High Court Patna High Court

In Re: Report Of The District & … vs Unknown on 5 March, 2003

Patna High Court
In Re: Report Of The District & … vs Unknown on 5 March, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003 (51) BLJR 799
Author: S Jha
Bench: S Jha, N Roy, R Garg


JUDGMENT

S.N. Jha, J.

1. These proceedings arise out of an unfortunate incident which took place in and around the Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Rohtas at Sasaram on 19-1-2002.

2. Briefly stated, notice was issued by the Sessions Judge, Rohtas to the Officer-in-Charge of Bikramganj Police Station, S.I. Arun Paswan, to show-cause in terms of Section 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code for non-production of the case diary despite adjournments in connection with hearing of Bail Petition No. 1671 /2001 arising out of Bikramganj P.S. Case No. 200/2001 under Sections 302 and 201/34 of the Indian Penal Code. On 19-1-2002, SI Arun Paswan appeared before the Sessions Judge and filed show-cause along with papers. The Sessions Judge found that the case diary had been written only up to 28-11-2001. After show-cause notice was issued three paragraphs were written but there was no investigation after 28-11-2001, even though it was a ‘Special Report’ case. The learned Judge found that from the Station Diary it appeared that the Officer was present at the police station upto 9-1-2001 but did not care to send the case diary. The learned Judge concluded that his conduct amounted to disobedience of the Court’s order and accordingly directed him to file further show-cause why he should not be remanded to custody. He was meanwhile directed to remain present till rising of the Court at 4.30 p.m. When the learned Judge sat after the luncheon recess and was in the midst of hearing Cr. Revision No. 334/2001, a group of persons in plain clothes as well as in police uniform were seen in front of the Court room. They were shouting abusive slogans against the Judge. The Officer-in-Charge of Sasaram (Town) Police Station and the Personal Security Guard of the District Judge took position on the Varanda outside the Court rooms to prevent them from entering the Court room, The advocates were excited and the learned Judge felt that untoward incident might take place. He requested them to resume their seats or to return to their Association. He learnt that the aforesaid group was led by Sudarsan Prasad Mandal, Dy. S.P. Sasaram, S.I. Sakaldeo Yadav and S.I. Syed Ahmad Khan. The learned Judge further came to learnt, later, that a meeting had been held in the Chambers of the Dy. S.P. where S.P. Rohtas was also present and he had instigated the police officials to create pandemonium and assault him as well as other Judicial Officers and employees of the Civil Courts. The Registrar, Rohtas Civil Courts telephonically informed the police office but no response came.

3. The District & Sessions Judge sent a report to this Court through the Registrar General narrating the incident to the above effect vide his confidential letter No. 5 dated 19-1-2002. He stated in the report, inter alia, that the incident was result of his pulling up the police officials for falsely implicating innocent persons, being slack in assisting the Court and conducting the investigation. The fact that the police was ill-disposed had also been reported in the newspapers. He sent another report, in continuation of the earlier one, vide confidential letter No. 7 dated 22/23-1-2002. Therein he disclosed the names of police officials (besides SI Sakal Deo Yadav and St Syed Ahmad Khan) who had indulged in the incident of 19-1-2002. They were Inspector Alvin Tigga of Sasaram (Muffasil) Police Station, SI Pawan Kumar, Agreh Police Station, SI Srikant Paswan of Nokha Police Station, SI Anil Kumar Yadavndu of Kochas Police Station and SI Kapildeo Singh of Chenari Police Station. They were led by Shri Sudarsan Prasad Mandal, Dy. S.P, of Sasaram, as already indicated in the previous report. They were raising slogan of “District Judge Murdabad, Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai” and other abusive slogans. They were also carrying their official arms. The learned Judge stated that during the luncheon recess, SI Arun Paswan, who had been ordered to remain in Court after rejecting his show-cause, had gone out and incited police officers who had assembled in connection with law and order
meeting on the eve of Panchayat Election to be held on the next day i.e. 20-1 -2001, and they came to the Court premises with the consent and connivance of the S.P. The learned Judge expressed his belief that the acts were aimed at bullying the Judiciary. The policemen had come prepared to criminally assault him and officers & learned Judge further stated in the said report that on 20-1-2001 at 9.00 p.m. The DIG, Sahabad range had informed him that FIR was to be lodged against him and FIR was actually lodged on 21-1-2002. This, according to the learned Judge, indicated that the entire police establishment was conspiring and planning things to humiliate and denigrate him and put the office of the District Judge to disrepute. The learned Judge took the position in the second show-cause which SI Arun Paswan filed at 3.15 p.m., he had expressed regrets from his mistake and this was enough to demonstrate the falsehood of the allegations in the criminal case filed by him.

4. Meanwhile on receipt of the first report dated 19-1-2002 the Hon’ble the Chief Justice directed the matter to be placed before special Bench for consideration on judicial side. On 22-1-2002, accordingly, the matter came up before the Court. Having regard to the gravity of the matter, the Court directed the Director General of Police, Bihar and Additional District General of Police, Patna Zone to appear at 1 p.m. on the same day. Notice in the meantime was issued to the Superintendent of Police, Sasaram, Dy. Superintendent of Police Sudarshan Prasad Mandal, SI Arun Paswan, SI Sakal Deo Yadav, and SI Syed Ahmad Khan to show-cause as to why a contempt proceeding be not initiated against them. The hearing was taken up in presence of the DGP and ADGP at 1 p.m. and they were asked about the steps taken by them after coming to know about the incident. Their statements were recorded and they were asked to file affidavit. The Addl. DGP, Shri Ashish Ranjan Sinha, made spot enquiry and submitted a report dated 27-1-2002 along with affidavit. The DGP also filed affidavit enclosing inter alia, copy of the said report of the Addl. DGP dated 27-1-2002, and the report of the S.P. Rohtas dated 22-1-2002.

5. On 20-2-2002 when the hearing was taken up next, after considering the above said reports and the affidavits/show-cause filed by the police Officers to whom notices had been issued earlier, the Court found that apart from those five Officers, seven more Police Officers were prima facie involved in the incident, namely, SI Ramakant Upadhyaya, SI Srikant Ram, SI Ajay Kumar, SI Rajeshwar Yadav, SI Chandra Shekhar Prasad, ASI Hari Shankar Singh and ASI Chandeshwar Singh. Notice accordingly was issued to these seven officers also to show-cause why contempt proceeding be not initiated. Having regard to the nature of the proceeding Shri Ram Balak Mahto, a Senior Advocate and an ex-Advocate General of this Court was appointed Amicus Curiae to assist the Court. On 18-3-2002, when the matter came up next, the show-cause filed by the above said 12 persons was held to be unsatisfactory and contempt proceeding was initiated against them. They were asked to file show-cause as to why they be not punished for having committed contempt of Court. On 13-5-2002 notice was issued to five more persons whose names had been mentioned in the supplementary report of Inspector Alvin Tigga, SI Pawan Kumar, SI Srikant Paswan, SI Anil Kumar Yadvendu and SI Kapildeo Singh. (It transpired later that Srikant Paswan is really Srikant Ram of Nokha PS to whom notice had already been issued on 20-2-2002 and he had already filed preliminary show-cause). There are thus sixteen contemnors in all. All of them filed their show-cause and the hearing was finally taken up with their consent on 3-9-2002.

