High Court Patna High Court - Orders

Deo Bachan Sharma vs The State Of Bihar &Amp; Ors on 19 August, 2010

Patna High Court – Orders
Deo Bachan Sharma vs The State Of Bihar &Amp; Ors on 19 August, 2010
                  IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA
                                  CWJC No.1713 of 2005
                   DEO BACHAN SHARMA SON OF LATE RAMESHWAR
                   SINGH RESIDENT OF VILLAGE HATI, P.O. HATI, P.S.
                   KAKO, DISTRICT JEHANABAD AT PRESENT NEW
                   COLONY, KALI BARI NUTAN NAGAR ROAD, P.S. CIVIL
                   LINES, DISTRICT GAYA.
                                          Versus
          1.     THE STATE OF BIHAR THROUGH DIRECTOR GENERAL
                  OF POLICE, BIHAR AT PATNA.
          2.     ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE,
                  C.I.D.BIHAR, PATNA.
          3.     THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE,
                  MAGADH RANGE, GAYA.
          4.     THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, GAYA
          5.      THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE (C ) C.I.D., BIHAR,
                  PATNA.
                                        -----------

For the Petitioner :- Mr. Mithilesh Kumar Upadhyay,

For the State :- Mr. A. C. to G. P. VII

——

There is a history behind the challenge to the
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order dated 1.11.2003 which has been annexed as

annexure-10 to the writ application. Petitioner is sought

to be punished for the crime which he never committed

and that too without there being any finding by the

enquiry officer that the charges which were drawn up

against him are established.

Short history behind the present writ application

is that the petitioner vide order dated 5.9.1995 issued by
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the police headquarters was ordered to be transferred

from Gaya police force to the C.I.D. at Patna. Petitioner

came and joined on 27.10.995 but since one of the person

who formed part of the chain of transfer was not relieved

since his order of transfer came to be stayed, there was

no vacancy in the C.I.D. Department for the petitioner to

continue. By an order of the C.I.D. department issued on

6.11.1995 petitioner was sent back to Gaya. There were

other orders of transfer in between too but none of them

came to be effected for one reason or the other including

the code of conduct being in force due to some election

or the other going on in the State of Bihar. Petitioner

continued to work with Gaya police till all of a sudden

vide order dated 23.5.1997 issued by the Headquarters,

he came to be suspended for not obeying the order of

transfer issued in the year 1995.

It took two years for the Police Headquarters to

realize that the petitioner has not obeyed the order of

transfer. A deeper look would show that that was not the

actual state of affair because petitioner did report to the

C.I.D. department but was sent back in the circumstances

noted above.

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Petitioner remained under suspension between

28.6.1997 and 7.9.1998. During this period, it is said

that his Headquarter was fixed at the C.I.D. Headquarters

at Patna and even a departmental enquiry was conducted

in which the enquiry officer did not find him guilty.

In view of various orders which came to be

passed at various levels and the manner in which the

petitioner was sent back to the district of Gaya from

where he was transferred, it was more a comedy of errors

rather than a case of defiance by a subordinate to the

orders of the Superiors. In this background the

suspension order came to be revoked but the problem of

the petitioner did not come to an end. Now a new kind

of charge was held out against him that during the period

of suspension he did not remain in the Headquarter and,

therefore, the authorities decided to apply the principle of

‘no work and no pay’ for the period of suspension.

Petitioner filed a review and appeal. The matter was

diluted by the authorities who modified the order to the

extent that this period will be adjusted against his earned

leave. The net effect is that the petitioner does not have

required earned leave for the period of suspension and he
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will go without salary for no fault of his.

Stand of the respondents is that since the

petitioner did not mark his attendance every day during

the period of suspension, that period will have to be

treated as no work and no salary can be paid to him. But

the principle of ‘no work and no pay’ will come to apply

provided it was a voluntary act of the petitioner not to

work. A suspended employee is not expected to work

otherwise he cannot be treated to be a suspended

employee. No doubt, Headquarter is fixed during the

period of suspension but the Court has not been pointed

out any service condition, rule or authority which could

show that the petitioner was expected to perform any

kind of responsibility besides hanging out at the

headquarters during the period of suspension.

Fate of the petitioner came to be decided by the

Police headquarters because there is lack of coordination

amongst the authorities. If the department of C.I.D.

passed an order dated 6.11.1995 and directed the

petitioner to report back to Gaya district Police which

order the petitioner carried out, there was no occasion to

suspend the petitioner for not following the order of
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initial transfer dated 5.9.1995. All these aspects have

been taken note of by the enquiry officer but then the

superiors have failed to look into all these details and the

niceties more so since the petitioner is a small employee,

down ladder who is on the receiving end. There cannot

be a better case of arbitrary exercise of power than what

has been taken note of in the earlier part of the order.

Annexure-1 stands quashed. The respondent

authorities are directed to pay salary of the petitioner for

the period 28.6.1997 to 7.9.1998 which was ordered to be

withheld and adjusted against the earned leave.

Withholding of salary or even subsequent modification

of the order by adjusting the said period against earned

leave would amount to punishing the petitioner for a

charge which was not proved or established.

This writ application is allowed. Since the

petitioner has already superannuated, the Court expects

the benefit to accrue to the petitioner within a period of

three months from the date of production or

communication of a copy of this order.

AMIN/                    (Ajay Kumar Tripathi, J.)
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