JUDGMENT
Dipak Misra, J.
1. By this writ petition the petitioner has prayed for declaration of Section 3(1)(a) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, as ultravires the Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
2. The facts which are essential to be adumbrated for disposal of the writ petition are that the father of the petitioner was the owner of immovable properties situated at Napier Town, Baratt Road, Jabalpur and after his death the property was inherited by the petitioner. Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Principal Act’) came into force in the year 1976. The father of the petitioner filed the return as required under the Principal Act. After due enquiry the competent authority declared 4016.65 sq.m. of the land as surplus and notification under Sections 10(1) and 10(3) was published. After publication of the notice, as pleaded in the petition, the surplus land vested in the State Government on 25-11-1992. A notice as required under Section 10(5) of the Act was issued to the petitioner directing him to handover the possession of the vacant land as the same was acquired by the Government under the Principal Act. The notice issued by the competent authority has been brought on record as Annexure P-1. It is putforth that Tehsildar (Nazul), Jabalpur went to the spot to take the possession and got a document signed by the petitioner indicating that physical possession of the entire land was taken by him although same was not done. Some part of the land measuring about 8185 sq.m. was already in occupation of 17 persons there. It is putforth that only symbolic possession could be taken through the said document. It is urged that the possession remained with 17 persons who were inducted by the father of the petitioner and they continued to be licensee of the petitioner after the death of his father. On 9-4-1994 an order was passed by the competent authority under the Principal Act that the petitioner’s possession on the entire land was not taken by the State Government and only a part of the land could be utilised by the State Government. A direction was issued to the petitioner to see that the physical possession of the land was given to the State Government and the petitioner cooperated with the Government. Out of total compensation determined by the State Government which was calculated at Rs. 20,083/- the petitioner was given compensation only to the extent of Rs. 5083/- and till the date entire compensation for the land was not paid by the State Government.
3. According to the writ petitioner the Principal Act was brought into existence keeping in view the increase of population and more over for urbanisation development urban area was required. Reference has been made to Section 10 to show how the possession of the surplus land is to be taken. There has been reference in the writ petition to Section 11 which provides the procedure for grant of compensation of acquired land and to Section 23 for disposal of the vacant land acquired by the State Government. It is setforth that the Principal Act remained in force till the year 1999 and eventually it was repealed by the Parliament and the State of Madhya Pradesh passed the resolution under Article 252(2) of the Constitution of India to apply the Repeal Act, 1999. Reference has been made to Section 3 of the Repeal Act, 1999 which deals with Savings. It is contended in the petition that Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act is discriminatory in nature and favours those persons who are dishonest and manipulated the proceedings before the competent authority. It is averred that the said provision is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it denies the equality before law or equal protection before law. It is contended that under the Principal Act the procedure was prescribed for acquisition of land and its use and for that purposes Sections 23(4) and 23(5) were enacted. After the repeal of the Act the powers which were given to the State Government to retain the land after its vesting is no longer there and the same cannot be exercised for public benefit because of repeal of the Act itself. Even if possession of the land was taken over and the same was not used for public benefit during the subsistence of the Principal Act, the retention can no longer be allowed as the State Government has lost its rights to utilise the same for any purpose. It is also putforth that the word ‘possession’ as used in the Act does not give a fair idea whether the word possession as used in the Repeal Act refers to physical possession or symbolic possession or whether symbolic possession of the property could mean retention of the land without getting physical possession of the same. It is putforth that if the symbolic possession has been taken over and the land has not been utilised for any purpose the State Government has no right to retain the same and is bound to restore it back to the owner. It is contended that the State Government by virtue of Section 3(1)(a) of the Repeal Act, 1999 does not have the right to retain the land if the possession was not taken and the same was not utilised for any public purpose. It is putforth that the aforesaid provision is arbitrary as the same can not be enforced to deprive the petitioner from that part of the land of which the physical possession was not taken and not utilised for the public purpose. It is also highlighted that the persons who surrendered their land to the Government honestly and cooperated with the Government have suffered and those who manipulated and delayed the decision have gained the benefit and, therefore, the provision is ultravires.
