JUDGMENT
1. This Writ Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the Government Transport Service impugns a common order dated May 2, 1989 made by the First Labour Court, Bombay, in Application (IDA) Nos. 837 to 841 of 1981, 1463 to 1475 of 1982, 183 to 189 of 1987, 27 to 31 of 1982, 1350 to 1357 of 1984, 67 of 1986 and 1430 to 1441 of 1984, under the provisions of Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
2. The petitioner is a Special Department of the Government of Maharashtra set up to provide transport service to a limited class such as V. I. Ps., V. V. I. Ps., and Higher Officers of the Government of Maharashtra and other State Governments and Central Government. Respondents 1 to 51, except Respondent 34-A, are working as drivers in the Petitioner Establishment. Respondent 34-A, Smt. Elorida George D’Souza is the legal representative of S. B. Pareira, who was working as a driver of the Petitioner Establishment at the material time and has since expired.
3. On or about April 1, 1944, the then Government of Bombay set up a Special Department known as ‘Government Transport Service’ (G. T. S., for short), which was required to handle mainly the transport of food-grains for the Civil Supplies Department and the Transport requirements of Secretariat Department. Subsequently, when the Government Milk Scheme was started, the G. T. S. was entrusted with the task of transport of Milk from the Government Milk Dairy to the various Milk Centres in Bombay. Some time in 1950-51, consequent upon the abolition of rationing, the work of food-grain transport done hitherto by the G. T. S. was discontinued. Subsequently, as a result of bifurcation of the G. T. S. the Milk Transport work handled by the G. T. S. was separated and transferred to the Milk Department along with the Mahim Depot used for operations of vehicles, in connection with Milk Transport. Thereafter, the G. T. S. has been functioning in the limited sphere of maintaining and running F. G. O. (First Grade Officers) Cars, D. V. (Distinguished Visitors) Cars and other vehicles to meet the transport requirements of the Government of Maharashtra Departments, V. V. I. Ps., V. I. Ps., from Foreign countries, various States of the Indian Union, etc., as State Guests. G. T. S. also maintains a workshop to repair the Department cars and other vehicles, D. V. Cars under the control of G. A. D. and Cars allotted to the Ministers.
4. The Government of Maharashtra has made detailed Rules governing the use of Distinguished Visitors and First Grade Officers Cars, which are incorporated in General Circular No. 10, G. E., P & S. D. No. DVC-1057-E, dated June 24, 1957. This circular has been amended from time to time and is contained at pages 450 to 460 of the Hand-Book of General Circulars published by the Government of Maharashtra in the year 1962. The general scheme of the rules is that, Distinguished Visitors Cars would be under the administrative control of the Chief Secretary to the Government, General Administration Department. As and when such cars are required to be placed at the disposal of Visiting Dignitaries, V. V. I. Ps., V. I. P. s, and other Higher Officers, a requisition is to be sent to the Superintendent of the Government Transport Service by the Chief Secretary to Government or by any other authorised Officer of the G. A. D. Rule VI (i) provides that no charges should be levied for the use of Distinguished Visitors’ Cars in the case of visits by the President of India, the Vice-President of India, the Prima Minister of India and Governors of other States, such charges being borne by the General Administration Department. Sub-Rule (ii) provides that, with regard to the visits of all other distinguished visitors, including the Chief Justice of India, Ministers and Deputy Ministers of the Government of India and of Other States, and the Members of the Planning Commission, Government of India, Distinguished Visitors’ Cars should be provided free of charge for the first two days of their visits, and, if the visit continues beyond two days, arrangements for transport should be made on payment basis, “except where a distinguished visitor’s or a Minister’s stay is in an official capacity and the car is required for official duty”. Sub-Rule (iv) provides that the Government may, if it so decides, bear the expenditure for the use of cars during the entire period of stay of any of the distinguished Visitors. When charges are not to be recovered, the expenditure would be borne by the General Administration Department, which will also arrange to effect recoveries wherever due. Under Sub-Rule (v) the Controller of the Government Transport Service, Bombay, is required to send to the General Administration Department