* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ I.T.A. NO. 869/2011
Reserved on: 21st July, 2011
% Date of Decision: 19th September, 2011
Director of Income Tax (Exemptions) ....Appellant
Through Mr. Abhishek Marath, Standing Counsel.
VERSUS
The Institute of Chartered Accountants of India ....Respondent
Through Mr. N.K. Poddar, Sr. Advocate with
Mr. Pramod Dayal, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest ? Yes
SANJIV KHANNA, J.
Director of Income Tax (Exemption) has filed the present appeal
under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (1961 Act, for short). It
is submitted that the following questions of law arise for consideration:-
A. Whether ITAT was justified in the eyes of law
in the facts and circumstances of the present
case in passing the impugned order ignoring
that the DIT(E) has passed the order u/s 263 of
the Act because the AO had not made
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 1 of 22
necessary inquiries during the assessment
proceedings in reaching the conclusion?
B. Whether the ITAT was justified in the eyes of
law in the facts and circumstance of the
present case in passing the impugned order
that running of the coaching classes is a
business activity and therefore is in violation
of the provisions of Income Tax as also
supported by Judgment of the Patna High
Court cited in 208 ITR 608?
C. Whether the impugned order passed by the
ITAT is perverse both in law and facts of the
present case?
2. The respondent is the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India
(Institute, for short), a statutory body established under the Chartered
Accountants Act, 1949 (1949 Act, for short), for regulating the
profession of Chartered Accountants in India.
3. Central Board for Direct Taxes (CBDT, for short), since the
assessment year 1996-97, has been approving the said Institute under
sub-clause (iv) of Section 10(23C) of the 1961 Act. Vide order dated
18th October, 2004, approval under Section 10(23C)(iv) was granted for
the assessment years 2003-04 to 2005-06.
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 2 of 22
4. For the assessment year 2005-06, the respondent filed its return
declaring its income as NIL, which was accepted by the assessment
order dated 21st August, 2007 under Section 143(3) of the 1961 Act.
The assessment order records that a notice under Section 142(1) was
issued calling for detailed information which was furnished by the
institute. Books of accounts were also furnished and examined on test
check basis.
5. The appellant, on the basis of a proposal received from the
Assessing Officer, passed an order under Section 263 of the 1961 Act on
two grounds, namely, coaching activity was undertaken by the institute
and the said activity was “business” and not a charitable activity. In
these circumstances, the institute was required to maintain separate
books of accounts and thus there was violation of Section 11(4A) of the
1961 Act. Secondly, it was also held that the institute had incurred
expenses of Rs.164.33 lacs on overseas activities including travelling,
membership of foreign professional bodies etc. without permission
from Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) as required under Section
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 3 of 22
11(1)(c) of the 1961 Act. Thus, income of the institute was not entitled
to exemption as a charitable institution.
6. On appeal by the institute, ITAT by order dated 18th October,
2010, held that the power under Section 263 of the 1961 Act was
wrongly exercised and the appellant was not justified in giving the
directions on the two grounds relied upon by him.
7. Before us, the appellant has raised and questioned the findings of
the ITAT on the first ground i.e. in respect of coaching classes, whether
the same amounts to business and whether separate books of accounts
were required to be maintained by the institute.
8. As far as scope of Section 263 of the 1961 Act is concerned, there
is merit in the contention of the appellant that the observations made
by the Tribunal in the impugned order are somewhat ambiguous and
contradictory. This does not, however, justify interference and framing
of question of law. The scope and ambit of the said provision was
examined by the Supreme Court in Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. vs. CIT,
[2000] 243 ITR 83 (SC), Commissioner of Income Tax versus Max India
Ltd. [2007] 295 ITR 282 (SC) CIT vs. Ralson Industries Lt. [2007] 288 ITR
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 4 of 22
322 (SC) and the question thereto is well-settled. The jurisdiction under
section 263 can be exercised when (i) when order of the Assessing
Officer is erroneous and (ii) it should be prejudicial to the interest of the
Revenue.
