ORDER
Shivashankar Bhat, J.
1. Mr. Viswanath, learned Counsel for the petitioner-owner, very vehemently argued that the evidence of the petitioner’s daughter should have been considered by the Appellate Authority in the light of the entries made in the Record of Rights. According to the learned Counsel, since the first respondent has not cross-examined the said witness, the statement in the said deposition should have been accepted as proved.
2. In W.P. No. 8230/79 this Court had remanded the matter to the Land Tribunal on the ground that the first respondent herein had no opportunity to cross-examine the said witness examined on behalf of the present petitioner-owner. After the remand once again the Land Tribunal considered the matter and by a cryptic order dated 25-6-1982 allowed the application of the first respondent. This order was again challenged and the matter was remitted to the Appellate Authority by this Court, on the constitution of the Appellate Authority.
3. Before the Appellate Authority the claimant (1st respondent herein) adduced fresh evidence by examining several neighbours as witnesses on his behalf. The Appellate Authority has considered the entire evidence and came to the conclusion that the entries in the record of rights were conflicting. As to the evidence tendered by Puttamma (on the first occasion), I find that it contains only a bare assertion that the 1st respondent was not cultivating the land in question. She stated that entry in the pahani proved about the self-cultivation of the land by the owner ; she further stated that, the 1st respondent sought to purchase the land on the death of the owner (father of the witness) and the offer was not accepted; hence he filed the application in Form No. 7.
The Appellate Authority has found that the entry in pahani showed the land to be fallow during the period 1963 to 1973. If so, the electricity bills produced by the petitioner for having used power to irrigate the land were unreliable. The Appellate Authority found that during the relevant period, the owner (husband of the petitioner herein) was a Revenue Inspector and thus had sufficient influence to get the requisite entries made in the Revenue Records. Appellate Authority found that there was no basis for the alterations made in the Record of Rights in favour of the said owner, for the years 1970-71 to 1972-73. The basis for these alterations were not explained by the petitioner at all.
4. Under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act an entry in the Record of Rights and a certified entry in the Register of Mutations shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted thereof. Thus, this presumption is rebuttable. Contrary facts may be established by the very circumstances of a case or by other evidence found in the records of a case. Presumption to be drawn has its weight only at the outset of a case, since it may get diluted, rebutted or overrun in the course of the trial. To start with, the presumption to be drawn as to certain state of facts, shifts the burden of proof on the parties, to disprove such a state of facts. The role of the Record of Rights, thus, essentially, is in the realm of appreciation of evidence in a case.
5. The Appellate Authority has given valid reasons as to why the earlier entries made in the record of rights cannot be accepted.
6. The petitioner has also produced certain receipts in regard to the pump-set and electricity charges, which has also been considered by the Appellate Authority, but they were not accepted as establishing the case of the petitioner. Further, Appellate Authority has drawn adverse inference against the petitioner for not having examined herself to prove her actual possession. The emphasis of Sri Viswanath, that Puttamma’s evidence should have been considered got completely erased, by his client’s failure to lead the best evidence and the evidence of several neighbours examined by the 1st respondent.
7. Scope of revision under Section 121-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act (‘the Act’ for short) is quite limited. The heading of the provision itself says it is a revisional power. It is to be invoked against the order of the Appellate Authority, which is constituted by a Judicial Member of the rant of a Civil Judge and a Revenue Member of the rank of a Deputy Commissioner. The very concept of revision restricts its amplitude. Under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act, 1960, the revisional power was couched in a wider language, empowering the High Court to satisfy itself as to the regularity of proceedings or the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order. Examination as to the correctness or propriety of an order involves a larger area of operation and overall evidence could be reappreciated. In spite of this wide language, Supreme Court held in SRI RAJALAKSHMI DYEING WORKS v. RANGASWAMY CHETTIAR, that —
“…..Quite obviously, the expression ‘revision’ is meant to the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction than that conveyed by the expression ‘appeal’. In fact it has to be noticed that under Section 25 the High Court calls for and examines the record of the Appellate Authority in order to satisfy itself. The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words to satisfy ‘itself under Section 25 appears to be that the power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 is essentially a power of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide language employed in Section 25 the High Court quite obviously should not interfere with findings of fac merely because it does not agree with the finding of the subordinate authority. The power conferred on the High Court under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure but in the words of Untwalia, J., in Dattonpant Gopala Rao v. Vithal Rao Maruti Rao “it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second Court of first appeal.”
(Underlining is mine)
Further, at para-4 thereof, it was observed, —
“…..Merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. It must, however, be shown that there was a taint of such unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of Justice.”