separate bills for transport used by each visitor on each day within a week of the day of departure of the visitor, only when recoveries are to be effected and not when transport is required to be provided free of charge. Sub-Rule (vii) provides that the expenditure on the maintenance of the Distinguished Visitors Cars is required to be debited to the detailed head “Maintenance of Cars” under the major head “25-General Administration – E – Secretariat and Attached Officers – K – Civil Secretariat – K-2b – General Administration Department – K2(b) (4) – Contingencies”, to be met from the sanctioned grant. The said Circular fixes the rate of recoveries to be made for the use of Distinguished Visitors’ Cars in the Bombay City. Originally the rates were Re. 0.35 paise per mile and waiting charges of Rs. 2/- per hour, which has now been revised to Rs. 4/- per kilometer with waiting charges of Rs. 2/- per hour and maximum of Rs. 20/- per day under the Government Resolution dated July 22, 1992. Rule IX makes detailed provisions as to recovery of charges in different cases when D. V. Cars are made available to Foreign Heads of Missions, Foreign Ambassadors designate arriving in Bombay in transit, Roving Ambassadors, and Foreign Ambassadors accredited to Foreign Countries passing through Bombay, Indian Ambassadors-designate and Indian Ambassadors accredited to Foreign Countries passing through Bombay and Distinguished Foreign Visitors Treated as State Guests.
5. In the affidavit in reply dated April 17, 1995, filed on behalf of the petitioner by Ramachandra Dadasaheb Pagare, Deputy Transport Commissioner and Controller, Government Transport Service, Bombay, it is stated that about 97.08% of the total billing for the running of vehicles of the Government Transport Service is borne by the Government Department, including the General Administration Department, as the said vehicles are used by the V. V. I. Ps., V. I. P. s., State Guests and High Government Officers. It is also stated that the billing amount for use of the said vehicles by Government Officers for private purposes is extremely negligible, that for the year 1993-94 it came to about 0.38% of the total billing. In Exhibit to the said affidavit is a chart showing the billing amount for the vehicles used in the year 1993-94 under different heads. From this chart it could be seen that, apart from the billing amount for vehicles used in the said year the amount to be paid by the Government Departments (G. A. D.) is Rs. 36,74,466/- (Rupees thirty six Lacs seventy four thousand four hundred sixty six only), payment of Rs. 79,134/- (Rupees seventy nine thousand one hundred thirty four only) had to be recovered from State Guests who used the vehicles on payment basis and a sum of Rs. 31,650/- (Rupees thirty one thousand six hundred fifty only) had to be recovered from the officers who had used vehicles for private purposes. Exhibit 2 attached to the affidavit gives an over view of the functioning of the G. T. S. and emphasizes the fact that it is a “Service Department” and that the G. T. S. had directed that the pro-forma accounts of the Government Service Organisations should no longer be maintained and that the accounts had to be maintained in the form of receipts and expenditure, as in the case of a ‘service department’.
6. During the material period, the Respondents were working as Drivers on different vehicles maintained by the G. T. S. for the purposes referred to as above. Considering the special nature of their duties, the Respondents were required to work for long periods while discharging the duties. By Government Resolutions issued from time to time, the drivers in the employment of the G. T. S. were sanctioned payment of over-time allowance at varying rates, for duties performed in excess of nine hours including lunch time, on all working days. The last applicable rates of over time were fixed by the G. R. No. GST-1278/1-TRA-6, dated June 21, 1980, and were applicable during the material period. The Respondents were paid over time allowance for work in excess of nine hours of work and working on Sundays and Holidays at the rates as prescribed in the circulars issued by the Government of Maharashtra from time to time. The Respondents, however claimed that they were entitled to payment of over-time allowance as prescribed under the provisions of the Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the M. T. W. Act’). When the said Act came into force the G. T. S. had actually registered as a “Motor Transport Undertaking” within the meaning of Section 2(g)(h) of the Act. Though this registration was renewed from time to time, upto the year 1974, thereafter there does not appear to have been a renewal of the registration.