9. On the first question, learned counsel for the appellant has
submitted that the Assessing Officer had failed to make enquiries and
therefore, jurisdiction under Section 263 of the 1961 Act was rightly
invoked by the appellant. He relies upon the decision of the Delhi High
Court in Gee Vee Enterprises versus ACIT, [1975] 99 ITR 375 (Del).
10. With regard to the coaching activity, the appellant in the show
cause notice dated 26th March, 2008, had made the following
allegations:-
“(a) Assessment has obtained coaching classes
income of Rs.237.11 lakh as per schedule XI of the
balance sheet. Expenditure of Rs.133.14 lakh as
per schedule XII of the balance sheet has been
incurred on running these coaching classes. I have
examined the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949.
Section 15 of the Act provides for the functions of
the Council. None of the functions remotely
relate to running of coaching classes. Further,
running of coaching classes is a business and not a
charitable activity. Under these circumstances,
assessee ought to have maintained separate
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 5 of 22
books of accounts in respect of the coaching
classes. Assessee has not maintained separate
books. A proviso below section 10(23C) provides
that profits and gains of a business run by the
approved institution could be exempt, if business
is incidental to the attainment of objectives and
separate books of accounts are maintained for
such business. I find that the AO has failed to
examine whether provision of coaching classes is
an activity approved by the Chartered Accountant
Act, 1949. If it is so, whether such activity
amounts to a business, and accordingly, separate
books of accounts were required to be
maintained. In the event of provision of coaching
classes being business, exemption granted u/s
10(23C) was liable to be cancelled. ”
11. In response thereto, the institute had filed a reply and contested
the show cause. The appellant rejected the said reply recording as
under:-
“Thus, none of the above clauses can be
referred to giving powers to ICAI for conducting of
coaching classes. The assessee has also not
brought on record any material which would
suggest that any of the objects allows powers to
conduct coaching classes.
Moreover, the receipts from such coaching
classes are business income and the assessee was
required to maintain separate books of accounts
as per section 11(4A) of the Income Tax Act. The
assessee has not maintained separate books for
such income. Therefore, it has clearly violated the
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 6 of 22
provisions of Income Tax Act and the order of the
AO has become erroneous as it is prejudicial to
the interest of revenue.”
12. In the operative portion, the appellant had given the following
directions to the Assessing Officer:-
“Therefore, keeping in view the facts of the case,
the order passed by the DDIT(E), Trust Circle-IV,
Delhi has been found to be erroneous as it is
prejudicial to the interest of revenue within the
meaning of section 263 of the Income Tax Act.
Accordingly, the order passed by the AO in this
case on 21.08.2007 is hereby set aside. The AO is
directed to re-assess the income of the assessee
in view of the discussions made as above as per
law.”
13. What is clear from the above is that the appellant had given a
categorical finding that the institute is conducting coaching classes. It
was held by the appellant that the receipts from these coaching classes
were business income and, therefore, the institute was required to
maintain separate books of accounts as per Section 11(4A) of the 1961
Act. However, since separate books of accounts were not maintained,
the institute was not entitled to exemption. The matter was not
remanded to the Assessing Officer for adjudication on the issue
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 7 of 22
because necessary enquiries had not been made, but the appellant had
examined the contentions and decided the question on merits. Specific
direction was given to the Assessing Officer to reassess the receipts/
profit as income. The appellant has given a finding on merits and it is
not the case of mere remittance for consideration on merits. The claim
that this income was not chargeable was rejected. In these
circumstances, we are required to examine the merits of the decision
made by the appellant.
