High Court Madhya Pradesh High Court

Gokul Agro Industries vs Dasri And Anr. on 18 January, 2006

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Gokul Agro Industries vs Dasri And Anr. on 18 January, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2007 ACJ 1562
Bench: A Sapre, A Tiwari


JUDGMENT

A.M. Sapre and A.K. Tiwari, JJ.

1. This is an appeal filed by employers (non-applicants) under Section 30 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act against an award dated 27.3.2003 passed by Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation (Labour Court), Indore in Case No. 12 of 1997 W.C.F. By impugned award, learned Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation, i.e., the Labour Court was pleased to allow the claim application made by the respondent in part under Section 10 of the Act and awarded a sum of Rs. 1,24,788 to the respondents. It is this award passed by the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation which is sought to be impugned by the employers in this appeal.

2. Heard Mr. S.V. Dandwate, learned Counsel for the appellants and Mr. Sanjay Patwa, learned Counsel for respondents.

3. We may at the outset, take note of the well defined principles or parameters provided in Section 30 of the Act while deciding the appeal. The section empowers this Court to hear and decide the appeal if it involves any question of law. In other words, it is only when the appeal involves any question of law then this Court can interfere in the impugned award of the Commissioner passed under Section 10 ibid. Every order/award of Commissioner cannot be interfered with in exercise of appellate powers conferred by Section 30 ibid. This Court can interfere in those legal findings which are against any provision of law or dehors to the pleading or/and evidence or are such that no judicial man can ever reach to such conclusion. These are certain well settled principles which can be made basis to interfere in the impugned award of the Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation.

4. Coming to the fact of this case out of which this appeal arises deceased Dhansingh aged about 30 years and working as a worker in factory of the appellants died in factory premises due to electrocution (electric shock). It is not in dispute that the deceased was in the employment of the appellants and secondly the death occurred in an accident at factory. It is this incident which gave rise to filing of claim petition by the respondents (legal representatives of deceased) under Section 10 of the Act out of which this appeal arises seeking compensation for death of Dhansingh. In substance the defence of appellants was that accident did not arise during the course of employment nor it arose out of the employment. Parties adduced evidence. The Commissioner held both the issues raised by the appellants in favour of respondents after appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties and accordingly awarded compensation to the respondents amounting to Rs. 1,24,788. It is this award which is sought to be impugned by the employers in this appeal under Section 30 ibid.

5. Placing reliance on two documents filed by the appellants for the first time in appeal by taking recourse to provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code, learned Counsel for appellants/employers contended that these two documents be taken on record as additional piece of evidence. According to learned Counsel these documents are in the nature of statement of deceased recorded by police prior to his death, i.e., they are in the nature of dying declaration and hence they are material. Learned Counsel contended that since the accident did not have any connection with the employment nor it arose out of employment and hence the main application made by respondents deserves to be dismissed by allowing the appeal and setting aside of the impugned award. In reply the learned Counsel for respondents supported the impugned award and contended that in the first place the application filed by the appellants under Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code should not be allowed for want of any substantial cause mentioned therein and required within the meaning of Order 41, Rule 27, Civil Procedure Code and secondly the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 30 ibid and lastly both the findings of fact recorded by the Commissioner do not call for any interference because they are based on proper appreciation of oral evidence adduced by the parties.

6. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused record of the case, we are inclined to dismiss the appeal as in our opinion the appeal has no substance nor it involves any substantial legal question so as to call for any interference and lastly, the findings recorded by Commissioner being based on proper appreciation of oral evidence, they do not call for any interference in appeal under Section 30 ibid.

7. In our opinion, the application made by the appellants (I.A. No. 1817 of 2003) under Order 41, Rule 27 of Civil Procedure Code seeking to file additional evidence cannot be allowed at this appellate stage for more than one reason. Firstly, the documents sought to be made basis were already in existence prior to filing of the case by the respondents before the Commissioner. Secondly, the appellants could have obtained these documents if they felt that they were very much material for filing before Commissioner. Thirdly, they have already raised their defence based on these documents. In this view of the matter, we do not find any good ground to entertain such application and grant any indulgence of remand by leading additional evidence, etc. Accordingly the application fails and is hereby dismissed.

8. Coming to the merits of the case the Commissioner on appreciation of oral evidence adduced by the parties has come to a categorical conclusion that deceased died while in employment. We also find that deceased an employee working for the appellants in their factory used to live in the same factory premises. Obviously, therefore, one can conclude that it was with the permission of appellants either express or implied that he was living in factory. It is for the reason that no workman can live in his employers’ factory 24 hours unless he is allowed by his employers. If the deceased as an employee was living in the factory for all times and taking care of the factory premises for the benefit of the appellants (i.e., employers) in addition to his regular duties in the factory then in such event, the employers have to be held responsible for any accident that may have caused in factory premises with their employee. It then becomes a case of an accident which can be said to arise out of employment and during the course of his employment. These expressions call for liberal interpretation while deciding such type of cases and in favour of an employee because they are part of a beneficial legislation enacted for the benefit of employees working in establishment and who receive any injury while rendering their services to their master.

9. We, therefore, find no merit in this appeal which fails and is hereby dismissed. No costs.