ORDER
Balakrishna, J.
1. The petitioner, who is a stage carriage operator operating about 16 services covering the portion of the route between Mangalore and Udupi and other places, has challenged the grant of temporary permit in favour of respondent-2 who is the Proprietor of Ambica Motors, Mangalore.
2. The important questions of law which arise for consideration are :
(1) Whether Rule 92 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963 read with Section 62(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 dispenses with the duty to assign reasons for grant of a temporary permit?
(2) Whether a temporary permit can be granted when the vehicle is already covered by a regular permit in respect of the same route or in respect of substantially the same route?
3. The material facts emerging from the case are these :
Respondent-2 applied for grant of a temporary permit for the route Kankanady to Malpe via Surathkal, Mulky, and Udupi for the period commencing from 7-12-1987 and expiring on 31-3-1988. Respondent-1, who is the Regional Transport Authority, Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore, represented by its Secretary, granted a temporary permit as sought by respondent-2 not by holding a regular meeting of the Board but by circulation in accordance with Rule 92 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963 (hereinafter called ‘the Rules’). It is stated by the petitioner that respondent-2 is a holder of an existing regular stage carriage permit, familiarly known as pakka permit, under permit No. 29/DK/78-79 in respect of route Mangalore Railway Station to Manipal via Udupi in respect of his vehicle No. CTX 6352. It is also the grievance of the petitioner that the temporary permit has been granted for the second time in succession to respondent-2 by respondent-1. It is stated by the petitioner that the timings assigned in relation to the temporary permit are such that respondent-2 is free to operate the servce with continuous timings along with the pakka stage carriage permit. It appears that respondent-2 before obtaining the temporary permit had applied for variation by way of additional trip between Mangalore Railway Station and Manipal. The application came to be rejected by respondent-1. The route between Mangalore Railway Station and Manipal covers the entire route now granted under the impugned temporary permit besides the temporary permit obtained earlier. It is also stated that after the petitioner failed in his attempt to obtain a variation of his permit, respondent-2 has been successfully obtaining temporary permits on identical route. On 8-7-1987, respondent-2 sought for the grant of temporary permit between Mangalore Railway Station and Manipal. At the time of consideration of the application, objections were filed against the grant of permit by the petitioner mainly on the ground that the earlier application of respondent-2 had been rejected for variation by way of additional trip on the identical route and that therefore the application for temporary permit was just a pretext to circumvent the law which prevented the grant of variation. The other objection raised by the petitioner to the grant of temporary permit was that no temporary permit in law can be granted where the vehicle is already covered by a regular permit. A resolution was passed sanctioning a temporary permit in favour of respondent-2 on 18-7-1987 and respondent-1 issued a temporary permit in favour of respondent-2. Thereafter, Writ Petition Nos.12598 and 13638 of 1987 were filed by other objectors before this Court questioning the grant of temporary permit and the said Writ Petitions were allowed quashing the grant of temporary permit. At the time of quashing of the temporary permit, respondent-2 requested this Court for stay of operation of the order on the ground that the temporary permit which was the subject matter of those Writ Petitions would expire within a few days. Accordingly, a stay was granted. But, nevertheless, the finding became conclusive as against respondent-2. Subsequently, respondent-2 made an application again on 19-11-1987 for grant of a temporary permit between Kankanady and Malpe instead of Kankanady and Udupi. Between Udupi and Malpe, the distance is 5 K.Ms. and Malpe lies beyond Udupi. But for this short distance of 5 K.Ms. between Udupi and Malpe, the entire route is identical with the routes for which earlier applications were filed by respondent-2. As stated earlier, respondent-1 granted the temporary permit by following the procedure of circulation contemplated under Rule 92 of the Rules with out drawing up any proceedings and without holding a meeting. Obviously no personal hearing was granted to either respondent-2 or the petitioner and other objectors. The permit was valid for a period of four months. This temporary permit was again assailed before this Court by one of the objectors, namely, Wilson S. Periera in Writ Petition No. 18506 of 1987. Respondent-2 took time to file the objections and the case was adjourned from time to time and, ultimately, since the temporary permit was due to expire by efflux of time, the petitioner in the said Writ Petition restricted the challenge only to the timings assigned. This Court remanded the matter back to respondent-1 for re-assignment of time schedule without disturbing the priority of the said petitioner in the forward journey. However, respondent-1 modified the entire timings.