6. Before adverting to the defence taken by the contemners it would be appropriate to notice the nature of the proceeding in view of the objection raised, particularly by Shri Shyama Prasad Mukherjee appearing for some of the contemners to the effect that without framing charge and giving opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses including the District & Sessions Judge, Rohtas, the proceeding cannot be taken to its logical end. Though the authority of this Court to take action for contempt of subordinate Courts was not challenged by any of the learned Counsel appearing for the contemners, I consider it advisable to refer to this aspect also.

7. Article 215 of the Constitution of India empowers the High Courts to punish for contempt of itself. Similar provision as regards the Supreme Court is contained in Article 129 of the Constitution. Apart from the Constitution, the Parliament has enacted the Contempt of Courts Act conferring power upon the Supreme Court and the High Courts to take action suo motu or on motion made in that regard in the manner laid down in the Act. The Contempt of Court Act was enacted (in the post-constitution era) first in 1952, being Act 32 of 1952 which replaced the contempt of Courts Act 1926, 1952 Act was replaced by Contempt of Courts Act 1971 (Act 70 of 1971). The Act makes distinction between ‘civil contempt and ‘criminal contempt’ as defined in Section 2 (b) and (c) of the Act. Contempt powers vest in the High Court but under Section 11, the High Court has jurisdiction to enquire into or try a contempt “of itself and any Court subordinate to it” and as per Section 10, the High Court has and exercises “the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempts of Courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempts of itself. Section 14 deals with contempt committed in the face of the Supreme Court or the High Courts. Section 15 deals with criminal contempt in other cases i.e. cases other than referred to in Section 14.

8. In these proceedings we are concerned with ‘criminal contempt, and therefore, it would be appropriate to notice its definition under Section 2 (c) of the Act as under:

2. (c) “Criminal contempt” means the publication (where by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever:

(i) scandlaises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any Court; or

(ii) prejudices, or interfere or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;

Section 15 may also be quoted so far as relevant, as under:

15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.–(1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in Section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by-

(a) the Advocate-General, or

(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General, or

(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in writing of such Law Officer.

(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate Court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate Court or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf.

9. In the case of S.K. Sarkar, Member, Board of Revenue, U.P. v. Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1981) 1 SCC 536, while dealing with the argument that under Section 15(2) the High Court does not nave suo motu power to take’cognizance, the Supreme Court observed that though comparison between two sub-sections (of Section 15) would show that whereas in Sub-section (1) one of the three alternative modes for taking cognizance is “on its own motion” no such mode is specifically provided in Sub-section (2), if this question is answered in affirmative, such a construction of Sub-section (2) will be inconsistent with Section 10 which makes the powers of the High Court to punish for contempt of subordinate Court coextensive and congruent with its power to punish for its own contempt not only in regard to quantum or prerequisites for punishment, but also in the matter of procedure and practices. Such a construction will bring Section 15 (2) in conflict to Section 10 and has to be avoided. Their Lordships concluded as under:

We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding in agreement with the High Court, that Sub-section (2) of Section 15, properly construed, does not restrict the power of the High Court to take cognizance of and punish contempt of a subordinate Court, on its own motion.

10. Article 215 of the Constitution of India lay down that “every High Court shall be a Court of Record and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt of Courts”. Article 129 contains similar provision in respect of the Supreme Court. The term ‘Court of Record’ is not defined in the Constitution. However, it is a well known expression defined in various law dictionaries and commentaries. Some of them were noticed in the decision in Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406 : AIR 1991 Supreme Court2176, asunder:

A Court whereof the acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial and testimony, and which has power to fine and imprison for contempt of its authority.

(Dictionary of English Law by Jowitt)

Courts are either of record where there acts and judicial proceedings are enrolled for a perpetual memorial and testimony and they have power to fine and imprison; or not of record being Courts of inferior dignity, and in a less proper sense the King’s Courts and these are not entrusted by law with any power to fine or imprison the subject of the realm, unless by the express provision of some Act of Parlimament. These proceedings are not enrolled or recorded.

(Law Lexicon by Wharton).

Another manner of division is into Courts of record and Courts not of record. Certain Courts are expressly declared by statute to be Courts of record. In the case of Courts not expressly declared to be Courts of record, the answer to the question whether a Court is a Court of record seems to depend in general upon whether it has power to fine or imprison, by statute or otherwise, for contempt of itself or other substantive offences; if it has such power, it seems that it is a Court of record.

(Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 10 para 709, P. 319)

Having noticed the above definitions the Supreme Court observed,

“the question whether in the absence of any express provision, the Court of Record has inherent power in respect of contempt of subordinate or inferior Courts, has been considered by English and Indian Courts…….. these authorities show that in England the power of the High Court to deal with the contempt of inferior Court was based not so much on its historical foundation but on the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction being a Court of Record having jurisdiction to correct the orders of those Courts. In India Prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926, High Court’s jurisdiction in respect of contempt of subordinate and inferior Courts was regulated by the principles of Common Law of England. The High Courts in the absence of statutory provisions exercised power of contempt to protect the subordinate Courts on the premise of inherent power of a Court of Record. …. The King’s Bench in England and the High Courts in India being superior Courts of record and having judicial power to correct orders of subordinate Courts enjoyed the inherent power of contempt to protect the subordinate Courts.

11. It would thus appear that the High Court being a Court of Record has always had power to punish for contempt of itself as well as Courts subordinate to it. The Contempt of Courts Act enacted in 1926 or in 1952 and 1971 merely gave statutory recognition of such power. The, High Courts having been recognized as ‘Court of Record’ in the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court to punish for contempt of subordinate Courts cannot be doubted for a moment.”

12. Now coming to the nature of the contempt proceeding as to whether the charges have to formally framed against the contemners like in criminal trial, and the contemner has to be given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, the following

observations in the case of Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat (supra) would seem to answer the point:

A criminal contempt is punishable by the superior Courts by fine or imprisonment, but it has many characteristics which distinguishes it from ordinary offence. An offence under the criminal jurisdiction is tried by a Magistrate or a Judge and the procedure of trial is regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which provides an elaborate procedure for framing of charges, recording of evidence, cross-examination, argument and the judgment. But charge of contempt is tried on summary process without any fixed procedure as the Court is free to evolve its own procedure consistent with fair play and natural justice. In contempt proceedings unlike the trial for a criminal offence no oral evidence is ordinarily recorded and the usual practice is to give evidence by affidavits. ……………..Ordinarily, process of trial for contempt is summary. A summary form of trial is held in the case of civil contempt and also in the case of criminal contempt where the act is committed in the actual view of the Court or by an officer of justice…….. The practice of proceeding summarily for the punishment of contempt out of Court has been the subject of comment and protest, but the practice is founded upon immemorial usage……. Proceedings for Contempt of Court are of a peculiar nature; though it may be that in certain aspects they are quasi-criminal, but in any view taken are not exercised as part of the original criminal jurisdiction of the Court, as was held in re: Tushar Kanti Ghosh, AIR 1935 Cal 419 (FB). The High Court held that since the proceedings for Contempt of Court do not fall within the original criminal jurisdiction of the Court no leave could be granted for appeal to Privy Council under Clause 41 of the Letters Patent of that Court.

