ORDER
Sadashiva, J
1. This Petition is listed for admission after notice to the respondents; With the consent of the learned Counsel appearing on both the sides, the Petition is heard on merits and disposed of by this Order.
2. The petitioner in Election Misc.6/94 on the file of the learned Munsiff, at Mulbagal is the Revision petitioner in this Petition. This Revision is directed against the order dated 7-6-1994 passed by the learned Munsiff, Mulbagal dismissing the Election Petition under Section 17 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993 (for short ‘the Act’) for non-compliance with Sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act. The learned Munsiff dismissed the Election Petition as not maintainable on the ground that the election petitioner has failed to attest the copies of the Election Petition as true copy of the Petition.
3. Sri G. Papireddy, the learned Counsel appearing for respondents 3 to 5 in addition to objections on merits, has raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the Revision Petition. He contends that by virtue of Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act, the decision of the Munsiff being made final, no Revision lies to this Court under Section 115 C.P.C; the only course open to the aggrieved party is to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, and not under the Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC. In this context, he relies on the Decision of this Court in HALAPPA v. THE RETURNING OFFICER AND ANR. 1987 (3) KLJ 580. Para-6 of the said Decision reads as follows:-
“In my opinion, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in M.M. YARAGATTI v. VASANT is a complete answer to the objection raised by the [earned counsel for respondent No. 2. The ratio of the said decision is that in cases where under the provisions of a special enactment a special forum is created for deciding disputes arising under such enactment and the provisions of the Act further provides that decision rendered by such a court is final, no revision under Section 115 of the C.P.C. lies to the High Court, even if the special forum happens to be a court subordinate to the High Court. From this it follows that a party aggrieved by the decision rendered by a Court subordinate to the High Court in exercise of the special jurisdiction conferred on it under such law would be entitled to involve the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is the position here. An order made by a Munsiff in an election petition presented under Section 14 of the Act is made final by Section 19 of the Act. The said section reads:
’19(2). The decision of the Munsiff shall be final.’
In view of the above provision, which gives finality to the decision of the Munsiff rendered under Section 14 of the Act, it is only the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution that could be invoked and not its ordinary jurisdiction under Section 115 of the C.P.C. For the above reasons, I answer the first question in the negative, and reject the contention of the learned counsel for respondent-2 that the writ petition should not be entertained.”
4. Admittedly the aforesaid Decision was rendered following the Judgment of the Full Bench of this Court pronounced in M.M. YARAGATTI v. VASANT . The Decision of the Full Bench came to be overruled by Supreme Court, by necessary implication in upholding the earlier Judgment of another Full Bench of this Court, in KRISHNAJI VENKATESH SHIRODKAR v. GURUPAD SHIVRAM KAVALEKAR AND ORS. ILR (Karnataka) 1978(2) 1585. The Supreme Court in SHYMARAJU HEGDE v. VENKATESHA BHAT AND ORS . has quoted with approval, the Judgment of this Court in Krishnaji’s case, and the same reads as under:
“Para-2: The short question for consideration in this appeal is as to whether a revision application is maintainable under Section 115, Civil P.C. read with Section 50(1) Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 when a District Judge has made an order in his Revisional jurisdiction under Section 50(2) of the Act This very question had come up for consideration before a Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Krishnaji Venkatesh Shirodkar v. Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar, ILR (1978) 2 Kant. 1585. Venkataramiah, J., as he then was, speaking for the Full Bench held :-
“The second point for consideration is whether the declaration made in Section 50(2) that the order of the District Judge shall be final takes away the jurisdiction of this Court to exercise its powers of revision under Section 115 CPC. A doubt about the above question arose in view of some observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in Diwakar Hegde v. Karkala Taluk Agriculture Produce Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd., (1975) 2 Kant LJ 390 to the effect that when a statute declares that the decision of an authority shall be final, it cannot be questioned either in appeal or revision under the statute. The doubt however stands resolved by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chhagan Lal v. The Municipal Corporation, Indore, . In that case Section 149, Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 which provided that the decision of the District Court in an appeal filed against an order of the Municipal Commissioner was final came up for consideration. Rejecting the contention that the said provision debarred the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 CPC over the order of the District Court passed in appeal, the Supreme Court observed (at p. 1558) –
The second contention is based on Section 149, Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. It provides that an appeal shall lie from the decision of the Municipal Commissioner to the District Court when any dispute arises as to the liability of any land or building to assessment. Sub-section (1) of Section 149 provides that the decision of the District Court shall be final. It was submitted that the decision of the District Court was therefore final and that the High Court was in error in entertaining a revision petition. This plea cannot be accepted for under Section 115 of the CPC the High Court has got power to revise the order passed by Courts subordinate to it. It cannot be disputed that the District Court is a subordinate Court and is liable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court……….’.