4. The contention of the petitioner is that the grant of temporary permit is illegal and contrary to the series of decisions of this Court. The other contention is that the reasons for grant of temporary permit mentioned in the application do not come within the purview of Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter called ‘the Act 😉 and that the application itself was not maintainable. The further contention is that the grant was made by circulation and it is apparent from the order passed that the granting authority has not applied its mind in regard to the question whether there is any temporary need justifying the grant of temporary permit. Lastly, the contention of the petitioner is that no temporary permit can be granted when the vehicle of respondent-2 is already covered by a pukka permit enabling respondent-2 to operate the service along with the pakka permit with continuous timings in circumvention of Section 57(8) of the Act. Besides, the petitioner is seriously affected by the time schedule assigned in favour of respondent-2 on identical route between Udupi and Kankanady but for a small portion of the route between Malpe and Udupi. The impugned temporary permit is valid for the period commencing from 7-12-1987 to 31-3-1988 and it is Annexure-B.
5. Section 62(1) of the Act reads as follows :
“62. Temporary permits :- (1) A regional Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in Section 57, grant permits, to be effective for a limited period not in any case to exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily –
(a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or
(b) for the purpose of a seasonal business, or
(c) to meet a particular temporary need, or
(d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit, and may attach to any such permit any condition it thinks fit:
Provided that a temporary permit under this Section shall, in no case, be granted in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the grant of a new permit under Section 46 or Section 54 during the pendency of the application:
Provided further that a temporary permit under this Section shall, in no case, be granted more than once in respect of any route or area specified in an application for the renewal of a permit during the pendency of such application for renewal.
6. Rule 92 of the Rules reads as follows :
“92. Circulation of papers :- (1) Save in the case of the hearing of an objection to the grant of a stage carriage permit or of a public carrier’s permit and in the case of the hearing of a representation under Sub-section (6) of Section 57 or in any matter where a person has a right to be heard in accordance with the provision of the Act or these rules, a State or a Regional Transport Authority as the case may be, may decide any matter, without holding a meeting by the majority of the votes of members recorded in writing and sent to the Secretary (hereinafter referred to as procedure by circulation).
(2) Nothing contained in Sub-rule (1), shall prevent the Transport Authority, from deciding by the procedure of circulation any matter which has been considered at a meeting or has been the subject of hearing and upon which a decision has been reserved.
(3) The State or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may require any applicant for a permit to appear before it and may withhold the consideration of the applicant for the permit until the applicant has so appeared in person if so required or by any authorised agent if so permitted and until the applicant has furnished such information as may reasonably be required by the Transport Authority in connection with the application.
(4) In the event of procedure by circulation the Secretary shall send to each member of the Transport Authority such particular of the matter as may reasonably be necessary in order to enable the members to arrive at a decision and shall specify a reasonable period within which the votes of members are to be received in the office of the authority.
(5) Upon receipt of the votes of members as aforesaid the Secretary shall lay the papers before the Chairman, who shall record the decision by endorsement on the form of application or other document as the case may be, according to the votes received and the vote or votes cast, by him. The record of votes cast shall be kept by the Secretary and shall not be available for inspection by any person save by a member of the Transport Authority at a regularly constituted meeting of the Transport Authority. No decision shall be made upon procedure by circulation if before the expiry of the period within which the votes of members are required to reach the office of the Transport Authority not less than one-third of the members of the Transport Authority by notice in writing to the Secretary demand that the matter be referred to a meeting of the Transport Authority.”