4. A reply has been filed by the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 contending, inter alia, that the proceeding which was initiated against the land owner, full opportunity was granted and upon due enquiry the competent authority held that the petitioner held 4016.65 sq.m. of excess vacant land and consequently the same was declared surplus. The said land vested in the State Government free from all encumbrances by issuance of notification under Section 10(3) of the Act. The said notice was served on the petitioner on 23-10-1992 and the petitioner handedover the possession on 30-12-1992. The petitioner signed the memo of delivery of possession. The copy of the said memo has been brought on record as Annexure R-1. It is putforth that the competent authority determined the total compensation of the land at Rs. 20,083.00 and out of the same 25% was paid to the petitioner vide cheque dated 13-7-1995. The balance amount of Rs. 15,000/- has been retained by the respondents for issuance of bonds as provided under Section 14(2) of the Act. It is setforth that the proceeding under the Principal Act has been finally concluded and the petitioner can not be permitted to reopen the same after lapse of more than eight years.
5. It is averred that Section 3 of the Repeal Act deals with the saving of the proceedings under the Principal Act. Clause (a) of Section 3 specifically provides that the repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect the vesting of any vacant land under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority. It is further putforth that object of the said provision is to attribute finality to the proceedings already completed under the Principal Act. In other words the land which has already been vested cannot be reverted to the land owner in case possession of the same has been taken over. It is also putforth that the said provision can not be regarded as discriminatory as the classification is based on acceptable rationale. It is urged that in the case of the petitioner the possession of the land was taken over on 30th December, 2000 by the officer authorised by the State Government and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the benefit in any manner by the repeal of the Principal Act.
6. We have heard Mr. A.K. Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner,
Mr. S.K. Yadav, learned Government Advocate for the respondent Nos. 1 and
2 and Mr. R.S. Patel, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Union of India,
respondent No. 3.
7. Mr. A.K. Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that once the surplus land vests in the State the State becomes the absolute owner and the land becomes free from all encumbrances and the sole proprietary right rests with the State. Elaborating the aforesaid submission it is putforth by him that when such a situation emerges by operation of law the classification made by laying emphasis on taking over possession is founded on no sound principle of law and this makes the provision arbitrary and discriminatory. It is canvassed by him that the concept of acquisition has a different connotation and has no nexus with taking over possession as such and hence, classification made by the statute in respect of the land owner whose possession has been taken over and whose possession has not been taken over is totally meaningless inasmuch as in both the circumstances the State has become title holder for all purposes. It is his further submission that the fiction which has been created by introducing the concept of taking over possession is totally alien to the Principal Act and infact a subterfuse and a maladroit device has been introduced to extend the benefit to a class of people without any rational basis. It is propounded by him the people who cooperated and handedover the possession have become victims of circumstances and people who fought the litigations in a malafidc manner and dragged it have become beneficiaries and the Legislature in a welfare State could not have conferred such a benefit on those persons and the classification made on that bedrock is not permissible in law being wholly arbitrary and totally discriminatory.
8. Mr. R.S. Patel, as well as Mr. S.K. Yadav, per contra, has contended that Section 10 of the Principal Act postulates about various steps and no step is ignorable. It is their contention that Legislature in its wisdom has made a classification in respect of land in which the possession has been taken over and land of which the possession has not been taken over and such a classification has rationale and reasonableness and does not suffer from any kind of arbitrariness. It is urged that when the possession of the surplus land has been taken over in many a case the State Government has dealt with it in accordance with law as permissible in the Statute and the clock can not be put back and hence, the classification. It is canvassed by them that the submission to the effect that both the categories are placed at par is totally a misconception and does not deserve any acceptance in law.
9. Before we dwell upon the rival submissions raised at the Bar we think it appropriate to notice a few decisions cited by Mr. Jain. Mr. Jain has endeavoured to pyramid the proposition that once there is vesting or acquisition the State becomes the absolute owner and the land gets free from all encumbrances. Mr. Jain has commended us to the decision rendered in the case of Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Co. Ltd. and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 119 to highlight what is the duty of the Court while dealing with the constitutional validity of the legislation. The learned Counsel has also relied on that decision to highlight that the concept of acquisition and taking over the possession. As far as the first aspect is concerned Their Lordships expressed thus:–
“In order to decide whether a particular legislation is unconstitutional as offending the provisions of the Constitution it is necessary to examine with some strictness the substance of the legislation for the purpose of determining what it is that the legislature has really done; the Court, when such questions arise, is not over persuaded by the mere appearance of the legislation. In relation to constitutional prohibitions binding a legislature it is clear that the legislature cannot disobey the prohibition merely by employing indirect method of achieving exactly the same result. Therefore, in all such cases the Court has to look behind the names, forms and appearances to discover the true character and nature of the legislation.”