14. What is noticeable and clear from the order dated 29th March
2010 of the appellant is lack of discussion, and examination of the
concept/term ‘business’, the object and role assigned to and performed
by the institute. On the other hand, ITAT examined the provisions of
1949 Act and the role assigned to and undertaken by the institute. It
was held that the institute has been created to regulate the profession
of Chartered Accountancy and for this purpose the institute can and is
required to provide education, training and monitor professional skills
of the members. It is also required to provide education and training
to students/article clerks who are appearing in the examinations and
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 8 of 22
aspire to be enrolled as member of the institute. In the impugned
order, it has been elucidated by the Tribunal as under:-
“We have gone through the various regulations of
ICAI which provide for coaching etc. to the
students of chartered accountancy course. These
regulations inter-alia provide that no candidate
shall be admitted to the professional examination
unless he produces a certificate from the head of
the coaching organization to the effect that he is
registered with coaching organization and has
complied with the requirements of the theoretical
education scheme. The candidate is also required
to pay such fee as may be fixed by the council for
such professional education. Before a student is
eligible for appearing in the examination, he has
to produce a certificate from the head of the
coaching organization to the effect that he has
complied with the requirements of postal tuition
scheme. An articled clerk who has completed the
practical training as provided in these regulations,
before complying for membership of the institute,
shall be required to attend a course on general
management and communication skill or any
other course as maybe specified in council from
time to time. For this purpose, the council is to
arrange funds for this purpose, the institute is also
conducting classes for chartered accountancy
students registered with it. We found that these
classes for chartered accountancy students
registered with it. We found that these classes
are conducted for which classes are provided to
the students registered with the institute to train
and is discharting its statutory function as
required by the Parliament, which does not
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 9 of 22
amount to any commercial activity. From the
detailed brochure, we also found that institute
provides a comprehensive study package
including large question bank for which no
separate cost is charged from the students. The
board of studies also provides a CD for self-
assessment and model test papers. Expenditure is
being incurred for preparation of the study
package, CD etc., salary of the faculty and other
professionals, printing and stationery, research
and development etc. The students registered for
charged accountancy are also provided on-line
guidance through institute’s own website. At a
very nominal cost, these services are provided to
the students. The institute also provides
computer training to the students registered with
it, at a very low fee.”
15. Thereafter, the Tribunal has quoted judgment of the Gujarat High
Court in Saurashtra Education Foundation vs. CIT, (2005) 273 ITR 139
at page 146, in which it has been observed as under:-
“As regards the illustration of the Institute of
Chartered Accountants of India, although the
institute was earlier not running formal classes
and there was no geographical proximity when
instructions were being imparted through postal
tuitions, the Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India has always been an institution set up, inter
alia for imparting formal education in accountancy
and connected subjects in an organized and
systematic manner. The institute is accountable
as per the provisions of the Act establishing it and
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 10 of 22
the institute also has disciplinary control over the
students who are required to be registered with
its in the first place and who appear at the exams
being held by the institute…..”
16. The aforesaid findings as to the object, purpose and role of the
institute cannot be disputed. The appellant has taken a very narrow
and myopic view and has not examined the question of object and role
of the institute in proper and correct perspective. As noticed above,
the order passed by the appellant is devoid of reasoning. This has
resulted in the error made by the appellant, which has been corrected
by the tribunal.
17. The second question which arises for consideration is whether
activities of the institute mentioned above including those of holding
classes for students/article clerks/members and charging fee for classes
and for providing literature/material can be regarded as a business
activity. Again as noticed above, the order passed by the appellant
dated 29th March, 2010 is devoid of any reasons and relevant
consideration on the aspects like of what is meant and understood by
the term of “business”. The appellant proceeded on an erroneous
basis that mere holding of classes amounts to business and the same
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 11 of 22
was outside the scope, ambit and object of the institute. The last
aspect, as noticed above, is not correct. The order passed by the
appellant is, therefore, bereft of reasons and does not meet the
requirement of Section 263 of the Act. It may be noticed here that the
term ‘business’ has been elucidated and explained by the Supreme
Court in State of Andhra Pradesh vs. H. Abdul Bakhi & Bros., AIR 1965
SC 531. The term ‘business’, is a word of large and infinite import but it
represents an activity carried on continuously in an organized manner
with a said purpose and with a view to earn profit.
18. The Supreme Court in Director of Supplies & Disposal versus
Member, Board of Revenue AIR 1967 SC 1826 observed:
“15. …To regard an activity as business there
must be a course of dealings, either actually
continued or contemplated to be continued with
a profit motive; there must be some real and
systematic or organised course of activity or
conduct with a set purpose of making profit. To
infer from a course of transactions that it is
intended thereby to carry on business, ordinarily
there must exist the characteristics of volume,
frequency, continuity and system indicating an
intention to continue the activity of carrying on
the transactions for a profit. But no single test or
group of tests is decisive of the intention to carry
on the business. It must be decided in the
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 12 of 22
circumstances of each particular case whether an
inference could be raised that the assessee is
carrying on the business of purchasing or selling
of goods within the meaning of the statute.”
