ORDER
U.C. Maheshwari, J.
1. Appellant/defendant has preferred this appeal under Section 100 of CPC being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 23-8-2003, passed by District Judge, Bhopal in Civil Regular Appeal No. 53-A/03 affirming the judgment and decree dated 31-1-2003 passed by Second Civil Judge, Class I, Bhopal in Civil Original Suit No. 123-A/2002 regarding eviction of the appellant from disputed premises under Section 12(1)(i) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to for short ‘the Act’).
2. The respondents/plaintiffs have filed the suit against appellant for eviction on the available grounds under Section 12(1)(i) of the Act from the house situated at “Bal Mukund Ki Bagiya, Gujarpura Road, Bhopal’, the averments of the plaint regarding ground for eviction was denied by the appellant in his written statement.
3. On framing the issues, by holding the trial on appreciation of evidence the suit was decreed by the Trial Court against the appellant on the aforesaid ground. On appeal, the decree of Trial Court has been affirmed hence this appeal is preferred at the instance of the appellant/defendant.
4. Shri Manoj Jain, learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently submitted that the evidence was not properly appreciated by the Courts below in view of the provisions of Section 12(1)(i) of the Act. As per evidence on record the appellant neither built not acquired any vacant accommodation in his possession and whatever accommodation as said by respondents is not fit for residential requirements of the appellants. The alleged acquired accommodation was in possession of the appellant prior to induct him as tenant in the disputed premises but it was not fully constructed as per sanctioned plan. Therefore, it is not covered by the aforesaid definition of the Act. The evidence was not appreciated by both the Courts below by keeping in view the aforesaid aspect for passing the decree against him. According to him, in view of the evidence available on record and the aforesaid provision of the Act the Courts below ought to have dismissed the suit but on wrong premises it has been decreed. It was also argued that the evidence which have been led by respondent is not in consonance of the pleadings. In the lack of it, the same was considered in passing the decree against him while it is not permissible under the law and submitted that these questions are open for admission and adjudication in this appeal.
5. Having heard the learned Counsels on perusing the records of the Courts below, it appears that aforesaid finding regarding ground of eviction is entirely based on appreciation of the evidence. In such appreciation, Ex. D-6, Ex. D-7 and Ex. D-8 have also been considered. Out of these, the Ex. D-7 is judgment of Regular Civil Suit No. 47-A/97 passed by Second Additional Civil Judge, Class I, Bhopal vide dated 21-10-1997 in a suit filed by the appellant against the Municipal Corporation, Bhopal regarding protection of such required/built said house property. In Para 8 of this judgment it was held that (NIRMAN KARYA LAGBHAG PURN HO CHUKA HAI) the construction of this house approximately has been completed and such judgment has become final in between Municipal Corporation, Bhopal and the appellant, as no order or judgment of the Superior Court against it is found on the record. It shows that appellant has built and acquired the accommodation for his residence in the same town. Though the respondents were not parties in aforesaid suit as it was not related with the property of respondent but such findings cannot be discarded lightly in fact it is binding against the appellant.
6. Thus, it is apparent that the respondents have proved that the appellant had acquired the suitable vacant house for his requirement. It was the duty of the appellant to rebut the aforesaid circumstance by adducing the cogent evidence that such house is not built or acquired by him and the same is not in his vacant possession or it was not suitable for his residence. But this burden was not discharged by the appellant and considering all these circumstances on the basis of factual matrix on appreciation of evidence the decree has been passed by the Trial Court and upheld by the Appellate Court. This Court has also not found any perversity in between the evidence and judgment regarding appreciation of the evidence. For the sake of the argument, for a moment it can be said that some part of the evidence has been appreciated by adopting some erroneous method but as per provision of Section 100, CPC, it does not give rise any question of law under the purview of much less the substantial question of law. In fact, it is concurrent findings of both the Courts below regarding availability of the alternate accommodation with the appellant and such findings are the findings of fact which cannot be interfered at this stage. In view of law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Ors. , in which it is held as under:
The right of appeal is neither natural nor an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force of the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the Section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no Court has the power to add to or enlarge those grounds. The second appeal cannot be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts however, erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of law.
It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived at by the last Court of fact, being the First Appellate Court. It is true that Lower Appellate Court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the Trial Court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the Trial Court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the Appellate Court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the Lower Appellate Court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the Lower Appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.
7. In view of the foregoing discussion and the aforesaid dictum of the Apex Court, I have not found any perversity or any apparent error in the impugned judgment, which can be a ground for framing the substantial question of law. Resultantly, in the lack of any question of law much less the substantial question of law, this appeal deserves to be dismissed hence the same is dismissed. There shall be no orders as to costs.