10. The learned Counsel, as far as second facet is concerned, has drawn inspiration from Paragraph 25 of the said judgment. The relevant part of the said paragraph reads as under:–
“25. The next contention of the learned Counsel that the word “acquisition” in Article 31(2) means the acquisition of title by the State & that unless the State becomes vested with the property there can be no acquisition within the meaning of the clause and that the expression “taking possession” connoted the idea of requisition cannot be sustained and does not, to my mind, affect the decision of the case. As above pointed, both these expressions used in Clause (2) convey the same meaning that is conveyed in Clause (1) by the expression “deprivation”. As I read Article 31, it gives complete protection to private property as against executive action, no matter by what process a person is deprived of possession of it. In other words, the Constitution declares that no person shall be deprived of possession of private property without payment of compensation and that too under the authority of law, provided there was a public purpose behind that law….”
11. Mr. Jain has commended us to the decision rendered in the case of Smt. Salubai Ramchandra and Ors. v. Chandu Saju and Ors., AIR 1966 Bombay 194 wherein the learned single Judge expressed the view as under:–
“The word ‘acquisition’ and the verb ‘acquire’ have a definite meaning
recognized in judicial pronouncements whenever used in a statute
relating to property. The use of the word ‘acquire’ necessarily postulates
a change of relationship vis-a-vis thing or property which is said to be
acquired and which was not existing before. The notion of ownership of
property implies various component rights, viz., that of possession,
enjoyment, destruction, alienation, exclusion and others incidental to
the right of ownership. A person who acquires a thing or property gets
this right for the first time from someone else otherwise the use of the
word ‘acquire’ is inappropriate and will not convey the correct meaning…..”
(Quoted from the placitum)
12. Mr. Jain has also referred to the decision rendered in the case of Jagannathpuri Guru Kamaleshwarpuri v. Godabai and Anr., AIR 1968 Bombay 25 to show the meaning of the word ‘acquire’.
13. Mr. Jain has also referred to the decision rendered in the case of Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of T.N. and Anr., (1996) 2 SCC 266 wherein the Apex Court expressed the view that though presumption is that the Act is constitutional and that Legislature understands and appreciates the needs of the people, but when the Act is ex-fade discriminatory and arbitrary, such presumption can not stand. The learned Counsel has also commended us to the decision rendered in the case of State of A.P. v. G. Ramakishan and Ors., (2001) 1 SCC 323 wherein the Apex Court has ruled that in the absence of reasonable basis for intelligible differentia an action is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution.
14. We may state here that these decisions were cited to show that taking over the possession can not be sine qua non and the classification made between two types of land owners is not rational. To appreciate the aforesaid submission of Mr. Jain it is appropriate to refer to Section 10 of the principal Act. It reads as under :–
“10. Acquisition of vacant land in excess of ceiling limit.–
(1) As soon as may be after the service of the statement under Section 9 on the person concerned, the competent authority shall cause a notification giving the particulars of the vacant land held by such person in excess of the ceiling limit and stating that–
(i) such vacant land is to be acquired by the concerned State Government; and
(ii) the claim of all persons interested in such vacant land may be made by them personally or by their agents giving particulars of the nature of their interests in such land, to be published for the information of the general public in the Official Gazette of the State concerned and in such other manner as may be prescribed.
(2) After considering the claim of the persons interested in the vacant land, made to the competent authority in pursuance of the notification published under Sub-section (1), the competent authority shall determine the nature and extent of such claims and pass such orders as it deems fit.
(3) At any time after the publication of the notification under Sub-section (1), the competent authority may, by notification published in the Official Gazette of the State concerned declare that the excess vacant land referred in the notification published under Sub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and upon the publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified.
(4) During the period commencing on the date of publication of the notification under Sub-section (1) and ending with the date specified in the declaration made under Sub-section (3)–
(i) no person shall transfer by way of sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise any excess vacant land (including any part thereof) specified in the notification aforesaid and any such transfer made in contravention of this provision shall be deemed to be null and void; and
(ii) no person shall alter or cause to be altered the use of such excess vacant land.