Notwithstanding the provisions contained in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 (1952 ?) making an offence of contempt, punishable, the Act does not confer any jurisdiction or create the offence, it merely limits the amount of the punishment which could be awarded and it removes a certain doubt. The jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings and take session of the contempt is inherent in a Court of record and the procedures of the Criminal Procedure Code do not apply to contempt proceedings. Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that nothing contained in this Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force. The power to take proceedings for the Contempt of Court is an inherent power of a Court of record, the Criminal Procedure Code does not apply to such proceedings. Since, the contempt proceedings are not in the nature of Criminal Proceedings for an offence, the pendency of contempt proceedings cannot be regarded as criminal proceedings merely because it may end in imposing punishment on the contemner. A contemner is not in the position of an accused, it is open to the Court to cross-examine the contemner and even if the contemner is found to be guilty of contempt, the Court may accept apology and discharge the notice of contempt, whereas tendering of apology is no defence to the trial of a Criminal Offence. This peculiar feature distinguishes contempt proceedings from criminal proceedings. In a criminal trial where a person is accused of an offence there is a public prosecutor who prosecutes the case on behalf of the prosecution against the accused but in contempt proceedings the Court is both the accuser as well as the Judge of the accusation as observed by Hidayatullah, C.J. in Debabrata Bandopadhyaya’s case AIR 1969 SC 189. Contempt proceeding is sui generis, it has peculiar features which are not found in criminal proceedings.

Reference may also be made to the case of Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 1993 Supp. (1) SCC 529, where it was observed that the power to punish for contempt of Court is an inherent power, untrammetted and uncontrolled by the ordinary laws such as the Criminal Procedure Code or the Evidence Act. The caution to be observed in exercise of this power is that it should be exercised sparingly, that
the procedure to be followed should be fair and the contemner should be made aware of the charge against him and given reasonable opportunity to defend himself. In Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995) 2 SCG 584, the Apex Court stated :

The criminal contempt of Court undoubtedly amounts to an offence but it is an offence sui generis and hence for such offence, the procedure adopted both under the common law and the statute law even in this country has always been
summary. However, the fact that the process is summary does not mean that the procedural requirement, viz., that an opportunity of meeting the charge, is denied to the contemner. The degree of precision with which the charge may be
stated depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the specific allegations is made clear or otherwise the contemner is aware of the specific allegation, it is not always necessary to formulate the charge in a specific allegation. The consensus of opinion among the judiciary and the jurists alike is that despite the objection that the Judge deals with, the contempt himself and the contemner has little opportunity to defend himself, there is a residue of cases where not only it is justifiable to punish on the spot but it is the only realistic way of dealing with certain offenders. This procedure does not offend against the principle of natural justice, viz., 1 nemo judex in sua causa since the prosecution is not aimed at protecting the Judge personally but protecting the administration of justice. The threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent against misconduct. The Judge has to remain in full control of the hearing of the case and he must be able the take steps to restore order as early as quickly as possible. The time factor is crucial. Dragging out the contempt proceedings means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which paralyses the Court for a time and indirectly impedes the speed and efficiency with which justice is administered. Instant justice can never be completely satisfactory yet it does provide the simplest, most effective and least unsatisfactory method of dealing with disruptive conduct in Court. So long as the contemner’s interests are adequately safeguarded by giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence, even summary procedure in the case of contempt in the face of the Court is commended and not faulted.

13. The Supreme Court in the same very case (re : Vinay Chandra Mishra) considered the nature of proceeding arising from contempt committed in face of the Court. The proceeding in that case had arisen out of an act of misbehaviour by an Advocate inside the Court room while arguing a case for his client. The learned Judge brought the incident to the notice of the Acting Chief Justice of the High Court orally as well as in writing. On the basis of the letter, which was forwarded by the Acting Chief to the Chief Justice of India, contempt notice was issued and proceeding was initiated against the Advocate. A prayer was made on behalf of the contemner to examine the learned Judge as a part of opportunity of hearing to defend himself. The Supreme Court observed as under:

In the present case, although the contempt is in the face of the Court, the procedure adopted is not only not summary but has adequately safeguarded the contemner’s interests. The contemner was issued a notice intimating him the specific allegations against him. He was given an opportunity to counter the allegations by filing his counter-affidavit and additional counter/supplementary affidavit as per his request, and he has filed the same. He was also given an opportunity to file an affidavit of any other person that he chose or to produce any other material in his defence, which he has not done. However, in the affidavit which he has filed, he has requested for an examination of the learned Judge. We have at length dealt with the nature of in facie curiae contempt and the justification for adopting summary procedure and puishing the offender on the spot. In such procedure, there is no scope for examining the Judge of Judges of the Court before whom the contempt is committed. To give such a right to the contemner is to destroy not only the raisond etre for taking action for contempt committed in the face of the Court but also to destroy the very jurisdiction of the
Court to adopt proceedings for such conduct. It is for these reasons that neither the common law nor the statute law countenances the claim of the offender for examination of the Judge or Judges before whom the contempt is committed. Section 14 of our Act, i.e., the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with the procedure when the action is taken for the contempt in the face of the Supreme Court and the High Court. Sub-section (3) of the said section deals with a situation where in facie curiae contempt is tried by a Judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed. The provision in specific terms and for obvious reasons, states that in such cases it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, to appear as a witness and the statement placed before the Chief Justice shall be treated as the evidence in the case. The statement of the learned Judge has already been furnished to the contemner and he has replied to the same. We have, therefore, to proceed by treating the statement of the learned Judge and the affidavits filed by the contemner and the reply given by the learned Judge to the said affidavits, as evidence in the case.

14. In view of the law enuciated by the Supreme Court the plea that without formally framing the charge against the contemners and giving them opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, including the District & Sessions Judge, does not have any substance. It is not the requirement of law.that witnesses should be examined or cross-examined in course of the contempt proceeding. It can be decided on the basis of affidavits and in a summary way. In C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1132, it was held that where the facts of the case clearly make out a charge, it is not necessary that a formal charge should be drawn up. It may be mentioned that copy of the report of the ADGP dated 27-1-2002 which he submitted after examining witnesses, as indeed the two reports of the District & Sessions Judge, have been supplied to the contemners. Copy of the affidavit of the DGP along with its annexures has also been served. Counsel were allowed inspection of the record. Being fully aware of the facts and circumstance against them they filed their show-cause and the Counsel made submissions. They did not at all seem to be unaware of the facts alleged against the respective Contemner(s). They thus cannot complain of any prejudice or denial of opportunity to defend themselves. In Pritam Pal v. High Court of M. P. (Supra), the Apex Court held that where the contemner has been served with a notice of contempt and thereafter, permitted to go through the records and finally has been afforded a fair opportunity of putting froth his explanation for the charge levelled against him it could not be said that the order holding him guilty of committing contempt is vitiated by procedural irregularities. The contentions in this regard are accordingly rejected.

15. Coming to the individual cases of the contemners, they may be grouped broadly in three categories-those named in the first report of the District & Sessions Judge dated 19-1-2002 comprising the first category, those named in the second report dated 22/23-1-2002 comprising the second category, and those whose names find place in the report of the ADGP comprising the third category. This however, does not mean that the persons in the particular category stand on par. As a matter of fact learned Advocate General grouped them in six categories as follows-(i) Superintendent of Police, (ii) Deputy Superintendent of Police, (iii) SI Arun Paswan, (iv) SI Sakaldeo Yadav and SI Syed Ahmad Khan, (v) SI Anil Kumar Yadvendu, SI Pawan Kumar, SI Alvin Tigga, Si Kapildeo Prasad, and SI Srikant Rama named in the second report of the District & Sessions Judge, (vi) SI Rama Kant Upadhyay SI Sri Kant Ram, SI Ajay Kumar, SI Rajeshwar Yadav, SI Chandra Shekhar Prasad, ASI Hari Shanker Singh and ASI Chandeshwar Singh-named in the report of the ADGP. It may be recalled, as indicated above, that SI Srikant Ram had already been named in the second report of the District & Sessions Judge (wrongly described therein as Srikant Paswan).