19. Further in CST v. Sai Publication Fund (2002) 4 SCC 57, the
Supreme Court, in the context of statutory provision under
consideration, has observed that if the main activity of a person is not
business then any ancillary transaction would not amount to business
unless an otherwise intention is established. It has also been held that
irrespective of the profit motive, determination of the question
whether a person’s activity as “business” is to be decided on facts and
circumstances of each case. It has held:-
“11. No doubt, the definition of “business”
given in Section 2(5-A) of the Act even without
profit motive is wide enough to include any
trade, commerce or manufacture or any
adventure or concern in the nature of trade,
commerce or manufacture and any transaction in
connection with or incidental or ancillary to the
commencement or closure of such trade,
commerce, manufacture, adventure or concern.
If the main activity is not business, then any
transaction incidental or ancillary would not
normally amount to “business” unless an
independent intention to carry on “business” in
the incidental or ancillary activity is established.
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 13 of 22
In such cases, the onus of proof of an
independent intention to carry on “business”
connected with or incidental or ancillary sales will
rest on the Department. Thus, if the main activity
of a person is not trade, commerce etc.,
ordinarily incidental or ancillary activity may not
come within the meaning of “business”. To put it
differently, the inclusion of incidental or ancillary
activity in the definition of “business”
presupposes the existence of trade, commerce
etc. The definition of “dealer” contained in
Section 2(11) of the Act clearly indicates that in
order to hold a person to be a “dealer”, he must
“carry on business” and then only he may also be
deemed to be carrying on business in respect of
transaction incidental or ancillary thereto. We
have stated above that the main and dominant
activity of the Trust in furtherance of its object is
to spread message. Hence, such activity does not
amount to “business”. Publication for the
purpose of spreading message is incidental to the
main activity which the Trust does not carry on as
business. In this view, the activity of the Trust in
bringing out publications and selling them at cost
price to spread message of Saibaba does not
make it a dealer under Section 2(11) of the Act.
12. This Court in State of T.N. v. Board of Trustees
of the Port of Madras (1999) 4 SCC 630 after
referring to various decisions in regard to
“business” and “carrying on business” in paras 15
and 16 has stated thus: (SCC p. 640)
“15. Now the definition of ‘business’ in Section
2(d) and in most of the sales tax statutes is an
inclusive definition and includes ‘trade or
business or manufacture etc.’ This itself shows
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 14 of 22
that the legislature has recognized that the word
‘business’ is wider than the words ‘trade,
commerce or manufacture etc.’ The word
business though extensively used is a word of
indefinite import. In taxing statutes, it is normally
used in the sense of an occupation, a profession
— which occupies time, attention and labour of a
person, normally with a profit motive and there
must be a course of dealings, either actually
continued or contemplated to be continued with
a profit motive and not for sport or pleasure
(State of A.P. v. H. Abdul Bakhi & Bros. AIR 1965
SC 531). Even if such profit motive is statutorily
excluded from the definition of ‘business’, yet the
person could be doing ‘business’.
16. The words ‘carrying on business’ require
something more than merely selling or buying
etc. Whether a person ‘carries on business’ in a
particular commodity must depend upon the
volume, frequency, continuity and regularity of
transactions of purchase and sale in a class of
goods and the transactions must ordinarily be
entered into with a profit motive (Board of
Revenue v. A.M. Ansari (1976) 3 SCC 512. Such
profit motive may, however, be statutorily
excluded from the definition of ‘business’ but still
the person may be ‘carrying on business’.
