ORDER
Rajeev Gupta, J.
1. Petitioner Imtiaz Ahmed, who is facing trial in S.T. No. 52/96, pending in the Court of IIIrd A.S.J., Satna, has filed this revision petition against the order dated 15-4-1996, whereby the trial Court had directed framing of charges, against the petitioner and other co-accused persons, for the offences under sections 255, 258, 259, 261, 263, 489D, 489E and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, and section 13/50 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
2. Police Kotwali Satna, after completing the investigation of the case, registered at Crime No. 627/95 filed charge-sheet against eight accused persons, including the petitioner, for the alleged commission of offences under sections 255, 258, 259, 261, 263, 489D, 489E and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, and section 13/50 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act.
3. Shri Hamid Khan, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the trial Court has erred in framing common charges’ against all the eight accused persons, though the material contained in the charge-sheet, is not similar against all the accused persons. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that on the basis of the material available in the charge-sheet, charge under section 263, Indian Penal Code only could have been framed, against the petitioner.
4. The exercise of framing of charges against the accused is an important step in a criminal trial. It is neither mere observing of a formality nor a mechanical process. Rather the order, directing framing of charges, is a pretrial judicial pronouncement of the existence of a prima facie case against the accused for making him to face trial on a particular charge. It substantially affects his liberty. Though it is not always necessary that the order, directing framing of charges, should be a detailed one but the application of mind, by the trial Court, to the allegations and material against the accused should always be apparent from such an order. Nevertheless, the above does not mean that the trial Court is to undertake a roving enquiry at the stage of framing of charges. At this stage the enquiry has to be for a limited purpose only.
5. The Apex Court, while considering the scope at the stage of framing of charges, in a recent decision in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, AIR 1996 SC 1744, observed in para 32 :-
“32. The aforesaid shows that if on the basis of material on record, a Court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.”
6. As the tendency of framing ‘common charges’, in a trial involving more than one accused, is on the increase, it is high time to check the above trend. An accused can be made to face trial on particular charge/charges only on the basis of the material available in the charge-sheet/complaint against that accused and not on the material available against his co-accused. It is, therefore, always incumbent on the trial Court, while considering the framing of charges against the accused persons in a trial, involving more than one accused, to evaluate the material, available against each and every accused, individually for ascertaining the culpability of each and every accused and then frame charge/charges against each and every accused accordingly.
7. In this context, a reference may be made to the following observation of the Apex Court, in the case of Som Nath Thapa (supra) :-
“35. The legal question having been examined, we may advert to the facts of each appellant to decide whether a prima facie case against him exists, requiring framing of charge, as has been ordered. Before we undertake this exercise, it may be pointed out that the learned Designated Court in his impugned judgment, instead of examining the merits of the prosecution case qua the charged accused has given reasons as to why he discharged 26 accused. A grievance has, therefore, been made by all the learned counsel appearing for the accused that this was not the legal approach to be adopted. We find merit in this grievance inasmuch as the impugned order ought to have shown that the Designated Court applied its judicial mind to the materials placed on record against the charged accused. This was necessary because framing of charge substantially affects the liberty of the concerned person. Because of the large number of accused in the case (and this number being large as regards changed accused also), the Court below might have adopted the approach he had done. But we do not think it was right in doing so. Be that as it may, now that we have been apprised by the prosecution regarding all the materials which were placed before the Designated Court against each of the appealing accused, we propose to examine, whether on the basis of such materials, it can reasonably be held that a case of charge exists. We would do so separately for each of the appellants.”
8. Now, reverting to the present case, the documents, forming part of the charge-sheet, reveal that during the investigation, police has seized 100 counterfeit postal stamps of the denomination of Rs. 5/- each from the possession of the petitioner. Though counterfeit Indian and Foreign currency are alleged to have been seized from the possession of some of the accused persons, but no such currency notes appears to have been seized from the petitioner.
9. On perusing the impugned order and the material, available against each of the accused persons, there appears sufficient force in the above mentioned contention of the petitioner’s counsel. The trial Court, apparently, does not appear to have considered the case of each and every accused individually for finding out as to which of the above mentioned offence/offences was/were prima facie made out against each and all of the eight accused persons. The impugned order, directing framing of charges against the accused persons, is therefore, liable to be set aside on this short ground alone.
10. Normally, this Court, while setting aside an order, directing framing of charges, does not remand the case to the trial Court, but in the present case as this revision petition has been filed by only one of the eight accused persons and as mentioned above, the trial court has failed in considering the case against all the accused persons individually, this Court deem it just and proper to remand the case back to the trial Court for reconsideration of the framing of charges against all the eight accused persons individually.
11. For the foregoing reasons, the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 15-44996, directing framing of charges against the petitioner and other accused persons under sections 255, 258, 259, 261, 263, 489D, 489E and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, and under section 13/50 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 is hereby set aside. The trial Court is directed to reconsider the material, contained in the charge-sheet, against the accused persons and to pass necessary orders according to law. It goes without saying that if the trial Court, on reconsideration of the material, contained in the charge-sheet, comes to the conclusion that prima facie case for the alleged commission of an offence under any of the above mentioned section is made out only against one or some of the accused persons, then there would be no justification for framing of charges under that section against other remaining accused persons.
12. A copy of this order be sent to the Court of IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Satna, in whose Court Sessions Trial No. 52/96 is pending, for necessary compliance and for proceeding further, according to law.