JUDGMENT
C.K. Thakker, CJ.
1. All these petitions have been placed before us, as a substantial question of law affecting jurisdiction of the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal (‘Administrative Tribunal’ for short), has been raised therein. It is the contention of the State/ Authorities/ employers that the Administrative Tribunal has no power, authority or jurisdiction to entertain petitions/applications claiming reliefs under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ID Act’ or any other corresponding law for the time being in force and the Administrative Tribunal can exercise power, authority or jurisdiction only under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the AT Act’). All the orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal by invoking the provisions of the ID Act or under the corresponding law for the time being in force in favour of the petitioners were, therefore, illegal, unlawful and without jurisdiction.
2. To appreciate the controversy in the proper perspective, relevant facts of C.W.P. No. 371 of 1999 titled Himachal Pradesh Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. Raj Kumar, son of Kamal Singh and Anr., may now be stated.
3. Respondent No. 1 Raj Kumar (hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiff) filed a suit in the Court of senior Sub-judge, Una on May 4, 1982 for a declaration that an order terminating his services passed by the Himachal Pradesh Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. and others (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendants’) on June 26, 1980 was illegal, contrary to law and liable to be set aside. It was registered as Civil Suit No. 128 of 1982. It was the case of the plaintiff that he was appointed as a Tractor Operator by the Managing Director, (defendant No. 2) of the Corporation (defendant No. 1) on September 26, 1973. He reported for duty on October 10, 1973 at Paonta Sahib. He was transferred to Nalagarh and then to Amb. The Divsional Manager, Himachal Pradesh Agro Industries Corporation Ltd.,
Amb (defendant No. 3) served a notice dated July 24, 1979 on the plaintiff, inter alia, stating therein that the services were no more required and by an order dated June 26, 1980, the services of the plaintiff were terminated on the ground that he was surplus. It was contended by the plaintiff that the termination was illegal, but the defendants did nothing. It was also his case that the action was taken as a measure of penalty and punishment without conducting enquiry and affording opportunity of hearing. It was, therefore, illegal, mala fide and violative of principles of natural justice. The plaintiff served a notice upon the defendants and then filed a suit.
4. The defendants filed a written statement taking objections preliminary as well as on merits. It was contended that no cause of action accrued in favour of the plaintiff; the termination of services of the plaintiff was valid; and he had no right to seek reinstatement. The suit had not been properly valued and the Court had no jurisdiction to try it. On merits, it was submitted by the defendants that the plaintiff was a temporary employee and he had no right over the post. His services, therefore, could be terminated at any time. The action of the defendants was, thus, legal and valid and; suit was liable to be dismissed.
5. In replication, the plaintiff reiterated what was stated in the plaint and prayed for the reliefs of reinstatement and consequential benefits.
6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed necessary issues. By a judgment and order dated June 10, 1985, the Court held that there was a dispute between an employer and employee, which was covered by the ID Act and Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. It also observed that the plaintiff had resorted to a remedy under the ID Act by applying to the Labour Department, Una for appropriate relief and it was not open to him to choose both the forums i. e. Labour forum as well as Civil Court simultaneously. The plaint was, therefore, ordered to be returned with the direction to the plaintiff to
pursue his case before the Conciliation Officer. For arriving at the said decision, the trial Court relied upon a leading decision of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shanta Ram Wadke and Ors., AIR 1975 SC 2238 : 1976(1) SCC 486 : 1975-II-LLJ-445.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Una. Meanwhile, the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal came to be established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (AT Act). The learned Judge, therefore, submitted papers of appeal to the Registrar of this Court on September 12, 1986. This Court, vide an order dated March 11, 1988 in CMP(M) No. 255 of 1987 transferred the appeal to the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal (Administrative Tribunal). The transferred appeal was registered by the Administrative Tribunal as TA No. 15 of 1988. The Administrative Tribunal decided the case on July 15, 1999 holding termination of the services of the plaintiff treating him as surplus bad and against the provisions of law. It was also violative of the principles of “last come first go” and since juniors to the plaintiff had been retained in service, the action was illegal, observed the Administrative Tribunal. It was contended on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff had selected Labour Forum and had approached Conciliation Officer for redressal of his grievances and the proceedings were, therefore, barred on that ground. The Administrative Tribunal however, noted that there was no record in the office of the Conciliation Officer, Una pertaining to the plaintiff. In view of the said fact, observed the Tribunal, “this Forum definitely cannot be said to be (sic) without jurisdiction in disposing of the present application”, and granted the relief to the applicant, as prayed in the plaint.
8. Being aggrieved by the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal, the defendants have approached this Court by filing the present petition. On September 27, 1999, the petition was admitted [Coram, RAJU CJ (as he then was) and L.S. PANTA, J] CMP No. 691 of 1999 was also placed along with the main matter. After hearing Mr. Kuldip Singh for the petitioner and Mr. K.D. Shreedhar for caveator/ respondent No. 1 (Original plaintiff), the Court observed, that as stated by Mr. Shreedhar, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 plaintiff, the respondent/plaintiff had already joined in, pursuance of the order passed by the Tribunal. The Court, therefore, observed that operation and execution of the order passed by the Tribunal could be stayed only in respect of reliefs other than reinstatement. C.M.P. was accordingly disposed of.
9. Thereafter, several such matters came to be admitted and all those matters were ordered to be heard along with CWP No. 371 of 1999.
10. We have heard Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned senior Advocate, instructed by Mr. Bimal Gupta, learned Advocate for the Corporation as also Mr. Sanjay Karol, learned Advocate General, instructed by Mr. M.L. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the State of Himachal Pradesh. We have also heard Mr. H.R. Bhardwaj, Ms. Jyotsna Dua, Mr. K.D. Shreedhar, Ms. Ranjana Parmar, Mr. Virender Verma, Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma, Mr. Vijay Thakur, Mr. Lokender Pal and Mr. A.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the parties.
