaya Bus Stand. The matter was reported to Chandauti Police Station.
It was also enquired into by the court of the Military Department which came to a conclusion that the accident had taken place due to gross negligence of the driver. The respondent remained in the hospital from 14.12.1977 to 2.2.1978 where his life was anyhow saved but not found fit for military service and so he was removed from service. As the matter was being enquired into by the court of enquiry of the department he could not file an application for grant of compensation within 60 days from the date of accident and accordingly prayed that the delay be condoned. The delay was also condoned on 23.7.1979 by the District Judge.
3. The appellant disputed the claim alleging, inter alia, that the application was barred by limitation and bad for non-joinder of parties; that due to the cantonment area the driver was driving the bus slowly and was blowing horn regularly but due to carelessness and negligence the applicant allowed the accident to take place; that the amount of compensation claimed is highly exaggerated and could not be allowed when column No. 21 of the claim petition does not disclose the expenses incurred over the different items and as such the claim is also bad for vagueness; and that accordingly the application should be dismissed with costs.
4. Following two questions were framed by the Tribunal for its decision:
(i) Whether the applicant is not entitled to get the compensation due to the fact that he filed this case after expiry of the period of limitation?
(ii) Whether the accident had taken place at the relevant time and place as claimed by the applicant and he is entitled to get the amount of compensation as claimed by him in the instant case?
5. The Tribunal considered the fact of the filing of the petition seeking condonation in the court of the District Judge where it was filed, the appearance of the appellant before the District Judge, Gaya and hearing of that matter by the learned District Judge on 23.7.1979 and the condonation by the District Judge after being satisfied of the explanation and admission of the case and observed that the Bihar State Road Transport Corporation ought to have challenged the said order in the higher court but it did not opt to do so and hence it is estopped from raising the said question again and in that backdrop the claim cannot be disallowed and answered the first question accordingly.
6. In regard to the second question, the Tribunal took into account the following admitted facts:
(i) The accident at the relevant time and place was caused by the bus in question, which was being driven by the driver Surajdeo Singh; and
(ii) Due to the said accident the applicant had sustained injuries on his person, became disabled and was removed from the service. The Tribunal considered the case put forward by the appellant that the accident took place due to the careless act of the applicant himself and in this regard considered the evidence of the applicant observing that he has fully supported his stand and noted that there was nothing in his cross-examination to disbelieve his testimony and the evidence of the driver but refused to accept his testimony on the ground that no one else had come to support him. It also took into account the fact of the enquiry by the Military Department and came to the conclusion that the accident took place due to rash and negligent act of the driver. It finally held that the applicant is entitled to recover compensation. The Tribunal also considered the non-disclosure of the basis of claim of amount of compensation and took into account that at the time of injuries, the claimant was only 38 years old and was removed from service whose pay at that time was Rs. 275/- per month and, thus, he would have served for at least 20 years and received Rs. 66,000/- towards salary and upheld the claim as very modest and reasonable. The Tribunal granted interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum on Rs. 30,000/- from the date of accident.
7. The learned Counsel for the appellant in support of the appeal submitted as follows:
(i) The claim was barred by limitation but wrongly entertained and the objection raised during hearing was erroneously discarded.
(ii) The findings are based only on the testimony of the claimant which should not have been done in the absence of any documentary evidence.
(iii) In terms of Section 110-CC the interest ought to have been awarded from the date of filing of the application and not from the date of accident.
8. I take up the submissions made by the learned Counsel one by one.
9. The question of limitation was urged by the appellant before the learned District Judge at the time of admission of the application filed by the respondent. In this view of the matter the Tribunal has correctly held that if the B.S.R.T.C. was actually dissatisfied with the said order of the District Judge then it ought to have challenged that order before this Court. The memorandum of the appeal of the appellant shows that the appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 7.8.1975. Even the certified copy of the earlier order has not been filed. These apart, the words ‘sufficient cause’ have been repeatedly held to be interpreted liberally and to advance substantial cause of justice. Thus, I do not see any merit in the submissions of the learned Counsel.
10. From the impugned order it is clear that the Tribunal had proceeded to take into account the admitted facts, namely, about the taking of the accident at the place in question, by the bus in question and by the driver OPW 1; that due to the said accident the applicant had sustained serious injuries on his person; and that he became disabled and was removed from service. It also took into account the fact that the applicant had fully supported his stand taken in the case and there was nothing in his cross-examination to disbelieve his statements, the applicant having sustained serious injuries resulting into fracture of his collar-bone, his remaining in the military hospital from 14.12.1977 to 5.2.1978 and of his removal from service on account of his disability.
Nothing could be pointed out to me by the learned Counsel to take a different view than the one taken by the Tribunal either in regard to the testimony of the claimant and of drawing of an inference against the appellant from its failure to produce any other corroborating evidence to support the statements made by the driver, OPW 1 and for not placing reliance for the same reason on the testimony of the driver, who alone appeared to prove the defence of the appellant.
I am aware of the fact that the enquiry report of the department of military has not been brought on the record and nothing was stated in that regard by the applicant, AW 1, in his examination-in-chief but the fact that such an enquiry was held and was supported by him in his cross-examination (para 5) and in the peculiar facts and circumstances, I do not consider desirable to take a view different from the one taken by the Claims Tribunal.
11. Now I come to the question of quantum of compensation and award of interest.
11.01. In my view, in the absence of anything to the contrary, the Tribunal correctly took into account the fact that the pay of the applicant being Rs. 215/- per month and that at the time of the accident he was only 38 years old and would have served for at least 20 years and would have received Rs. 66,000/- towards salary had he not been removed from the service. In this backdrop and in view of the fact that nothing has been shown to me to the contrary the grant of claim of Rs. 30,000/- is upheld.
11.02. Coming to the award of interest, however, I find that Section 110-CC of the Act runs as follows:
Where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under this Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf.
(Emphasis added)
From a bare perusal of the aforementioned provision it is clear that the Tribunal should have awarded simple interest from the date of making of the claim and not from the date of accident. Accordingly, I hold that the grant of 6 per cent per annum interest on the compensation amount from the date of accident, i.e., from 14.12.1977 to the respondent was incorrect. The finding in this regard is modified and I hold that the applicant was entitled to 6 per cent per annum interest only on the compensation amount of Rs. 30,000/- from the date of his application.
12. With the modification in regard to the finding as above, this appeal is dismissed. Since the claimant-respondent has not entered appearance, 1 make no order as to costs.