7. The Respondents filed applications under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court and claimed certain amounts payable to them as difference between the over-time payments payable under the provisions of the M. T. W. Act and the amounts actually paid to them. Detailed calculation of over-time claim of each applicant Driver was placed on record. Though the petitioners did not dispute the actual calculations, they disputed that the provisions of the M. T. W. Act were applicable to the Government Transport Service or the drivers working in it. The Labour Court tried the applications and, by the impugned common order, held that the provisions of the M. T. W. Act were applicable to the Government Transport Service and that the Respondents were entitled to claim over-time payments thereunder. Since the actual calculations of the over-time claim were not disputed by the Petitioners, the Labour Court by the impugned order directed the claimed amounts to be paid by the Petitioners to the Respondents. The said order of the Labour Court is impugned in the Writ Petition.
8. The learned Advocate General, vehemently contended that the Labour Court has misconstrued the provisions of the M. T. W. Act and held that the said Act is applicable to the G. T. S. He urges that the M. T. W. Act is intended to apply to one who carries on the business of transport of passengers or goods by vehicle and not intended to apply to an establishment of the Government merely catering to the needs of transportation of V. V. I. Ps., V. I. Ps., First Grade Officers and State Guests. The learned Advocate General submitted that, though he would not be in a position to dispute that the persons carried in the vehicles of the G. T. S. would be ‘passengers’ yet, since they were not being carried for hire or reward the G. T. S. cannot be said to be carrying on the business of transport of passengers by vehicles; consequently, the provisions of the Act are not applicable to the G. T. S. Though he did not dispute that the G. T. S. raised bills against different Departments requisitioning vehicles from the G. T. S. and further that the amounts required to be paid were even described as ‘hire charges’ in the different circulars and in the bills, he contends that this arrangement is merely a matter of book entry, without actual cash transaction and therefore there is no element of hire or reward. The main thrust of the learned Advocate General’s argument is that the provisions of the Act are intended only for regulation of the conditions of service and welfare of the workers employed by an employer carrying on the business of transport of passengers and goods by vehicles and that an activity of the State Government, such as the G. T. S., was not intended to be covered by the provisions of the M. T. W. Act. The learned Advocate General states that, though the G. T. S. did get itself registered as a Motor Transport Undertaking under the M. T. W. Act during the years 1961 to 1971, it was due to a misconception of law and, when, it was realised that the provisions of the M. T. W. Act could not apply to the G. T. S., the Registration was thereafter not renewed. The contention is that irrespective of the mistaken registration under the M. T. W. Act, the provisions of the said Act have to be looked at to determine whether the Act applies or not.
9. It would be necessary to notice some of the provisions of the M. T. W. Act in order to appreciate the arguments of the learned Advocate General.
10. The preamble to the M. T. W. Act declares that it is an Act “to provide for the welfare of Motor Transport workers and to regulate the conditions of their work”. Section 1(4) provides that the Act would apply to every ‘Motor Transport’ undertaking, employing five or more ‘Motor transport workers’. The expression “Motor Transport Undertaking” is defined in clause 2(g) as :
“2(g) “Motor Transport Undertaking” means a Motor Transport Undertaking engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward, and includes a private carrier.”
Section 2(h) defines the expression “Motor Transport Workers” as :
“2(h) “Motor Transport Worker” means a person who is employed in a Motor Transport Undertaking directly or through an agency, whether for wages or not, to work in a professional capacity on a transport vehicle or to attend to duties in connection with the arrival, departure, loading or unloading of such transport vehicle and includes a driver, conductor, cleaner, station staff, line-checking staff, booking clerk, cash clerk, depot clerk, time-keeper, watchman or attendant, but except in Section 8 does not include –
(i) any such person who is employed in a factory as defined in the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
(ii) any such person to whom the provisions of any law for the time being in force regulating the conditions of service of persons employed in shops or commercial establishments apply.”