16. I shall first take up the case of the Superintendent of Police, Raghubansh Prasad Yadav. Appearing for him Sri Tara Kant Jha submitted that the allegation that on his instigation the Police Officer proceeded towards the Court of District & Sessions Judge and indulged in slogan shouting etc. is without any basis. Sri Jha stated that on 19-1-2002 three meetings were fixed at Dehri, Bikramganj and Sasaram in connection with Panchayat election to be held on the following day. According to the schedule the meetings were fixed respectively at 10 a.m., 1 p.m. and 3 p.m. The meeting at Dehri however was actually held at 11 a.m. The Additional Collector, Rohtas Sri Hasib Akhtar participated in the meeting on behalf of the District Magistrate. The meeting continued up to 1 p.m. whereafter, they left for Bikramganj. The meeting at Bikramganj commenced at 2.15 p.m. In course of the meeting he was informed about the detention of the Officer Incharge Bikramganj PS i.e. SI Arun Paswan in the Court of District & Sessions Judge. He immediately contacted the Dy. S.P. Sasaram and the Police Prosecutor, Sasaram over telephone and they confirmed the news. They informed him that the order had been passed on account of non-supply of the Case Diary of some case. He advised them to move the Court for bail. At 3 p.m. he was informed telephonically by the Sergeant Major, Dehri that the Police Officers were intending to boycott the election duty on 20-1-2002. He asked the sergeant Major to inform the policemen that the Public prosecutor and the Dy. S.P. had been advised to move the District & Sessions Judge for bail. He thereafter, proceeded to Sasaram to oversee the situation himself. He went to the office of Sub-Divisional Officer where meeting was already fixed reaching there at 4.30 p.m. It was only then that he came to learnt about the details of the incident from the SDO. He informed him about the scuffle between the police personnel and the lawyers and about the slogan shouting by the President and Secretary of the Rohtas District Police Association i.e. SI Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Akhtar against the District & Sessions Judge. He requested the learned Judge over telephone for an appointment so that he may know the entire facts and take action in the matter. The learned Judge however refused to meet him. He thereafter, contacted the Public Prosecutor and the Government Pleader and conveyed the request through them to the learned District & Sessions Judge for appointment. The Public Prosecutor and the Government Pleader went along with the Circle Officer, Sasaram to request the learned Judge for appointment. But appointment was refused. He informed the Additional DGP, Patna Zone and DIG, Sahabad Range. He thereafter, went to the chambers of the Dy. S.P. where Members of Rohtas Chamber of Commerce were waiting to discuss the law and order situation arising out of killing of one Ravi Prakash Saraogi, a prominent businessman of Sasaram on 16-1-2002. He hurriedly finished the discussion. After the meeting was over the Officer Bearers of the Rohtas Police Association namely SI Sakaldeo Yadav and SI Syed Ahmad Khan came there and informed about the incident. He reprimanded them and also told them that he will be taking appropriate steps against the erring police officers after preliminary enquiry. He asked the Dy. S.P. Sasaram who was present there to submit report immediately so that action against the erring police officers could be taken.

17. It may be recalled that the charge against the S.P. vide letter of the District & Sessions Judge dated 19-1-2002 is that on his instigation the police officers came and indulged in slogan shouting etc. However, if it is a fact that the S.P. reached Sasaram at or about 4.30 p.m. it would be difficult to hold him responsible for the incident. As per the report of the District & Sessions Judge the incident took place at about 2.45 p.m. At that point of time he was in the midst of meeting at Bikramganj 45 Km. away from Sasaram. The scheduled meetings at Bikramganj and other places were fixed from before, From Annexure A/1 of his show-cause it appears that the notice relating to the meetings had been circulated under the signatures of the District Magistrate, Rohtas and Superintendent of Police, Rohtas on 18-1-2002 itself vide Memo No. 305/GO. According to the Officer, the District Magistrate did not attend the meeting and he was represented by the Additional Collector. The statement of the Additional Collector Sri Hasib Akhtar was recorded by the ADGP in course of his enquiry on 23/24-1-2002 who stated that on 19-1-2002 he and the SP remained together throughout the day. He also informed the ADGP that he along with the SP had reached Bikramganj Sub-Divisional Officer at about 2.30 p.m. In course of the meeting the SP came to learn about the detention of the Officer Incharge Bikramganj PS in the Court of District & Sessions Judge as a result of which the police officers were agitated and contemplating to boycott the panchayat election on 20-1-2002. The SP gave necessary direction to the Dy. S.P. Sasaram. The Additional Collector also informed that after hurriedly finishing the meeting at Bikramganj they left for Sasaram reaching there at about 4.30 p.m. There he came to learn about the slogan shouting by some police officers in front of the Court of District & Sessions Judge and the resultant scuffle between the lawyers and the policemen. On coming to know about the incident the SP immediately raised to contact the District & Sessions Judge on telephone but failed to get any appointment The Additional Collector also stated that the SP admonished the Police Officers who were present in the scheduled meeting telling them that dignity of the Court had to be maintained in any case and the incident which had taken place was unfortunate and unpardonable.

18. Sri Tara Kant Jha submitted that the allegation in the report of the District & Sessions Judge that the incident had taken place on the instigation of the SP would thus appear to be baseless. Sri Jha submitted that as a matter of fact the report is based on information derived by him and not on his personal knowledge. The report to the extent it is based on information may be treated on a different footing from the other part of the report based on his personal knowledge. So far as the SP is concerned, there is nothing in the report to suggest that the District & Sessions Judge had any personal knowledge about the role allegedly played by him. Had the learned Judge verified the facts, firstly, from the SP himself and, thereafter, from others, such as the SDO etc., he would have known that the SP had played on role. But without making any endeavour in this regard, believing the information to be true he jumped to the conclusion that the acts of vandalism and slogan shouting had been committed at his instance. Sri Jha stated that in the enquiry held at the Government level the SP has been exonerated.

19. As indicated above, if it is a fact that the SP was busy in the scheduled meetings to review the law and order situation in connection with the panchayat election to be held on the next day, in my opinion, he has sufficient alibi for being let off. If he was present at Bikramganj and holding meeting with the local officers, along with the Additional Collector from 2.15-2.30 p.m. reaching Sasaram at 4.30 p.m., it would be difficult to accept that at his instigation the incident took place. There is no suggestion that he instigated the police officers from Bikramganj on telephone or otherwise. Perhaps, the presence of the SP in the chambers of the Dy. S.P. later in the day created the impression in the mind of the District & Sessions Judge that he too had a hand in the incident, but as noticed above, the meeting in the chambers of the Dy. SP was a scheduled meeting in connection with the killing of a local business man on 16-1-2002. Earlier he had gone to the chambers of the SDO for the law and order meeting in connection with the panchayat election. In these premises I have no hesitation in accepting the show-cause of the SP and exonerating him of the charge.