13. Further in para 30 of the same judgment, it is
stated thus: (SCC pp. 647-48)
“30. In our view, if the main activity was not
‘business’, then the connected, incidental or
ancillary activities of sales would not normally
amount to ‘business’ unless an independent
intention to conduct ‘business’ in these
connected, incidental or ancillary activities is
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 15 of 22
established by the Revenue. It will then be
necessary to find out whether the transactions
which are connected, incidental or ancillary are
only an infinitesimal or small part of the main
activities. In other words, the presumption will be
that these connected, incidental or ancillary
activities of sales are not ‘business’ and the onus
of proof of an independent intention to do
‘business’ in these connected, incidental and
ancillary sales will rest on the Department. If, for
example, these connected, incidental or ancillary
transactions are so large as to render the main
activity infinitesimal or very small, then of course
the case would fall under the first category
referred to earlier.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In the case on hand, the Revenue neither
contended nor proved that in sale of publications
the Trust had an independent intention to do
business as incidental or as an ancillary activity.
15. This Court in the aforementioned judgment
further examined the cases to find out if the main
activity was not “business”. In para 32, reference
is made to the case of the Bombay High Court in
State of Bombay v. Ahmedabad Education Society
(1956) 7 STC 497 (Bom). In that case, the
educational society was entrusted with the task
of founding a college and for that purpose it was
to construct buildings therefore. It was held that
it could not be said to be “carrying on business”
merely because for the above purposes, it
established a brick kiln and sold surplus bricks
and scrap at cost price without intending to make
profit or gain. Having regard to main activities
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 16 of 22
and its objects, it was held that the educational
society was not established “to carry on
business” and the sale of bricks was held not
excisable to sales tax. Chagla, C.J. pointed out
that it was not merely the act of selling or buying
etc. that constituted a person a “dealer” but the
“object” of the person who carried on the
activities was important. It was further stated
that it was not every activity or any repeated
activity resulting in sale or supply of goods that
would attract sales tax. If the legislature intended
to tax every sale or purchase irrespective of the
object of the activities out of which the
transaction arose, then it was unnecessary to
state that the person must “carry on business” of
selling, buying etc.
16. In para 33 of the same judgment, this Court
has referred to various decisions to consider
whether one is a “dealer” or carries on
“business” and the nature and object of activity.
The said para reads thus: (SCC pp. 648-50)
“33. In Girdharilal Jiwanlal v. CST (1957) 8 STC
732 (Bom), relied on for the respondent-Port
Trust, the Bombay High Court held that an
agriculturist did not necessarily fall within the
definition of a ‘dealer’ under Section 2(c) of the
C.P. & Berar Sales Tax Act (21 of 1967), merely
because he sold or supplied commodities. It must
be shown that he was carrying on a business. It
was held that it must be established that his
primary intention in engaging himself in such
activities must be to carry on the business of sale
or supply of agricultural produce. This High Court
held that there was ‘nothing to show that the
petitioner acquired these lands with a view to
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 17 of 22
doing “the business of selling or supplying”
agricultural produce. According to (the assessee),
he (was) principally an agriculturist who also
deals in cotton, coal, oilseeds and groundnuts’.
(emphasis supplied)
He was having agriculture for the purpose of
earning income from the fields but there was
nothing to show that he acquired the lands with
the primary intention of doing business of selling
or buying agricultural produce. This decision was
approved by this Court in Dy. Commr. of
Agricultural Income Tax & Sales Tax v. Travancore
Rubber & Tea Co. (1967) 20 STC 520 (Bom) and it
was held that where the only facts established
were that the assessee converted latex tapped
from rubber trees into sheets and effected a sale
of those sheets to its customers, the conversion
of latex into sheets being a process essential for
transport and marketing of the produce, the
Department had failed to prove that ‘the
assessee was formed’ with a commercial
purpose. The Allahabad High Court in Swadeshi
Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. STO (1964) 15 STC 505
(All) was dealing with a batch of cases where
different bodies were running canteens. One of
the cases concerned Aligarh Muslim University
which was maintaining dining halls where it was
serving food and refreshments to its resident-
students. It was held, referring to observations of
this Court in University of Delhi v. Ram Nath, AIR
1963 SC 1873 that it was incongruous to call
educational activities of the University as
amounting to ‘carrying on business’. The activity
of serving food in the dining hall was a minor part
of the overall activity of the University. Education
was more a mission and avocation rather than a
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 18 of 22
profession or trade or business. The aim of
education was the creation of a well-educated,
healthy, young generation imbued with a rational
and progressive outlook of life. On this reasoning,
it was held that Aligarh University was not
‘carrying on business’ and the sale of food at the
dining halls was not liable to tax. Likewise after
the amendment of the definition of ‘business’
question arose in Indian Institute of Technology v.