8. The above inherent limitation apart, the language of Section 121-A itself shows, the limitations. Under Section 121-A of the Act this Court has to examine the records to satisfy itself as to (1) the legality of the order or (2) as to the regularity of the proceedings of the Appellate Authority. Legality of the order envisages, an examination as to whether the order is legal or illegal, which again calls for an examination as to whether the order contravenes any provision of law or while making the order, requirements of law has been ignored or offended. To me, it looks comparable to the provisions of Section 100(1) of CPC prior to its amendment in the year 1976. The said earlier Section 100(1) of the CPC provided for an appeal on the ground that (a) the decision under appeal was contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law ; (b) the decision having failed to determine some material issue of law or usage having the force of law ; or (c) a substantial error or defect in the prescribed procedure has been committed, which resulted in the decision being erroneous or defective. Even when the finding on an issue depends upon the construction of a document or of several documents, it has been held as not involving any question of law, except where the document is one of title or one which is the direct foundation of rights, (vide DEITY PATTABHIRAMASWAMY v. S. HANMAYYA & ORS.), AIR 1959 SC 57. The following observations of the Privy Council was quoted, by Supreme Court, at page 59:
“If the question to be decided is one of fact it does not involve an issue of law merely because documents which are not instruments of title or otherwise the direct foundation of rights but are merely historical documents, have to be construed.”
In MADAMANCHI RAMAPPA & ANR. v. MUTHALURU BOJJAPPA, the Supreme Court once again reiterated the proposition, that, —
“…..The admissibility of evidence is no doubt a point of law, but once it is shown that the evidence on which Courts of fact have acted was admissible and relevant, it is not open to a party feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the Courts of fact, to contend before the High Court in second appeal that the said evidence is not sufficient to justify the findings of fact in question. It has been always recognised that the sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a finding of fact is a matter for decision of the Court of facts and cannot be agitated in a second appeal.”
In SHRI RAJA DURGA SINGH OF SOLON v. THOLU AND ORS., the Supreme Court observed that the finding that a person is a tenant, arrived at on the consideration of all evidence, oral or documentary, adduced by the parties, is a finding of fact and this quality of it being a finding of fact is not changed just because documentary evidence fell to be considered. The principle referred by the Supreme Court in Deity Pattabhiramaswamy’s case, AIR 1959 SC 57 regarding the documentary evidence was again followed.
9. The second ground on which the revisional power is to be exercised pertains to the ‘regularity of the proceedings.’ In other words, if the proceedings are irregular, the revisional power is attracted. This provision is comparable to Section 115(c) and 100(1)(c) of the CPC as it stood prior to the amendment in 1976. In KESHARDEO CHAMRIA v. RADHA KISSEN CHAMRIA & ORS., , the Supreme Court has quoted the observations of the Privy Council, which observed with reference to Section 115(c) of the CPC, that material irregularity occurs by the committing of some error of procedure in the course of the trial which may have affected the ultimate decision. Though the word ‘material’ is not found in Section 121-A, an examination as to regularity of proceeding will have to be confined to material irregularity. All kinds of irregularities which have no bearing on the ultimate decision, cannot vitiate an order. This Court will always ignore minor deviations in the procedure or marginal contraventions of procedural law, which have no bearing on the ultimate decision.
10. At one stage I thought that my views may not be in harmony with some of the observations in VILAS alias GUNDU ANANTHA CHARYA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, . A closer analysis of the said decision shows that my view in no way conflict with the observations therein. At page 1442, the observations to the effect that Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act is ‘almost akin to Section 121-A of the Act actually does not equate the two provisions on par. It is almost akin, except that the word ‘correctness’ (examination of which is permitted under Section 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act), is not found in the Land Reforms Act. The actual ratio of the said decision, as to the scope of Section 121-A is found at page 1445 (para-19) to the effect,–
“…..It appears to me that this Court while exercising the revisional power is required to reappreciate the evidence whenever it finds that the conclusion arrived at by the lower Appellate Court runs contrary to the material on record or when it finds that there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the Appellate Court or when it finds that the reasons given by the Appellate Court are absolutely perverse and cannot be supported by the evidence on record.”
11. A perverse order is always an illegal order. Errors of fact become errors of law, as Wade states in his Administrative Law (5th Edn) page 284 :-
“Errors of fact can however be reached to this extent, that the Court will quash where the finding of facts is manifestly based on no evidence, i.e., no evidence on which a reasonable Tribunal could act. This is an application of the settled rule that to find facts unsupported by evidence is to err in law.”