The Full Bench also relied upon a brief Decision of this Court in Krishnadas Bhatija v. A.S. Venkatachala Shetty (dead) by LRs. (Special Leave Petn.No. 913 of 1978 dated 13th of February, 1978) where referring to the very provision, this Court observed :-
“The petitioner contends that the order of the High Court is without jurisdiction because under Section 50 Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961, a revision does not lie to the High Court. We do not agree. Section 115, CPC gives powers to the High Court to revise any order from the District Court, subject of course to the limitations set out therein. The narrow point then is as to whether the District Judge can be equated with a District Court, The High Court, following its own earlier decisions, has held so.
We agree that in the scheme of Karnataka Rent Control Act, the District Judge and the District Court are interchangeable expressions and nothing turns on the mere fact that the section uses the expression ‘District Judge’. Section 115, CPC therefore applies and the revisional jurisdiction is vested in the High Court.”
“In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court it has to be held that the fact that the order of the District Judge under Section 50(2) is made final does not affect the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 CPC to revise the orders of the District Judge made under Section 50(2) in the absence of any express words in the statute taking away such jurisdiction.”
5. In view of the aforesaid pronouncement, that the expressions ‘District Court’ and ‘District Judge’ being interchangeable expressions, the Munsiff can be equated with the Munsiff Court and the learned Munsiff being subordinate to this Court, the decision of the learned Munsiff in the Election Petition is revisable by this Court under Section 115 of C.P.C. The preliminary objection of respondents 3 to 5 is therefore, hereby rejected.
6. Sri G. Papireddy, the learned Counsel for respondents 3 to 5 next submits that the order under Revision is in accordance with Section 17(1) of the Act, which provides for dismissal of the Election Petition for non-compliance with Section 15 of the Act. It is the contention of the respondents that the Election Petitioner is responsible for the allegations made in the Election Petition and in order to make him responsible, it is necessary that he shall verify the pleadings and attest the copies of the Petition as true copies of the Petition as prescribed by Sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act and for non-compliance with the said provision, the Munsiff shall dismiss the Election Petition and therefore this Revision Petition is liable to be rejected.
7. Section 19 of the Act provides for the grounds for declaring the election of the elected candidate void by the Munsiff to the Election Petition. Sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act is not one of the grounds for which the election could be declared to be void. However, Section 17 of the Act which deals with the trial of Election Petition provides for dismissal of the Petition for non-compliance with Section 15 of the Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act reads as follows:
“Section 17(1): The Munsiff shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 15.
Explanation: An order of the Munsiff dismissing an election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 18″.
Sub-section (3) of Section 15 of the Act, which is the relevant provision for the purpose of this case reads as follows:
“15(1) xxx xxx xxx
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(a) and (b) xxx xxx xxx
(3): Every Election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the revision and every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.
EXPLANATION – The expression “returned candidate” means a candidate who has been declared as duly elected”.
From the aforesaid provision it is necessary that the Election petitioner shall produce as many copies of the Petition as there are respondents along with the Election Petition and each of such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his signature to be true copy of the Petition.