11. We have heard Mr. Shrawan Dogra. and Neel Kemal, learned counsel for interveners. An important question of law, which has been raised before us by the learned counsel for the parties relates to the jurisdiction of the Himachal Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal (Administrative Tribunal). The question is whether Administrative Tribunal can exercise jurisdiction only under the AT Act or it can also exercise powers under ID Act or any other corresponding law for the time being in force. Before dealing with the relevant decisions cited by the learned counsel for the parties, it would be appropriate if we refer to the relevant provisions of both the Acts.
12. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (the ID Act) was enacted and came into force with
effect from April 1, 1947. As stated in the Preamble of the Act, it was an Act to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for certain other purposes. Section 2 defines important terms. Whereas Clause (g) defines ‘Employer’, Clause (s) defines the term ‘Workman’. Clause (j) of Section 2 states as to what ‘industry’ means. Clause (k) deals with ‘Industrial Dispute’. It reads:
‘”industrial dispute’ means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workman, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person”.
Clause (ka) describes what ‘industrial establishment or undertaking’ means. Clauses (kkb) and (r) provide for Labour Court and Tribunal respectively. Clause (oo) defines ‘retrenchment’. Section 2-A declares that dismissal of an individual workman would be deemed to be an ‘industrial dispute’ within the meaning of the Act. Chapter II enumerates Committees, Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals under the Act. Chapter III deals with Reference of disputes to Board, Courts or Tribunals. Section 10 authorises an ‘appropriate Government’ to refer industrial disputes to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication in certain circumstances. Section 11-A empowers Conciliation Officers, Boards, Courts, Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen. Chapter VA provides for lay- off and retrenchment. Section 25-F prohibits an employer from retrenching a -workman employed in any industry, who has been in continuous service for a particular period unless he has been paid ‘retrenchment compensation’. This will have to be read with Section 25-G, which provides for procedure on retrenchment as also Section 25-B, which defines the expression “continuous service”. This is the general scheme of the ID Act.
13. By the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Part XIVA (Tribunals) was inserted in the Constitution after Part XIV. It considers of two Articles. Articles 323-A and 323-B. Clause (1) of Article 323-A enacts that Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by administrative Tribunals of disputes/ complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government. Clause (2)(d) provided that a law made under Clause (1) might exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts, except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to the disputes or complaints referred to in Clause (1).
14. Likewise, Article 323-B provides for Tribunals for other matters. It declares that an appropriate Legislature may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by Tribunals of any disputes, complaints, or offences relating to all or any of the matters specified in Clause (2) with respect to which such Legislature has power to make laws. Clause (2)(c) of Article 323B, inter alia, provides for adjudication or trial by the Tribunals of industrial and labour disputes. Clause (3)(d) of the said Article, like Clause (2)(d) of Article 323-A states that a law made under Clause (1) may exclude the jurisdiction of all Courts except that of the Supreme Court under Article 136 with respect. to all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said Tribunals. Explanation to Article 323-B defines “appropriate Legislature”.
15. It may be stated at this stage that no law has been enacted by an appropriate Legislature providing for adjudication or trial by the Tribunals of ‘industrial and labour disputes’.
16. In exercise of powers under Article 323-A, Parliament has enacted an Act known as the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (the AT Act). The Preamble of the Act reads as under:
“An Act to provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government in pursuance of Article 323-A of the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”.
17. Section 2, as it originally stood, excluded certain classes from operation of the Act. The provision as enacted reads thus:
“2. Act not to apply to certain persons – The provisions of this Act shall not apply to
(a) any member of the naval, military or of any other armed forces of the Union;
(b) any person governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in regard to such matters in respect of which he is so governed;
(c) any officer or servant of the Supreme Court or of any High Court;
(d) any person appointed to the secretarial staff of either House of Parliament or to the secretarial staff of any State Legislature or House thereof or, in the case of a Union Territory having a Legislature, of that Legislature.
18. Clause (b), which covered persons governed by the ID Act was omitted by the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1986 (Act No. 19 of 1986). Section 3 is a Legislative Dictionary and defines relevant expression used in the Act. Clause (aa) defines ‘Administrative Tribunal’ in relation a State means ‘the Tribunal for the State’. ‘Appropriate Government’ is defined in Clause (d) the State Government in relation to the State Administrative Tribunal. Clauses (k) and (p) define ‘post’ and ‘service’ and mean post and service within or outside India, respectively.
19. Clause (q) defines ‘service matters’. It reads thus:
“(q) ‘service matters’, in relation to a person, means all matters relating, to the conditions of his service in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India, or, as the case may be, of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the Government, as respects-
(i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits;
(ii) tenure including confirmation, seniority, promotion, reversion, premature retirement and superannuation;
(iii) leave of any kind; (iv) disciplinary matters; or (v) any other matter whatsoever.
20. Clause (t) defines Tribunal as Central Administrative Tribunal or State Administrative Tribunal or Joint Administrative Tribunal. Chapter II contains provisions regarding establishment of Tribunals and Benches thereof. Chapter III deals with jurisdiction, power and authority of such Tribunals. Whereas Section 14 speaks of jurisdiction, power and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Section 15 deals with jurisdiction; power and authority of State Administrative Tribunal.