(5) Where any vacant land is vested in the State Government under Sub-section (3), the competent authority may, by notice in writing, order any person who may be in possession of it to surrender or deliver possession thereof to the State Government or to any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf within thirty days of the service of the notice.
(6) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under Sub-section (5), the competent authority may take possession of the vacant land or cause it to be given to the concerned State Government or to any person duly authorised by such State Government in this behalf and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary.
Explanation.– In this section, in Sub-section (1) of Section 11 and in Sections 14 and 23, “State Government”, in relation to–
(a) any vacant land owned by the Central Government, means the Central Government;
(b) any vacant land owned by any State Government and situated in a Union territory or within the local limits of a Cantonment declared as such under Section 3 of the Cantonment Act, 1924 (2 of 1924), means that State Government.”
15. On a careful scrutiny of the said provision it is luminously clear that Sub-section (3) of the aforesaid section deals with the declaration that the excess vacant land referred to in the notification published under Sub-section (1) shall, with effect from such date as may be specified in the declaration, be deemed to have been acquired by the State Government and upon the publication of such declaration, such land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Sub-section (5) deals with how the possession has to be taken over. Sub-section (6) empowers the competent authority to take possession of the vacant land by application of force.
16. Submission of Mr. Jain is that once that property vests it becomes free from all encumbrances. The State becomes the owner in entirety and there is acquisition in proper sense of the term. The word ‘vest’ has a different facet. In this context we may refer to the meaning of the term as defined in Chamber’s Twentieth Century Dictionary:
“To settle, secure, or put in fixed right of possession; to endow, to descend, devolve or to take effect, as a right.”
Concise Oxford Dictionary gives the following meaning :–
“Confer formally on him an immediate fixed right of present or future possession of it (vested rights, interest, estate, etc., possession of which is determinately fixed in a person and is subject to no contingency); (of property right etc.) vest in (person) came to him.”
Wharton’s Law Lexicon gives the following meaning of the term “vest” :–
“(1) Either to place in possession; to make possessor of or; to give an absolute interest in property when a named period or event occurs.
(2) of a right or interest. Its coming into the possession of any one; ensuring to the benefit of any one.”
Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary gives the following meaning to the word “vest” :–
“(1) “To vest”, generally means to give the property in,
(2) “vest” in the absence of a context, is usually taken to mean vest in interest rather than vest in possession.”
P. Ramanata Aiyer’s Law Lexicon has given the meaning of word ‘vest’ as under:–
“To place in possession to take passession of; to take an interest in property when a named period or event occurs.”
17. In the case of the Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 Their Lordships while dealing with the said terms held as under :–
“The word “vest” has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases
that the property in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in
possession, or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context
in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The
provisions of the U.P. Town Improvement Act particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54 and 54A when they speak of a certain building or street or
square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a
trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.
The vesting of property in the Trust is only for the purpose of executing
any improvement scheme which it has undertaken and not with a view
to clothing it with complete title.”
(quoted from the placitum)
18. Again Their Lordships in Paragraph 19 expressed the view as under:–
“(19) The word “vest” is a word of variable import is shown by provisions of Indian statutes also. For example, S. 56 of the Provincial Insolvency Act (5 of 1920) empowers the Court at the time of the making of the order of adjudication or thereafter to appoint a receiver for the property of the insolvent and further provides that “such property shall thereupon vest in such receiver”. The property vests in the receiver for the purpose of administering the estate of the insolvent for the payment of his debts after realisting his assets. The property of the insolvent vests in the receiver not for all purposes but only for the purpose of the Insolvency Act and the receiver has no interest of his own in the property. On the other hand, Sections 16 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act (Act 1 of 1894), provide that the property so acquired, upon the happening of certain events, shall “vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances”. In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17 the property acquired becomes the property of Government without any conditions or limitations either as to title or possession, the legislature has made it clear that the vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or limited duration. It would thus appear that the word “vest” has not got a fixed connotation, meaning in all cases that the property is owned by the person or the authority in whom it vests. It may vest in title, or it may vest in possession or it may vest in a limited sense, as indicated in the context in which it may have been used in a particular piece of legislation. The provisions of the Improvement Act, particularly Sections 45 to 49 and 54 and 54A when they speak of a certain building or street or square or other land vesting in a municipality or other local body or in a trust, do not necessarily mean that ownership has passed to any of them.”
