JUDGMENT
S.K. Chawla, J.
1. In this appeal by the claimant seeking enhancement of compensation, there is no serious factual dispute. On 10.11.1977, at about 4.15 p.m., a moving truck No. MPI 4035 had knocked down an oncoming cycle on Agra-Bombay Road near village Barodi, Police Station Kotwali Shivpuri. One Kuldeep Kumar, PW 2, was riding that cycle and deceased Arvind Kumar was sitting double on it. Both persons on the cycle were thrown on the road, but deceased Arvind Kumar in addition was run over by the truck, resulting in his death. The truck was being driven by Babu Khan, respondent No. 2 and was owned by Amar-nath, respondent No. 1 and insured with New India Assurance Co. Ltd., respondent No. 3. Both persons on the cycle were constables receiving training in Indo-Tibetan Border Police Centre (I.T.B.P. Centre), Shivpuri. The deceased was unmarried, aged about 27 years. Claimant-appellant, Khashti Devi, is the deceased’s mother.
2. The question for consideration is whether the compensation awarded was excessively low to require interference in this appeal. The Claims Tribunal held that the deceased was getting Rs. 360/- p.m. and was sending about Rs. 100/- p.m. to his mother, the claimant. Claimant-appellant, Khashti Devi, was receiving Rs. 50/- p.m. as family pension after the death of the deceased. So the monthly loss of dependency, argued the Tribunal, was Rs. 50/-p.m. or Rs. 600/- p.a. Claimant, Khashti Devi, is aged 51 years. Choosing the multiplier of 10, the Claims Tribunal multiplying the annual dependency of Rs. 600/- arrived at the figure of Rs. 6,000/- as the total loss on account of dependency. The Tribunal accordingly gave an award of Rs. 6,000/- to the claimant with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of claim petition till realisation.
3. Deduction of family pension was obviously done by the Claims Tribunal on the assumption that it was a “death benefit”. The matter is, however, not as simple as that. The general principle, no doubt, is that in assessing the amount of compensation to be paid to the dependants of the victim of a motor accident, one has to balance the financial loss to the dependants on one side and financial gain or benefit directly arising from the death of the victim on the other. So, the figure of family pension being received by the dependants of a victim of the motor accident may be deducted or “balanced” only if it can be regarded as a “death benefit”. It would be necessary in that case to know the terms and conditions of the pension and the period for which the dependants would be entitled to get it. It may turn out, when these things are ascertained, that the pension being received by the dependants should really be regarded as deferred fruit of service, industry, thrift or contributions of the deceased employee or as an incident of statutory service rules, or result of employment contract. In all such situations, it would be wrong to deduct or “balance” the amount of pension by wrongly considering it to be a “death benefit”. There is Full Bench decision of our High Court in Kashiram Mathur v. Sardar Rajendra Singh 1983 ACJ 152 (MP), throwing light on the point. Suffice it to say that the calculation of compensation done by the Claims Tribunal was excessively low and unjust on the broad ground of minimum value of human life statutorily fixed by the Parliament. The liability to pay compensation on the principle of no fault in motor accident cases came to be statutorily provided by Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 and now under Section 140 of the new Act of 1988. A sum of Rs. 15,000/- as provided in Section 92-A and now the modified sum of Rs. 25,000/- as provided in Section 140 of the new Act of 1988 represents, in our opinion, the minimum compensation for loss of human life in the estimate of Parliament. This legislative norm set forth by Parliament, in our opinion, ought to serve as a guideline for the courts while assessing the amount of compensation, more so when final compensation in motor accident cases is arrived at on the principle of fault, which is likely to be more and never less. In view of this position, it is not necessary to decide the question, whether or not Section 92-A (Section 140 of the present Act of 1988) is retrospective in its operation or not. That provision may or may not be retrospective, but the principle of minimum compensation can be applied to all pending claim cases before the Claims Tribunals and pending appeals before the High Courts. Reference may be made here to the decisions of this court in Nanjibhai Patel v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma 1990 ACJ 982 (MP), Ramsingh v. Sheikh Sikandar 1990 ACJ 801 (MP) and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambhabai 1991 ACJ 306 (MP). On the above broad ground, it must be held, irrespective of calculations made by the Claims Tribunal, that the assessment of compensation at Rs. 6,000/- by the Claims Tribunal was unjust and excessively low. It must and could never be below the figure of Rs. 25,000/-, representing the legislative norm and guideline with regard to minimum compensation for loss of human life.
4. The rate of interest awarded was also excessively low. It should have been awarded at the minimum rate of 12 per cent per annum.
5. For the foregoing reasons, the present appeal is partly allowed. The award given by the Claims Tribunal is enhanced from Rs. 6,000/- to Rs. 25,000/-. Interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum, instead of at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, shall be paid from the date of claim petition to the date of realisation. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay the amount of award, but we further direct that the entire amount shall be paid by respondent No. 3, i.e., New India Assurance Co. Ltd. The costs as directed by the Claims Tribunal as also costs of this appeal, which we quantify at Rs. 750/-, shall be paid by respondent No. 3 to the claimant-appellant.