JUDGMENT
S.K. Dubey, J.
1. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal, has preferred this application under Section 29 of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), for granting a certificate for leave for filing an appeal before the Supreme Court against the judgment delivered by this court in CWT v. Meghaji Girdharilal (Misc. Civil Case No. 179/1984) decided on 22-7-1985–[1989] 177 ITR 297 (MP) (Appx.) (infra). The application under Section 29(1) of the Act filed by the applicant is barred by 27 days. Initially, no application was filed by the applicant to condone the delay. When the matter came up for hearing on admission, the applicant prayed for time. Ultimately, an application I. A. No. 275/1986 was filed on January 16, 1986, which was supported by an affidavit of the upper division clerk in the office of the Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal. The matter came before this court for hearing on August 21, 1987. After hearing counsel, this court directed the applicant to furnish necessary details and particulars regarding the date on which the special leave petition before the Supreme Court was filed and when it was detected that the petition for leave to appeal should have been filed and, thereafter, when it was withdrawn. The applicant prayed for time ; but after giving a number of opportunities, no particulars were furnished. Not only this, the applicant has not filed any memo of special leave petition filed before the Supreme Court nor any affidavit of any counsel or the
departmental head, who passed the order for filing the special leave petition before the Supreme Court, to the effect that he or counsel acted bona fide and diligently and prosecuted the special leave petition before the Supreme Court.
2. Shri R. C. Mukati, learned counsel for the applicant, contended that the matter involves a substantial question of law of public importance. As such, the delay, if any, caused deserves to be condoned. He placed reliance on a decision of the apex court in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji [1987] 167 ITR 471 and also contended that there are differences of opinion on the point involved among various High Courts with the decisions of the Full Bench of this court in CWT v. Smt. Tarabai Kanakmal [1983] 140 ITR 374 and CIT v. Narbharam Popat Bhai and Sons [1988] 170 ITR 612.
3. Shri S.C. Goyal, learned counsel for the non-applicant, opposed the application.
4. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we have come to the conclusion that the application filed under Section 29 of the Act deserves to be dismissed as barred by time. A bare reading of Section 29 of the Act clearly shows that after the judgment of the High Court is delivered in a case stated under Section 27 of the Act, in that case, if the High Court certifies it as a fit case for appeal to the Supreme Court, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was. any confusion in filing an appeal before the Supreme Court without first approaching the High Court for a certificate. Moreover, all litigants including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact, on account of an impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with note-making, file-pushing, and passing of the buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant the non grata status. So also the approach of the courts must be to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach, which scuttles a decision on merits (See Katiji’s case [1987] 167 ITR 471). It is true that after considering the facts of the case and observing as above, the apex court in that case condoned the delay, but in the present facts and circumstances of the case, we are not satisfied that the applicant has made out sufficient cause, though a number of opportunities were afforded to the applicant. In fact, the applicant has come forward with a case which was not at all there, i.e., no special leave petition was either filed before the Supreme Court or was withdrawn. As such, the statement supported by an affidavit of a clerk
cannot be accepted nor indulgence can be shown in such a state of affairs. Moreover, if it was true, then with the petition itself the Department could have filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay but when the matter came up before the court for admission, the applicant prayed for time and after seeking a long time, moved an application making a ground, which did not at all exist. Therefore, this court on August 21, 1987, ordered the applicant to furnish particulars but the applicant failed to supply the particulars and insisted upon submitting that in the matters of the Government, a strict view should not be taken. We are not satisfied with this submission of learned counsel for the applicant. A Government or an authority cannot be given preferential treatment than an ordinary litigant arid the Government was bound to explain each day’s delay. Moreover, if the Department acted on the advice of some senior official or counsel, the Department at least ought to have filed an affidavit to that effect but as no affidavit has been filed, it cannot be said that the Department acted bona fide or that sufficient cause to condone the delay has been made out.
5. In the result, this petition under Section 29 of the Act is dismissed as barred by time. No order as to costs.