Section 2(n) provides :
“2(n) all other words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939), shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act”.
11. The concept of ‘Motor Transport Undertaking’, deducible from the defining section, is that it is : (a) Undertaking, (h) engaged in carrying passengers or goods or both by road, (c) for hire or reward, and (d) includes a private carrier. The expression ‘private carrier’ is not defined in the Act itself. Section 2(22) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, defines a “private carrier” as the owner of a transport vehicle other than a public carrier, who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purposes of his business, not being a business of providing transport, or who uses the vehicle for any of the purposes specified in sub-Section 2 of Section 42. The expression ‘passengers’ and ‘hire or reward’ are not defined by the M. T. W. Act, though they have been subject matters of judicial interpretation in cognate statutes over a number of years.
12. The first thing that strikes the mind upon reading the definition of “Motor Transport Undertaking” is that in order to fall within the definition, the undertaking must be ‘engaged’ in the specific type of work. In other words, the specified type of work is carried out by the Undertaking on a regular basis and is not merely a casual occurrence. The specified type of work is, “carrying passengers or goods or both by road”. It is not disputed by the learned Advocate General that, any person who is carried in a transport vehicle, other than the driver, would be a passengers. The third element of the definition is that the carrying of passengers or goods by road is done for “hire” or “reward”. This element is missing in the case of G. T. S., according to the learned Advocate General.
13. The expression ‘hire’ is defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, page 729, as “Compensation for the use of a thing, or for Labour or Service. State v. Kenyon, Inc. Tax. Civ. App. 153 S. W. 2d 195, 197. Act of hiring; A bailment in which compensation is to be given for the use of a thing, or for Labour and services about it.”
14. Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, Second Edition, Volume 1, Page 910 defines ‘hire’ as “a bailment for a reward or compensation. It is divisible into four sorts :- (1) the hiring of a thing for use (locatio rei); (2) the hiring of work and Labour (locatio operis faciendi); (3) the hiring of cars and service to be performed or bestowed on the thing delivered (locatio custodiae); (4) the hiring of the carriage of goods (locatio operis mercium vehendarum) from one place to another. The three last are but sub-divisions of the general head of hire of Labour and services.
15. According to Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, Fifth Edition, Volume 2, Pages 1169 to 1970, carrying passengers for ‘hire’ or ‘reward’ within the meaning of Road Traffic Act, 1960, means “the carriage of passengers for a monetary reward legally recoverable by the carrier under a contract express or implied by the mere act of entering the vehicle. An employee who regularly carries fellow – employee to work in his car with the understood expectation of some compensation is carrying them for “hire or reward” (Albert v. Motor Insurers’ Bureau. 1972 A. C. 301. It was held in (Bonham v. Zurich General Accident and liability Insurance Co. 1945 K. B. 292., that passengers who are regularly carried in a private motor car by the assured for voluntary payments are carried for ‘hire or reward’.
16. With this background of the concept of ‘hire’ or ‘reward,’ the subsidiary contention urged by the learned Advocate General that vehicles of the G. T. S. are not given out for ‘hire or reward’ can be straightway dismissed. The material on record, consisting of the Government Resolutions, Departmental Circulars, the affidavit in reply filed by the Petitioner and the evidence on record, makes it abundantly clear that the vehicles of the G. T. S. are given out against payment, that regular bills are raised in respect of charges, which are even described ‘hire charges’, though in the case of V. V. I. Ps., V. I. Ps and State Guests, such charges are actually paid by the concerned Department of the State Government. In other cases, where charges are not borne by the State Government, the hire charges are paid by the person using the vehicle. In these circumstances, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned Advocate General that there is no element of ‘hire’ or ‘reward’ for the use of the vehicles of the G. T. S.
