ORDER
T.S. Doabia, J.
1. The brief facts for the purposes of this petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are as under:
The Municipal Corporation, Gwalior invited tenders for the purpose of giving contract to look after the boating in the Savarkar Sarovar, Gwalior. The advertisement, in this regard, was issued in the local newspaper. The tenders were opened on 21st of December, 1993. The petitioner’s offer was for Rs. 60,500/- for three years. Since the
offer of the petitioner was highest, he was
required to deposit Rs. 20,200/- as contract’
money. This was deposited vide receipt No.
391/148/93 on 27-12-1993.
2. The grievance of the petitioner is that his offer was the highest and, therefore, the action of the Municipal Corporation in not accepting the same cannot be sustained. Annexure P/3 is a resolution adopted by the Corporation. A view was formed by its Administrator that the contract may be given to the petitioner for a period of three years from 1-1-1994 to 31-12-1996. In the last portion of the order it has been mentioned that the agreement may be got approved from Corporation Counsel. It was further provided that ‘ before entering into agreement the papers be put before the Administrator. However, the Municipal Corporation took a final decision not to accept the offer of the petitioner. This decision is at Annexure R/3. A decision was taken not to go ahead with the tenders in question and that the Corporation itself would look into this.
3. The petitioner’s grievance is against this decision of the Corporation. So far as Annexure R/3 is concerned, petitioner’s counsel admits that it was never communicated to his client. The question, therefore, arises as to whether any rights accrue to the petitioner on the basis of order Annexure R/3. As noticed above, the resolution Annexure P/3 remained an inter-departmental communication. It was never communicated to the petitioner. As such, no right came to vest in the petitioner.
4. In State of Punjab v. S.S. Singh, AIR 1961 SC 493, it was held that unless and until the decision is communicated to the party concerned, it cannot derive any benefit and the competent authority can reconsider the matter. It was observed at page 512 :–
“Even if the Council of Ministers had provisionally decided to reinstate the respondent that would not prevent the Council from reconsidering the matter and coming to a contrary conclusion later on, until a final decision is reached by them and is communicated to the Rajpramukh in the form of advice and acted upon by him by issuing an order in that behalf to the respondent. Until the final order is thus communicated to the respondent; it would be open to the Council to consider the matter over and over again, arid the fact that they reached provisional conclusions on two occasions in the past would not alter the character of the said conclusions. The said conclusions, provisional in character, are a part of the proceedings of the Council of Ministers and no more.”
The same view was expressed in Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 395. It was observed:–
“Thus, it is of the essence that the order has to be communicated to the person who would be affected by that order before the State and that person can be bound by that order. For, until the order is communicated to the person affected by it, it would be open to the Council of Ministers to consider the matter over and over again and, therefore, till its communication the order cannot be regarded as anything more than provisional in character.”
5. As decision contained in Annexure P/3 was never communicated to the petitioner, he can derive no benefit from this. Apart from this, the Corporation has not given the contract to any third person. The Corporation wants to manage its own affairs through its own employees. As a matter of fact, the petitioner has no right to force the Corporation to enter into a contractual arrangement. In State of Orissa v, Harinayaran Jaiswal, AIR 1972 SC 1816 : (1972 Tax LR 2298) it was held that State is within its rights not to accept the highest bid. It was observed :–
“It is for the Government to decide whether the price offered in an auction, sale is adequate. While accepting or rejecting a bid, it is merely performing an executive function. The correctness of its conclusion is not open to judicial review.”
It was further observed:–
“There is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted. Before there’ was a’ concluded contract, it was open to the bidders to withdraw their bids — See Union of India v; Bhimsen Walaiti Ram, (1970) 2 SCR 594; (AIR 1971 SC 2295). By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights. The fact that the Government was the seller does not change the legal position once its exclusive right to deal with those privileges is conceded. If the Government is the exclusive owner of those privileges, reliance on Article 19(1)(g) or Article 14 becomes irrelevant. Citizens cannot have any fundamental right to trade or carry on business in the properties or rights belonging: to the Government nor can there be any infringement of Article 14, if the Government tries to get the best available price for its valuable rights.”
The fact that the person taking part in the process of submitting tenders has no right is again apparent from the following observations of the Supreme Court in Harinarayan’s case (AIR 1972 SC 1816) (supra) :–
“Once the Government declines to accept the highest bid, the auction held became useless. Similar is the effect when the Government refused to accept the highest tender.”
Thus, looking from any point of view, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed with no order as to costs.
6. The Corporation shall refund the amount deposited by the petitioner within 15 days. In case the amount is not refunded, the petitioner shall be entitled, to interest at the rate of 12% from the date of deposit.