20. I will now taken up the case of Dy. SP. Sudarshan Prasad Mandal. In his show-cause he stated that a Sub-Divisional level meeting was fixed on 19-1 -2002 at 3 p.m. at Sasaram in the chambers of the SDO in connection with the panchayat election vide wireless message No. 305 dated 18-1-2002. All the Officers-lncharge, SDPOs, Circle Officers, BDOs etc. were directed to attend the-meeting. At 1.30 p.m. he was informed by Inspector Alvin Tigga in his office chambers that SI Arun Paswan, Officer Incharge, Bikramganj PS had been detained in the Court of District & Sessions Judge for not submitting the case diary. He contacted the Government Pleader and the Public prosecutor on telephone for confirmation of the information. At 1.50 p.m. he informed SDO Sadar Sasaram and requested to gather the information. At 2.30 p.m. The Public prosecutor and one Rajesh Kumar, an Advocate of Sasaram Civil Court, came to his office chambers and told him that they saw the incident after some time. He then contacted the SP Rohtas at Bikramganj where he
was busy in election meeting on telephone and informed him about the incident. SDO Sasaram came to his office chambers and they were engaged in the panchayat election meeting. AT 2.45 p.m. Sri Manokamna Prasad, a Senior Advocate came there searching the Public Prosecutor for tendering apology on behalf of SI Arun Paswan. By that time he was not told about the seriousness of the matter. At 2.50 p.m. he left his office alongwith the SDO Sri Kishore Sao for inspection of the Strong Room for the panchayat election keeping in view the threats from the NCC ultras to distrube the election. At 3.15 p.m. he heard shouting in the Court premises and immediately proceeded towards the Court. SDO Sri Kishori Sao and Inspector Alvin Tigga followed him. He saw that eight ten policemen were being driven out by some Advocates from the court-yard of the western gate of the Civil Court. Sri Diwakar Mishra, Judge-in-Charge Administration, who was standing on the verandah of the office of the District & Sessions Judge called him and informed about the situation. He told him that SI Sakaldeo Yadav and SI Syed Ahmad Khan were leading the group of policemen in shouting slogans. Immediately thereafter, he took steps and got SIs Sakaldeo Yadav, Syed Ahmad Khan, Srikant Kachchap and other policemen driven out of the premises with the help of Inspector Alvin Tigga and the situation was made normal. He remained present in the campus of the Civil Court with several Senior Advocates. After giving necessary instructions to the policemen posted in the Civil Court he left the Court premises to meet the SP who was sitting in the chambers of SDO and apprised him of the situation. On the direction of the SP vide Memo No. 347 dated 19-1 -2002 he submitted detailed report on 21 -1 -2002 describing the whole incident and action taken by him against the irresponsible police officers. Vide Memo No. 354 dated 20-1-2002 the SP asked him to submit explanation as to why he did not take steps to check the incident pursuant to which he also submitted explanation on 21-1-2002 stating therein that he had taken all steps to control the situation. The SDO Sasaram, Inspectors Srikant Kachchap and Alvin Tigga in their statements before the ADGP appreciated his role in making the situation normal.

21. Shri Shyama Prasad Mukherji appearing for Dy. S.P. Sudarshan Prasad Mandal, submitted that as soon as he heard the shouts in the Court premises at 3.15 p.m. he rushed there and brought the situation under control with the help of Inspectors Alvin Tiga and S.K. Kachapa and remained present in the campus until the situation became normal. It may be recalled that as per report of the District & Sessions Judge the group of police officers was being led by the Dy. S.P. The learned Judge stated so on the basis of information from his personal body-guard, members of the Association as well as officers and employees of the Civil Court. The submission of Shri Mukherji in this regard was that the truth or otherwise of the allegation can be established only by examining the persons concerned from whom the District & Sessions Judge learnt about the complicity of the Dy. S.P. It was has already been noticed above that examination/cross-examination of witness is not an integral part of the contempt proceeding and it is permissible to decide the proceeding on the basis of affidavits. There is no dispute at the Bar that Ihe report of the District & Sessions Judge is a piece of evidence. It is therefore, to be seen as to whether and to what extent the defence of this officer can be accepted.

22. The show-cause of the Dy. S.P. gives us an impression as if after informing the S.P. about detention of SI Arun Paswan at about 2.30 p.m. it was no longer in his mind. He simply forgot that a police officer was in detention. On his own own saying, Sri Manokamna Prasad, Senior Advocate, came to his chamber at 2.45 p.m. to find out the Public Prosecutor and “by that time, no seriousness of the matter was reported to the deponent” so much so that at 2.50 p. m. he left the office for inspection of the Strong Room. He heard the slogan shouting at 3.15 p. m. It may be recalled that as per the second report of the District & Sessions Judge dated 22/23-2002 the incident took place at about 2.45 p.m. after the luncheon recess when the learned Judge was in the midst of hearing of a Criminal Revision. There is material on record to suggest that SI Arum Paswan had gone out during the luncheon recess. The possibility of his meeting the police officers who had assembled from before in

connection with the scheduled law and order meeting and his contacting the Dy. SP cannot be ruled out. It is true that there is no direct evidence suggesting any meeting between SI Arun Paswan and Dy. S.P. Sudarshan Prasad Mandal but is admitted position that the Dy. SP learnt about the so-called detention of SI Arun Paswan at 1.30 p. m. If the incident had taken place soon after the luncheon recess it would be difficult to accept the case of the Dy. SP that he heard the shouts at 3.15 p.m. and thereafter, went to the Civil Court premises. We were informed in course of hearing that the Civil Court building is situate just across the road. The shouts or slogans coming from the Civil Court premises could not have escaped the attention of the officer sitting in the office chamber across the road. It is indeed curious that the Dy. SP went for routine inspection of the Strong Room at 2.50 p.m. when the situation had become volatile. If he was not leading the group of slogan shouting police officers, as alleged, leaving the office for inspection of the Strong Room on his own saying indicates the facit approval of the acts of vandalism by the policemen. It is difficult to believe that he did not discuss the incident of detention of SI Arum Paswan with the police officers present for the meeting or that they took to slogan shouting etc. without the knowledge of the Dy. SP. It is to be kept in mind that even the SP had given him some instruction about making prayer for bail on behalf of SI Arum Paswan but he has said nothing about it is the show-cause.

23. On his own statement in the show-cause when he went there he found eight ten policemen being driven out by some Advocates from the court-yard at the western gate of the Civil Court. He got Sis Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmad Khan forcibly driven out of the premises with the help of Inspectors Alvin Tigga and Srikant Kachchap. Sri Kant Kachchap stated before the ADGP that at 2.45 p.m. he learned that the District Judge had detained the Officer Incharge of Bikramganj PS. he also learnt that the President and the Secretary of the Rohtas District Police Association i.e. SIs Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmad Khan were going towards the Court and other Sub-Inspectors of Police who had come to Sasaram in connection with law and order meeting were also going. He tried to prevent them but they did not accept the advice and went to Court. At that point of time Dy. SP Sudarshan Prasad Mandal was present there. He (Kachchap) released that the action of the police officers in going to Court was not proper and apprehending untoward incident he went forward. When he reached outside the Court Room of District & Sessions Judge he found SIs Sakaideo Yadav, Syed Ahmad Khan, Ramakant Upadhyay, Srikant Ram, Ajay Kumar, Chandeshwar Singh and others (whom he could not identify). From the statement of Srikant Kachchap it would appear that the Dy. SP had seen the police officers proceeding towards the Civil Court, and though Kachchap tried to persuade them not to go there the Dy. SP kept quite. It is worth mentioning here that even the ADGP in his report found the Dy. SP guilty of dereliction of duty. The ADGP held in no uncertain terms that while Kachchap tried to prevent the police officers from going to the Civil Court premises Sri Sudarshan Prasad Mandal, Dy, SP who was present there did not prevent them from going there nor he went to the Court premises when he was already aware of the fact through the Town Inspector of Police that the Office Bearers of the Bihar Police Association Rohtas Branch had already proceeded to the Court premises and there was apprehension of untoward incident. The ADGP has observed that had he prevented the police officer from going towards, the Civil Court premises the incident would not have taken place. As seen above, in stead of going towards the Civil Court premises, he went on a routine inspection of the Strong Room. The complicity of the Dy. SP, S.P. Mandal in the occurrence-cannot be ruled out.

