JUDGMENT
Srinivasan, J.
1. The question which is raised in these petitions is as follows :
“Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the income-tax refunds which became due after the valuation date constitute an asset chargeable to wealth-tax ?”
2. The Tribunal has decided against the assessee, relying upon the ruling of this court in T. V. Srinivasan v. CWT [1985] 152 ITR 599. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the said decision of this court requires to be reconsidered inasmuch as the Division Bench had not considered the question as to how, on the valuation date, the advance tax already paid by the assessee under the Income-tax Act could be considered to be his asset. It was held in that case that the entire advance tax paid will be an asset of the assessee and the entire accrued income-tax liability for the relevant accounting year will be a debt owed by the assessee to the Government with the result that the excess advance tax paid will continue to have the character of an asset of the assessee.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Revenue contends that there is no error in the order of the Tribunal as it has applied the law laid down by this court in T. V. Srinivasan v. CWT [1985] 152 ITR 599. According to learned counsel for the Revenue, the matter has been fully and exhaustively considered by the Division Bench in that case. Learned counsel for the Revenue our attention to the decision in CIT v. Carborandum Universal Ltd. [1985] 156 ITR 1 (Mad), wherein it was held that the discretion under section 256(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, could be exercised by the High Court only if it was not satisfied about the correctness of the decision of the Tribunal is wholly in accordance with the law laid down by the High Court, it could not be required to state a case and refer the question of law. That reasoning was agreed with by the Kerala High Court in CIT v. K.S.R.T.C. Pension and Graduity Fund Trust [1987] 167 ITR 383 (Ker). Learned counsel for the Revenue also places reliance on the decision in Sundaram Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1986] 159 ITR 646 (Mad). In that case, it was held that in the matter of construction of an Indian statute, as far as possible, there must be uniformity of construction and if the provisions of law which fall for construction before the court had already been construed by another High Court or High Courts, unless there are compelling reasons to depart from the view, normally, that construction should be accepted.
4. The principle enunciated in CIT v. Carborandum Universal Ltd. [1985] 156 ITR 1 (MaD) And Sundaram Industries Ltd. v. CIT [1986] 159 ITR 646 (Mad), could come into play only when there is no reason whatever to depart from the view taken already. If the High Court finds in any particular matter that the view taken in an earlier decision requires reconsideration, then the only course open to the High Court is to direct the Tribunal to make a reference. Otherwise, it will lead to a situation where a decision once rendered will be conclusive and binding for ever, unless reversed or overruled by the Supreme Court. It is always open to a Division Bench of this court to refer the matter to a larger Bench when it finds it necessary to differ from an earlier decision of a Division Bench.
5. We find that there is considerable force in the argument advanced by learned counsel for the assessee that the Division Bench in T. V. Srinivasan v. CWT [1985] 152 ITR 599 (Mad) has omitted to consider the vital matter as to how, on the relevant valuation date, the excess advance tax which could be ascertained only after the completion of the assessment, which would naturally be only after the relevant valuation date, could relate back to the valuation date and such excess tax could be considered to be an asset of the assessee on the date of valuation. Hence, we are of the opinion that the decision of the aforesaid Division Bench of this court requires to be reconsidered. Thus, we are satisfied that the question of law raised in the petition needs to be referred to this court for consideration and that the petition raise a referable question of law.
6. Hence, we direct the Tribunal to forward to this court a statement of the case referring the question of law set out at the commencement of this order.