21. The said Section reads thus:
“15. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of State Administrative Tribunals.-(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction powers and authority exercisable immediately before that day by all Courts except the Supreme Court in relation to-
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any civil service of the State or to any civil post under the State;
(b) all service matters concerning a person not being a person referred to in Clause (c) of this sub-section or a member, person or civilian referred to in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post under the State and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with the affairs of the State or of any local or other authority -under the control of the State Government or of any corporation or society owned or controlled by the State Government;
(c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the State concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in Clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by any such local or other authority or corporation or society or other body as is controlled or owned by the State Government, at the disposal of the State Government for such appointment.
(2) The State Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be specified in the notification the provisions of Sub-section (3) to local or other authorities and corporation or societies controlled or owned by the State Government:
Provided that if the State Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different categories under any class of, local or other authorities or corporations or societies.
(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall also exercise, on and from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-section apply to any local or other authority or corporation or society, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable immediately before that date by all Courts except the Supreme Court in relation to-
(a) recruitments and matters concerning recruitment, to any service or post in
connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society; and
(b) all service matters concerning a person other than a person referred to in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of this Section or a member, person or civilian referred to in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 appointed to any service or post in connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society and pertaining to the service of such person in connection with such affairs.
(4) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Administrative Tribunal for a State shall not extend to, or be exercisable in relation to, any matter in relation to which the jurisdiction, power and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal extends or is exercisable”.
22. Section 19 enables a person aggrieved by any order pertaining to any matter within the jurisdiction of a Tribunal to make an application to the Tribunal for the redressal of his grievances. Section 20 enjoins the Tribunal not to admit such application unless other remedies were exhausted by the aggrieved applicant. Section 21 prescribes limitation for making an application to the Tribunal. Section 22 lays down procedure and enumerates powers of Administrative Tribunal.
23. Section 28 as it originally stood reads thus:
“28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts, the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution – On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matters concerning members of any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post, no Court (except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution) shall have, or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such
recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment of such service matters”.
24. Section 29 provides for transfer of pending cases to the Tribunal. Sections 35 and 36 authorise Central Government and appropriate Government to make Rules to carry out the provisions of the Act.
25. As stated hereinabove, by the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1986, certain provisions were amended. In Section 2, Clause (b) was omitted and it was clarified that the said Clause “shall be deemed to have been omitted with effect from November 1, 1985”. Other changes were also made. It may, however, not be necessary for us to deal with all those changes except the amendment in Section 28. After the amendment in 1986, the said Section reads thus:
“28. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution – On and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority becomes exercisable under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any Service or put or service matters concerning members of any Service or persons appointed to any Service or post, no Court except-
(a) the Supreme Court; or
(b) any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other corresponding law for the time being in force,
shall have, or be entitled to exercise any Jurisdiction, powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters”.
26. Section 25 of the Amendment Act is also relevant and it may be reproduced:
“25. Validation.-Anything done or any action taken (including any application admitted or orders passed) by the Central Administrative Tribunal or any of its Bench or Benches immediately before the
commencement of this Act in the exercise or purported exercise of its jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred by or under the principal Act shall be deemed to have been validly done or taken as if the provisions of the principal Act, as amended by this Act, had been in force at all material times and, accordingly, anything done or any action taken by the said Tribunal or any of its Bench or Benches shall not be called in question merely on the ground that-
(a) the Bench or Benches of such Tribunal had not been properly constituted, or
(b) the said Tribunal had no jurisdiction to adjudicate or try any dispute or complaint or to hear any appeals in relation to such dispute or complaint”.
27. In Statement of Objects and Reasons, it has been stated:
“The Central Administrative Tribunal, with five Benches, was established on November 1, 1985 in pursuance of the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Prior to its establishment, writ petitions were filed in various High Courts as well as the Supreme Court challenging the constitutional validity of Articles 323 of the Constitution and the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act. The main contention in the writ petitions was that the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution as well as in the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be taken away even by an amendment of the Constitution. Although the Supreme Court, by an interim order, stayed the transfer of writ petitions filed in the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution to the Central Administrative Tribunal, it did not stay the transfer of writ petitions under Article 226 subject to the condition that the Government would make certain amendments in the Act. One of the amendments suggested by the Court was that each case in the Tribunal must be heard by a Bench, consisting of one Judicial Member and one Non-judicial Member and the appointment of Judicial Members should be
done in consultation with the Chief Justice of India. An undertaking was given in the Supreme Court that a Bill to make suitable amendments in the Act would be brought before Parliament as early as possible. The Central Administrative Tribunal had also started functioning in Benches in accordance with the above directions of the Supreme Court. As the writ petitions referred to above were coming up for hearing some time in January, 1986, the President promulgated the Administrative Tribunals (Amendment) Ordinance, 1986 on January 22, 1986 so as to give effect to the assurance given in the Supreme Court and to make some other amendments found necessary in the administration of the Act.”
28. The Ordinance provided, among other things, for the following matters, namely:
(a) The concept of Judicial Member and Administrative Member was introduced in the Act, and a Bench of the Administrative Tribunal would consist of one Judicial Member and one Administrative Member instead of three members Benches to be presided over either by the Chairman or by the Vice-Chairman. It was also provided that the appointment of a Judicial Member would be made after consultation with the Chief Justice of India. Suitable provisions had also been included in the Ordinance to regularise the existing appointment of Members as Judicial Members and Administrative Members.
(b) The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in service matters under Article 32 of Constitution was preserved. The principal Act intended to confer this jurisdiction also on the Tribunal.
(c) A provision was included to designate, with the concurrence of any State Government, all or any of the Members of the Bench or Benches of the State Administrative Tribunal established for that State as members of the Bench or Benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal in respect of that State, and to designate, on receipt of a request from any State
Government, all or any of the members of the Bench or Benches of the Central Administrative Tribunal functioning in that State as members of the Bench or Benches of the State Administrative Tribunal for that State.