19. In the case of Municipal Committee v. Ramkaran Ganeshilal, AIR 1958 MP 355 this Court interpreted the term ‘vest’ and held the word ‘vest’ has only a limited effect.
20. In the case of Mrs. Daya Wansi v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, AIR 1982 Delhi 534 the Bench interpreted the term ‘vest’ synonymous with ‘title’.
21. In the case of State v. Ram Sri, AIR 1976 All. 121 it was expressed that the term ‘vest’ does not have a fixed connotation or meaning.
22. In this context we may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, AIR 1995 SC 605 wherein the Apex Court expressed the view that the term ‘vest’ has to be understood in a different context.
23. In Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England the word ‘vested’ has been described as under :–
“The word ‘vested’ is used in two distinct senses. It may mean that the right with reference to which it is used, is vested in possession; or it may mean that it is vested in interest, though not necessarily in possession or
indefeasibly vested.”
24. If we analyse the concept of vesting in the aforesaid background the meaning given in the statute gathers a different connotation altogether. Section 10 of the Principal Act can be understood in two compartments. As far as Section 10(3) is concerned, there is declaration of vesting. As far as Section 10(5) is concerned there is procedure for taking over the possession. In this context we may profitably refer to Section 4 of the Repeal Act. It reads as under:–
“4. Abatement of Legal Proceedings.– All proceedings relating to any order made under Principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any Court, Tribunal or other authority shall abate :
Provided that this section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to Sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the Principal Act in so far as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority.”
25. In the case of Pt. Madan Swaroop Shrotiaya Public Charitable Trust v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2000) 6 SGC 325 the Apex Court after referring to Section 4 of the Repeal Act, 1999 and taking note of the fact position came to hold that the proceedings have to be abated under the Repeal Act, 1999.
26. In the case of Smt. Angoori Devi v. State of U.P. and Ors., 2001 AIR SCW 5128 the Constitution Bench expressed the view as under:–
“2. These cases relate to the interpretation of different provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. During the pendency of these appeals in this Court, the Urban Land. (Ceiling and Regulation) Act has been repealed by Act 15 of 1999 and the State of U.P. also has adopted the same by a resolution. In view of the provisions contained in Section 3 of the Repealing Act and the fact that the possession of the vacant land has not been taken over by the State Government, which is asserted by the Counsel appearing for the appellants and is also apparent from the interim orders passed by this Court, the question for consideration no longer survives. Further under Section 4 of the Repealing Act all proceedings under the Act must be held to have abated. In that view of the matter, we do not think it necessary to proceed with this matter. These Appeals stand disposed of accordingly.”
27. Section 3 of the Repeal Act deals with the savings. Said provision reads as under :–
“3. Savings.– (1) The repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect–
(a) the vesting of any vacant land under Sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority;
(b) the validity of any order granting exemption under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any Court to the contrary;
(c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under Sub-section (1) of Section 20.
(2) Where–
(a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and
(b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land,
such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government.”
28. On a perusal of the aforesaid provision it is quite vivid that where the land has been vested in the State Government under Sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority, nothing remains to be done.
29. Submission of Mr. Jain is that once the property has been acquired, classification thereon invites the frown of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. As has been indicated hereinbefore he has referred to two decisions to show that though presumption is that the Act is constitutionally valid, the said presumption has to withstand scrutiny of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The legislature in its wisdom has put lands into two categories : land which has been declared surplus and possession has been taken over and the land possession of which has not been taken over despite such declaration. Taking over of possession is the most crucial and the acid test. It can not be said the factum of taking over of the possession by the State Government or by the competent authority is not a valid criteria to create a classification. The classification according to us is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. It is based on good reasoning. To elaborate : when possession has been taken over the State might have dealt with the property by distributing the same among the people or done something as per law. May be in certain instances the State might not have distributed but categorisation or division on that base would lead to utter chaos and confusion. A pragmatic and purposive approach has been made by classifying the land on the bedrock of taking over possession. We perceive no unreasonableness or irrationality in the same.
30. In view of the preceding analysis we are of the considered opinion that classification does not suffer from the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution. As far as fortuitous circumstance as putforth by Mr. Jain is concerned, is without substance as the legislation is not to be declared unconstitutional on that score.
31. In view of the premised reasons we do not find any merit in the writ petition and the same stands dismissed without any order as to costs.