JUDGMENT
M. Hidayatullah, C.J.
1. This appeal is against the judgment of Deo, J. in second appeal no. 672 of 1950, dated 21-1-1955.
2. The short question in this appeal is whether the tariff rates existing on 27-3-1947 should have been applied to the consignments made by the appellant through the railways or the tariff rates existing after, 1-4-1947. The appellant brought his goods to the railway platform or godown on 26-3-1947 and indented for waggons presenting consignment notes and risk forms duly filled in by him. These goods were kept on the railway premises while requisition for waggons was made. The consignments were to be sent in closed waggons. The waggons were available after 1-4-1947 and the railway receipts were executed by the railway authorities on 8-4-1947, applying the new tariff rates which had then come into force. The appellant as plaintiff claims refund of the difference between the old and the new tariff rates on the allegation that his goods were accepted for consignment before 1-4-1947 and therefore the old rates were applicable to his case.
3. The learned single Judge held that there is a difference between the receipt of goods and the commencement of a contract of carriage of goods. When the goods are brought to the yard for being booked by train they are received by the railway subject to the rules and the fact that waggons should be available. If waggons are not available the goods are never consigned and the consignor then has to take his goods away. While they are on the railway premises the railway acts merely as bailee but not as carrier.
The railway acts as carrier of goods only after the railway receipt is prepared and the relationship of a carrier emerges only after the goods are loaded in waggons. Under rules 29-AA and 86-AA of the General Rules of the Goods Tariff it is quite clear that the railway undertakes no responsibility for any goods that may be brought on their premises for despatch until they have been loaded and the railway receipt for the same has been given. The reception of the goods is a convenience and it may lead to different considerations if the goods are destroyed while on the railway premises, but we cannot say from this alone that a contract of carriage can be spelled out.
The learned single Judge has, in our opinion, given adequate reasons for holding that a contract of carriage emerges only after the goods are loaded and a receipt for the same has been issued. Till
that time there is but an offer to take the goods subject to waggons being available. In our opinion the decision of the learned single Judge is correct. We see no reason to interfere.
4. The appeal fails and is dismissed with
costs.