(d) The jurisdiction of the Tribunal was also extended to persons who are governed by the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 without affecting the rights of such persons under that Act.
29. Subsequent to the promulgation of the Ordinance, a few doubts were expressed in respect of some of the provisions of the Act and the Ordinance. It is, therefore, proposed to include in the Bill a few clarificatory amendments, to make certain provisions included in the Ordinance retrospective from the date of establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal, and to validate certain actions taken by the said Tribunal. The amendments included in the Bill have been explained in the memorandum attached to the Bill.
30. The Bill seeks to replace the aforesaid Ordinance and to include therein the aforesaid amendments.
31. Before dealing with the rival contentions of the parties, we consider it appropriate to keep in mind the declaration of law by the Supreme Court on AT Act.
32. S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1987 SC 386 : 1987 (1), SCC 124 : 1987-I-LLJ-128 is indeed a leading decision on the point. An important question of law having far reaching effect and of great importance was raised in that case. The constitutional validity of the AT Act was challenged, inter alia, on the ground that it could not have totally excluded the jurisdiction of the High Courts by depriving them power of judicial review guaranteed under the Constitution; The power conferred on High Courts by the Founding Fathers of the Constitution was “basic structure of the Constitution” and was, therefore, outside the constituent power of Parliament contended the petitioners. Article 323-A, therefore, could not have been inserted in the Constitution as it was
ultra vires ‘basic structure doctrine’ enunciated by the Apex Court.
33. Negativing the contention and upholding the validity of the AT Act, the Court observed that it was no doubt true that the jurisdiction of the High Court had been excluded by the AT Act, but ‘judicial review’ had not been totally excluded. What was sought to be done by Parliament was creating or setting up an ‘alternative institutional mechanism’ in the place of High Courts providing judicial review. For the exercise of that power, Administrative Tribunals were sought to be established. It was thus a substitute of the High Court de jure and also de facto. Such an action, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, could not be said to be unconstitutional. It was further indicated that had Parliament excluded jurisdiction of the High Courts without setting up “an effective alternative institutional mechanism for judicial review”; it would have undoubtedly violated the basic structure, outside constituent power of Parliament. But once it had set up another effective institutional authority vesting power of judicial review therein, no objection could be raised. Administrative Tribunals constituted in exercise of the power, therefore, could be said to be a machinery equally efficacious to the High Court and was within the power of Parliament.
34. The effect of Sampath Kumar (supra) was that Central Administrative Tribunals were held to be “real substitute” of the High Court de jure as well as de facto with regard to the matters to be dealt with by such Tribunals and no void had been created.
35. In R. K. Jain v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 1769 : 1993 (4) SCC 119, the Apex Court expressed its anguish on working of an ‘alternative institutional mechanism and its effectiveness in exercising the power of judicial review’. It also observed that the sole remedy provided under Article 136 of the Constitution against the orders passed by the Administrative Tribunals was ineffective and inconvenient. Sampath Kumar, hence, required “fresh look by a larger Bench over all issues adjudicated in Sampath Kumar”, opined R.K. Jain.
36. In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1125 : 1997 (3) SCC 261 the larger Bench held power of judicial review a ‘basic and essential feature of the Constitution’ conferred on High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. It was thus a ‘basic structure’. Though Parliament was empowered to amend the Constitution, such power could not be exercised as to damage, destroy or curtail the essential feature of the Constitution or to dispense with fundamental principle. In the opinion of the larger Bench, High Courts and the Supreme Court have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and with a view to achieving that end, power of judicial review had been conferred on them. Such power, therefore, could not be tinkered. Any action interfering with the said power must be held to be violative of basic structure. Sampath Kumar was accordingly overruled and the earlier legal position and majesty of High Courts was restored. In the light of the above enunciation of law by the Apex Court, we have to consider the rival contentions of the parties.
37. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the authorities that ID Act is a self contained code and it provides in detail the rights conferred on employees and remedies available to them for protection, implementation and enforcement of those rights. It is well settled that when a statute confers rights and provides remedy, an aggrieved party has to avail the remedy provided under the Act and it is not open to him to invoke jurisdiction of ordinary Court. Our attention in this connection was invited by the Council to several decisions. In the well known case in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1969 SC 78, it has been held by the Supreme Court that if a statute creates a special right or liability and provides procedure for the determination therefor, an aggrieved party should call in aid the provisions of the statute and he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of any other forum.
38. In Premier Automobiles Ltd., the Supreme Court laid down the following principles applicable to the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in relation to industrial disputes:
“(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil Court.
(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of, the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy.
(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act.
(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33-C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be”.
39. A similar question again arose in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr., v. Krishna Kant and Ors. AIR 1995 SC 1715 : 1995 (5) SCC 75 : 1995-II-LLJ-728. After considering several cases, including Premier Automobiles Ltd., the Court summarised the principles thus at pp. 741 & 742 of LLJ:
“1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i. e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in civil Court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
(2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act.
(3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of rights and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 which can be called “sister enactments” to Industrial Disputes Act and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute Industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an Industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act. Otherwise, recourse to civil Court is open.
(4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate Government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the Government to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. This rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the Government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication.
(5) Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly i.e., without the requirement of a reference by the Government in case of industrial dispute, covered by Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act.
(6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1948 are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to “statutory provisions”. Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil Court where recourse to civil Court is open according to, the principle, indicated herein.
(7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute- resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil Courts. Indeed, the powers of the Courts and Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an Industrial Dispute”.