17. It would thus be seen that the G. T. S. is an Undertaking, meaning thereby a Special Service Department, set up and established by the Government of Maharashtra, for the purpose of catering to the transportation needs, albeit of a restricted class of persons. That this is the only work carried out by the G. T. S. day in and day out, is also proved by the material on record. The G. T. S., therefore, can be said to be engaged in carrying passengers by road, for hire or reward. We are not concerned with the inclusive portion of the definition in Section 2(g), which talks of private carriers, though, later on, for a different purpose, I shall have occasion to focus attention on this portion of the definition. The evidence on record clearly shows that the G. T. S. answers all the requirements of a ‘Motor Transport Undertaking’ within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the M. T. W. Act.
18. The principal thrust of the argument of the learned Advocate General had been that the scheme of the M. T. W. Act, particularly the scheme of the Rules made hereunder, indicates that the M. T. W. Act and the Rules thereunder were intended to apply only to an entity carrying on the business of transportation or transport of passengers or goods for hire or reward and not to the Government. He contends that it is permissible to interpret the statute by reference to the rules framed thereunder, on the principle of ‘contemporanea expositio’ accepted as a legitimate principle of interpretation of statutes by English Courts as well our Supreme Court. He, therefore, invited my attention to Rule 4 of the Maharashtra Transport Workers Rules, 1962, and pointed out that under Rule 4 every employer of a Motor Transport Undertaking covered by the Act is required to make an application for registration to the Chief Inspector in Form No. 1. Adverting to the contents of Form No. 1, the learned-Advocate General particularly high-lighted Items 4 and 5. Item 4 refers to ‘Total number of routes’ and Item 5 refers to ‘Total route mileage’. He contended that in the case of G. T. S. whose vehicles are used by V. V. I. Ps., V. I. Ps., High Officers of the State and Guests, there cannot be any stipulated ‘routes’ or ‘route mileage’ indicated at the time of registration. According to him the very requirements of Items 4 and 5 of Form No. 1 demonstrate sufficiently that registration is required only of an entity which would be in a position to comply with the said requirements.
19. The learned Advocate General also contends that a careful analysis of Sections 2(g) and 2(b) of the M. T. W. Act would indicate that the element of ‘public service’ is a necessary ingredient of the concept of ‘Motor Transport Undertaking’ and, hence, for applicability of the Act. He invited my attention to the definition of the expression ‘transport vehicle’ in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and the definition of the expression ‘Motor Transport Worker’ in Section 2(h) of the M. T. W. Act. Section 2(33) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, defines a ‘transport vehicle’ to mean “public service vehicle” or “goods vehicle”. Section 2(25) of the said Act defines ‘public service vehicle’ to mean “any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage, and stage carriage”. The expression ‘motor car’ is defined in Section 2(15) to mean “any motor vehicle constructed, adapted or used to carry not more than six passengers excluding the driver, for hire or reward”.’Motor car’ is defined in Section 2(16) to mean “any motor vehicle other than a transport vehicle, omnibus, road-roller, tractor, motor cycle or invalid carriage”. The expression, ‘route’ is also defined in Section 2(28-A) to mean “a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between the terminus and another.” A conjoint reading of these sections, in the submission of the learned Advocate General, indicates that the element of ‘public service’ is a necessary ingredient which must be impliedly read into the provisions of Section 2(g) and Section 2(h) of the M. T. W. Act.