7. On behalf of the petitioner, it is contended that though the order has been passed under Rule 92 of the Rules granting a temporary permit to respondent-2, it is not a considered order inasmuch as no reasons have been assigned in support of the order. In short, it is contended that it is not a speaking order. Secondly, it is contended that the grant of a temporary permit in respect of a vehicle which is already covered by a pucca permit is contrary to law :
8. On behalf of respondent-2, it is vehemently contended that Rule 92 does not contemplate that reasons should be assigned in support of the order granting a temporary permit particularly in view of the wordings of the said Rule read with the provisions of Section 62(1) of the Act. According to the learned Counsel for respondent-2, a decision taken by circulation under Rule 92 does not contemplate the procedure prescribed under Section 57 of the Act. Section 57(7) of the Act provides that reason shall be given in writing where the temporary permit is not granted to the applicant. It is further argued that it is only in respect of a permit granted under Section 62 of the Act without following the procedure of circulation under Rule 92 of the Rules that it is necessary for the granting authority to apply his mind and give reasons in support of the order declining the temporary permit.
9. The learned Counsel for respondent-2 contended that it is not illegal to grant a temporary permit even though the vehicle is covered already by a regular or pucca permit for the reason that a particular temporary need can co-exist with a permanent need on a particular route.
10. The original records relating to the grant of the impugned permit is produced before me and I have carefully examined them. The Secretary, R.T.A., Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore, has put up a note for the views of the members of the R.T.A. and for orders of the Chairman. In the last two paragraphs of the Secretary’s note it is mentioned :
“During November 1987 there is no R.T.A. meeting and the temporary stage carriage permit granted by this authority expires on 30-11-1987. The temporary permit prayed for is from 1 -12-1987 to 31-3-1988. In order to provide uninterrupted bus service to the travelling public, this application is placed before the R.T.A.
Hence the above application is placed before the members of the RTA for their views and the Chairman, RTA for kind orders.”
“Views of the members of the RTA and orders of the Chairman.”
Temporary permit may be granted
(SD) ....27-11-87
May be granted (SD) .... 3-12-87
(S.P. O.K.)
I agree with the E.E./PWD and the S.P./D.K.
(SD) ....6-12-87
(D.C./D.K.)"
A reading of the above recordings, makes it self-explanatory that order granting the temporary permit was issued without application of mind and without supporting reasons. In short, the decision making process has been short-circuited and the principles of natural justice have been thrown to the winds.
A perusal of the original application for grant of a temporary permit submitted by respondent-2 before the R.T.A., Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore, dated 19-11-1987 in the prescribed Form No. 57 under Karnataka Motor Vehicle Rules (ix) shows in column No. 4 under the heading of purpose for which permit is required :
“To meet the particular temporary need of providing the transport facilities on the route opened from Kankanady to Udupi and also to meet the additional requirement of the particular need from Kankanady to Malpe under Section 62(1)(c) of the M.V. Act. A covering letter also had been enclosed along with the application.
From the proceedings of the R.T.A., it is sufficiently clear that there is not even a finding that a specific temporary need exists and that it is necessary to grant the temporary permit to meet that particular temporary need. There is no link between the purpose stated by the applicant and the order passed by the R.T.A. on the one hand and there is no nexus between the order passed by the R.T.A. and the relevant provision of law on the other. This indeed is the factual situation as borne out from the records of the proceedings of the R.T.A. in relation to the impugned grant.
11. In order to appreciate the contentions raised by the parties to this dispute, it is necessary to set out the relevant provisions of law.
Section 57(7) of the Act states :
“When a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for a permit of any kind, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal.”