24. It is to be kept in mind that it is difficult to expect direct evidence about one’s complicity in an incident of this kind. It can be gathered only from circumstances. A question would arise as to whether the conduct/role of the Dy. SP warrants any action for Contempt of Court. We have noticed the definition of ‘criminal contempt’ above. Criminal Contempt means, inter alia, doing of any act which amounts to scandalising or tending the scandalise or lowering or tending to lower the authority of any Court. Though there is allegation in the report of the District & Sessions
Judge that the Dy. SP was leading the group of policemen suggesting that he was present at the place and time of incident, even if he was not present at that time he was apparently aware of slogan shouting against the District & Sessions Judge by SIs Sakaldeo Yadav, S.A. Khan and others. The definition of Criminal Contempt is wide enough to include any act which tends to scandalise or lower the authority of any Court. The ‘act’ also, in my opinion has to be given a wider meaning to include, say, covert acts of instigation or support. If the Dy. SP with full awareness of the gravity of the situation allowed the incidentto take place his bona fide would become suspect. It is curious, as per his own show-cause that till 2.45 p.m. “no seriousness of the matter was reported” to him. This clearly is a false statement. At the particular time Inspector Srikant Kachchap had realised the gravity of the situation and as stated by him, being Inspector of the Town PS he went to the Court premises to prevent the police officers from entering the Court room because he though it was part of his duty. The conduct of the Dy. SP in going for the routine inspection of the Strong Room simply suggests that he wanted the police officers to act as they liked. This suggests his covert support for them. As noticed above, even the ADGP stated in his report that had the Dy. SP taken prompt action the incident could have been avoided. Where the omission is part of a plan or a design, in my opinion, it would be more than simple dereliction of duty which in the ordinary course would have merely justified administrative action. In the facts and circumstances I am inclined to think that the incident took place with the tacit support of the Dy. SP and therefore, he cannot be absolved of the culpability of the incident. I would accordingly hold Dy. SP Sudarshan Pd. Mandal, guilty of contempt.

25. I shall now take up the case of SI Arun Paswan. He was, if I may say so, the immediate cause of the incident. On account of non-submission of the case diary of Bikramganj P.S. Case No. 200/2001 he had been asked to show-cause in terms of Section 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code as to why he should not be committed to prison. He also been directed to bring the Station Diary to find out the veracity of the intimation sent by him earlier about his absence on the previous dates fixed in the case. On 19-1-2002 he appeared along with the case diary and other papers. The case diary revealed that the investigation was entrusted to him on 28-11-2001 but he had done nothing and after the Court issued show-cause notice for non-production, three paragraphs were written. The Station Diary revealed that he had left the police station for Banka on 9-1-2002 at 7 a.m., and the case diary was available at the police station and there was no reason why the same could not be sent. Apparently, this was because it had been written only upto 28-11-2001. The learned Judge accordingly decided to proceed in accordance with Section 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The officer was directed to remain present till rising of the Court at 4.30 p.m. and file his further show-cause as to why he should not be remanded to custody. In the second report dated 22/23-1-2002 the Districts Sessions Judge stated that though SI Arun Paswan was ordered to remain present in the Court after rejection of his first show-cause, he went outside during the recess and informed the police officers who had assembled in connection with the law and order meeting and asked them to come to the Court. According to the officer, he remained standing in Court throughout from 11 a.m. to 4.30 a.m. “out of respect lowering down his head before the District & Sessions Judge”. He has asserted that he was never party to the assemblage in front of the Court room of the District & Sessions Judge. As a matter of fact, in his statement before the ADGP he stated that when he heard commotion outside the Court room he requested the Court to permit him to go not of the Court room so that he could explain the matter to the slogan shouting people The Court permitted him to go out but while going out Advocates pushed him inside the Court room. He thus could not know as to who slogan shouting persons were. The Advocates were agitated. But the District & Sessions Judge told them that this was internal matter and they should allow the Court proceeding to continue. The Advocates did not, however, agree saying that the prestige of the Court was their prestige. The commotion continued for ten minutes. Thereupon, the District & Sessions judge told him that he could be granted pardon but on account of acts committed by his colleagues this could not be done. This made him anxious and apprehensive. He was then permitted to appear and file show-cause either himself or through lawyer on 28-1-2002 and leave the Court room. He submitted a written report about the events at the Sasaram Town P.S, and returned to Bikramganj police station. On the basis of said report Sasaram Town P.S. Case No. 46/2002 dated 19-1-2002 was registered under Sections 342 and 501 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3/4 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act against the District & Sessions Judge. (Curiously, on the report submitted by the Judge Incharge (Administration) about the incident the case (Sasaram Town P.S. Case No. 48/2002) was registered on the next day i.e. 20-1 -2002). As regards non-submission of the case diary it has been stated that the requisition for the case diary was not received prior to 9-1-2002. Earlier, on 5-1-2002 he had received summons for his appearance in two cases at Banka on 9-1-2002 and 20-1-2002 and accordingly he proceeded for Banka on 9-1 -2002 at 7 a.m. The adjourned date (16-1 -2002) for hearing of Bail Petition No. 167/2001 was not intimated until 18-1-2002 when he received show-cause notice, whereafter, he appeared in Court on 19-1-2002, the date fixed, and remained present in the Court room till 4.30 p.m.

26. In the present proceeding we are not concerned with the facts relating to non-submission or belated submission of the case diary in connection with Bail Petition No. 167/2001. That is subject-matter of criminal miscellaneous case initiated against the officer under Section 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code. We are only concerned with his conduct in relation to the incident of slogan shouting and vandalism by the police officers on 19-1-2002. According to the officer, he remained present-standing in the Court room of District & Sessions Judge throughout the day from 11 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. so much so that he had no idea as to who the slogan shouting persons were. If this part of his case is believed, it is difficult to appreciate the other part of his case that he made a request to District & Sessions Judge to let him go out so that he could talk to the persons and make them understand. If this statement is believed, it would follow that he was well aware of the fact that slogan shouting persons were police officers and it was his detention which had provoked them to indulge in the impugned acts. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to believe that he remained in the Court room throughout the day even during the luncheon recess. I am inclined to accept the report of the District & Sessions Judge that during the luncheon recess he went outside, talked to the police officers who had assembled in connection with the law and order meeting and exhorted them to retaliate against the judicial officers in general and District & Sessions Judge in particular. Though, I do not wish to make comments on the allegations made by him in Sasaram Town P.S. Case No. 46/2002 against the District & Sessions Judge, prima facie, having regard to the second show-cause submitted at the end of the day on 19-1-2002 seeking unqualified apology, the allegations would appear to be an after-thought. Making allegations in the nature of aspersion against head of the judicial administration of the district is itself a serious matter raising doubt about the bona fide of the Officer.