40. The Counsel, therefore, submitted that in resolving industrial disputes or for implementation of rights and observances of liabilities under ID Act, the only remedy available to an aggrieved party is to invoke the provisions of the ID Act. To put it differently, an aggrieved party has to approach either Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court established and constituted under the ID Act or under the relevant law. He cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a civil Court or any other forum/authority constituted or established under any other statute.
41. We are impressed by the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the authorities. It is, no doubt, contended on behalf of the respondents that what was barred was jurisdiction of civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure and not of the jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal constituted and established under the AT Act. Once it is
conceded that the matter is a “service matter” as defined in Section 3 of the AT Act, exclusive jurisdiction is of the Administrative Tribunal and an aggrieved party can approach the Tribunal by invoking Section 19 of the Act. Section 28 is an exception to Section 19 of the AT Act, or a sort of proviso to rule, which declares that the exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts would not apply to any Industrial Tribunal, Labour Court or other authority constituted under the ID Act or any other corresponding law for the time being in force. In the light of the said provision, at the most, it can be said that the jurisdiction of both the authorities, namely, Administrative Tribunals on the one hand and Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court on the other hand, is to co-ordinate and it is left to the aggrieved party to approach any authority he chooses. It, however, cannot be contended that Administrative Tribunal is devoid of jurisdiction in such cases. We are unable to uphold the contention. Let us consider some of the decisions cited by the learned counsel for both the sides.
42. In Krishan Prasad Gupta v. Controller, Printing and Stationery AIR 1996 SC 408 : 1996 (1) SCC 69 : 1996-I-LLJ-296, the appellant was an employee of the respondent. He filed an application under the Payment of Wages Act alleging, inter alia, that the respondent illegally withheld his wages. The authority passed an order allowing the application of the employee. The respondent preferred an appeal before the District Judge. During the pendency of appeal, an Administrative Tribunal was created under the AT Act. Under Section 29 of the Act, the appeal was transferred to the Administrative Tribunal. The appeal was dismissed. The aggrieved employer approached the Supreme Court. The question for determination before the Apex Court was whether the appeal before the District Court could be transferred to the Administrative Tribunal.
43. Considering the relevant provisions of the AT Act, the Court held that the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court or other
authorities under the ID Act or any other corresponding law for the time being in force remained unaffected.
The Court stated:
“It is, therefore, apparent that in spite to Section 14 of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal, Labour Courts or other authorities, under the Industrial Disputes Act or Authority created under any other corresponding law remains unaffected. The original, or for that matter, the appellate authority under the Payment of Wages Act is neither an Industrial Tribunal nor Labour Court nor are they ‘Authorities’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 but if the Payment of Wages Act is ultimately found to be a “corresponding law”, the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act would also be saved”.
44. The Court also indicated that the ID Act and other corresponding law is “a part of the same social legislative canopy made by Parliament for immediate amelioration of workmen’s plight resulting from non-payment, or delayed payment or, for that matter, short payment of their wages”.
The Court, therefore, concluded:
“Our conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the ‘Authority’, constituted under Section 15 and the appellate authority under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, fall within the exception indicated in Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act and this Act, namely, Payment of Wages Act, is positively covered by the connotation “corresponding law” used in that Section. Consequently, the jurisdiction of the Authority to entertain and decide claim cases under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act is not affected by the establishment of the Administrative Tribunals”.
45. The Court also observed that the jurisdiction of the Appellate Authority under the Payment of Wages Act would not be affected by the establishment of Administrative Tribunals and the appeals could not be transferred to the said Tribunal. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal was set aside.
46. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll) and Anr., AIR 2000 SC 1274 : 2000 (3) SCC 224 : 2000-I-LLJ- 846 it was held by the Supreme Court that the activity of the Delhi Municipal Corporation by which construction work was undertaken or roads were laid or repaired or trenches were dug would fall within the definition of industry”. The persons employed on muster roll for carrying on those activities would, therefore, be “workmen” and dispute between them and the Corporation would have to be tackled as an industrial dispute in the light of various statutory provisions of industrial Law.
47. In Ajay D. Panalkar v. Management of Pune Telecom Department, AIR 1999 SC 538: 1997 (11) SCC 469 : 1998-II-LLJ-170 the Supreme Court was called upon to consider the “principal question” whether Central: Administrative Tribunal (CAT) could entertain an application wherein the respondent claimed himself to be a ‘workman’ within the meaning of the ID Act, particularly, after Industrial Tribunal had ruled that he was not. The Court held that the decision of the Industrial Tribunal on the point could be upset only by the Court within that hierarchy and could not have been brushed aside by the Central Administrative Tribunal. Reliance was placed on Krishan Prasad Gupta (supra).
48. Reference may also be made to a decision in Jitendra Nath Biswas v. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. and Anr., AIR 1990 SC 255 : 1989 (3) SCC 582 : 1989-II-LLJ-572, wherein it was held that the relief of reinstatement and back wages of an employee would be available only under the ID Act and it could not be granted by a Civil Court. Provisions of the ID Act impliedly excluded the jurisdiction of Civil Court as regards such relief.
49. It was strenuously contended by the other side that conjoint reading of Sections 19
and 28 of the AT Act leaves no room for doubt that the jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal and Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court is concurrent and the option is available to the aggrieved party. If he chooses to approach Administrative Tribunal, the only thing which is required to be ascertained is whether the dispute relates to “service matter”, as defined in the AT Act. If it is, the Administrative Tribunal’s jurisdiction is not barred irrespective of the fact that it is also an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of the ID Act and notwithstanding that he could have approached Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court.