12. While considering the regularity of the proceedings the approach can be modelled on the lines stated by the Supreme Court (sic) V. RAMA CHANDRA AYYAR & ANR. v. RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR & ANR., , though it was made in the context of Clause (c) of Section 100(1) CPC.
“…..The error or defect in the procedure to which the clause refers is, as the clause clearly and unambiguously indicates, an error or defect connected with, or relating to, the procedure, it is not an error or defect in the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties on the merits. That is why, even if the appreciation of evidence made by the lower Appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence is grossly erroneous, that cannot be said to introduce a substantial error or defect in the procedure. On the other hand, if in the dealing with a question of fact, the lower Appellate Court has placed the onus on a wrong party and its finding of fact is the result, substantially of this wrong approach that may be regarded as a defect in procedure; if in dealing with questions of fact, the lower Appellate Court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, that may introduce an error or defect in procedure. If the lower Appellate Court fails to consider an issue which had been tried and found upon by the trial Court and proceeds to reverse the trial Court’s decision without the consideration of such an issue, that may be regarded as an error or defect in procedure; if the lower Appellate Court allows a new point of fact to be raised for the first time before it, or permits a party to adopt a new plea of fact, or makes out a new case for a party, that may, in some cases be said to amount to a defect or error in procedure. But the High Court cannot interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the lower Appellate Court, however erroneous the said conclusions may appear to be to the High Court, because, as the Privy Council has observed, however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be, there is no jurisdiction under Section 100 to correct that error.”
13. The development in the law has equated errors of law to jurisdictional errors (vide ), M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur and hence, while understanding the scope of Section 121-A of the Act one need not strictly confine oneself to the earlier enunciations compartmentalising the errors of law (for purposes of Section 100 CPC) and errors of jurisdiction (for purposes of Section 115 CPC). Decisions under both categories, can guide us while entertaining a case under Section 121-A of the Act. The emphasis, however, is to the limitations, found under both sets of cases, to the sphere of interference.
14. Findings of fact, arrived at on the basis of admissible evidence, without ignoring relevant evidence, if reasonably arrived at, in the sense, it is possible to arrive at such a finding by a reasonable person instructed in law, cannot be interfered with at all. A wrong interpretation of law involved in arriving at the decision will certainly invite the interference under Section 121-A of the Act.
15. The difficulty in identifying the errors of law and errorson facts has been noted by Wade in his Administrative Law (5th Edn.) at page 817 :-
“The truth is, however, that there can hardly be a subject on which the Courts act with such total lack of consistency as the difference between fact and law. The House of Lords has indeed laid down the Rule explained in the following paragraphs, but it is common place to find Courts proceeding in complete disregard of it. It may be that Judges instinctively agree with an American comment:
No two terms of legal science have rendered, better service than ‘law and fact’…..They are the creations of centuries. What Judge has not found refuge in them? The man who could succeed in defining them would be a public enemy.
The House of Lords attempts at definition have had, as will be seen, only moderate success.”
16. Another aspect of Section 121-A is that it confers a discretion on the High Court to exercise the power of revision by the use of the word ‘may.’ A similar phraseology in Section 115 CPC was construed in MAJOR S.S. KHANNA v. BRIG. F.J. DILLON, and it was observed at para-13, —
“That is not to say that the High Court is obliged to exercise its jurisdiction when a case is decided by a subordinate Court and the conditions in Clauses (a), (b) or (c) are satisfied. Exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; the High Court is not bound to interfere merely because the conditions are satisfied. The interlocutory character of the order or decree in the proceeding or by a suit, and the general equities of the case being served by the order made are all matters to be taken into account in considering whether the High Court, even in cases where the conditions which attract the jurisdiction exist, should exercise its jurisdiction.”
17. It is thus clear that the scope of revision under Section 121-A of the Act is limited and does not extend to reappreciation of facts. Further, this Court has a discretion to interfere or not to interfere, even when other ingredients of Section 121-A are satisfied and this discretion involves considerations of equity and justice and other circumstances of the case, such as the conduct of the parties, the nature of the order and stage of the litigation at which this Court’s interference is sought etc. The power of revision under Section 121-A can be exercised suo motu. This highlights the nature of the power being supervisory. The power is vested in the High Court to see that the Appellate Authority acts within the bounds of law.
18. I do not find any illegality in the order of the Appellate Authority nor any irregularity in its proceedings, in spite of the persuasive arguments of Sri Viswanath. The conclusion of the Appellate Authority is essentially one of fact based entirely on an exhaustive appreciation of evidence produced by the parties.
19. In the result, for the reasons stated above, this petition fails and is rejected.