JUDGMENT
Jawahar Lal Gupta, J.
1. This appeal under clause X of the Letters Patent is directed against the orders dated June 3, 1992 and September 14, 1992 passed by the learned single Judge in a petition under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act. A few facts may be noticed.
2. Balwant Singh, an Assistant Sub Inspector of Police was prematurely retired vide order dated September 12, 1987. This order was passed in exercise of the powers under Rule 3(1)(a) of the Punjab Civil Services (Premature Retirement) Rules, 1975. He had challenged this order through Civil Writ Petition No. 8360 of 1988. Vide judgment dated February 16, 1990, a learned single Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition on the ground that the order of compulsory retirement was without jurisdiction. Even the order passed on the representation of the official was quashed. It was directed that the “the petitioner should be reinstated within one month from today. The petitioner will be entitled to all consequential benefits including arrears of pay and allowances, seniority and promotion. He will also be entitled to interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum on the arrears of pay and allowances etc …..”
3. In pursuance of the aforesaid directions, the official was reinstated. He was paid the arrears etc. Still further, he was confirmed as an Assistant Sub Inspector with effect from July 1, 1989 and promoted as Sub Inspector w.e.f. July 12, 1989. However, Balwant Singh approached this court through a petition under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act in August 1991 complaining that the respondents had wilfully disobeyed the order. Notice of this contempt petition was given to the present appellants. Two written statements were filed. It was inter alia pointed out that Balwant Singh was involved in a corruption case. FIR No. 155 dated July 11, 1990 had been recorded against him. It was further alleged that he had committed offences under Section 13(2) read with section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. He was accused of having accepted illegal gratification from Buta Singh while posed at a police post in District Gurdaspur. The case was pending in the court of Additional Judge, Gurdaspur. Still further, in the reply filed by Mr. GIS Bhullar, the Deputy Inspector General of Police, it was pointed out that the petitioner had a chequered record of service. He had been awarded different penalties at different intervals of time. Adverse remarks had been recorded in his confidential reports for the years 1982-83 and 1986-87. Adverse comments regarding the petitioner’s integrity had been made in the report for the year 1990. It was pointed out that the petitioner’s claim for confirmation as an Assistant Sub Inspector w.e.f. January 1, 1987 was considered along with that of the other Assistant Sub Inspectors. He was, however, ignored due to bad record of service. Similarly, his case for promotion to the rank of Sub Inspector was also considered. He was found fit for confirmation w.e.f July 1, 1989 and for promotion as Sub Inspector w.e.f. July 12, 1989. After explaining the factual position, it was submitted that there was no wilful disobedience of the orders which may call for the imposition of any penalty.
4. It appears that this contempt petition had come up for hearing before the learned single Judge who has decided the writ petition (K. P. Bhandari, J.) on June 3, 1992. An order was passed in which it was inter alia observed as under :-
“The learned State Counsel was asked to give reasons why the petitioner was given notional date of confirmation from 1-7-1989. He submitted that this date had been fixed because a person junior to the petitioner was confirmed from this date. The petitioner submits that he is already working as Assistant Sub Inspector and if his performance as Assistant Sub Inspector is satisfactory during the whole year he should be confirmed from the due date. He further submits that a person junior to him has been confirmed from a particular date is not a ground to deny him the proper date of confirmation. As there is nothing adverse in the service record of the petitioner during the whole of the year 1987 his date of confirmation cannot be linked to the date of confirmation of a person junior to him. Such a linking would be utterly arbitrary, unreasonable and irrational. The date of confirmation of the petitioner should be 1-1-1987 as during the whole of the year there is no adverse entry against him. Giving notional date of confirmation from 1-7-1989 is hardly a compliance of the order of this Court dated 16-2-1990 whereby it was directed that petitioner should be granted all consequential benefits. In my opinion, the petitioner should be given due date of confirmation. He should be deemed to be confirmed with effect from 1-1-1987. After giving this date of confirmation as Assistant Sub Inspector, the petitioner should be considered for promotion/confirmation as Sub Inspector.”
5. A perusal of the above order would show that the learned single Judge was pleased to declare that Balwant Singh should be deemed to have been confirmed w.e.f. January 1, 1987 as an Assistant Sub Inspector and that his claim for further promotion and confirmation should be consider on this basis. The result was that the official was granted seniority over persons who were not even parties in the case. Directions for the issue of orders regarding retrospective confirmation and furthers promotion etc. were given without even hearing the persons whose interests were likely to be adversely affected. It appears that the matter was again listed before his Lordship on September 14, 1992. On that date, it was adjourned to October 30, 1992 with a direction to the Deputy Inspector General of Police “to personally look into the matter and see that the order dated 3-6-1992 is complied with within three weeks”.
6. Aggrieved by the orders dated June 3, 1992 and September 14, 1992, the respondents in the contempt petition have filed the present Letters Patent Appeal. It has been contended on behalf of the appellants that the directions given by the learned Judge while deciding CWP No. 8360 of 1988 had been fully complied with. The benefits which were not even warranted by the respondent’s record of service had been given to him. The learned single Judge did not find that the directions had not been complied with. Yet, his Lordship had given directions for retrospective confirmation and promotion of the respondent. This was beyond the scope of the petition and wholly unwarranted by the circumstances of the case.
7. The petition filed by the respondent under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act is on record. A perusal of this petition shows that even the respondent had not made a claim for confirmation as an Assistant Sub Inspector w.e.f. January 1, 1987. Equally, he has not even made a claim for promotion as a Sub Inspector with effect from any particular date. Still further, if the petitioner had any particular claim for confirmation with effect from a specific date or if he was not satisfied with the orders passed by the authorities in pursuance of the directions of the Court, his only remedy was to challenged the orders in appropriate proceedings by impleading necessary parties. He was not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and to claim those reliefs by merely filling an additional affidavit at a subsequent stage. Still further, the implementation of the directions given by the learned Judge was bound to affect the rights of the persons who were not even parties before the Court. Thus, instead to doing justice, the order would have resulted in causing injustice to persons who had no chance of making their submissions.
8. Taking the totality of circumstances into consideration it is clear that the appellants had implemented the directions given in the judgment dated February 16, 1990. They were not guilty of any contempt. Still further, the directions given by the learned Judge were beyond the scope of controversy which fell for consideration in the contempt proceedings. These directions would have operated prejudicially to the interests of persons who were not even before the Court. Happily, such a situation was avoided by the interim directions for the stay of these orders given by the Motion Bench on October 30, 1992. The directions given by the learned single Judge were wholly untenable and are, consequently, set aside.
9. The appeal is allowed. The impugned orders passed on June 3, 1992 and September 14, 1992 are set aside. In view of our conclusion, we find no ground to continue with the contempt proceedings and dismiss the petition. In the circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.