50. The counsel also submitted that the ratio laid down in Premier Automobiles (supra) and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra) would not apply in such cases. Those directions did not lay down that Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction in such cases. What was said in those cases was that Civil Court had no jurisdiction. They, however, did not hold that Administrative Tribunal had also no jurisdiction in such matters.
51. In our opinion, the principle laid down in Premier Automobiles and reiterated in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation would apply not only to jurisdiction of Civil Courts but to all Courts as well as other forums/Authorities. They, in our considered opinion, clearly, expressly and unequivocally lay down that if the dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or obligation created under the ID Act then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get it adjudicated under the Act. In other words, it is not, as contended on behalf of the respondents, that the dicta laid down in the above decisions bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts and not of Administrative. Tribunals, but is that when a right is created or obligation is imposed by a statute, the remedy to the suitor is to get such dispute adjudicated under the Act. The bar, in our considered view, is not limited to ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Courts, but to all authorities and forums.
52. In Union of India and Ors. v. Deep Chand Pandey and Anr., AIR 1993 SC 382 :
1992 (4) SCC 432 services of casual railway employees engaged on daily wages were terminated. They claimed right to continue in service on temporary basis by filing petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held that the claim was covered by the AT Act and remedy was available before the Administrative Tribunal and not before the High Court.
53. We are unable to understand how the decision in Deep Chand Pandey helps the respondents. The point decided in that case related to the jurisdiction of the High Court. Petitions instituted under Article 226 of the Constitution were allowed by the High Court and the aggrieved Union of India contended that the High Court could not have exercised jurisdiction. The question did not relate to jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal/Labour. Court vis-a-vis Administrative Tribunal.
54. In Himachal Pradesh State Electricity
Board, Shimla and Ors. v. Tirath Raj and Ors.,
AIR 1996 SC 615 : 1995 (5) SCC 678 :
1996-I-LLJ-986, a similar view was taken by
the Apex Court. Following Deep Chand
Pandey, the Court observed that the
controversy was no longer res integra. Tirath
Raj related to a claim of “equal pay for equal
work”.
55. A reference was also made to a decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Rajendranagar Municipality v. B. V. Perraju Workmen, 1995 Lab IC 2102, wherein it was observed that for claim of over time wages by the workmen of local authority like Municipality, the aggrieved employees could invoke jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal under the AT Act. They should also avail the remedy under Section 33-C(2) of the ID Act as an alternative remedy. It was held that it would be futile to contend that the jurisdiction of Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) was barred.
56. The case, as is clear, was a converse one. The contention raised by the Municipality was that the jurisdiction of Labour Court was barred which was negatived by the High Court. In our opinion, however, the question is not
whether the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court was barred but the jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal is barred in view of Section 28 of the AT Act.
57. Ishar Singh v. National Fertilizers and Anr. AIR 1991 SC 1546 : 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 649 is not material for the purpose of resolving the controversy inasmuch as a workman sought injunction by filing a suit in civil Court against apprehended superannuation and ancillary reliefs. Ouster was pleaded relying on the provisions of Section 2-A of the ID Act. The Court, however, repelled the contention observing that on the date of filing of the suit, none of the situations contemplated by Section 2-A of the ID Act was present and, hence, the suit was maintainable.
58. In State of Haryana v. Randhir Singh and Ors., 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 144 : 1998-III-LLJ (Suppl)-745 a penalty of withholding of increments was imposed on an employee. He approached Civil Court. When the jurisdiction of Civil Court was questioned, the Court noted that the plaint was neither based on Section 2-A of the ID Act nor on the Standing Orders. It was essentially founded on the provisions of Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1952 and the rights and liabilities thereunder. The liability thus arose under the Common Law and it would not attract principle No. 2 laid down in Premier Automobiles (supra). The Civil Court had, therefore, jurisdiction. The ratio in Randhir Singh, hence, in our opinion, is of no avail to the respondents.
59. In Union of India v. Punnilal and Ors., 1996 (11) SCC 112, an employee filed a suit for declaration for his entitlement to promotion, but he did not seek consequential relief of back wages. Declaration for promotion was granted. He, then filed an application for back wages before the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act. The authority directed payment of wages. An appeal was filed before the Additional District Judge, which was dismissed. Original Application was then filed in the Administrative Tribunal, which also met the same fate. In an appeal by the Union of India,
it was held by the Supreme Court that the Original Application was not maintainable. Invoking the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court held that the workman was debarred from claiming relief of back wages and the authority under the Payment of Wages Act could not have granted such relief.
60. We are unable to understand how the ratio of the above decision would be of any assistance to the respondents.
61. Reference may be made at this stage to a decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Parma Nanda, AIR 1989 SC 1185 : 1989 (2) SCC 177 : 1989-II-LLJ-57. In that case, the respondent was a master mind behind preparation of false pay bills and bogus identity card. Other employees used them for drawing salary. After detailed enquiry, the respondent and other two employees were found guilty. Those two persons were let off with a minor punishment, but the respondent was dismissed. The Administrative Tribunal upheld the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer against the respondent. According to the Tribunal, however, the punishment imposed on the respondent was excessive. According to the Tribunal, it ought to have been in line with other delinquents. The Tribunal, therefore, modified the penalty and reduced it. The aggrieved Union of India approached the Supreme Court.
62. The Apex Court set aside the order passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal holding that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or punishment could not be equated with the appellate jurisdiction and it could not have disturbed an order of punishment by the authority. Once the Tribunal held that the enquiry was consistent with the principles of natural justice, it was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the competent authority to award appropriate punishment. The adequacy of penalty, unless mala fide, was not the matter for the Tribunal to concern itself with, indicated the Supreme Court.
