JUDGMENT
N.D. Ojha, C.J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by the Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Raisen. The order which is sought to be quashed in the present writ petition is an order passed by the Board of Revenue, M. P. Gwalior, respondent No. 4 whereby an order of termination of service of respondent No. 1 was set aside. It was held that even though the order was of termination of services of respondent No. 1 simpliciter, if the background in which it was passed is looked into, it was apparently an order of punishment. In this connection it has been pointed out by the Board of Revenue that certain charges were framed against respondent No. 1 and he was required to give a reply to those charges, but subsequently the disciplinary proceedings were dropped and an order of termination of services of respondent No. 1 was passed. In the alternative, the Board of Revenue has further held that even if it was taken to be an order of termination of services simpliciter, it was had inasmuch as one month’s, salary which was necessary to be given for passing an order of terminal ion of services, had not been given to respondent No. 1. It has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of the Board of Revenue suffers from manifest error of law on both points.
2. On the first point, it has been urged that it is true that certain charges were framed and respondent No. 1 was required to give reply to those charges but subsequently in order to avoid imposing any stigma which an order of dismissal necessarily implies, the enquiry was stopped and an order terminating his services simpliciter was passed. Reliance in support of this submission has been placed on a decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Milter v. Union of India, AIR 1964 SC 449, where it was held as under :
“Take a case where the authority initiates a formal departmental enquiry against a temporary servant, but whilst the enquiry is pending, it takes the view that it may not be necessary or expedient to terminate the services of the temporary servant by issuing an order of dismissal against him. In order to avoid imposing any stigma which an order of dismissal necessarily implies, the enquiry is stopped and an order of discharge simpliciter is served on the servant. On the authority of the decision of this court in the case of Parshottam Lal Dhingra, 1958 SCR 828 : AIR 1958 SC 36, it must be held that the termination of services of the temporary servant which in form and in substance is no more than is discharge effected under the terms of contract or the relevant rule, cannot, in law, be regarded as his dismissal, because the appointing authority was actuated by the motive that the said servant did not deserve to be continued for some alleged misconduct. That is why in dealing with temporary servants against whom formal departmental enquiries may have been commenced but were not pursued to the end, the principle that the motive operating in the mind of the authority is immaterial, has to be borne in mind.”
3. Reliance was also placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on a Division Bench decision of this Court in S.N. Trivedi v. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, Bhopal, 1980 MPLJ 146. In our opinion, in view of the principle of law enunciated in the two decisions referred to above, there is substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that on the facts of the instant case, the Board of Revenue committed a manifest error of law in taking the view that the order of termination of services of respondent No. 1 really was an order of punishment even though couched in an innocuous language indicating that it was an order of termination of services simpliciter.
4. In regard to the alternative ground on which the order of termination of services of respondent No. 1 has been found to be illegal by the Board of Revenue, it has been urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that it was not a case where prior payment of one month’s salary was a condition precedent under the relevant Rules before passing an order of termination of services. On the other hand, it was a case where services of a temporary employee could be terminated either on giving one month’s notice or one month’s pay in lieu of notice. In this connection reliance has been placed on Rule 18 of the relevant Rules as they stood when the order of termination of services was passed.
5. Having gone through the relevant Rule, we find substance in this submission also. On a plain reading of Rule 18, it is apparent that the said Rule contemplates termination of services of a temporary employee either by giving one month’s notice or one month’s pay in lieu of notice. In this view of the matter even if it may be accepted for the sake of argument that one month’s salary was not paid (even though the case of the petitioner is that one month’s salary was paid to respondent No. 1 by making adjustment in his accounts), it cannot be said that the order of termination of services was illegal. On the language of Rule 18, respondent No. 1 was entitled to one month’s salary in lieu of notice, but on that ground, the order of termination of services would not be illegal.
6. In the result, this writ petition succeeds and is allowed and the order passed by the Board of Revenue dated 28-2-83 (Annexure VII) is quashed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Security amount, if any, be refunded to the petitioner.