20. It is not possible to accept this contention for more than one reason. In the first place, the rule of interpretation of a statute by resorting to the principle of contemporanea expositio, though acted upon in certain cases by the Supreme Court in our country, has been held to be a rule which must be confined within narrow compass and applied with strict care and caution. It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that, where the words used in the statute are clear and admit of no ambiguity, it would be erroneous to construe them by resorting to the principles of contemporanea expositio. Even if it be true that persons who dealt with the statute understood its provisions in a restricted sense, such mistaken construction of the statute did not bind the Court so as to prevent it from giving it its true construction. As pointed out in M/s. Traders and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. , even in England doubt has been expressed whether the principle of contemporanea expositio, if at all, could be applicable to a modern statute. (See in this connection the observations of Lord Blackburn in The Trustees of the Clyde Navigation v. Laird and Sons 1883 8 AC 658, 670, as quoted in National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay , in Senior Inspector and Ors. v. Laxminarayan Chopra and Anr. , the Supreme Court refused to apply the principle of contemporanea expositio to the word telegraph line in Section 34(2) (b) of the Electricity Act, 1910, and in Raja Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, , the Supreme Court refused to apply the principle of contemporanea expositio to Section 25 of the Evidence Act.
21. Though, in some of the cases, the Supreme Court has accepted ‘contemporanea expositio’ as a principle which can be legitimately called in aid in the construction of the statute, I am of the view that in the instant case the language used by the M. T. W. Act is explicit and leads to no ambiguity. When the statute is clear and admits of no ambiguity, it must be applied by the Courts, there being no occasion for an exercise in construction of statute by resorting to any of the known principles. In my judgment, it would be erroneous to construe the provisions of Section 2(g) and Section 2(h) of the M. T. W. Act in the light of Rule 4 read with Form No. 1 of the Maharashtra Motor Transport Workers’ Rules, by relying on the principle of contemporanea expositio.
22. Even if it would be assumed that it is possible to invoke the principles of ‘contemporanea expositio’ in my view, there is sufficient internal evidence in the statute to exclude the operation of the said principle.
I may here usefully refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Municipal Council, Raipur and Ors. v. the State of Madhya Pradesh. (1970-II-LLJ-40) (SC). In this case, the Municipal Council was using certain vehicles owned by it for 1-7 transporting night soil and refuge of the town free of charges. It failed to register itself as a Motor Transport Undertaking under the Act. There was a prosecution filed against it. The Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that the Act was not applicable to the activity of the Municipal Council. A revision filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh before the Sessions Judge, Raipur was dismissed. In the further revision under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, the High Court held that the Municipal Council was a ‘Motor Transport Undertaking’ liable to register under the Act. In the appeal before the Supreme Court, it was firstly contended that the Municipal Council did not carry out any activity which would make it amenable to Section 2(g) of the M. T. W. Act and secondly, that if it was liable to be covered by the said even definition, its activity was exempt under Section 38 of the Act. The Supreme Court pointed out that ‘private carrier’ falls within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the M. T. W. Act, by virtue of the inclusive clause that a private carrier is defined in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to mean an owner of a motor transport vehicle other than a public carrier who uses that vehicle solely for the carriage of goods which are his property or the carriage of which is necessary for the purpose of his business, not being a business of providing transport” and, therefore, the Raipur Municipal Council squarely fell within the definition of ‘private carrier’ as the Municipal Council owned transport vehicles and used them solely for carriage of the goods which were necessary for its business. Another contention raised before the Supreme Court was that the definition of the expression ‘Motor Transport Undertaking’ in Section 2(g) of the Act indicated that it was only an undertaking of a commercial nature which was intended to be included within the definition of ‘Motor Transport Undertaking’ and that inasmuch as the Municipal Council was not carrying on any business or commercial activity, but was carrying on statutory obligations imposed upon it, the Municipal Council could not be held to be an undertaking covered by the definition. Emphatically rejecting all contentions, the Supreme Court observed at Page 42.