63. Emphasis was, however, put on the observations of the Supreme Court in
paragraph 30 of the decision, which reads as under:
“The last contention that the respondent falls into the category of a workman and the Tribunal could exercise the powers of an Industrial Court for giving appropriate relief is unavailable in this case, since the respondent had made his choice of forum and was even otherwise dealt with under the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules which are undisputedly applicable to him.”
64. It was submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that even according to the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of both, Administrative Tribunal and Industrial Tribunal is concurrent. We cannot read the judgment as suggested by the counsel. The question did not arise before the Supreme Court about the jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal vis-a-vis jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal and no decision was given on that point.
65. Our attention was also invited by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents to an order passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 6214 of 1997 (titled State of H.P. and Ors. v. Leela Dhar) decided on September 18, 2001. The said order reads thus:
“The Tribunal set aside the order of retrenchment of the respondents and directed that they may be continued in service and the respondents have been working in the establishment of the appellant for over 10 years. Therefore, we do not think, it would be appropriate for us to interfere with the order made by the Tribunal in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. The appeals shall stand dismissed.”
66. It was contended that the above matter arose from an order passed by the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Tribunal in OA (M) No. 557 of 1994 titled Leela Dhar v. State of H.P. The case of the petitioner before the Tribunal was that the provisions of the ID Act had not been complied with and termination of services was, therefore, illegal. The petition was entertained, order was set aside and relief was granted. The contention of the State Authorities before the Supreme Court was that Administrative Tribunal could not have exercised jurisdiction under the I.D. Act. When the appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court, the order passed by the Administrative Tribunal became final and “Law” declared by the Supreme Court under article 141 of the Constitution. It must, therefore, be held that according to the Supreme Court, Administrative Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain, deal with and decide matters in the domain of Industrial Law.
67. Reading the order of the Court extracted hereinabove, however, it is clear that the Court did not think it appropriate to interfere with the order in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution and dismissed the appeal on that ground. The jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal vis-a-vis Industrial Tribunal was not even, referred to by the Court.
68. Reference was also made to certain; decisions of the Central Administrative Tribunals. In Dashrath Singh and Komal Singh v. Union of India and Ors., 1989 Lab IC 2236, Jabalpur Bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal, after interpreting the. relevant provisions of the AT Act and the ID Act held that a remedy under the ID Act is “arrangements as in force” within the meaning of Section 3(r) of the AT Act and a petition without seeking alternative remedy was not maintainable.
69. In Full Bench decisions in G.M. Southern Rly. v. Presiding Officer, (1987) 4 ATC 912, S.K. Sisodia v. Union of India, (1988) 7 ATC 852 and Union of India v. Sarup Chand Singla, (1989) 9 ATC 167, the Central Administrative Tribunal held that when an employee, who had two remedies open to him either, to approach Administrative Tribunal or Industrial Tribunal, it was open to him to elect or to choose a Forum and if he chooses to approach Administrative Tribunal, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be termed as without jurisdiction. It was held that Administrative Tribunal was substitute not only of the High Court but of all Courts as well as Authorities
and if the dispute was covered by the definition of “service matter” within the meaning of the AT Act, jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal could not be excluded only on the ground that such a matter could have been vitiated under the ID Act or any other corresponding law for the time being in force before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. The Administrative Tribunal was also vested with the jurisdiction, power and authority to deal with the grievances and complaints of persons governed by the ID Act. According to the Full Bench, there was no provision in the AT Act prohibiting the Administrative Tribunal from granting relief to employees entitled to such relief under the I.D. Act. Administrative Tribunals were constituted to expedite the adjudication of disputes and not to take away or abridge the substantive rights conferred on the empties by various statutes under Industrial laws. It also observed that Parliament never intended to force the workmen to move to different Tribunals to get their grievances redressed, one by approaching Administrative Tribunal and the other by approaching Administrative Tribunal. In leaving choice to the workmen concerned to move either of the two forums, it has left to the workman concerned to get his grievances redressed and such an action could not be held to be illegal or unlawful. It is more so when Administrative Tribunal had been held real substitute of the High Court de jure and de facto. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles (supra) therefore, would not apply and the jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal would not get barred.
70. The above Full Bench decisions, no doubt, support the contention put forward by the respondents. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that those decisions are not binding upon this Court. Moreover, in the light of conflicting decisions by various Benches, the matter was referred to a larger Bench of Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad in A. Padmavathy and Ors. v. CPWD, (1990) 14 ATC 914. The larger bench considered the relevant provisions of the AT Act, the ID Act and several decisions on the point. It overruled Full Bench decisions referred to hereinabove. It held that looking to the scheme of the ID Act in juxtaposition of the AT Act, it was clear, that if the case was covered by the provisions of the I.D. Act, the aggrieved party had to take appropriate action in accordance with the ID Act before a forum constituted by the said Act and he could not move Administrative Tribunal. The larger Bench did not agree and did not approve the reasons recorded and grounds weighed in earlier decisions. Considering Sections 9-C, 10-A, 11-A, 33-C(2) and other provisions of the ID Act, the larger Bench held that there was no concurrent jurisdiction vested in Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court and Administrative Tribunal so far as the provisions of the ID Act were concerned. It also noted that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the object of both the Acts. It might also result in contradictory orders being passed by two forums. It would not be in conformity with the conferment of jurisdiction under the relevant statutes. For instance, under Section 11-A of the ID Act, Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court has power to give appropriate relief in case of dismissal/discharge of an employee by reducing penalty. No such power is conferred on Administrative Tribunal. If a dismissed/ discharged workman invokes jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunal instead of approaching Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court, he would not be able to press in aid the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act. Likewise, the provisions of Section 33-C(2) is really in the nature of execution of award/ orders. The only thing which has to be seen by the Industrial forum is whether any award/order/settlement preceded. Once an award/order/settlement is there, the question is of calculation of benefits. It is not open to the employer to challenge legality or validity of such award/order/ settlement. It is also not open to the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court to go behind award/order/ settlement. But if such a workman goes to Administrative Tribunal, in view of the original proceedings before the Administrative Tribunal, it is open to the employer to contest the matter on merits and the Administrative Tribunal has to decide validity or otherwise of such award/order/ settlement. This would virtually destroy the legislative provision frustrating the laudable object behind the legislation. It is also fallacious to argue that the matters would be expeditiously
dealt with and decided before the Administrative Tribunal than before the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. It is factually incorrect and legally ill-founded.