The object is to make the petitioner responsible for any inaccuracies between the original and the copy and to prevent the supply of incorrect copies. It is also to make the petitioner responsible for all the allegations made therein. However, no particular form of attestation is prescribed. The attestation to the effect that it is the true copy of the Petition under the signature of the petitioner. Can it be said that the attestation is incomplete if it does not contain anything but the signature of the petitioner. If by the signature of the petitioner at the foot of each of the copy is attested, I think, the object of the provision would be achieved, and the absence of any other statement, would not render the Petition liable for dismissal on that score alone. The Courts must see whether any substantial injury would be caused to the other party or whether the petitioner is guilty of suppression of facts.
8. IN F.A. SAPA AND ORS. v. SINGORA AND ORS . and other connected matters, the Supreme Court dealing with the interpretation and application of Sections 83 & 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 has held as follows :
“Para 31- The next objection raised by the appellants is that the copy of the petition served on each one of them is not attested to be a true copy of the original petition as required by Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act and Rule 1 of the Rules. Each copy is attested as ‘certified true copy’ and the petitioner has put his signature thereunder. This, contend the appellants, is not in conformity with Section 81(3) and, therefore, it is obvious that the mandatory requirements of Section 81(3) read with Section 86(1) is not satisfied. On a plain reading of Section 81(3) it becomes clear that the requirement of that provision is: (i) the election petition should be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition, and (ii) every such copy shall be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. There is no dispute in regard to the compliance of the first part. So far as the second part is concerned, all that the section requires is that the copy should be attested by the petitioner to be a true copy of the petition under his own signature. The requirement of this part of the provision is met by each copy having been signed at the foot thereof by the concerned petitioner. What is essential is that the petitioner must take the responsibility of the copy being a true copy of the original petition and sign in token thereof. No particular form of attestation is prescribed; all that the sub-section enjoins is that the petitioner must attest the copy under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition. By certifying the same as true copy and by putting his signature at the foot thereof, the petitioner of each election petition had clearly complied with the letter and spirit of Section 81(3) of the R.P, Act, In fact in Ch. Subba Rao v. Member, E.T. Hyderabad , which was followed in Kamalm’s case (supra) this Court had accepted the mere signature without the words like true copy, sufficient attestation under Section 81(3) of the R.P. Act. We are, therefore, in agreement with the finding recorded in this behalf by the High Court.”
9. Even though this Decision was brought to the notice of the learned Munsiff, the learned Munsiff still proceeded to dismiss the Election Petition on the ground that Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Act provides for dismissal of the Election Petition for non-compliance with Section 15 of the Act. The learned Munsiff appeared to have come to this conclusion that, Section 17(1) of the Act specifically provides for dismissal of the Petition for non-compliance with Section 15(3) of the Act, whereas Section 86(1) of the R.P. Act does not include non-compliance with Section 83 of the said Act, as one of the grounds for dismissal of the Election Petition, as has been observed by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Decision. The learned Munsiff has obviously failed to read the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the point as to what constitutes the compliance with the requirement of Section 83 of the R.P. Act, and thus failed to apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in its proper perspective.
10. That, Section 15(3) of the Act, applying the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Decision, has been complied with, as each copy of the petition having been signed at the foot thereof by the petitioner. It is relevant to note that the Supreme Court has held that:
“So far as the second part is concerned, all that the Section requires is that the copy should be attested by the petitioner to be a true copy of the petition under his own signature. The requirement of this part of the provision is met by each copy having been signed at the foot thereof by the concerned petitioner. What is essential is that the petitioner must take the responsibility of the copy being a true copy of the original petition and signed in token thereon. No particular form of attestation is prescribed.”
It is admitted that the petitioner to the Election Petition has signed at foot of each page of the Petition and no inaccuracies are found from between the original and the copy.
11. In view of the categorical pronouncement of the Supreme Court, the order made by the Learned Munsiff in respect of an analogous provision under the Act is unsustainable in law and it is liable to be set aside.
12. Accordingly, this Revision Petition is allowed. The order dated 7-6-1994 passed by the learned Munsiff; Mulbagal in Election Misc.No. 6/1994 is set aside. The Election Misc.No. 6/94 is restored to file. The Learned Munsiff is directed to hear and dispose of the Election Petition in accordance with law. The parties are directed to appear before the Learned Munsiff on 15-9-1994 to take further date of hearing.