“We are unable to accept this contention. First the Act provides for the welfare of motor transport workers and regulates the conditions of their work. Such beneficial Acts are not, as a rule, construed strictly. Secondly, the words of the definition are plain and not susceptible of any reasonable limitation. It seems to us that by using the word “Includes” the legislature undoubtedly intended to enlarge the meaning of the expression “motor transport undertaking”. The words “private carrier” have been given a specific meaning in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and it is difficult to limit this specific meaning on any reasonable basis. Further Section 38 of the Act, which exempts certain transport vehicles, also proceeds on the basis that a private carrier who is carrying on activities which are not commercial would be included within the expression “motor transport undertaking”.
23. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the words used in the definition are plain, unambiguous and not susceptible of any reasonable limitation. It is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Advocate General that an element of public service or commercial venture must be read as an inbuilt limitation in the definition. I am unable to accept the contention that by resort to the principle of ‘contemporanea expositio’ the ambit of the definitions and expression ‘motor transport undertaking’ in Section 2(g) or the ‘motor transport worker’ in Section 2(h) of the M. T. W. Act must be so read as to exclude the petitioners. In my view, it would be sufficient compliance with Rule 4 in Form No. 1, if it is complied with mutatis mutandis or where applicable. I put it to the learned Advocate General, and he did not dispute, that a private taxi operator carrying on business on a commercial basis would also be covered by the provisions of the M. T. W. Act. In such a case, it would be virtually impossible for him, at the time of registration, to give the information required by Items 4 and 5 of Forum No. 1 (‘Total number of routes’ and ‘total route mileage’ respectively). Merely because such an operator is unable to give information at the time of Registration on these two items, it is not possible to infer that the Act would not apply to him. Similarly, merely because the G. T. S. is unable to give information on Items 4 and 5 prescribed in Form I under Rules 4 and 8 at the time of Registration, it is not possible to infer that the provisions of the M. T. W. Act were not intended to apply to the G. T. S. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the words used in the Statute in Section 2(g) are plain and unambiguous and see no reason to resort to the principle of ‘contemporanea expositio’ to interpret the plain and unambiguous words used by Parliament in Section 2(g) and Section 2(h) of the M. T. W. Act.
24. The contention urged by the learned Advocate General is also met by the answer given by the Supreme Court in Municipal Council Raipur’ case (supra), emphasising the provisions of Section 38 of the Act. Section 38 of the Act provides for exemption from the Act and says :
“38. Exemption. – (1) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to or in relation to any transport vehicle –
(i) used for the transport of sick or injured persons;
(ii) used for any purpose connected with the Security of India, or the Security of a State, or the maintenance of public order.
(2) ……”
If a commercial enterprise runs the business of hiring out vehicles to transport sick or injured person, or vehicles used for any purpose of security of India, or security of State, or the maintenance of public order, but for the exemption under Section 38 of the M. T. W. Act, it would be covered by the M. T. W. Act. By a legislative policy, the Parliament has declared that nothing in the Act would apply to the activities falling within the two clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 38. Exemption granted of this nature is indicative of the fact that, but for the exemption, the statute would have applied. (See in this connection the judgment of this Court in Khadi and Village Industries’ Commission, Bombay v. B. Satyanaryana. 1985 I CLR 211. That is why the Supreme Court is at pains to point out in paragraph 8 in the judgment in Municipal Council Raipur, (supra) that the scheme of Section 38 also proceeds on the basis that a private carrier carrying on activities would be governed by the expression “Motor Transport Undertaking”. It is, therefore, unnecessary to look for an element of commercial activity for service to the public at large, for coverage under Section 2(g) and 2(h) of the M. T. W. Act, in view of the plain and unambiguous words used in these sections.
25. The learned Advocate General referred to a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court in Mohammed Zafrul Islam v. Birendra Lall (1964-II-LLJ-584) (Bom), in support of his contention. In that case a contention was raised that the motor service maintained by the Post and Telegraph Department was amenable to the M. T. W. Act, as it was a “Private carrier”. It was contended that the vehicles belonging to the Post and Telegraph Department were used for the carriage of goods which were necessary for the purpose of the Department’s business, which was business other than transport business. While rejecting this contention, the Learned Single Judge observed : Page 587
“Now it appears to me that any activity, which is not connected with the main idea of ‘making profits or gains’, cannot be described as “business”. The question, therefore, that arises and will have to be considered is as to whether the Posts and Telegraph Department is maintained for the purposes of making profits and gains, is it maintained as and by way of commercial activity with intent to make profits, or is it, in the alternative, only maintained as a department of revenue with purpose to discharge functions of public utility”.