12. A reading of Rule 92 of the Rules shows that what is contemplated under the law is decision making by the granting authority by following the procedure of circulation. The Rule refers to the procedure to be followed in the matter of taking a decision by circulation but, however, does riot dispense with the duty to render a decision. Decision making, in my opinion, involves consideration of the application, application of mind and supply of reasons leading to the decision. Unless all these ingredients co-exist, it cannot be called a decision. Granting of a temporary permit is only an order preceded by a decision. The order pre-supposes the existence of a decision. It has to be borne in mind that a quasi judicial authority is not relieved of its responsibility to pass a speaking order by having recourse to the procedure of granting a temporary permit by circulation. Whether the method adopted is by circulation or by holding a regular meeting and affording personal hearing to all the parties concerned, the principles of natural justice do not dispense with the requirement of passing a reasoned order in support of the grant of a temporary permit. It may not be necessary to give reasons to the applicant in the event of grant of permit, but so far as those whose rights are affected are concerned, the granting authority is under a duty to disclose the reasons. The duty to disclose reasons arises out of principles of natural justice. The objectors have a “right to know” the reasons and this “right to know” is an extension of the concept of natural justice. This right exists even in the absence of a statutory obligation to disclose the reasons. If the contention of the learned Counsel for respondent-2 is to be accepted, then every application for grant of permit could be disposed of without a duty to give reasons by resorting to the procedure prescribed under Rule 92 of the Rules. The intention of the Legislature is not to defeat the ends of justice. The argument of the learned Counsel for respondent-2, if stretched to the extent of non-existence of the duty to disclose reasons, I am afraid, would lead to reductio absurdum. It may also be mentioned that the provisions of Section 57(7) of the Act do not prohibit the assignment of reasons to those affected by the grant if the procedure for grant of permit adopted, falls within the ambit of Rule 92 of the Rules. Before passing an order granting temporary permit, it is the duty of the granting authority, which is a quasi judicial authority, to examine whether the application for grant of temporary permit discloses the grounds for grant of permit set out under Section 62 of the Act. After being satisfied that the grounds mentioned in the application fall within the ambit of Section 62 of the Act, the granting authority shall apply its mind and decide whether or not to grant the permit and thereafter pass an order supported by reasons. These are the elements which constitute the process of decision making. If these constituent elements do not co-exist, the order passed by the granting authority would be contrary to law. Since the basis for grant of permit involves questions of fact, factual determination is obligatory.
13. The application should be intelligible regarding the need and the order of the R.T.A. must be as articulate as an adjudicative process can be. Otherwise, it would lead to the presumption that the R.T A. has abandoned the well known principle of audi alteram partem and has chosen the path of arbitrariness and whimsicality. Where there are no reasons there can be no fairness. If the order does not disclose reasons, mere existence of material on record will not be an acceptable substitute. Reasons should be derived from the material on record and conclusion arrived at. That in essence is the indisputable and integral part of decision-making process. In short, a decision devoid of reasons is no decision at all. The impugned order falls into such a category, in my opinion. Since there is no scope for personal hearing under Rule 92, the residuary responsibility to assign reasons is all the more onerous particularly since the order carries with it material consequences on the right to operate service on the route in question in relation to all ‘persons interested.’
The ‘right of know’ is an extension of the principle of audi alteram partem. Every person interested who is affected by the grant of temporary permit has a right to know the reasons for ordering grant of the permit. Such a right would be subverted by passing an order without disclosing the reasons. Non-disclosure could be presumed as with-holding of information and an anti-thesis of openness and accountability in the discharge of quasi judicial functions. Fairness-is a mandate of natural justice. Since a temporary permit can be granted only in specified circumstances, reasons should be recorded. If reasons are not placed on record, the aggrieved person will be deprived of the right to test the validity or correctness of the reasoning in a judicial review and the competent forum will be impeded in its function of judicial review.
In WISEMAN v. BORNEMAN, 1971 AC 297 : (1969) 13 AER 275 Law Lord made the following observations:
“……..that the conception of natural justice should at all stages guide those who discharge judicial functions is not merely an acceptable but is an essential part of the philosophy of law. We often speak of the rules of natural justice. But there is nothing rigid or mechanical about them. What they comprehend has been analysed and described in many authorities. But any analysis must bring into relief rather their spirit and their inspiration than any precision of definition or precision as to application. We do not search for prescriptions which will lay down exactly what must, in various divergent situations, be done. The principles and procedure are to be applied, which, in any particular situation or set of circumstances, are right and just and fair. ‘Natural Justice’, it has been said, is only “fair play in action.” Nor do we wait for directions from Parliament. The common law has abundant riches: there may we find what Byles, J called “the justice of the common law.”
In American Journal of International Law, Vol.67 Page 479, as pointed out by Bhagwati, J (as he then was) in MANEKA GANDHI v. UNION OF INDIA, Magarry, J describes natural justice “as a distillate of due process of law” (vide Fountaine v. Chastarton, (1968) 112 SC 690.
In STATE OF ORISSA v. DR. BINAPANI DEI, while approvingly referring to the decision in Ridge v. Baldwin observed that:
“If there is power to decide and determine to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in the exercise of such power.”
