JUDGMENT
A.M. Sapre, J.
1. This appeal is filed under Section 82 of Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 by the Regional Director, Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, Indore office questioning the legality and propriety of an order passed by Labour Court on June 18, 1993 in Section 75 proceedings initiated by the respondents in case No. 3/E.S.I./85. Facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal need mention in brief.
2. In the year 1968 proceedings were started against the respondent under the Act, for payment of employees contribution payable under the Act. This related to period April 1, 1963 to December 31, 1967. Since the respondent disputed their liability to pay the same on several grounds employees contribution pertaining to this period (April 1, 1963 to December 31, 1967), the matter went to Labour Court it being a Competent Authority under the Act, to adjudicate the liability of the respondent to pay the said dues. The matter was registered as case No. 12/68. The Labour Court (Competent Authority) by its order dated March 22, 1976 (Ex. P-1) asked the respondent to pay a total sum of Rs. 12,023.30 paisa together with interest. This amount was paid by the respondent.
3. On December 4, 1984 (Ex. P-5) the appellant issued yet another demand under Section 45A of the Act asking the respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 70.85 finally determined
as employees contribution in terms of order passed in Case No. 12/67 and Rs. 6,400/- being an interest on Rs. 11,612/- being an amount of E.S.C. (Employees’ Special Contribution) for the period January 28, 1968 to February 15, 1977. It is this demand that was challenged by the respondent before the Labour Court (Competent Authority) by making an application under Section 75 of the Act, being case No. 3/85 (E.S.I.) out of which this appeal arises. In substance, the application was founded on the allegations that the appellant i. e. E.S.I. Corporation having already recovered the contribution pursuant to the order dated March 22, 1976 (Ex. P-1) from the respondent for the period in question, the same amount cannot be recovered twice from the respondent by issuing a fresh demand. It was alleged that even if the impugned demand is for employer’s special contribution i.e. different than the one for which the earlier demand was issued, yet the same not having been issued alongwith the earlier demand, it is now barred on the principles of Order 2 Rule 2 of C.P. Code.
4. The appellant contested the application inter alia on the ground that present dues have nothing to do with the earlier dues which were subject matter of earlier proceedings i.e. order dated March 22, 1976 (Ex. P-1). According to appellant (non-applicant before the Labour Court), the present dues relate essentially towards interest payable by the respondent on Rs. 11,612/- being the dues towards employer’s special contribution for the period January 23,
1968 to February 15, 1977. It was therefore contended that the dues which are under challenge are proper, legal and hence payable by the respondent having no connection with the earlier dues.
5. The Labour Court by impugned order allowed the application made by the respondent (employer). While doing so, the learned Presiding Officer was of the view that the impugned demand pertains to the same period for which the earlier proceedings had been initiated and since the appellant did not issue the demand alongwith the earlier one and hence it is barred by the principle of Order 2 Rule 2 of C.P. Code. In the opinion of learned Presiding Officer the present demand though related to employer’s special contribution and the earlier one was related to employees’ contribution, yet, the period for both the demands being the same, both. had to be issued together. This not having been done, the appellant is now precluded from raising a subsequent impugned demand. On this reasoning, the impugned demand dated December 4, 1984 (Ex. P-5) was quashed. It is this order of Labour Court quashing the impugned demand dated December 4, 1984 (Annexure P-5) which is challenged by the E. S.I. Corporation through Regional Director by filing this appeal.
6. Heard Shri Vivek Saran learned counsel for the appellant (E.S.I.) Corporation and Shri O.K. Chouhan learned counsel for the respondent (employer).
7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the entire original record of the case, I am inclined to set aside the impugned order and allow the appeal.
8. In my considered opinion, the learned Presiding Officer committed both factual as well as legal error in allowing the application made by the respondent. Perusal of order dated March 22, 1976 (Ex. P-1) shows that the demand which was subject matter of earlier proceedings was for payment of employees’ contribution whereas the
demand in question was towards interest for the delayed payment of employer’s special contribution. This is clear from the impugned order itself when the learned Presiding Officer observed in para 7:
(Vernacular Omitted)
The same thing can be seen from the order dated December 4, 1984 (Ex. P-5) when it was observed as under:
“I have applied my mind to all the relevant facts and have come to the conclusion that contributions totalling Rs. 70.85 for 12/67 (Rs. Seventy and paisa eighty five only) is payable for the employer and interest Rs. 6400/- on Rs. 11,612/-(ESC) for the period from January 28, 1968 to February 15, 1977.”
9. I fail to appreciate as to on what basis that the learned Presiding Officer could conclude that both the demands are similar in nature. Merely, because period for these 2 demands happened to be the same does not take away the right of authorities to issue demand separately. Indeed present demand which was for interest had nothing to do with the earlier one and hence it had to sustain on its own. I really fail to appreciate as to on what basis, the principle of Order 2 Rule 2 of C.P. Code can be made applicable or has any application in the facts of this case. Plea of Order 2 Rule 2 of C.P. Code applies against the adversary litigation in suits and not against the authority exercising its powers under the Act. This is apart from the fact that in the present case as I have held supra, the 2 demands were entirely different in nature having no resemblance at all between the two.
10. In view of aforesaid discussion the impugned order is not sustainable in law. It is liable to be set aside. Accordingly the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. No costs.