26. By taking view that the Post and Telegraph Department was not running as a commercial activity with a view to profits or gains, the learned Judge of this Court held that it was not carrying on a business and, therefore, would not fall within the definition of ‘Motor Transport Undertaking’ used in Section 2(g) of the M. T. W. Act as it did not fall within the definition of ‘Private Carrier’ in Section 2(22) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. In view of the subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Council Raipur, (supra) and also the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bangalore water Supply and Sewerage Board, etc. v. R. Rajappa and Ors. (1978-I-LLJ-349). It is doubtful if it can be successfully contended now that an element of commercial trading or gain or profit is a sine qua non of business. The concepts have changed with time. The Supreme Court in Rajappa’s case (supra) was at pains to indicate the unmitigated amplitude of the concept of ‘industry’ defined in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, also in terms of ‘business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of employers’. In Rajappa’s case (supra), after having noticed all extant judgments on the subject, the Supreme Court formulated the test for application of the definition of ‘industry’. After laying down the guidelines, the Court administered a stern caveat in the following words : Page 404
“III. Application of these guidelines should not stop short of their logical reach by invocation of creeds, cults or inner sense of incongruity or other sense of motivation for or resultant of the economic operations. The ideology of the Act being Industrial peace, regulation and resolution of industrial disputes between employer and workmen, the range of this statutory ideology must inform the reach of the statutory definition. Nothing less, nothing more”.
27. In my considered view, the caveat administered by the Supreme Court in Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act in Rajappa’s case in apposite to the case on hand which is also the case of interpretation of a beneficial social welfare legislation. In my opinion, the observations in Rojappa (Supra) and Municipal Council Raipur (Supra), render it difficult to whittle down the sweep of the definition in Section 2(g) and 2(h) of the M. T. W. Act.
28. To sum up, I am of the view that the G. T. S. is engaged in carrying of passengers by road for hire or reward, within the meaning of Section 2(g) of the M. T. W. Act and is, therefore, a ‘Motor Transport Undertaking’ as defined in that section. I am also of the view that the Respondents Drivers working in the G. T. S. are ‘Motor Transport Workers’ within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the said Act. Notwithstanding its failure to register under that Act. I am of the view that the G. T. S. is liable to get itself registered under that Act and also liable to implement all the provisions thereof. The learned Judge of the Labour Court was fully justified in holding that the petitioners were covered by the provisions of the M. T. W. Act and that the respondents were entitled to claim over-time payments under the provisions of the M. T. W. Act. The actual calculations of the differences payable to the Respondents have not only not been disputed, but by a purshis filed before the Labour Court the petitioners admitted the calculations to be correct. In these circumstances, I find that the learned Judge of the Labour Court was justified in directing the petitioners to make payments to the Respondents as done in the impugned order.
29. I see no merit in the petition which deserves to be and is hereby dismissed. Rule discharged with no order as to costs.
30. The learned Additional Government Pleader requests that the interim order in terms of prayer (b) granted in the Writ Petition be continued upto July 15, 1995, because the Government needs time to take a decision as to whether the provisions of the Act are to be implemented or whether this judgment needs to be appealed against. In either case, he submits that Government machinery being what it is, a minimum period of three months would be required. Prayer allowed. The interim order in terms of prayer (b) shall continue for a period of three months from today.
It is, however, made clear that atleast two weeks advance notice shall be served upon the Advocate on record for the respondents, in case any appeal is carried by the petitioners against this judgment.