27. It was submitted that he has been placed under suspension besides made accused in the criminal case filed by the Judge Incharge (Administration) i.e. Sasaram Town P.S. Case No. 48/2002, and transferred to the Zonal Office at Patna, the proceeding be dropped, As indicated above, he is the root cause of the unsavoury incident As the ADGP concluded, had he sent the case diary the occasion for his appearance or detention in Court leading to the incident would not have arisen. The case related to an occurrence of 17-11-2001. As the Officer Incharge he had assigned the investigation to a junior Sub-Inspector, Md. Noor Hasan Khan. On 28-11-2001 pursuant to the direction of Dy. S.P. Bikramganj he himself took over investigation but made no investigation. That apparently was reason why the case diary was not submitted in the Court of District & Sessions Judge. ADGP concluded that it was due to inefficiency. In the present proceeding we are not concerned with the question of efficiency, but the fact remains that he was the pivotal point of the incident. If his plea that he remained all along with “standing position” in the Court room from 11 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. is disbelieved and the report of the District & Sessions Judge is accepted that he had gone out during the luncheon recess it would be difficult to hold that he played no role in the occurrence. It may be that he was not one of the slogan shouters. As he was present inside he could not have done so but if the alleged acts of slogan shouting etc. were committed at his instance he cannot be exonerated of the charge. I would accordingly hold that SI Arun Paswan too guilty of contempt.

28. The case of SI Sakaldeo Yadav and SI Syed Ahmed Khan may be next taken up. They stand on the same footing and, therefore, their cases may be considered together. In his show-cause SI Sakaldeo Yadav stated that he was posted as Sub-Inspector at Dehri Police Lines. When he reached his residence on 19-1-2002 at about 4 O’clock he was informed by SI Syed Ahmed Khan, Secretary of the District Unit of the Bihar Police Association that the Officer Incharge of Bikramganj P.S. has been taken into custody on the order of the District & Sessions Judge. SI Sakaldeo Yadav, it may be mentioned, is President of the District Unit of the Bihar Police Association, He came to Sasaram along with SI Syed Ahmed Khan reaching there at about 4.15 p.m. They together went to Sasaram Court at about 4.45 p.m. they found gate of the Court compound closed. There was small group consisting of Advocates and the public inside and as such he could not enter the Court compound and thus could not know about the actual incident. He then along with SI Syed Ahmed Khan went to the chambers of the Sub-Divisional Police Officer i.e. Dy. S.P. Sasaram where he came to know about the ongoing meeting in connection with Panchayat election in which the Additional Collector Rohtas, SDO Sasaram, S.P. Rohtas and others were present. After the meeting was over, the S.P. came to the Chambers of the SDPO where he called the members of the Chamber of commerce. Thereafter, the office-bearers of the district unit of the Police Association who were waiting outside, were called. He along with others apprised the S.P. of the incident regarding detention of the Officer Incharge of the Bikramganj and his subsequent release. The S.P. told the police officers not to worry as he would raise the issue at the appropriate stage. The S.P. was also informed about the earlier incidents when other police officers were ill-treated by the District & Sessions Judge.

29. SI Sakaldeo Yadav has thus denied the charge. According to him having reached Sasaram Court campus at about 4.45 p.m. and not entered the campus of the Civil Court of which the main gate was closed there was no question of his making noise or raising slogans. He has stated that he later came to know that on 19-1-2002 there was Dharna meeting and procession on the western side of the Court campus by CPI (ML) and their members were shouting slogans on loudspeakers against the District & Sessions Judge and the judicial system and, therefore, he has reason to believe that the impugned report of the District & Sessions Judge was result of some confusion. The officer also denied to have met SI Arum Paswan on 19-1-2002 as he was not even present in the Civil Court campus until 4.45 p.m. He has however, been made accused in Sasaram Town P.S. Case No. 48/2002 under Sections 143, 448, 511 and 341 of the Indian Penal Code.

30. The show cause of SI Syed Ahmed Khan is identical to that of SI Sakaldeo Yadav. He is, as indicated above, Secretary of the Rohtas District Unit of the Bihar Police Association. He too claims to have reached Sasaram Court at about 4.45 p.m. along with Si Sakaldeo Yadav when he found gate of the Court compound closed and, as such, he did not enter the Court compound and could not know about the actual incident. He has also thus flatly denied iike SI Sakaldeo Yadav, to have played any role in the incident. It may be mentioned that he too figures as an accused in Sasaram Town P.S. Case No. 48/2002 along with SI Sakaleo Yadav and others.

31. So far as Sis Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan are concerned, it may straight-away be stated that while the culpability of Dy. S.P. Sudarshan Prasad Mandal or St Arun Paswan could be ascertained from the attending circumstances, allegations against them (Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan) are direct. They appear to have played the leading role in the incident (After all, they were officebearers of the district unit of the Bihar Police Association). Apart from the report of the District & Sessions Judge report of the ADGP also indicts them. The ADGP, as seer above, recorded the statements of a number of officials and Advocates, such as, the S.P., Dy. S.P. Additional Collector, SDO, Town Inspector Shrikant Kachchap, Muffasil Inspector Alvin Tigga, Government Pleader, Public Prosecution, Anchal Adhikari, besides Sis Arun Paswan, Sakaldeo Yadav, Syed Ahmed Khan and others facing the charge. Most of them including Dy. S.P. Sudarshan Pd. Mandal named these two officers as slogan shouters and mischief makers. Dy. S.P. Sudarshan Pd. Mandal stated, as noticed above, that he got them (Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan) evicted with the help of Inspector Alvin Tigga and Shrikant Kachchap. Shrikant Kachchap stated that when he went inside the Civil Court campus he found the police officers and Sis. Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan shouting slogans to the effect that they would not tolerate the dictatorship of the Court. Seeing this he (Shrikant Kachchap) stood in front of the Court room of District & Sessions Judge. Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan asked whether they would be prevented from entering the Court room to which he (Shrikant Kachchap) replied that being the Inspector of Town P.S. it was his duty to protect the Court. Then Syed Ahmed Khan tore his (Kachchap’s) uniform and dragged him down from the verandah. When he was being dragged the Dy. S.P. Sasaram reached there and rebuked the police officers present there and asked them to leave the Court premises, Kachchap further stated that he received the assistant of Inspector Alvin Tigga in the process. In the meanwhile, Advocate also started raising slogans against the policemen and a group of them turned the police officers out of the Court campus. The Advocates also manhandled the Dy. S.P. Kachchap further stated that Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan were the Chief Spokesmen of the police officers. Besides Kachchap, Alvin Tigga, Inspector Sasaram Mofaffil Anchal in his statement also specifically named Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan, amongst others, as having indulged in slogan shouting etc. As per the report of the S. P., when the reached Sasaram at 4.30 p.m., SDO Sasaram told him about.Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan and his actions. The Dy. SP also informed him told him about the acts committed by them. These were, it may kept in mind, the earliest version of the incident.