State of U.P. (1976) 38 STC 428 (All) with respect
to the visitors’ hostel maintained by the Indian
Institute of Technology where lodging and
boarding facilities were provided to persons who
would come to the Institute in connection with
education and the academic activities of the
Institute. It was observed that the statutory
obligation of maintenance of the hostel which
involved supply and sale of food was an integral
part of the objects of the Institute. Nor could the
running of the hostel be treated as the principal
activity of the Institute. The Institute could not be
held to be doing business. Similarly, in the case of
a research organization, in Dy. Commr. (C.T.) v.
South India Textile Research Assn. (1978) 41 STC
197 (Mad) which was purchasing cotton and
selling the cotton yarn/cotton waste resulting
from the research activities, it was held that the
Institute was solely and exclusively constituted for
the purposes of research and was not carrying on
‘business’ and these sales and purchases
abovementioned could not be subjected to sales
tax. Likewise, in State of T.N. v. Cement Research
Institute of India (1992) 86 STC 124 (Mad) it was
held that the Institute was an organisation, the
objects of which were to promote research and
other scientific work, that the laboratories and
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 19 of 22
workshops were maintained by the organization
for conducting experiments, and that though the
cement manufactured as a result of research was
sold, it could not be considered to be a trading
activity within Section 2(d) of the Tamil Nadu
General Sales Tax Act, 1959. Again in Tirumala
Tirupati Devasthanam v. State of Madras (1972)
29 STC 266 (Mad) the dispute arose with regard
to the sales of silverware etc. which are
customarily deposited in the hundis by devotees.
It was held by the Madras High Court that the
Devasthanam’s main activities were religious in
nature and these sales were not liable to tax. (No
doubt, the case related to a period where the
profit motive was not excluded by statute.) We
are of the view that all these decisions involve the
general principle that the main activity must be
‘business’ and these rulings do support the case
of the respondent-Port Trust.”
(emphasis supplied)
17. This decision is directly on the point
supporting the case of the respondent after
noticing number of decisions on the point
including the decisions cited by the learned
counsel before us. It may be stated that the
question of profit motive or no-profit motive
would be relevant only where a person carries on
trade, commerce, manufacture or adventure in
the nature of trade, commerce etc. On the facts
and in the circumstances of the present case
irrespective of the profit motive, it could not be
said that the Trust either was “dealer” or was
carrying on trade, commerce etc. The Trust is not
carrying on trade, commerce etc., in the sense of
occupation to be a “dealer” as its main object is
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 20 of 22
to spread message of Saibaba of Shirdi as already
noticed above. Having regard to all aspects of the
matter, the High Court was right in answering the
question referred by the Tribunal in the
affirmative and in favour of the respondent-
assessee. We must however add here that
whether a particular person is a “dealer” and
whether he carries on “business”, are the
matters to be decided on facts and in the
circumstances of each case.”
20. The purpose and object to do business is normally to earn and is
carried out with a profit motive; in some cases the absence of profit
motive may not be determinative. The appellant has given no such
finding as far as the activities of the institute are concerned. The
appellant without examining the concept of business has held that the
institute was carrying on business as coaching and programmes were
held by them and a fee is being charged for the same. On the basis of
the findings recorded in the order dated 29th March 2010, under section
263 of the Act, it is not sufficient to hold that the institute is carrying on
business. In these circumstances, we do not think that the order passed
by the appellant under Section 263 of the 1961 Act can be sustained
and was, therefore, rightly upset and set aside by the Tribunal.
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 21 of 22
21. In view of the facts and circumstances stated above, we do not
think any question of law arises in the present appeal and the same is
accordingly dismissed. No costs.
(SANJIV KHANNA)
JUDGE
( DIPAK MISRA )
CHIEF JUSTICE
September 19th, 2011
kkb
ITA No. 869/2011 Page 22 of 22