71. It is also profitable to refer to a decision of the Court of Kerala in Mani v. Union of India, (1990) 2 Ker LT 216, wherein a single Judge of the High Court considered the provisions of Sections 28 and 14 of the AT Act in the light of Article 323-B of the Constitution. As observed earlier, the said Article enacts that the appropriate Legislature, may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by Tribunals of any disputes, complaints or offences with respect to all or any of the matters specified in Clause (2) in regard to which such Legislature has power to make Rules. One of the matters specified in Clause (2) of Article 323- B is “Industrial and Labour disputes”. The effect of Section 28 of the AT Act read and understood in the light at Article 323-B is that those disputes and complaints governed by the Industrial laws enacted by the appropriate Legislature are taken out of the purview of the Act notwithstanding the fact that the employees, who raise such disputes are persons appointed to any service or post and covered by the A T Act. Laws enacted by the appropriate Legislature are thus excluded from the purview of the Act enacted under Article 323-B. The provisions of Article 323-B have an overriding effect because of non-obstante Clause contained in Article 323-B (4).
72. Since Administrative Tribunal is a creature of statute, it has to function within the four corners of the statute and cannot exercise powers outside the Act. It was also observed that Article 323-A (2) (d) only excluded the jurisdiction of Courts and other Authorities. It did not confer jurisdiction on any authority. The Administrative Tribunal, therefore, has no power to deal with matters in respect of which no express jurisdiction has been conferred on it. It is not in dispute that no Tribunal has been constituted by an appropriate Legislature in exercise of power under Article 323-B of the Constitution. The Administrative Tribunal working in the State of Himachal Pradesh is indisputably a Tribunal constituted under Article 323-A of the Act. Such Tribunal, therefore, has no plenary jurisdiction over matters concerning service disputes under Article 323B and AT Act.
73. Keeping in mind the relevant provisions of the ID Act as well as other corresponding laws for the time being in force and the AT Act, there is no doubt in our minds that the ambit and scope as also object of both the Acts are distinct, separate and different independent forums, therefore, have been constituted by the competent Legislature and it is obligatory on the aggrieved person to approach an appropriate forum constituted and established under the relevant law. It is also clear to us that in Premier Automobiles (supra) and Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court laid down in no uncertain terms that where rights or obligations are created by the ID Act, the only remedy is to approach the forum created by the Act. The argument that the ratio in those cases would not apply to Administrative Tribunals inasmuch as the Supreme Court had held that Civil Court had no jurisdiction and thus jurisdiction of only Civil Court is ousted did not impress us. The Supreme Court had so held as the question had arisen regarding the jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court vis-a-vis Civil Court. That, however, does not mean that the law laid down in those cases has limited application and it would not apply to Administrative Tribunals or Authorities other than Civil Court. Reading the judgment in the way in which it is sought to be suggested by the learned counsel for the respondents would make the principles formulated by the Apex Court nugatory, otiose and ineffective. The words “only remedy” used by their Lordship of the Supreme Court will also become ineffective and redundant, which is not permissible. In our considered view, proper reading of the judgments of the Supreme Court and ratio laid down therein would mean and only mean that where the rights and obligations are created by the ID Act, an aggrieved person has to approach a forum created by that Act alone. Any other interpretation, in our opinion, would be inconsistent with and contrary to the law laid down in those cases. We are, therefore, unable to read the decisions of the Supreme Court in any other manner.
74. Moreover, the legal petition has also been substantially changed after the decision in L. Chandra Kumar (supra). Between Sampath Kumar and L. Chandra Kumar, Administrative Tribunal was held to be an “effective, alternative institutional mechanism for judicial review” and a real substitute of all Courts including the High Court dejure as well as de facto. That is not the position now. Sampath Kumar was overruled by L. Chandra Kumar and is no longer good law. As per settled legal position, an Administrative Tribunal constituted under the AT Act has retained its character as a Tribunal like any other Tribunal constituted under a statute and has to exercise its jurisdiction under the Act. It has no plenary or unlimited jurisdiction. It cannot travel beyond the four corners of the AT Act. In our opinion, therefore, it has no jurisdiction to enquire into the grievances made by an aggrieved party in the matters covered by the ID Act or any other corresponding law for the time being in force.
75. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion the Administrative Tribunal constituted and established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 has no jurisdiction to entertain, deal with and decide an application for the protection or enforcement of rights created or liabilities imposed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other law for the time being in force and the only remedy available to the aggrieved party is to approach Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court or an Authority constituted and/or established under the relevant statute. The orders passed by the Administrative Tribunal either under the provisions of the ID Act or any other law for the time being in force must necessarily be held to be null and void and without jurisdiction.
76. Whether the Himachal Pradesh Administrative. Tribunal has invoked the jurisdiction under the ID Act or any other law for the time being in force has to be decided on the facts of each case. The Registry will now place all the matters for passing appropriate orders in accordance with law.