32. It was submitted in defence of these officers that as they have completely denied their presence at the time and place of occurrence the veracity of the charge could be verified only by cross-examining the witnesses. I find no substance in the argument. As already observed above, examination/cross-examination of witness is not an integral part of contempt proceeding which can be decided on the basis of affidavits. Having gone through the report and the statement of the witnesses examined by the ADGP there is no manner of doubt that Sis. Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan had played the leading role, while SI Arun Paswan exhorted them and the mischief was committed with the covert support of the Dy. S.P. Sasaram as held above. It is Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan who led the mob of police officers which indulged in slogan shouting and other acts. They have been named, and specific allegations have been made against them not only in the report of the District & Sessions of the police and district administration without any loss of time at the earliest opportunity.

33. It is relevant to mention here that SI Sakaldeo Yadav appears to have had personal reason to settle scores with the District’s Sessions Judge as he had been stationed in the Police Lines at Dehri as a result of an order passed by him in Cr. Rev. No. 24 of 2000 on 8-10-2001. It is matter of common knowledge that posting in the Police Lines is ordinarily for administrative reasons and never to the liking of the persons concerned, and, therefore, SI Sakaldeo Yadav apparently had a personal grievance against the District & Sessions Judge. When the opportunity came he mobilised the police officers who had assembled in connection with law and order meeting later in the day for abusing the District & Sessions Judge. Though there is bald denial by them and they claim to have reached the Court premises at 4.45 p.m. and leant about the occurrence at Dehri at about 4.00 p.m., from the materials on record there is no doubt that they were not only present at the time and place of incident at about 2.45 p.m. but had also taken leading part in the incident Once their plea of ignorance about the incident until 4 p.m. and their reaching the Sasaran Court premises at about4.45 p.m. is disbelieved, their plea of innocence and denial would appear to be false. I would accordingly held Sis. Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan too guilt of contempt.

34. So far as others, namely, Sis. Ramakant Upadhyay, Shrikant Ram, Ajay Kumar, Rajeshwar Yadav, Chandrashekhar Prasad and ASIs Shanker Singh and Chandreswhar Singh are concerned, notice was issued to them in view of the report of the ADGP dated 27-2-2002. Similarly, notice was issued to the remaining five, namely, Inspectors Alvin Tigga, SIs Pawan Kumar, Anil Kumar Arvind and Kapildeo Singh (omitting the name of SI Shrikant Ram, who had already been issued notice earlier) in view of the second report of the District & Sessions Judge dated 22/23-1-2002. Though the names of the above seven i.e. SI Ramakant Upadhyay and others find place in the report of the ADGP and they were seen present in the mob there is no specific allegation of slogan shouting or other overt acts against them, unlike SIs. Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmed Khan. As a matter of fact, Sub-Inspector Alvin Tigga whose name was mentioned in the second report is concerned, it appears that he rather helped Shrikant Kachchap in preventing the untoward events from turning worse. The materials on record, in my opinion, do not warrant any action against these persons. Accordingly, show-cause filed by them is accepted and they are exonerated of the charge.

35. Before considering the question of punishment to the officers found guilty of Contempt, it may be stated that apart from denying the charge they have also tendered apology declaring that they have respect for the Courts and so on, Proviso to Section, 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act lays down that the accused i. e. contemner may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court. While considering the apology, it need hardly be emphasised, apart from the facts and circumstances of the case it has also to be kept in mind that respect for judiciary is very essence of rule of law. The foundation of judiciary, indeed any system, is trust and respect of the people. In the instant case what did the officers do? They attempted to ransack the Court and had some of their colleagues with the presence of Advocates and staff behind them not prevented their entry, they would have entered the courtroom of the District & Sessions Judge and even harmed him and others. The cause of incident was detention of a colleague who had been found prima facie guilty of disobedience of Courts’ order and asked to show-cause in terms of Section 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code confers power upon the Court to sentence any witness or person called, inter alia, to produce documents before the Court, for a term not exceeding seven days. The District & Sessions Judge recorded a prima facie finding and asked the officer, SI Arun Paswan, to remain present in the Court room till 4.30 p.m. and show-cause why he should not be remanded to custody in terms of Section 349 of the Code. It may be recalled that even the ADGP found SI Arun Paswan guilty of not submitting the Case Diary and observed in the report that had this been done the incident would never have taken place. If SI Arun Paswan or other though that the order of the District & Sessions Judge was not correct it was open to him to challenge the same before the superior Court. There was legal remedy available to him. In stead, at his instance, the Police Officers took law in their own hands. Apparently they found it intolerable that a police officer could be detained. While ‘lesser mortals’ could be detained, a police officer could not be or so they though. The forgot that howsoever high a person may be, law is above him and the police officers are no exception. The maxim “Salus populi superma /ex” which means “the welfare of the people is the Supreme law” adequately encuciates the idea of law. This can be achieved only when justice is administered lawfully, judicially, without fear or favour
and without being hampered and thwarted, and this cannot be effective unless respect for it is fostered and maintained.

36. The incident reminds us of the infamous incident which took place in Bhagalpur Civil Courts on 18-11-1997 when a murderous attack was made on Judicial Officers and Advocates of the Bhagalpur Court. In fact, as seen above, the processionists were shouting the slogan Bhagalpur Dohrana Hai. The Bhagalpur incident too, curiously, arose from the judicial remand of a police officer who despite successive orders and issurance of non-bailable warrant of arrest, did not appear for his cross-examination. Angered by his remand the police officers attacked the Court. For that incident the concerned Police Officers were convicted by this Court vide judgment reported in 1998 (1) PLJR 650.’The Court observed that even hard-core criminals accept the verdict of Courts awarding them imprisonment or even the extreme penalty of death.

37. As a matter of fact, judgments and orders of the Courts are supposed to be executed by the Police. They are thus intergral part of the administration of justice system. If Police were to start behaving in such wanton and uncivilized manner that too with judiciary and judicial officers, the people would loose faith not only in the police force but in the system itself. Faith is the foundation of respect, and if there is erosion in respect for judiciary and its independence, the democracy itself will be in danger.

38. It is clear that the impugned acts were committed in a pre-planned manner and in full public view. They certainly undermined the dignity and authority of the Court and accepting the apology at this stage would be counter productive of the course of justice. I would accordingly decline to accept the apology tendered on behalf of the officers contemners.

39. Now coming to the question of punishment, in the Delhi Judicial Service Association’s (Supra) the Supreme Court observed that in determining the quantum of punishment, the degree and extent of the role played by each of the contemners should be kept in mind. In my opinion, SIs Sakaldeo Yadav and Syed Ahmad Khan played key role in the incident while SI Arun Paswan was the prime mover. All the three, therefore, deserve same punishment. In the facts and circumstances, I would award each of them sentence of two months simple imprisonment. So far as Dy. SP Sudarshan Prasad Mandal in concerned, he has been found guilty of actively conniving and abetting the incident. In his case sentence of line of Rs. 1000/- or in default simple imprisonment for 15 days would serve the ends of justice. These sentences however, would remain in abeyance for eight weeks to enable them to move the Supreme Court and secure suitable order, if so advised.

40. It is made clear that the above sentences shall be without prejudice to any departmental action which may be taken against the four contemners, or others against whom I have chosen not to take any action for contempt, in accordance with law.

41. At the end I would record my appreciation of the assistance rendered by Shri Ram Balak Mahto, the Amicus Curiae and Shri Shashi Anugrah Narayan, the Advocate General, in the proceedings. Shri Ram Balak Mahto and his junior, Shri Ajay, shall be paid their fees by the State Government at the rates payable to the Advocate General and his JC.

42. The proceedings stand disposed of.

Narayan Roy, J.

43. I agree

R.S. Garg, J.

44. I agree