In Bhagwati, J observed :
“The law must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that even in an administrative proceeding which involves civil consequences, the doctrine of natural justice must be held to be applicable.”
Thus there is no escape either for a quasi judicial authority or for an administrative authority from the rigours of the principles of natural justice.
14. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the decision of the Supreme Court in SIEMENS ENGG. & MFG. CO., v. UNION OF INDIA, The relevant portion of the decision is extracted below :
“It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons………………….. The Rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process and this Rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law.”
In SRIDHAR RAJ v. SECY., R.T.A., AIR 1959 Mysore 120 this Court held as follows :
“Where the Regional Transport Authority in passing the orders granting temporary permits has failed to apply its mind to find out whether one or other of the circumstances mentioned in Section 62, Motor Vehicles Act, did exist, he acts without jurisdiction and the grant of the temporary permits is liable to be quashed in a petition under Article 226, Constitution of India, although the aggrieved party has not exhausted the remedies available under the Motor Vehicles Act.”
In the case of SHARANAPPA v. R.T.A., AIR 1959 Mysore 226 this Court took the following view :-
“Under Section 62 of the Act, temporary permits can be granted only if the circumstances mentioned therein exist. In respect of such applications all the elaborate procedure prescribed for the grant of permanent or pucca permits is waived. When the statutory safeguards of advertisement and consideration of all representations and relevant factors are waived in the special circumstances stated in Section 62, the power to grant temporary permits under that Section cannot be exercised unless the specific and particular circumstances stated therein do exist, it is not sufficient merely to endorse an order on an application for temporary permit. The authority passing the order must apply its mind to the application, find positively that one or other of the circumstances mentioned in Section 62 do exist and thereupon pass an order. Where the application was not in a prescribed form and did not state any reason for the grant of a temporary permit and the authority did not apply its mind to the question, the grant of a temporary permit to the applicant cannot be sustained.”
15. The learned Counsel for respondent-2 has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in M.P.S.R.T. CORPORATION v. R.T.A., I have carefully gone gone through the said decision. It is only an authority for the proposition that there is no anti-thesis between a particular temporary need and a permanent need and that it is manifest that these two kinds of need may co-exist on a particular route. The context in which this view was taken by the Supreme Court was that there existed a situation wherein a regular permit earlier granted was cancelled subsequently and that there was also a shortage of necessary number of transport vehicles on the route and, therefore, the R.T.A. though it fit to provide for the temporary need until regular operations were introduced and regular permits were granted after following the procedure prescribed under Section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was against this back-drop “to meet a particular temporary need,” a temporary permit was granted under Section 62(c) of the Act. The grant was also subject to the condition that the temporary permit will stand cancelled if regular operations covering these routes are introduced in the meantime. Further, it is crystal clear in the facts of that case that the R.T.A. had applied his mind and had passed a reasoned order before granting the temporary permit.
16. This decision on which the learned Counsel for respondent-2 has placed reliance does not assist him. The facts of the instant case are patently different.
17. In my opinion, the principles laid down in the decisions relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner are applicable to the facts of the instant case.
18. On the question whether a temporary permit could be granted when the vehicle is already covered by a pucca permit, it is not necessary to express any opinion for the purpose of disposal of this Writ Petition. Similarly, with regard to the question whether successive temporary permits could be issued is also a question which it is not necessary to consider for similar reason.
19. One more point has been raised that where the application of the petitioner for deviation of the route by way of additional trip was rejected, whether it is justifiable to grant a temporary permit. Since I am taking the view that in the instant case that the R.T.A. has not applied his mind and passed a reasoned order before granting a temporary permit to respondent-2, it is not necessary for me to consider other points raised in this case.
20. For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion that the temporary permit granted in favour of respondent-2 vide Annexure-B is liable to be quashed. Accordingly, I quash the temporary permit vide Annexure-B and allow this Writ Petition. In the result, I answer the first question as follows :
“Rule 92 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1963 read with Section 62(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, does not dispense with the duty to assign reasons for grant of a temporary permit.”
It is open to respondent-2 to make an application in accordance with law. Parties to bear their own costs.